

## Studies in the Authoritarian Personality

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The chapters appearing here are those written by Adorno alone or in collaboration with others.

## Chapter I

### Introduction

#### A. The Problem

The research to be reported in this volume was guided by the following major hypothesis: that the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a »mentality« or »spirit,« and that this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality.

The major concern was with the *potentially fascist* individual, one whose structure is such as to render him particularly susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda. We say »potential« because we have not studied individuals who were avowedly fascist or who belonged to known fascist organizations. At the time when most of our data were collected fascism had just been defeated in war and, hence, we could not expect to find subjects who would openly identify themselves with it; yet there was no difficulty in finding subjects whose outlook was such as to indicate that they would readily accept fascism if it should become a strong or respectable social movement.

In concentrating upon the potential fascist we do not wish to imply that other patterns of personality and ideology might not profitably be studied in the same way. It is our opinion, however, that no politico-social trend imposes a graver threat to our traditional values and institutions than does fascism, and that knowledge of the personality forces that favor its acceptance may ultimately prove useful in combating it. A question may be raised as to why, if we wish to explore new resources for combating fascism, we do not give as much attention to the »potential antifascist.« The answer is that we do study trends that stand in opposition to fascism, but we do not conceive that they constitute any single pattern. It is one of the major findings of the present study that individuals who show extreme susceptibility to fascist propaganda have a great deal in common. (They exhibit numerous characteristics that go together to form a »syndrome« although typical variations within this major pattern can be distinguished.) Individuals who are extreme in the opposite direction are much more diverse. The task of diagnosing potential fascism and studying its determinants required techniques especially designed for these purposes; it could not be asked of them that they serve as well for various other patterns. Nevertheless, it was possible to distinguish several types of personality structure that seemed particularly resi-

stant to antidemocratic ideas, and these are given due attention in later chapters.

If a potentially fascistic individual exists, what, precisely, is he like? What goes to make up antidemocratic thought? What are the organizing forces within the person? If such a person exists, how commonly does he exist in our society? And if such a person exists, what have been the determinants and what the course of his development?

These are questions upon which the present research was designed to throw some light. Though the notion that the potentially antidemocratic individual is a totality may be accepted as a plausible hypothesis, some analysis is called for at the start. In most approaches to the problem of political types two essential conceptions may be distinguished: the conception of ideology and the conception of underlying needs in the person. Though the two may be thought of as forming an organized whole within the individual, they may nonetheless be studied separately. The same ideological trends may in different individuals have different sources, and the same personal needs may express themselves in different ideological trends.

The term ideology is used in this book, in the way that is common in current literature, to stand for an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values – a way of thinking about man and society. We may

speak of an individual's total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas of social life: politics, economics, religion, minority groups, and so forth. Ideologies have an existence independent of any single individual; and those which exist at a particular time are results both of historical processes and of contemporary social events. These ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual's needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated.

There are, to be sure, individuals who take unto themselves ideas from more than one existing ideological system and weave them into patterns that are more or less uniquely their own. It can be assumed, however, that when the opinions, attitudes, and values of numerous individuals are examined, common patterns will be discovered. These patterns may not in all cases correspond to the familiar, current ideologies, but they will fulfill the definition of ideology given above and in each case be found to have a function within the over-all adjustment of the individual.

The present inquiry into the nature of the potentially fascist individual began with anti-Semitism in the focus of attention. The authors, in common with most social scientists, hold the view that anti-Semitism is based more largely upon factors in the subject and in

his total situation than upon actual characteristics of Jews, and that one place to look for determinants of anti-Semitic opinions and attitudes is within the persons who express them. Since this emphasis on personality required a focusing of attention on psychology rather than on sociology or history – though in the last analysis the three can be separated only artificially – there could be no attempt to account for the existence of anti-Semitic ideas in our society. The question was, rather, why is it that certain individuals accept these ideas while others do not? And since from the start the research was guided by the hypotheses stated above, it was supposed (1) that anti-Semitism probably is not a specific or isolated phenomenon but a part of a broader ideological framework, and (2) that an individual's susceptibility to this ideology depends primarily upon his psychological needs.

The insights and hypotheses concerning the antidemocratic individual, which are present in our general cultural climate, must be supported by a great deal of painstaking observation, and in many instances by quantification, before they can be regarded as conclusive. How can one say with assurance that the numerous opinions, attitudes, and values expressed by an individual actually constitute a consistent pattern or organized totality? The most intensive investigation of that individual would seem to be necessary. How

can one say that opinions, attitudes, and values found in groups of people go together to form patterns, some of which are more common than others? There is no adequate way to proceed other than by actually measuring, in populations, a wide variety of thought contents and determining by means of standard statistical methods which ones go together.

To many social psychologists the scientific study of ideology, as it has been defined, seems a hopeless task. To measure with suitable accuracy a single, specific, isolated attitude is a long and arduous proceeding for both subject and experimenter. (It is frequently argued that unless the attitude is specific and isolated, it cannot properly be measured at all.) How then can we hope to survey within a reasonable period of time the numerous attitudes and ideas that go to make up an ideology? Obviously, some kind of selection is necessary. The investigator must limit himself to what is most significant, and judgments of significance can only be made on the basis of theory.

The theories that have guided the present research will be presented in suitable contexts later. Though theoretical considerations had a role at every stage of the work, a beginning had to be made with the objective study of the most observable and relatively specific opinions, attitudes, and values.

Opinions, attitudes, and values, as we conceive of

them, are expressed more or less openly in words. Psychologically they are »on the surface.« It must be recognized, however, that when it comes to such affect-laden questions as those concerning minority groups and current political issues, the degree of openness with which a person speaks will depend upon the situation in which he finds himself. There may be a discrepancy between what he says on a particular occasion and what he »really thinks.« Let us say that what he really thinks he can express in confidential discussion with his intimates. This much, which is still relatively superficial psychologically, may still be observed directly by the psychologist if he uses appropriate techniques – and this we have attempted to do.

It is to be recognized, however, that the individual may have »secret« thoughts which he will under no circumstances reveal to anyone else if he can help it; he may have thoughts which he cannot admit to himself, and he may have thoughts which he does not express because they are so vague and ill-formed that he cannot put them into words. To gain access to these deeper trends is particularly important, for precisely here may lie the individual's potential for democratic or anti-democratic thought and action in crucial situations.

What people say and, to a lesser degree, what they really think depends very largely upon the climate of



opinion in which they are living; but when that climate changes, some individuals adapt themselves much more quickly than others. If there should be a marked increase in antidemocratic propaganda, we should expect some people to accept and repeat it at once, others when it seemed that »everybody believed it,« and still others not at all. In other words, individuals differ in their *susceptibility* to antidemocratic propaganda, in their readiness to exhibit antidemocratic tendencies. It seems necessary to study ideology at this »readiness level« in order to gauge the potential for fascism in this country. Observers have noted that the amount of outspoken anti-Semitism in pre-Hitler Germany was less than that in this country at the present time; one might hope that the potentiality is less in this country, but this can be known only through intensive investigation, through the detailed survey of what is on the surface and the thorough probing of what lies beneath it.

A question may be raised as to what is the degree of relationship between ideology and action. If an individual is making antidemocratic propaganda or engaging in overt attacks upon minority group members, it is usually assumed that his opinions, attitudes, and values are congruent with his action; but comfort is sometimes found in the thought that though another individual expresses antidemocratic ideas verbally, he

does not, and perhaps will not, put them into overt action. Here, once again, there is a question of potentialities. Overt action, like open verbal expression, depends very largely upon the situation of the moment – something that is best described in socioeconomic and political terms – but individuals differ very widely with respect to their readiness to be provoked into action. The study of this potential is a part of the study of the individual's over-all ideology; to know what kinds and what intensities of belief, attitude, and value are likely to lead to action, and to know what forces within the individual serve as inhibitions upon action are matters of the greatest practical importance.

There seems little reason to doubt that ideology-in-readiness (ideological receptivity) and ideology-in-words and in action are essentially the same stuff. The description of an individual's total ideology must portray not only the organization on each level but organization among levels. What the individual consistently says in public, what he says when he feels safe from criticism, what he thinks but will not say at all, what he thinks but will not admit to himself, what he is disposed to think or to do when various kinds of appeal are made to him – all these phenomena may be conceived of as constituting a single structure. The structure may not be integrated, it may contain contradictions as well as consistencies, but it is *organized*

in the sense that the constituent parts are related in psychologically meaningful ways.

In order to understand such a structure, a theory of the total personality is necessary. According to the theory that has guided the present research, personality is a more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual. These persisting forces of personality help to determine response in various situations, and it is thus largely to them that consistency of behavior – whether verbal or physical – is attributable. But behavior, however consistent, is not the same thing as personality; personality lies *behind* behavior and *within* the individual. The forces of personality are not responses but *readinesses for response*; whether or not a readiness will issue in overt expression depends not only upon the situation of the moment but upon what other readinesses stand in opposition to it. Personality forces which are inhibited are on a deeper level than those which immediately and consistently express themselves in overt behavior.

What are the forces of personality and what are the processes by which they are organized? For theory as to the structure of personality we have leaned most heavily upon Freud, while for a more or less systematic formulation of the more directly observable and measurable aspects of personality we have been guided primarily by academic psychology. The forces of

personality are primarily *needs* (drives, wishes, emotional impulses) which vary from one individual to another in their quality, their intensity, their mode of gratification, and the objects of their attachment, and which interact with other needs in harmonious or conflicting patterns. There are primitive emotional needs, there are needs to avoid punishment and to keep the good will of the social group, there are needs to maintain harmony and integration within the self.

Since it will be granted that opinions, attitudes, and values depend upon human needs, and since personality is essentially an organization of needs, then personality may be regarded as a *determinant* of ideological preferences. Personality is not, however, to be hypostatized as an ultimate determinant. Far from being something which is given in the beginning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surrounding world, personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated from the social totality within which it occurs. According to the present theory, the effects of environmental forces in moulding the personality are, in general, the more profound the earlier in the life history of the individual they are brought to bear. The major influences upon personality development arise in the course of child training as carried forward in a setting of family life. What happens here is profoundly influenced by economic and

social factors. It is not only that each family in trying to rear its children proceeds according to the ways of the social, ethnic, and religious groups in which it has membership, but crude economic factors affect directly the parents' behavior toward the child. This means that broad changes in social conditions and institutions will have a direct bearing upon the kinds of personalities that develop within a society.

The present research seeks to discover correlations between ideology and sociological factors operating in the individual's past – whether or not they continue to operate in his present. In attempting to explain these correlations the relationships between personality and ideology are brought into the picture, the general approach being to consider personality as an agency through which sociological influences upon ideology are mediated. If the role of personality can be made clear, it should be possible better to understand which sociological factors are the most crucial ones and in what ways they achieve their effects.

Although personality is a product of the social environment of the past, it is not, once it has developed, a mere object of the contemporary environment. What has developed is a *structure* within the individual, something which is capable of self-initiated action upon the social environment and of selection with respect to varied impinging stimuli, something which though al-

ways modifiable is frequently very resistant to fundamental change. This conception is necessary to explain consistency of behavior in widely varying situations, to explain the persistence of ideological trends in the face of contradicting facts and radically altered social conditions, to explain why people in the same sociological situation have different or even conflicting views on social issues, and why it is that people whose behavior has been changed through psychological manipulation lapse into their old ways as soon as the agencies of manipulation are removed.

The conception of personality structure is the best safeguard against the inclination to attribute persistent trends in the individual to something »innate« or »basic« or »racial« within him. The Nazi allegation that natural, biological traits decide the total being of a person would not have been such a successful political device had it not been possible to point to numerous instances of relative fixity in human behavior and to challenge those who thought to explain them on any basis other than a biological one. Without the conception of personality structure, writers whose approach rests upon the assumption of infinite human flexibility and responsiveness to the social situation of the moment have not helped matters by referring persistent trends which they could not approve to »confusion« or »psychosis« or evil under one name or

another. There is, of course, some basis for describing as »pathological« patterns of behavior which do not conform with the most common, and seemingly most lawful, responses to momentary stimuli. But this is to use the term pathological in the very narrow sense of deviation from the average found in a particular context and, what is worse, to suggest that everything in the personality structure is to be put under this heading. Actually, personality embraces variables which exist widely in the population and have lawful relations one to another. Personality patterns that have been dismissed as »pathological« because they were not in keeping with the most common manifest trends or the most dominant ideals within a society, have on closer investigation turned out to be but exaggerations of what was almost universal below the surface in that society. What is »pathological« today may with changing social conditions become the dominant trend of tomorrow.

It seems clear then that an adequate approach to the problems before us must take into account both fixity and flexibility; it must regard the two not as mutually exclusive categories but as the extremes of a single continuum along which human characteristics may be placed, and it must provide a basis for understanding the conditions which favor the one extreme or the other. Personality is a concept to account for relative

permanence. But it may be emphasized again that personality is mainly a potential; it is a readiness for behavior rather than behavior itself; although it consists in dispositions to behave in certain ways, the behavior that actually occurs will always depend upon the objective situation. Where the concern is with antidemocratic trends, a delineation of the conditions for individual expression requires an understanding of the total organization of society.

It has been stated that the personality structure may be such as to render the individual susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda. It may now be asked what are the conditions under which such propaganda would increase in pitch and volume and come to dominate in press and radio to the exclusion of contrary ideological stimuli, so that what is now potential would become actively manifest. The answer must be sought not in any single personality nor in personality factors found in the mass of people, but in processes at work in society itself. It seems well understood today that whether or not antidemocratic propaganda is to become a dominant force in this country depends primarily upon the situation of the most powerful economic interests, upon whether they, by conscious design or not, make use of this device for maintaining their dominant status. This is a matter about which the great majority of people would have little to say.



The present research, limited as it is to the hitherto largely neglected psychological aspects of fascism, does not concern itself with the production of propaganda. It focuses attention, rather, upon the consumer, the individual for whom the propaganda is designed. In so doing it attempts to take into account not only the psychological structure of the individual but the total objective situation in which he lives. It makes the assumption that people in general tend to accept political and social programs which they believe will serve their economic interests. What these interests are depends in each case upon the individual's position in society as defined in economic and sociological terms. An important part of the present research, therefore, was the attempt to discover what patterns of socioeconomic factors are associated with receptivity, and with resistance, to antidemocratic propaganda.

At the same time, however, it was considered that economic motives in the individual may not have the dominant and crucial role that is often ascribed to them. If economic self-interest were the only determinant of opinion, we should expect people of the same socioeconomic status to have very similar opinions, and we should expect opinion to vary in a meaningful way from one socioeconomic grouping to another. Research has not given very sound support for these expectations. There is only the most general similarity

of opinion among people of the same socioeconomic status, and the exceptions are glaring; while variations from one socioeconomic group to another are rarely simple or clear-cut. To explain why it is that people of the same socioeconomic status so frequently have different ideologies, while people of a different status often have very similar ideologies, we must take account of other than purely economic needs.

More than this, it is becoming increasingly plain that people very frequently do not behave in such a way as to further their material interests, even when it is clear to them what these interests are. The resistance of white-collar workers to organization is not due to a belief that the union will not help them economically; the tendency of the small businessman to side with big business in most economic and political matters cannot be due entirely to a belief that this is the way to guarantee his economic independence. In instances such as these the individual seems not only not to consider his material interests, but even to go against them. It is as if he were thinking in terms of a larger group identification, as if his point of view were determined more by his need to support this group and to suppress opposite ones than by rational consideration of his own interests. Indeed, it is with a sense of relief today that one is assured that a group conflict is merely a clash of economic interests – that

each side is merely out to »do« the other – and not a struggle in which deep-lying emotional drives have been let loose. When it comes to the ways in which people appraise the social world, irrational trends stand out glaringly. One may conceive of a professional man who opposes the immigration of Jewish refugees on the ground that this will increase the competition with which he has to deal and so decrease his income. However undemocratic this may be, it is at least rational in a limited sense. But for this man to go on, as do most people who oppose Jews on occupational grounds, and accept a wide variety of opinions, many of which are contradictory, about Jews in general, and to attribute various ills of the world to them, is plainly illogical. And it is just as illogical to praise all Jews in accordance with a »good« stereotype of them. Hostility against groups that is based upon real frustration, brought about by members of that group, undoubtedly exists, but such frustrating experiences can hardly account for the fact that prejudice is apt to be generalized. Evidence from the present study confirms what has often been indicated: that a man who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others. There is no conceivable rational basis for such generalization; and, what is more striking, prejudice against, or totally uncritical acceptance of, a particular

group often exists in the absence of any experience with members of that group. The objective situation of the individual seems an unlikely source of such irrationality; rather we should seek where psychology has already found the sources of dreams, fantasies, and misinterpretations of the world – that is, in the deep-lying needs of the personality.

Another aspect of the individual's situation which we should expect to affect his ideological receptivity is his membership in social groups – occupational, fraternal, religious, and the like. For historical and sociological reasons, such groups favor and promulgate, whether officially or unofficially, different patterns of ideas. There is reason to believe that individuals, out of their needs to conform and to belong and to believe and through such devices as imitation and conditioning, often take over more or less ready-made the opinions, attitudes, and values that are characteristic of the groups in which they have membership. To the extent that the ideas which prevail in such a group are implicitly or explicitly antidemocratic, the individual group member might be expected to be receptive to propaganda having the same general direction. Accordingly, the present research investigates a variety of group memberships with a view to what general trends of thought – and how much variability – might be found in each.

It is recognized, however, that a correlation between group membership and ideology may be due to different kinds of determination in different individuals. In some cases it might be that the individual merely repeats opinions which are taken for granted in his social milieu and which he has no reason to question; in other cases it might be that the individual has chosen to join a particular group because it stood for ideals with which he was already in sympathy. In modern society, despite enormous communality in basic culture, it is rare for a person to be subjected to only one pattern of ideas, after he is old enough for ideas to mean something to him. Some selection is usually made, according, it may be supposed, to the needs of his personality. Even when individuals are exposed during their formative years almost exclusively to a single, closely knit pattern of political, economic, social, and religious ideas, it is found that some conform while others rebel, and it seems proper to inquire whether personality factors do not make the difference. The soundest approach, it would seem, is to consider that in the determination of ideology, as in the determination of any behavior, there is a situational factor and a personality factor, and that a careful weighing of the role of each will yield the most accurate prediction.

Situational factors, chiefly economic condition and

social group memberships, have been studied intensively in recent researches on opinion and attitude, while the more inward, more individualistic factors have not received the attention they deserve. Beyond this, there is still another reason why the present study places particular emphasis upon the personality. Fascism, in order to be successful as a political movement, must have a mass basis. It must secure not only the frightened submission but the active cooperation of the great majority of the people. Since by its very nature it favors the few at the expense of the many, it cannot possibly demonstrate that it will so improve the situation of most people that their real interests will be served. It must therefore make its major appeal, not to rational self-interest, but to emotional needs – often to the most primitive and irrational wishes and fears. If it be argued that fascist propaganda fools people into believing that their lot will be improved, then the question arises: Why are they so easily fooled? Because, it may be supposed, of their personality structure; because of long-established patterns of hopes and aspirations, fears and anxieties that dispose them to certain beliefs and make them resistant to others. The task of fascist propaganda, in other words, is rendered easier to the degree that anti-democratic potentials already exist in the great mass of people. It may be granted that in Germany econo-

mic conflicts and dislocations within the society were such that for this reason alone the triumph of fascism was sooner or later inevitable; but the Nazi leaders did not act as if they believed this to be so; instead they acted as if it were necessary at every moment to take into account the psychology of the people – to activate every ounce of their antidemocratic potential, to compromise with them, to stamp out the slightest spark of rebellion. It seems apparent that any attempt to appraise the chances of a fascist triumph in America must reckon with the potential existing in the character of the people. Here lies not only the susceptibility to antidemocratic propaganda but the most dependable sources of resistance to it.

The present writers believe that it is up to the people to decide whether or not this country goes fascist. It is assumed that knowledge of the nature and extent of antidemocratic potentials will indicate programs for democratic action. These programs should not be limited to devices for manipulating people in such a way that they will behave more democratically, but they should be devoted to increasing the kind of self-awareness and self-determination that makes any kind of manipulation impossible. There is one explanation for the existence of an individual's ideology that has not so far been considered: that it is the view of the world which a reasonable man, with some understand-

ding of the role of such determinants as those discussed above, and with complete access to the necessary facts, will organize for himself. This conception, though it has been left to the last, is of crucial importance for a sound approach to ideology. Without it we should have to share the destructive view, which has gained some acceptance in the modern world, that since all ideologies, all philosophies, derive from nonrational sources there is no basis for saying that one has more merit than another.

But the rational system of an objective and thoughtful man is not a thing apart from personality. Such a system is still motivated. What is distinguishing in its sources is mainly the *kind of personality organization* from which it springs. It might be said that a mature personality (if we may for the moment use this term without defining it) will come closer to achieving a rational system of thought than will an immature one; but a personality is no less dynamic and no less organized for being mature, and the task of describing the structure of this personality is not different in kind from the task of describing any other personality. According to theory, the personality variables which have most to do with determining the objectivity and rationality of an ideology are those which belong to the ego, that part of the personality which appreciates reality, integrates the other parts,



and operates with the most conscious awareness.

It is the ego that becomes aware of and takes responsibility for nonrational forces operating within the personality. This is the basis for our belief that the object of knowing what are the psychological determinants of ideology is that men can become more reasonable. It is not supposed, of course, that this will eliminate differences of opinion. The world is sufficiently complex and difficult to know, men have enough real interests that are in conflict with the real interests of other men, there are enough ego-accepted differences in personality to insure that arguments about politics, economics, and religion will never grow dull. Knowledge of the psychological determinants of ideology cannot tell us what is the *truest* ideology; it can only remove some of the barriers in the way of its pursuit.

## B. Methodology

### 1. General Characteristics of the Method

To attack the problems conceptualized above required methods for describing and measuring ideological trends and methods for exposing personality, the contemporary situation, and the social background. A particular methodological challenge was imposed by the conception of *levels* in the person; this made it necessary to devise techniques for surveying opinions, attitudes, and values that were on the surface, for revealing ideological trends that were more or less inhibited and reached the surface only in indirect manifestations, and for bringing to light personality forces that lay in the subject's unconscious. And since the major concern was with *patterns* of dynamically related factors – something that requires study of the total individual – it seemed that the proper approach was through intensive clinical studies. The significance and practical importance of such studies could not be gauged, however, until there was knowledge of how far it was possible to generalize from them. Thus it was necessary to perform group studies as well as individual studies, and to find ways and means for integrating the two.

Individuals were studied by means of interviews and special clinical techniques for revealing underlying wishes, fears, and defenses; groups were studied by means of questionnaires. It was not expected that the clinical studies would be as complete or profound as some which have already been performed, primarily by psychoanalysts, nor that the questionnaires would be more accurate than any now employed by social psychologists. It was hoped, however – indeed it was necessary to our purpose – that the clinical material could be conceptualized in such a way as to permit its being quantified and carried over into group studies, and that the questionnaires could be brought to bear upon areas of response ordinarily left to clinical study. The attempt was made, in other words, to bring methods of traditional social psychology into the service of theories and concepts from the newer dynamic theory of personality and in so doing to make »depth psychological« phenomena more amenable to mass-statistical treatment, and to make quantitative surveys of attitudes and opinions more meaningful psychologically.

In the attempt to integrate clinical and group studies, the two were carried on in close conjunction. When the individual was in the focus of attention, the aim was to describe in detail his pattern of opinions, attitudes, and values and to understand the dynamic

factors underlying it, and on this basis to design significant questions for use with groups of subjects. When the group was in the focus of attention, the aim was to discover what opinions, attitudes, and values commonly go together and what patterns of factors in the life histories and in the contemporary situations of the subjects were commonly associated with each ideological constellation; this afforded a basis on which to select individuals for more intensive study: commanding first attention were those who exemplified the common patterns and in whom it could be supposed that the correlated factors were dynamically related.

In order to study potentially antidemocratic individuals it was necessary first to identify them. Hence a start was made by constructing a questionnaire and having it filled out anonymously by a large group of people. This questionnaire contained, in addition to numerous questions of fact about the subject's past and present life, a variety of antidemocratic statements with which the subjects were invited to agree or disagree. A number of individuals who showed the greatest amount of agreement with these statements – and, by way of contrast, some who showed the most disagreement or, in some instances, were most neutral – were then studied by means of interviews and other clinical techniques. On the basis of these indivi-

dual studies the questionnaire was revised, and the whole procedure repeated.

The interview was used in part as a check upon the *validity* of the questionnaire, that is to say, it provided a basis for judging whether people who obtained the highest antidemocratic scores on the questionnaire were usually those who, in a confidential relationship with another person, expressed antidemocratic sentiments with the most intensity. What was more important, however, the clinical studies gave access to the deeper personality factors behind antidemocratic ideology and suggested the means for their investigation on a mass scale. With increasing knowledge of the underlying trends of which prejudice was an expression, there was increasing familiarity with various other signs or manifestations by which these trends could be recognized. The task then was to translate these manifestations into questionnaire items for use in the next group study. Progress lay in finding more and more reliable indications of the central personality forces and in showing with increasing clarity the relations of these forces to antidemocratic ideological expression.

## 2. The Techniques

The questionnaires and clinical techniques employed in the study may be described briefly as follows:

a. **THE QUESTIONNAIRE METHOD.** The questionnaires were always presented in mimeographed form and filled out anonymously by subjects in groups. Each questionnaire included (1) factual questions, (2) opinion-attitude scales, and (3) »projective« (open answer) questions.

1. The *factual questions* had to do mainly with past and present group memberships: church preference and attendance, political party, vocation, income, and so on. It was assumed that the answers could be taken at their face value. In selecting the questions, we were guided at the start by hypotheses concerning the sociological correlates of ideology; as the study progressed we depended more and more upon experience with interviewees.

2. *Opinion-attitude* scales were used from the start in order to obtain quantitative estimates of certain surface ideological trends: anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, politico-economic conservatism. Later, a scale was developed for the measurement of antidemocratic tendencies in the personality itself.

Each scale was a collection of statements, with each of which the subject was asked to express the degree of his agreement or disagreement. Each statement concerned some relatively specific opinion, attitude, or value, and the basis for grouping them within a particular scale was the conception that taken together they expressed a single general trend.

The general trends to which the scales pertained were conceived very broadly, as complex systems of thought about wide areas of social living. To define these trends empirically it was necessary to obtain responses to many specific issues – enough to »cover« the area mapped out conceptually – and to show that each of them bore some relation to the whole.

This approach stands in contrast to the public opinion poll: whereas the poll is interested primarily in the distribution of opinion with respect to a particular issue, the present interest was to inquire, concerning a particular opinion, with what other opinions and attitudes it was related. The plan was to determine the existence of broad ideological trends, to develop instruments for their measurement, and then to inquire about their distribution within larger populations.

The approach to an ideological area was to appraise its grosser features first and its finer or more specific features later. The aim was to gain a view of the »over-all picture« into which smaller features

might later be fitted, rather than to obtain highly precise measures of small details in the hope that these might eventually add up to something significant. Although this emphasis upon breadth and inclusiveness prevented the attainment of the highest degree of precision in measurement, it was nevertheless possible to develop each scale to a point where it met the currently accepted statistical standards.

Since each scale had to cover a broad area, without growing so long as to try the patience of the subjects, it was necessary to achieve a high degree of efficiency. The task was to formulate items which would cover as much as possible of the many-sided phenomenon in question. Since each of the trends to be measured was conceived as having numerous components or aspects, there could be no duplication of items; instead it was required that each item express a different feature – and where possible, several features – of the total system. The degree to which items within a scale will »hang together« statistically, and thus give evidence that a single, unified trait is being measured, depends primarily upon the surface similarity of the items – the degree to which they all say the same thing. The present items, obviously, could not be expected to cohere in this fashion; all that could be required statistically of them was that they correlate to a reasonable degree with the total scale. Conceivably,



a single component of one of the present systems could be regarded as itself a relatively general trend, the precise measurement of which would require the use of numerous more specific items. As indicated above, however, such concern with highly specific, statistically »pure« factors was put aside, in favor of an attempt to gain a dependable estimate of an over-all system, one which could then be related to other over-all systems in an approach to the totality of major trends within the individual.

One might inquire why, if we wish to know the intensity of some ideological pattern – such as anti-Semitism – within the individual, we do not ask him directly, after defining what we mean. The answer, in part, is that the phenomenon to be measured is so complex that a single response would not go very far toward revealing the important differences among individuals. Moreover, anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and politico-economic reactionism or radicalism are topics about which many people are not prepared to speak with complete frankness. Thus, even at this surface ideological level it was necessary to employ a certain amount of indirectness. Subjects were never told what was the particular concern of the questionnaire, but only that they were taking part in a »survey of opinions about various issues of the day.« To support this view of the proceedings, items belonging to

a particular scale were interspersed with items from other scales in the questionnaire. It was not possible, of course, to avoid statements prejudicial to minority groups, but care was taken in each case to allow the subject »a way out,« that is to say, to make it possible for him to agree with such a statement while maintaining the belief that he was not »prejudiced« or »undemocratic.«

Whereas the scales for measuring surface ideological trends conform, in general, with common practice in sociopsychological research, the scale for measuring potentially anti-democratic trends in the personality represents a new departure. The procedure was to bring together in a scale items which, by hypothesis and by clinical experience, could be regarded as »giveaways« of trends which lay relatively deep within the personality, and which constituted a *disposition* to express spontaneously (on a suitable occasion), or to be influenced by, fascist ideas.

The statements in this scale were not different in form from those which made up the surface ideology scales; they were direct expressions of opinion, of attitudes, or of value with respect to various areas of social living – but areas not usually touched upon in systematic presentations of a politico-socioeconomic point of view. Always interspersed with statements from other scales, they conveyed little or nothing to

the subject as to the nature of the real question being pursued. They were, in the main, statements so designed as to serve as rationalizations for irrational tendencies. Two statements included in this scale were the following: (a) »Nowadays with so many different kinds of people moving around so much and mixing together so freely, one has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease« and (b) »Homosexuality is an especially rotten form of delinquency and ought to be severely punished.« That people who agree with one of these statements show a tendency to agree with the other, and that people who agree with these two statements tend to agree with open antidemocratic statements, e.g., that members of some minority group are basically inferior, is hardly to be explained on the basis of any obvious logical relation among the statements. It seems necessary, rather, to conceive of some underlying central trend which expresses itself in these different ways. Different people might, of course, give the same response to a statement such as the above for different reasons; since it was necessary to give the statements at least a veneer of rationality, it was natural to expect that the responses of some people would be determined almost entirely by the rational aspect rather than by some underlying emotional disposition. For this reason it was necessary to include a large number of

scale items and to be guided by the general trend of response rather than by the response to a single statement; for a person to be considered potentially antidemocratic in his underlying dynamic structure, he had to agree with a majority of these scale items.

The development of the present scale proceeded in two ways: first, by finding or formulating items which, though they had no manifest connection with open antidemocratic expressions, were nevertheless highly correlated with them; and second, by demonstrating that these »indirect« items were actually expressions of antidemocratic potential within the personality as known from intensive clinical study.

3. *Projective Questions*, like most other projective techniques, present the subject with ambiguous and emotionally toned stimulus material. This material is designed to allow a maximum of variation in response from one subject to another and to provide channels through which relatively deep personality processes may be expressed. The questions are not ambiguous in their formal structure, but in the sense that the answers are at the level of emotional expression rather than at the level of fact and the subject is not aware of their implications. The responses always have to be interpreted, and their significance is known when their meaningful relations to other psychological facts about the subject have been demonstrated. One pro-

jective question was, »What would you do if you had only six months to live, and could do anything you wanted?« An answer to this question was not regarded as a statement of what the subject would probably do in actuality, but rather an expression having to do with his values, conflicts, and the like. We asked ourselves if this expression was not in keeping with those elicited by other projective questions and by statements in the personality scale.

Numerous projective questions were tried in the early stages of the study, and from among them eight were selected for use with most of the larger groups of subjects: they were the questions which taken together gave the broadest view of the subject's personality trends and correlated most highly with surface ideological patterns.

b. CLINICAL TECHNIQUES, 1. *The interview* was divided roughly into an ideological section and a clinical-genetic section. In the first section the aim was to induce the subject to talk as spontaneously and as freely as possible about various broad ideological topics: politics, religion, minority groups, income, and vocation. Whereas in the questionnaire the subject was limited to the topics there presented and could express himself only by means of the rating scheme offered, here it was important to know what topics he

would bring up of his own accord and with what intensity of feeling he would spontaneously express himself. As indicated above, this material afforded a means for insuring that the questionnaire, in its revised forms, more or less faithfully represented »what people were saying« – the topics that were on their minds and the forms of expression that came spontaneously to them – and provided a valid index of anti-democratic trends. The interview covered, of course, a much wider variety of topics, and permitted the expression of more elaborated and differentiated opinions, attitudes, and values, than did the questionnaire. Whereas the attempt was made to distill from the interview material what seemed to be of the most general significance and to arrange it for inclusion in the questionnaire, there was material left over to be exploited by means of individual case studies, qualitative analyses, and crudely quantitative studies of the interview material by itself.

The clinical-genetic section of the interview sought to obtain, first, more factual material about the subject's contemporary situation and about his past than could be got from the questionnaire; second, the freest possible expressions of personal feelings, of beliefs, wishes, and fears concerning himself and his situation and concerning such topics as parents, siblings, friends, and sexual relationships; and third, the sub-

ject's conceptions of his childhood environment and of his childhood self.

The interview was conducted in such a way that the material gained from it would permit inferences about the deeper layers of the subject's personality. The technique of the interview will be described in detail later. Suffice it to say here that it followed the general pattern of a psychiatric interview that is inspired by a dynamic theory of personality. The interviewer was aided by a comprehensive interview schedule which underwent several revisions during the course of the study, as experience taught what were the most significant underlying questions and what were the most efficient means for evoking material bearing upon them.

The interview material was used for estimation of certain common variables lying within the theoretical framework of the study but not accessible to the other techniques. Interview material also provided the main basis for individual case studies, bearing upon the interrelationships among all the significant factors operating within the antidemocratic individual.

2. The *Thematic Apperception Test* is a well-known projective technique in which the subject is presented with a series of dramatic pictures and asked to tell a story about each of them. The material he produces can, when interpreted, reveal a great deal

about his underlying wishes, conflicts, and mechanisms of defense. The technique was modified slightly to suit the present purposes. The material was analyzed quantitatively in terms of psychological variables which are found widely in the population and which were readily brought into relation with other variables of the study. As a part of the case study of an individual an analysis in terms of more unique personality variables was made, the material here being considered in close conjunction with findings from the interview.

Though designed to approach different aspects of the person, the several techniques actually were closely related conceptually one to another. All of them permitted quantification and interpretation in terms of variables which fall within a unified theoretical system. Sometimes two techniques yielded measures of the same variables, and sometimes different techniques were focused upon different variables. In the former case the one technique gave some indication of the validity of the other; in the latter case the adequacy of a technique could be gauged by its ability to produce measures that were meaningfully related to all the others. Whereas a certain amount of repetition was necessary to insure validation, the main aim was to fill out a broad framework and achieve a maximum of scope.



The theoretical approach required in each case either that a new technique be designed from the ground up or that an existing one be modified to suit the particular purpose. At the start, there was a theoretical conception of what was to be measured and certain sources – to be described later – which could be drawn upon in devising the original questionnaire form and the preliminary interview schedule. Each technique then evolved as the study progressed. Since each was designed specifically for this study, they could be changed at will as understanding increased, and since an important purpose of the study was the development and testing of effective instruments for diagnosing potential fascism, there was no compulsion to repeat without modification a procedure just in order to accumulate comparable data. So closely inter-related were the techniques that what was learned from any one of them could be applied to the improvement of any other. Just as the clinical techniques provided a basis for enriching the several parts of the questionnaire, so did the accumulating quantitative results indicate what ought to be concentrated upon in the interview; and just as the analysis of scale data suggested the existence of underlying variables which might be approached by means of projective techniques, so did the responses on projective techniques suggest items for inclusion in the scales.

The evolution of techniques was expressed both in expansion and in contraction. Expansion was exemplified in the attempt to bring more and more aspects of antidemocratic ideology into the developing picture and in the attempt to explore enough aspects of the potentially antidemocratic personality so that there was some grasp of the totality. Contraction took place continuously in the quantitative procedures as increasing theoretical clarity permitted a boiling down so that the same crucial relationships could be demonstrated with briefer techniques.

## C. Procedures in the Collection of Data

### 1. The Groups Studied

a. THE BEGINNING WITH COLLEGE STUDENTS. There were enough practical reasons alone to determine that the present study, which at the beginning had limited resources and limited objectives, should start with college students as research subjects: they were available for the asking, whether singly or in groups, they would cooperate willingly, and they could be reached for retesting without much difficulty. At the same time, other considerations favored the use of college students in a study of ideology. In the first place, the intellectual and educational level is high enough so that there needed to be relatively little restriction with respect to the number and nature of issues that might be raised – a very important matter in a study that emphasized breadth and inclusiveness. One could be fairly certain that college students *had* opinions about most of the various topics to be considered. In the second place, there could be relative certainty that all the subjects understood the terms of the questions in the same way and that the same responses had uniform significance. In the third place, however large a population one might be

able to sample he would probably find that most of his generalizations had in any case to be limited to various relatively homogeneous subclassifications of the total group studied; college students form one group that is relatively quite homogeneous with respect to factors that might be expected to influence ideology. And they represent an important sector of the population, both through their family connections and through their prospective leadership in the community.

It is obvious, however, that a study which used only college students as subjects would be seriously limited in its general significance. Of what larger population could a group of students at a state university be regarded as an adequate sample? Would findings on this sample hold for all the students at this university? For college students generally? For young people of the middle class? It depends upon what kind of generalization is to be made. Generalizations about the distribution of particular opinions or about the average amount of agreement with this or that statement – the kind of information sought in poll studies – could hardly go beyond the students at the university where the survey was made. Results from an Eastern university or from a privately endowed institution might be quite different. The present concern, however, was not so much with questions of distribu-

tion as with questions of relationship. For example, there was less interest in what per cent of the general population would agree that »labor unions have grown too powerful« and that »there are too many Jews in government agencies« than in whether or not there was a general relationship between these two opinions. For the study of how opinions, attitudes, and values are organized within the individual, college students had a great deal to offer, particularly in the early stages of the work where the emphasis was upon improving techniques and obtaining first approximations of general relationships. This work could proceed without hindrance so long as the factors to be studied were present, and varied sufficiently widely from one individual to another. In this regard, the limitations of the college sample were that the relatively high intellectual and educational level decreased the number of extremely prejudiced individuals, and that some of the factors which were presumed to influence prejudice were rarely or never present.

These considerations made it necessary to study various other groups of subjects. As it turned out, the *strength* of the various ideological trends was found to vary widely from one group to another, while the *relationships* found in the college group were very similar to those found elsewhere.

## b. THE GENERAL NONCOLLEGE POPULATION FROM WHICH OUR SUBJECTS WERE DRAWN.

When it became possible through increased resources to expand the scope of the study, there began an attempt to obtain as subjects a wide variety of adult Americans. The aim was to examine people who possessed in different degrees as many as possible of the sociological variables presumed to be relevant to the study – political, religious, occupational, income, and social group memberships. A list of all the groups (college and noncollege) from whom questionnaires were collected is given in Table 1 (I).

Table 1 (I)

### Groups From Whom Questionnaires Were Collected<sup>a</sup>

	<i>No. of Cases</i>
I. <i>Form 78</i> (January to May, 1945)	
University of California Public Speaking Class	
Women	140
University of California Public Speaking Class Men	52
University of California Extension Psychology	
Class (adult women)	40
Professional Women (public school teachers, social workers, public health nurses)	
(San Francisco area)	63
<i>Total</i>	295

II. <i>Form 60</i> (Summer, 1945)	
University of Oregon Student Women	47
University of Oregon and University of California Student Women	54
University of Oregon and University of California Student Men	57
Oregon Service Club Men (Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary Clubs) (Total questionnaire)	68
Oregon Service Club Men (Form A only) <sup>b</sup>	60
<i>Total</i>	286

III. <i>Forms 45 and 40</i> (November, 1945, to June, 1946)	
A. <i>Form 45</i>	
University of California Extension Testing Class (adult women)	59
Psychiatric Clinic Patients (men and women) (Langley Porter Clinic of the University of California)	121
San Quentin State Prison Inmates (men)	110
<i>Total</i>	243

B. <i>Both Forms 45 and 40</i>	
Alameda School for Merchant Marine Officers (men)	343
U.S. Employment Service Veterans (men)	106
<i>Total</i>	449

C. <i>Form 40</i>	
<i>Working-Class Women:</i>	
California Labor School	19
United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.)	8
Office Workers	11
Longshoremen and Warehousemen (I.L.W.U.)	

(new members)	10	
Federal Housing Project Workers	5	53
<i>Working-Class Men:</i>		
United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.)	12	
California Labor School	15	
Longshoremen and Warehousemen (I.L.W.U.)		
(new members)	26	
United Seamen's Service	8	61
<i>Middle-Class Women:</i>		
Parent-Teachers' Association	46	
California Labor School (middle-class members)	11	
Suburban Church Group	29	
Unitarian Church Group	15	
League of Women Voters	17	
Upper Middle-Class Women's Club	36	154
<i>Middle-Class Men:</i>		
Parent-Teachers' Association	29	
Suburban Church Group	31	
California Labor School (middle-class members)	9	69
<i>California Service Club Men:</i>		
Kiwanis Club	40	
Rotary Club	23	63
George Washington University Women Students		132



Los Angeles Men (classes at University of California and University of Southern California, fraternity group, adult evening class, parents of students, radio writers group)	117
Los Angeles Women (same groupings as above)	130
<i>Total</i>	779
<i>Total Forms 45 and 40</i>	1,518
<i>Overall Total of All Forms</i>	2,099

**a** In most cases each group taking the questionnaire was treated separately for statistical purposes, e.g., San Quentin Prison Inmates, Psychiatric Clinic Men. However, some groups were too small for this purpose and were therefore combined with other sociologically similar groups. When such combinations occurred, the composition of the overall group is indicated in the table.

**b** *Form A* included the scale for measuring potentially anti-democratic trends in the personality and half of the scale for measuring politico-economic conservatism.

The group within which a subject was functioning at the time he filled out the questionnaire was, of course, not necessarily the most important or representative of the various groups to which he belonged. The questionnaire itself was relied upon to give information about the group memberships deemed most relevant to the study, and subjects could be categorized on this basis regardless of the group through which the questionnaires were collected.

The emphasis throughout was upon obtaining different *kinds* of subjects, enough to insure wide varia-

bility of opinion and attitude and adequate coverage of the factors supposed to influence ideology. The subjects are in no sense a random sample of the non-college population nor, since there was no attempt to make a sociological analysis of the community in which they lived, can they be regarded as a representative sample. The progress of the study was not in the direction of broadening the basis for generalization about larger populations, but rather toward the more intensive investigation of »key groups,« that is, groups having the characteristics that were most crucial to the problem at hand. Some groups were chosen because their sociological status was such that they could be expected to play a vital role in a struggle centering around social discrimination, e.g., veterans, service clubs, women's clubs. Other groups were chosen for intensive study because they presented extreme manifestations of the personality variables deemed most crucial for the potentially antidemocratic individual, e.g., prison inmates, psychiatric patients.

Save for a few key groups, the subjects were drawn almost exclusively from the middle socioeconomic class. It was discovered fairly early in the study that the investigation of lower classes would require different instruments and different procedures from those developed through the use of college students and, hence, this was a task that had best be postponed.

Groups in which there was a preponderance of minority group members were avoided, and when minority group members happened to belong to an organization which cooperated in the study, their questionnaires were excluded from the calculations. It was not that the ideological trends in minority groups were considered unimportant; it was rather that their investigation involved special problems which lay outside the scope of the present study.

The great majority of the subjects of the study lived within the San Francisco Bay area. Concerning this community it may be said that the population increased rapidly during the decade preceding the outbreak of World War II, so that a large proportion were newcomers from all parts of the nation. During the war, when the area took on the aspect of a boom town, the influx was greatly intensified and, hence, it is probable that a large number of the present subjects were people who had recently come from other states.

Two large groups were obtained in the Los Angeles area, several smaller groups in Oregon, and one group in Washington, D.C.

Unless a person had at least a grammar school education, it was very difficult, if not impossible, for him to fill out the questionnaire properly – to understand the issues set forth in the scales and the instructions for marking the forms. The average educational level

of the subjects in the study is about the twelfth grade, there being roughly as many college graduates as there were subjects who had not completed high school. It is important to note that the present samples are heavily weighted with younger people, the bulk of them falling between the ages of twenty and thirty-five.

It will be apparent that the subjects of the study taken all together would provide a rather inadequate basis for generalizing about the total population of this country. The findings of the study may be expected to hold fairly well for non-Jewish, white, native-born, middle-class Americans. Where the same relationships appeared repeatedly as different groups – e.g., college students, women's clubs, prison inmates – came under scrutiny, generalizations may be made with the most certainty. When sections of the population not sampled in the present study are made the subjects of research, it is to be expected that most of the relationships reported in the following chapters will still hold – and that additional ones will be found.

## 2. The Distribution and Collection of Questionnaires

In approaching a group from whom questionnaires were to be collected, the first step was to secure the cooperation of the group leadership. This was never difficult when the leader was liberal in his outlook, e.g., the instructor of a class in public speaking, the psychologist at a Maritime School, a minister in the inner councils of a men's service club. The purposes and procedures of the study were explained to him fully, and he then presented the project of filling out the questionnaires to his group. When the group leadership was conservative, the procedure was more difficult. If it were made known that the study had something to do with social discrimination, it was not unusual for great interest in this »important problem« to be expressed at first and then for one delay to follow another until hope of obtaining responses from the group in question had to be abandoned. Among people of this type there appeared to be a conviction that it was best to let sleeping dogs lie, that the best approach to the »race problem« was not to »stir up anything.« A more successful approach to conservative leaders was to present the whole project as a survey of general public opinion, »like a Gallup poll,«

being carried forward by a group of scientists at the University, and to count upon the variety and relative mildness of the scale items to prevent undue alarm.

In collecting questionnaires from classes of students, whether in regular sessions of the University, in summer school, or in university extension, it was usual for the instructor of the class to handle the whole proceeding himself. In other instances it was usually necessary to combine the administration of the questionnaire with a talk to the group by a member of the study staff. He gave the instructions for filling out the questionnaires, aided in their collection, and then gave a talk on »Gauging Public Opinion,« coming only as close to the real issues of the study as he judged possible without arousing the resistances of his audience.

Whether the group was judged to be liberal or not, the questionnaire was always presented to it as a public opinion inventory – not as a study of prejudice. The instructions given to the groups follow:

### Survey of General Public Opinion: Instructions

We are trying to find out what the general public feels and thinks about a number of important social questions.

We are sure you will find the enclosed survey interesting. You will find in it many questions and social issues which you have thought about, read about in newspapers

and magazines, and heard about on the radio.

This is *not* an *intelligence test* nor an Information test. There are no »right« or »wrong« answers. The best answer is *your personal opinion*. You can be sure that, whatever your opinion may be on a certain issue, there will be many people who agree, many who disagree. And this is what we want to find out: how is public opinion really divided on each of these socially important topics?

It must be emphasized that the sponsors of this survey do not necessarily agree or disagree with the statements in it. *We have tried to cover a great many points of view*. We agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others. Similarly, you will probably find yourself agreeing strongly with some statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and being perhaps more neutral about still others.

We realize that people are very busy nowadays, and we don't want to take too much of your time. All that we ask is that you:

- (a) Read each statement carefully and mark it according to your first reaction. It isn't necessary to take a lot of time for any one question.
- (b) *Answer every question.*
- (c) *Give your personal point of view.* Don't talk the questions over with anyone until you have finished.
- (d) Be as *sincere, accurate, and complete* as possible in the limited time and space.

This survey works just like a Gallup Poll or an election. As in any other secret ballot, the »voters« who fill it out do not have to give their names.

The cooperation of the groups, once they were presented with the questionnaire, was excellent, at least 90 per cent of those present usually handing in completed questionnaires. Some members of each group were, of course, absent on the day the questionnaire was administered, but since there was never any advance notice about this part of the program, there is no reason to believe that the responses of these absentees would have been generally different from those of the rest of the group. Subjects who were present but failed to hand in completed questionnaires fall almost entirely into two classes: those who made no attempt to cooperate and those who handed in incomplete questionnaires. It is to be suspected that the former were more antidemocratic than the average of their group, while the slowness or carelessness of the latter is probably of no significance for ideology.

There was one attempt to collect questionnaires by mail. Over 200 questionnaires with complete instructions were mailed to teachers and nurses, together with a letter soliciting their cooperation and covering letters from their superintendents. The return was a disappointing 20 per cent, and this sample was strongly biased in the direction of low scores on the scales for measuring antidemocratic trends.



### 3. The Selection of Subjects for Intensive Clinical Study

With a few exceptions, the subjects from a given group who were interviewed and given the Thematic Apperception Test were chosen from among the 25 per cent obtaining the highest and the 25 per cent obtaining the lowest scores (high and low quartiles) on the Ethnocentrism scale. This scale, it seemed, would give the best initial measure of antidemocratic tendencies.

If the group from which subjects were to be selected was one which held regular meetings, as was usually the case, the procedure was to collect the questionnaires at one meeting, to obtain the scale scores and decide upon suitable interviewees, and then to solicit further cooperation at the next meeting. In the few cases where the use of a second meeting was impossible, the request for interviewees was made at the time of administering the questionnaire, those willing to be interviewed being asked to indicate how they might be reached. In order to disguise the basis of selection and the purpose of the clinical study, the groups were told that the attempt was being made to carry on a more detailed discussion of opinions and ideas with a few of their number – about 10 per cent –

and that people representing the various kinds and degrees of response found in the group were being asked to come for interviews.

Anonymity was to be insured for the Interviews as well as for the group survey, if the subject so desired. In order to arrange this, subjects desired for individual study were referred to by the birth date which they had entered on their questionnaires. This could not be done, however, in those cases where subjects were asked to signify at the time of filling out the questionnaire whether or not they were willing to be interviewed. This may have been one reason why the response in these instances was poor. But there were other reasons why subjects of these groups were difficult to interview, and it is to be noted that the great majority of those secured under the birth date arrangement showed no concern about anonymity once their appointments had been made.

Subjects were paid \$3.00 for the two to three hours they spent in the clinical sessions. In offering this inducement at the time of the request for interviewees, it was pointed out that this was the only way to insure that the staff of the Study would not be conscience-stricken for taking so much valuable time. The arrangement did indeed have this effect, but what was more important, it was a considerable aid to securing suitable subjects: most of those who scored low on the

Ethnocentrism scale would have cooperated anyway, being somewhat attracted to psychology and willing to give their time in a »good cause,« but many of the high scorers made it plain that the money was the determining consideration.

In selecting subjects for clinical study the aim was to examine a variety of high and low scorers. Considerable variety was assured by the device of taking a few from most of the different groups studied. Within a given group it was possible to achieve further variety with respect to group memberships and scores on the other scales. There was no attempt, however, to arrange that the percentage of the interviewed subjects having each of various group memberships was the same as that which held for the group from which they were drawn. The question of how well the high and low scorers who were interviewed represent all those who scored high or low on the Ethnocentrism scale is taken up in Chapter IX.[1]

Very few »middle« subjects – the 50 per cent whose scores fall between the high and the low quartiles – were interviewed. It was believed that for the understanding of antidemocratic trends the most important first step was to determine the factors which most clearly distinguished one extreme from the other. In order properly to compare two groups it is necessary to have a minimum of thirty to forty subjects in

each group, and since men and women, as it turned out, presented somewhat different problems and had to be treated separately, the study of high- vs. low-scoring men and the study of high- vs. low-scoring women involved four statistical groupings totaling 150. To conduct more interviews than this was for practical reasons impossible. The intensive study of representative middle scorers should form a central part of any future research along the lines of the present study. Since they are more numerous than either extreme, it is especially important to know their democratic or antidemocratic potentialities. The impression gained from a few interviews with middle scorers, and from the examination of many of their questionnaires, is that they are not indifferent or ignorant with respect to the issues of the scales, or lacking in the kinds of motivation or personality traits found in the extremes. In short, they are in no sense categorically different; they are, as it were, made of the same stuff but in different combinations.

## Fußnoten

[1 Else Frenkel-Brunswik, »The Interviews as an Approach to the Prejudiced Personality,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 291–336.]

## Part I

### The Measurement of Ideological Trends

#### Chapter VII

#### The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends

##### A. Introduction

At a certain stage of the study, after considerable work with the A[nti]-S[emitism] and E[thnocentrism] scales had been done, there gradually evolved a plan for constructing a scale that would measure prejudice without appearing to have this aim and without mentioning the name of any minority group. It appeared that such an instrument, if it correlated highly enough with the A-S and E scales, might prove to be a very useful substitute for them. It might be used to survey opinion in groups where »racial questions« were too »ticklish« a matter to permit the introduction of an A-S or E scale, e.g., a group which included many members of one or another ethnic minority. It might be used for measuring prejudice among minority group members themselves. Most important, by cir-

cumventing some of the defenses which people employ when asked to express themselves with respect to »race issues,« it might provide a more valid measure of prejudice.

The P[olítico-] E[conomic] C[onservatism] scale might have commended itself as an index of prejudice, but its correlations with the A-S and E scales did not approach being high enough. Moreover, the items of this scale were too explicitly ideological, that is, they might be too readily associated with prejudice in some logical or automatic way. What was needed was a collection of items each of which was correlated with A-S and E but which did not come from an area ordinarily covered in discussions of political, economic, and social matters. The natural place to turn was to the clinical material already collected, where, particularly in the subjects' discussions of such topics as the self, family, sex, interpersonal relations, moral and personal values, there had appeared numerous trends which, it appeared, might be connected with prejudice.

At this point the second – and major – purpose of the new scale began to take shape. Might not such a scale yield a valid estimate of antidemocratic tendencies at the personality level? It was clear, at the time the new scale was being planned, that anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism were not merely matters of surface

opinion, but general tendencies with sources, in part at least, deep within the structure of the person. Would it not be possible to construct a scale that would approach more directly these deeper, often unconscious forces? If so, and if the scale could be validated by means of later clinical studies, would we not have a better estimate of antidemocratic *potential* than could be obtained from the scales that were more openly ideological? The prospect was intriguing. And experience with clinical techniques and with the other scales gave considerable promise of success. In attempting to account for the generality of A-S and of E, to explain what it was that made the diverse items of these scales go together, we had been led to the formulation of enduring psychological dispositions in the person – stereotypy, conventionalism, concern with power, and so forth. Study of the ideological discussions of individuals, e.g., Mack and Larry,<sup>[1]</sup> had had the same outcome: there appeared to be dispositions in each individual that were reflected in his discussion of each ideological area as well as in his discussion of matters not ordinarily regarded as ideological. And when clinical-genetic material was examined, it appeared that these dispositions could frequently be referred to deep-lying personality needs. The task then was to formulate scale items which, though they were statements of opinions and attitudes



and had the same form as those appearing in ordinary opinion-attitude questionnaires, would actually serve as »giveaways« of underlying antidemocratic trends in the personality.

This would make it possible to carry over into group studies the insights and hypotheses derived from clinical investigation; it would test whether we could study on a mass scale features ordinarily regarded as individualistic and qualitative.

This second purpose – the quantification of antidemocratic trends at the level of personality – did not supersede the first, that of measuring anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism without mentioning minority groups or current politico-economic issues. Rather, it seemed that the two might be realized together. The notion was that A-S and E would correlate with the new scale because the A-S and E responses were strongly influenced by the underlying trends which the new scale sought to get at by a different approach. Indeed, if such a correlation could be obtained it could be taken as evidence that anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism were not isolated or specific or entirely superficial attitudes but expressions of persistent tendencies in the person. This would depend, however, upon how successful was the attempt to exclude from the new scale items which might have been so frequently or so automatically associated with anti-Semitism or ethno-

centrism that they might be regarded as aspects of the same political »line.« In any case, however, it seemed that the discovery of opinions and attitudes, in various areas other than the usual politico-socioeconomic one, that were associated with anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism, would give a more comprehensive grasp of the prejudiced outlook on the world. The new instrument was termed the F scale, to signify its concern with implicit prefascist tendencies.

On theoretical grounds it was expected that the correlations of F with A-S and E would not approach unity. It was hoped that the F scale would catch some of the antidemocratic potential that might not be expressed when subjects responded to items which dealt directly with hostility toward minority groups. True, the items of the present A-S and E scales were, for the most part, so formulated as to allow the subject to express prejudice while maintaining the feeling that he was being democratic. Yet it was recognized that a subject might score relatively low on A-S or E and still, in the interview, where a confidential relationship was established and the interviewer was very permissive, reveal that he was prejudiced. More than this, it had to be admitted that a subject might refuse altogether to express hostility against minority groups and yet reveal features, e.g., a tendency to think of such groups in a stereotyped way or a tendency mora-

listically to reject social groups other than ethnic ones, which had to be taken as susceptibility to anti-democratic propaganda. If the F scale were to be regarded as a measure of antidemocratic potential – something which might or might not be expressed in open hostility against outgroups – then it could not be perfectly correlated with A-S or E. Rather, the demand to be made of it was that it single out individuals who in intensive clinical study revealed themselves to be receptive to antidemocratic propaganda. Although it was not possible within the scope of the study to use the F scale alone as the basis for selecting interviewees, it was possible to relate F scale score to various other indices of antidemocratic personality trends as brought to light by other techniques. Such trends, it seemed, could exist in the absence of high A-S or E scores.

However, the distinction between potential and manifest should not be overdrawn. Given emotionally determined antidemocratic trends in the person, we should expect that *in general* they would be evoked by the A-S and E items, which were designed for just this purpose, as well as by the F scale and other indirect methods. The person who was high on F but not on A-S or E would be the exception, whose inhibitions upon the expression of prejudice against minorities would require special explanation.

## B. Construction of the Fascism (F) Scale

### 1. The Underlying Theory

The 38 items of the original F scale are shown in Table 1 (VII), numbered in the order of their appearance on Form 78. If the reader considers that most of what has gone before in this volume was either known or thought about before construction of the F scale began, it will be apparent that in devising the scale we did not proceed in a strictly empirical fashion. We did not consider starting with hundreds of items chosen more or less at random and then seeing by trial and error which ones might be associated with A-S and E. For every item there was a hypothesis, sometimes several hypotheses, stating what might be the nature of its connection with prejudice.

#### Table 1 (VII)

##### The F Scale: Form 78

2. Although many people may scoff, it may yet be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.
3. America is getting so far from the true American way of life that force may be necessary to restore it.
6. It is only natural and right that women be restricted in cer-

tain ways in which men have more freedom.

9. Too many people today are living in an unnatural, soft way; we should return to the fundamentals, to a more red-blooded, active way of life.
10. It is more than a remarkable coincidence that Japan had an earthquake on Pearl Harbor Day, December 7, 1944.
12. The modern church, with its many rules and hypocrisies, does not appeal to the deeply religious person; it appeals mainly to the childish, the insecure, and the uncritical.
14. After we finish off the Germans and Japs, we ought to concentrate on other enemies of the human race such as rats, snakes, and germs.
17. Familiarity breeds contempt.
19. One should avoid doing things in public which appear wrong to others, even though one knows that these things are really all right.
20. One of the main values of progressive education is that it gives the child great freedom in expressing those natural impulses and desires so often frowned upon by conventional middle-class society.
23. He is, indeed, contemptible who does not feel an undying love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
24. Today everything is unstable; we should be prepared for a period of constant change, conflict, and upheaval.
28. Novels or stories that tell about what people think and feel are more interesting than those which contain mainly action, romance, and adventure.
30. Reports of atrocities in Europe have been greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes.
31. Homosexuality is a particularly rotten form of delinquency

and ought to be severely punished.

32. It is essential for learning or effective work that our teachers or bosses outline in detail what is to be done and exactly how to go about it.
35. There are some activities so flagrantly un-American that, when responsible officials won't take the proper steps, the wide-awake citizen should take the law into his own hands.
38. There is too much emphasis in college on intellectual and theoretical topics, not enough emphasis on practical matters and on the homely virtues of living.
39. Every person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher than himself to which he gives total allegiance and whose decisions he does not question.
42. No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason.
43. Sciences like chemistry, physics, and medicine have carried men very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
46. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country today, even in circles where people might least expect it.
47. No insult to our honor should ever go unpunished.
50. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
53. There are some things too intimate or personal to talk about even with one's closest friends.
55. Although leisure is a fine thing, it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile.

56. After the war, we may expect a crime wave; the control of gangsters and ruffians will become a major social problem.
58. *What* a man does is not so important so long as he does it well.
59. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
60. Which of the following are the most important for a person to have or to be? *Mark X the three most important.*

artistic and sensuous

popular, good personality

drive, determination, will power

broad, humanitarian social outlook

neatness and good manners

sensitivity and understanding

efficiency, practicality, thrift

intellectual and serious

emotional expressiveness, warmth, intimacy

kindness and charity

65. It is entirely possible that this series of wars and conflicts will be ended once and for all by a world-destroying earthquake, flood, or other catastrophe.
66. Books and movies ought not to deal so much with the sordid and seamy side of life; they ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining or uplifting.
67. When you come right down to it, it's human nature never to do anything without an eye to one's own profit.
70. To a greater extent than most people realize, our lives are governed by plots hatched in secret by politicians.
73. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move

around so much and mix together so freely, a person has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease.

74. What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in.
75. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped.
77. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.

The major source of these hypotheses was the research already performed in the present study. Available for the purpose was the following material: results, such as those given in preceding chapters, from the A-S, E, and PEC scales; numerous correlates of E derived from questionnaire studies, that is, from responses to factual and short essay questions pertaining to such topics as religion, war, ideal society, and so forth; early results from projective questions; finally, and by far the most important, material from the interviews and the Thematic Apperception Tests. Another important source of items was research in fields allied to the present one in which the authors had previously had a part. Principal among these were several studies performed at the University of California on personality in relation to war morale and ideology,<sup>2</sup> and researches of the Institute of Social Research such as



content analyses of speeches of anti-Semitic agitators and a study on anti-Semitic workers.<sup>3</sup> Finally, there was the general literature on anti-Semitism and fascism, embracing both empirical and theoretical studies.

It will have been recognized that the interpretation of the material of the present study was guided by a theoretical orientation that was present at the start. The same orientation played the most crucial role in the preparation of the F scale. Once a hypothesis had been formulated concerning the way in which some deep-lying trend in the personality might express itself in some opinion or attitude that was dynamically, though not logically, related to prejudice against out-groups, a preliminary sketch for an item was usually not far to seek: a phrase from the daily newspaper, an utterance by an interviewee, a fragment of ordinary conversation was usually ready at hand. (As will be seen, however, the actual formulation of an item was a technical proceeding to which considerable care had to be devoted.)

As to what kinds of central personality trends we might expect to be the most significant, the major guide, as has been said, was the research which had gone before; they were the trends which, as hypothetical constructs, seemed best to explain the consistency of response on the foregoing scales, and which emer-

ged from the analysis of clinical material as the likely sources of the coherence found in individual cases. Most of these trends have been mentioned before, usually when it was necessary to do so in order to give meaning to obtained results. For example, when it was discovered that the anti-Semitic individual objects to Jews on the ground that they violate conventional moral values, one interpretation was that this individual had a particularly strong and rigid adherence to conventional values, and that this general disposition in his personality provided some of the motivational basis for anti-Semitism, and at the same time expressed itself in other ways, e.g., in a general tendency to look down on and to punish those who were believed to be violating conventional values. This interpretation was supported by results from the E and PEC scales, where it was shown that items expressive of conventionalism were associated with more manifest forms of prejudice. Accordingly, therefore, *adherence to conventional values* came to be thought of as a *variable* in the person – something which could be approached by means of scale items of the F type and shown to be related functionally to various manifestations of prejudice. Similarly, a consideration of E-scale results strongly suggested that underlying several of the prejudiced responses was a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain un-

critical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority. Hence, *authoritarianism* assumed the proportions of a variable worthy to be investigated in its own right.

In the same way, a number of such variables were derived and defined, and they, taken together, made up the basic content of the F scale. Each was regarded as a more or less central trend in the person which, in accordance with some dynamic process, expressed itself on the surface in ethnocentrism as well as in diverse psychologically related opinions and attitudes. These variables are listed below, together with a brief definition of each.

- a. *Conventionalism*. Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.
- b. *Authoritarian submission*. Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.
- c. *Authoritarian aggression*. Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
- d. *Anti-intraception*. Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.
- e. *Superstition and stereotypy*. The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.
- f. *Power and »toughness.«* Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimensi-

on; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

- g. *Destructiveness and cynicism*. Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.
- h. *Projectivity*. The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.
- i. *Sex*. Exaggerated concern with sexual »goings-on.«

These variables were thought of as going together to form a single syndrome, a more or less enduring structure in the person that renders him receptive to antidemocratic propaganda. One might say, therefore, that the F scale attempts to measure the potentially antidemocratic personality. This does not imply that *all* the features of this personality pattern are touched upon in the scale, but only that the scale embraces a fair sample of the ways in which this pattern characteristically expresses itself. Indeed, as the study went on, numerous additional features of the pattern, as well as variations within the over-all pattern, suggested themselves – and it was regretted that a second F scale could not have been constructed in order to carry these explorations further. It is to be emphasized that one can speak of personality here only to the extent that the coherence of the scale items can be better explained on the ground of an inner structure than on the

ground of external association.

The variables of the scale may be discussed in more detail, with emphasis on their organization and the nature of their relations to ethnocentrism. As each variable is introduced, the scale items deemed to be expressive of it are presented. It will be noted, as the variables are taken up in turn, that the same item sometimes appears under more than one heading. This follows from our approach to scale construction. In order efficiently to cover a wide area it was necessary to formulate items that were maximally rich, that is, pertinent to as much as possible of the underlying theory – hence a single item was sometimes used to represent two, and sometimes more, different ideas. It will be noted also that different variables are represented by different numbers of items. This is for the reason that the scale was designed with first attention to the whole pattern into which the variables fitted, some with more important roles than others.

a. *Conventionalism*

12. The modern church, with its many rules and hypocrisies, does not appeal to the deeply religious person; it appeals mainly to the childish, the insecure, and the uncritical.
19. One should avoid doing things in public which appear wrong to others, even though one knows that these things are really all right.

38. There is too much emphasis in colleges on intellectual and theoretical topics, not enough emphasis on practical matters and on the homely virtues of living.
55. Although leisure is a fine thing, it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile.
58. *What* a man does is not so important so long as he does it well.
60. Which of the following are the most important for a person to have or to be? *Mark X the three most important.*

artistic and sensuous

popular, good personality

drive, determination, will power

broad, humanitarian social outlook

neatness and good manners

sensitivity and understanding

efficiency, practicality, thrift

intellectual and serious

emotional expressiveness, warmth, intimacy

kindness and charity

It is a well-known hypothesis that susceptibility to fascism is most characteristically a middle-class phenomenon, that it is »in the culture« and, hence, that those who conform the most to this culture will be the most prejudiced. Items referring to the holding of conventional values were included in order to gather data bearing on this hypothesis. Many of the early findings of the present study, however, gave evidence that the matter was not quite so simple. The correlation bet-

ween conventional values and prejudice seemed to be positive but not very high; whereas unconventional people tended to be free of prejudice, it was clear that some conventional people were prejudiced while others were not. It seemed that, among the conventional group, what might make the difference was the deeper source of the conventionality, or rather the type of broader personality structure within which it had a functional role. If the adherence to conventional values was an expression of a fully established individual conscience, then we should expect no necessary connection between these values and antidemocratic potential. The same standards which render the individual easily offended by what he conceives to be the morally loose behavior of unassimilated minority group members or of »lower-class« people, would – if they are well internalized – cause him to resist the violence and delinquency which characterize the advanced stages of fascism. If, on the other hand, adherence to conventional values is determined by contemporary external social pressure, if it is based upon the individual's adherence to the standards of the collective powers with which he, for the time being, is identified, then we should expect a close association with antidemocratic receptivity. It is this latter state of affairs that we wish to call conventionalism – and to distinguish from mere acceptance of conventional va-

lues. The conventionalistic individual could in good conscience follow the dictates of the external agency wherever they might lead him and, moreover, he would be capable of totally exchanging one set of standards for another quite different one – as in a conversion from official Communism to Catholicism.

The scale items listed under *Conventionalism* afford the subject an opportunity to reveal whether or not his adherence to conventional values is of the rigid, absolutist character just described. For example, this would seem to be indicated by a mark of +3 on the item, »Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.« However, a sound decision on this matter would depend on the individual's responses to items in the other categories. For example, extreme conventionalism going with a strong inclination to punish those who violate conventional values is a different thing from conventional values associated with a philosophy of live and let live. In other words, the meaning of a high score on this variable, as on any of the others, is to be known from the broader context within which it occurs.

b. *Authoritarian Submission*

20. One of the main values of progressive education is that it gives the child great freedom in expressing those natural impulses and desires so often frowned upon by



conventional middle-class society.

23. He is indeed contemptible who does not feel an undying love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
32. It is essential for learning or effective work that our teachers or bosses outline in detail what is to be done and exactly how to go about it.
39. Every person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher than himself to which he gives total allegiance and whose decisions he does not question.
43. Sciences like chemistry, physics, and medicine have carried men very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
50. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
74. What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in.
77. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.

Submission to authority, desire for a strong leader, subservience of the individual to the state, and so forth, have so frequently and, as it seems to us, correctly, been set forth as important aspects of the Nazi creed that a search for correlates of prejudice had naturally to take these attitudes into account.<sup>4</sup> These attitudes have indeed been so regularly mentioned in association with anti-Semitism that it was particularly

difficult to formulate items that would express the underlying trend and still be sufficiently free of logical or direct relations to prejudice – and we cannot claim to have been entirely successful. Direct references to dictatorship and political figures were avoided for the most part, and the main emphasis was on obedience, respect, rebellion, and relations to authority in general. Authoritarian submission was conceived of as a very general attitude that would be evoked in relation to a variety of authority figures – parents, older people, leaders, supernatural power, and so forth.

The attempt was made to formulate the items in such a way that agreement with them would indicate not merely a realistic, balanced respect for valid authority but an exaggerated, all-out, emotional need to submit. This would be indicated, it seemed, by agreement that obedience and respect for authority were the *most important* virtues that children should learn, that a person should *obey without question* the decisions of a supernatural power, and so forth. It was considered that here, as in the case of conventionalism, the subservience to external agencies was probably due to some failure in the development of an inner authority, i.e., conscience. Another hypothesis was that authoritarian submission was commonly a way of handling ambivalent feelings toward authority figures: underlying hostile and rebellious impulses, held in check by

fear, lead the subject to overdo in the direction of respect, obedience, gratitude, and the like.

It seems clear that authoritarian submission by itself contributes largely to the antidemocratic potential by rendering the individual particularly receptive to manipulation by the strongest external powers. The immediate connection of this attitude with ethnocentrism has been suggested in earlier chapters: hostility against ingroup authorities, originally the parents, has had to be repressed; the »bad« aspects of these figures – that they are unfair, self-seeking, dominating – are then seen as existing in outgroups, who are charged with dictatorship, plutocracy, desire to control, and so forth. And this displacement of negative imagery is not the only way in which the repressed hostility is handled; it seems often to find expression in authoritarian aggression.

c. *Authoritarian Aggression*

6. It is only natural and right that women be restricted in certain ways in which men have more freedom.
23. He is indeed contemptible who does not feel an undying love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
31. Homosexuality is a particularly rotten form of delinquency and ought to be severely punished.
47. No insult to our honor should ever go unpunished.
75. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals

ought to be publicly whipped.

The individual who has been forced to give up basic pleasures and to live under a system of rigid restraints, and who therefore feels put upon, is likely not only to seek an object upon which he can »take it out« but also to be particularly annoyed at the idea that another person is »getting away with something.« Thus, it may be said that the present variable represents the sadistic component of authoritarianism just as the immediately foregoing one represents its masochistic component. It is to be expected, therefore, that the conventionalist who cannot bring himself to utter any real criticism of accepted authority will have a desire to condemn, reject, and punish those who violate these values. As the emotional life which this person regards as proper and a part of himself is likely to be very limited, so the impulses, especially sexual and aggressive ones, which remain unconscious and ego-alien are likely to be strong and turbulent. Since in this circumstance a wide variety of stimuli can tempt the individual and so arouse his anxiety (fear of punishment), the list of traits, behavior patterns, individuals, and groups that he must condemn grows very long indeed. It has been suggested before that this mechanism might lie behind the ethnocentric rejection of such groups as zootsuiters, foreigners, other nations;

it is here hypothesized that this feature of ethnocentrism is but a part of a more general tendency to punish violators of conventional values: homosexuals, sex offenders, people with bad manners, etc. Once the individual has convinced himself that there are people who ought to be punished, he is provided with a channel through which his deepest aggressive impulses may be expressed, even while he thinks of himself as thoroughly moral. If his external authorities, or the crowd, lend their approval to this form of aggression, then it may take the most violent forms, and it may persist after the conventional values, in the name of which it was undertaken, have been lost from sight.

One might say that in authoritarian aggression, hostility that was originally aroused by and directed toward ingroup authorities is *displaced* onto outgroups. This mechanism is superficially similar to but essentially different from a process that has often been referred to as »scapegoating.« According to the latter conception, the individual's aggression is aroused by frustration, usually of his economic needs; and then, being unable due to intellectual confusion to tell the real causes of his difficulty, he lashes out about him, as it were, venting his fury upon whatever object is available and not too likely to strike back. While it is granted that this process has a role in hostility against minority groups, it must be emphasized that accor-

ding to the present theory of displacement, the authoritarian *must*, out of an inner necessity, turn his aggression against outgroups. He must do so because he is psychologically unable to attack ingroup authorities, rather than because of intellectual confusion regarding the source of his frustration. If this theory is correct, then authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission should turn out to be highly correlated. Furthermore, this theory helps to explain why the aggression is so regularly justified in moralistic terms, why it can become so violent and lose all connection with the stimulus which originally set it off.

Readiness to condemn other people on moral grounds may have still another source: it is not only that the authoritarian must condemn the moral laxness that he sees in others, but he is actually driven to see immoral attributes in them whether this has a basis in fact or not. This is a further device for countering his own inhibited tendencies; he says to himself, as it were: »I am not bad and deserving of punishment, he is.« In other words the individual's own unacceptable impulses are *projected* onto other individuals and groups who are then rejected. Projectivity as a variable is dealt with more fully below.

Conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression all have to do with the moral aspect of life – with standards of conduct, with the au-

thorities who enforce these standards, with offenders against them who deserve to be punished. We should expect that, in general, subjects who score high on one of these variables will score high on the others also, inasmuch as all three can be understood as expressions of a particular kind of structure within the personality. The most essential feature of this structure is a lack of integration between the moral agencies by which the subject lives and the rest of his personality. One might say that the conscience or superego is incompletely integrated with the self or ego, the ego here being conceived of as embracing the various self-controlling and self-expressing functions of the individual. It is the ego that governs the relations between self and outer world, and between self and deeper layers of the personality; the ego undertakes to regulate impulses in a way that will permit gratification without inviting too much punishment by the superego, and it seeks in general to carry out the activities of the individual in accordance with the demands of reality. It is a function of the ego to make peace with conscience, to create a larger synthesis within which conscience, emotional impulses, and self operate in relative harmony. When this synthesis is not achieved, the superego has somewhat the role of a foreign body within the personality, and it exhibits those rigid, automatic, and unstable aspects discussed above.

There is some reason to believe that a failure in superego internalization is due to weakness in the ego, to its inability to perform the necessary synthesis, i.e., to integrate the superego with itself. Whether or not this is so, ego weakness would seem to be a concomitant of conventionalism and authoritarianism. Weakness in the ego is expressed in the inability to build up a consistent and enduring set of moral values within the personality; and it is this state of affairs, apparently, that makes it necessary for the individual to seek some organizing and coordinating agency outside of himself. Where such outside agencies are depended upon for moral decisions one may say that the conscience is externalized.

Although conventionalism and authoritarianism might thus be regarded as signs of ego weakness, it seemed worthwhile to seek other, more direct, means for estimating this trend in personality, and to correlate this trend with the others. Ego weakness would, it seemed, be expressed fairly directly in such phenomena as opposition to introspection, in superstition and stereotypy, and in overemphasis upon the ego and its supposed strength. The following three variables deal with these phenomena.

d. *Anti-intrapeption*

28. Novels or stories that tell about what people think and feel are more interesting than those which contain



mainly action, romance, and adventure.

38. There is too much emphasis in colleges on intellectual and theoretical topics, not enough emphasis on practical matters and on the homely virtues of living.
53. There are some things too intimate or personal to talk about even with one's closest friends.
55. Although leisure is a fine thing, it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile.
58. *What* a man does is not so important so long as he does it well.
66. Books and movies ought not to deal so much with the sordid and seamy side of life; they ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining or uplifting.

Intraception is a term introduced by Murray<sup>5</sup> to stand for »the dominance of feelings, fantasies, speculations, aspirations – an imaginative, subjective human outlook.« The opposite of intraception is extraception, »a term that describes the tendency to be determined by concrete, clearly observable, physical conditions (tangible, objective facts).« The relations of intraception/extraception to ego weakness and to prejudice are probably highly complex, and this is not the place to consider them in detail. It seems fairly clear, however, that *anti*-intraception, an attitude of impatience with and opposition to the subjective and tender-minded, might well be a mark of the weak ego. The extremely anti-intrceptive individual is afraid of thinking about human phenomena because he might, as it

were, think the wrong thoughts; he is afraid of genuine feeling because his emotions might get out of control. Out of touch with large areas of his own inner life, he is afraid of what might be revealed if he, or others, should look closely at himself. He is therefore against »prying,« against concern with what people think and feel, against unnecessary »talk«; instead he would keep busy, devote himself to practical pursuits, and instead of examining an inner conflict, turn his thoughts to something cheerful. An important feature of the Nazi program, it will be recalled, was the defamation of everything that tended to make the individual aware of himself and his problems; not only was »Jewish« psychoanalysis quickly eliminated but every kind of psychology except aptitude testing came under attack. This general attitude easily leads to a devaluation of the human and an overevaluation of the physical object; when it is most extreme, human beings are looked upon as if they were physical objects to be coldly manipulated – even while physical objects, now vested with emotional appeal, are treated with loving care.

e. *Superstition and Stereotypy*

2. Although many people may scoff, it may yet be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.

10. It is more than a remarkable coincidence that Japan had an earthquake on Pearl Harbor Day, December 7,

1944.

39. Every person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher than himself to which he gives total allegiance and whose decisions he does not question.
43. Sciences like chemistry, physics, and medicine have carried men very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
65. It is entirely possible that this series of wars and conflicts will be ended once and for all by a world-destroying earthquake, flood, or other catastrophe.

Superstitiousness, the belief in mystical or fantastic external determinants of the individual's fate, and stereotypy,<sup>6</sup> the disposition to think in rigid categories, have been mentioned so frequently in the foregoing chapters and are so obviously related to ethnocentrism that they need little discussion here. A question that must be raised concerns the relations of these trends to general intelligence – and the relations of intelligence to ethnocentrism. Probably superstition and stereotypy tend to go with low intelligence, but low intelligence appears to be correlated with ethnocentrism to only a slight degree (see Chapter VIII).<sup>[7]</sup> It appears likely that superstition and stereotypy embrace, over and above the mere lack of intelligence in the ordinary sense, certain dispositions in thinking which are closely akin to prejudice, even though they might not hamper intelligent performance in the extraceptive

sphere. These dispositions can be understood, in part at least, as expressions of ego weakness. Stereotypy is a form of obtuseness particularly in psychological and social matters. It might be hypothesized that one reason why people in modern society – even those who are otherwise »intelligent« or »informed« – resort to primitive, oversimplified explanations of human events is that so many of the ideas and observations needed for an adequate account are not allowed to enter into the calculations: because they are affect-laden and potentially anxiety-producing, the weak ego cannot include them within its scheme of things. More than this, those deeper forces within the personality which the ego cannot integrate with itself are likely to be projected onto the outer world; this is a source of bizarre ideas concerning other peoples' behavior and concerning the causation of events in nature.

Superstitiousness indicates a tendency to shift responsibility from within the individual onto outside forces beyond one's control; it indicates that the ego might already have »given up,« that is to say, renounced the idea that it might determine the individual's fate by overcoming external forces. It must, of course, be recognized that in modern industrial society the capacity of the individual to determine what happens to himself has *actually* decreased, so that items referring to external causation might easily be realistic and

hence of no significance for personality. It seemed necessary, therefore, to select items that would express ego weakness in a nonrealistic way by making the individual's fate dependent on more or less fantastic factors.

f. *Power and »Toughness«*

9. Too many people today are living in an unnatural, soft way; we should return to the fundamentals, to a more red-blooded, active way of life.
35. There are some activities so flagrantly un-American that, when responsible officials won't take the proper steps, the wide-awake citizen should take the law into his own hands.
47. No insult to our honor should ever go unpunished.
70. To a greater extent than most people realize, our lives are governed by plots hatched in secret by politicians.
74. What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in.

This variable refers, in the first place, to overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego. The underlying hypothesis is that overdisplay of toughness may reflect not only the weakness of the ego but also the magnitude of the task it has to perform, that is to say, the strength of certain kinds of needs which are proscribed in the subject's culture. The relations of ego and impulse, then, are at least as

close as the relations of ego and conscience. Nevertheless, they may be separated for purposes of analysis, and other variables of the F scale refer to the deeper strata of the individual's emotional life.

Closely related to the phenomenon of exaggerated toughness is something which might be described as a »power complex.« Most apparent in its manifestations is overemphasis on the power motif in human relationships; there is a disposition to view all relations among people in terms of such categories as strong-weak, dominant-submissive, leader-follower, »hammeranvil.« And it is difficult to say with which of these roles the subject is the more fully identified. It appears that he wants to get power, to have it and not to lose it, and at the same time is afraid to seize and wield it. It appears that he also admires power in others and is inclined to submit to it – and at the same time is afraid of the weakness thus implied. The individual whom we expected to score high on this cluster readily identifies himself with the »little people,« or »the average,« but he does so, it seems, with little or no humility, and he seems actually to think of himself as strong or to believe that he can somehow become so. In short, the power complex contains elements that are essentially contradictory, and we should expect that sometimes one feature and sometimes another will predominate at the surface level. We should

expect that both leaders and followers will score high on this variable, for the reason that the actual role of the individual seems to be less important than his concern that leader-follower relations shall obtain. One solution which such an individual often achieves is that of alignment with power figures, an arrangement by which he is able to gratify both his need for power and his need to submit. He hopes that by submitting to power he can participate in it. For example, a man who reports that the most awe-inspiring experience for him would be »to shake hands with the President« probably finds his gratification not in submission alone but in the idea that some of the big man's power has, as it were, rubbed off onto him, so that he is a more important person for having »shook his hand« or »known him« or »been there.« The same pattern of gratification can be obtained by acting in the role of »the lieutenant« or by functioning in a middle position in some clearly structured hierarchy where there is always somebody above and somebody below.

The power complex has immediate relations with certain aspects of ethnocentrism. An individual who thinks of most human relations in such terms as strong versus weak is likely to apply these categories in his thinking about ingroups and outgroups, e.g., to conceive of »superior« and »inferior races.« And one

of the psychologically least costly devices for attaining a sense of superiority is to claim it on the basis of membership in a particular »race.«

g. *Destructiveness and Cynicism*

3. America is getting so far from the true American way of life that force may be necessary to restore it.
9. Too many people today are living in an unnatural, soft way; we should return to the fundamentals, to a more red-blooded, active way of life.
14. After we finish off the Germans and Japs, we ought to concentrate on other enemies of the human race such as rats, snakes, and germs.
17. Familiarity breeds contempt.
24. Today everything is unstable; we should be prepared for a period of constant change, conflict, and upheaval.
30. Reports of atrocities in Europe have been greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes.
35. There are some activities so flagrantly un-American that, when responsible officials won't take the proper steps, the wideawake citizen should take the law into his own hands.
42. No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason.
56. After the war, we may expect a crime wave; the control of gangsters and ruffians will become a major social problem.
59. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
67. When you come right down to it, it's human nature



never to do anything without an eye to one's own profit.

According to the present theory, the antidemocratic individual, because he has had to accept numerous externally imposed restrictions upon the satisfaction of his needs, harbors strong underlying aggressive impulses. As we have seen, one outlet for this aggression is through displacement onto outgroups leading to moral indignation and authoritarian aggression. Undoubtedly this is a very serviceable device for the individual; yet, the strong underlying aggression seems at the same time to express itself in some other way – in a nonmoralized way. It was assumed, of course, that primitive aggressive impulses are rarely expressed with complete directness by adults, but must instead be sufficiently modified, or at least justified, so that they are acceptable to the ego.

The present variable, then, refers to rationalized, ego-accepted, nonmoralized aggression. The supposition was that a subject could express this tendency by agreeing with statements which though thoroughly aggressive were couched in such terms as to avoid his moral censorship. Thus, some items offered justifications for aggression, and were formulated in such a way that strong agreement would indicate that the subject needed only slight justification in order to be ready for all-out aggression. Other items dealt with

contempt for mankind, the theory being that here the hostility is so generalized, so free of direction against any particular object, that the individual need not feel accountable for it. Still another guiding conception was that a person can most freely express aggression when he believes that everybody is doing it and, hence, if he wants to be aggressive, he is disposed to believe that everybody *is* doing it, e.g., that it is »human nature« to exploit and to make war upon one's neighbors. It goes without saying that such undifferentiated aggressiveness could easily, by means of propaganda, be directed against minority groups, or against any group the persecution of which was politically profitable.

#### h. *Projectivity*

46. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country today, even in circles where people might least expect it.
56. After the war, we may expect a crime wave; the control of gangsters and ruffians will become a major social problem.
65. It is entirely possible that this series of wars and conflicts will be ended once and for all by a world-destroying earth-quake, flood, or other catastrophe.
70. To a greater extent than most people realize, our lives are governed by plots hatched in secret by politicians.
73. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people

move around so much and mix together so freely, a person has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease.

The mechanism of projection was mentioned in connection with authoritarian aggression: the suppressed impulses of the authoritarian character tend to be projected onto other people who are then blamed out of hand. Projection is thus a device for keeping id drives ego-alien, and it may be taken as a sign of the ego's inadequacy in carrying out its function. Indeed, in one sense most of the items of the F scale are projective: they involve the assumption that judgments and interpretations of fact are distorted by psychological urges. The subject's tendency to project is utilized, in the present group of items, in an attempt to gain access to some of the deeper trends in his personality. If the antidemocratic individual is disposed to see in the outer world impulses which are suppressed in himself, and we wish to know what these impulses are, then something may be learned by noting what attributes he most readily, but unrealistically, ascribes to the world around him. If an individual insists that someone has hostile designs on him, and we can find no evidence that this is true, we have good reason to suspect that our subject himself has aggressive intentions and is seeking by means of projection to justify them. A notorious example is Father [Charles Edward] Cough-

lin's referring to anti-Semitism as a »defense mechanism,« i.e., a protection of Gentiles against the supposed aggressive designs of the Jews. Similarly, it seemed that the greater a subject's preoccupation with »evil forces« in the world, as shown by his readiness to think about and to believe in the existence of such phenomena as wild erotic excesses, plots and conspiracies, and danger from natural catastrophes, the stronger would be his own unconscious urges of both sexuality and destructiveness.

i. *Sex*

31. Homosexuality is a particularly rotten form of delinquency and ought to be severely punished.
42. No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason.
46. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country today, even in circles where people might least expect it.
75. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped.

Concern with overt sexuality is represented in the F scale by four items, two of which have appeared in connection with authoritarian aggression and one other as an expression of projectivity. This is an example of the close interaction of all the present varia-

bles; since, taken together they constitute a totality, it follows that a single question may pertain to two or more aspects of the whole. For purposes of analysis, sex may be abstracted from the totality as well as any of the other variables. Which of these variables are most basic must be determined by clinical study. In any case, it seemed that countercathexis (repression, reaction formation, projection) of sexual wishes was well qualified for special study.

The present variable is conceived of as ego-alien sexuality. A strong inclination to punish violators of sex mores (homosexuals, sex offenders) may be an expression of a general punitive attitude based on identification with ingroup authorities, but it also suggests that the subject's own sexual desires are suppressed and in danger of getting out of hand. A readiness to believe in »sex orgies« may be an indication of a general tendency to distort reality through projection, but sexual content would hardly be projected unless the subject had impulses of this same kind that were unconscious and strongly active. The three items pertaining to the punishment of homosexuals and of sex criminals and to the existence of sex orgies may, therefore, give some indication of the strength of the subject's unconscious sexual drives.

## 2. The Formulation of Scale Items

The considerations which guided the formulation of items in the scales described in previous chapters held as well for the F scale. There were several principles which, though a part of our general approach to scale construction, had particular significance for the present scale. In the first place, the item should have a maximum of *indirectness*, in the sense that it should not come close to the surface of overt prejudice and it should appear to be as far removed as possible from our actual interest. From this point of view, items such as 2 (Astrology) and 65 (Flood) were regarded as superior to items such as 74 (Tireless leaders) and 3 (Force to preserve). The latter two items, admittedly, could very well express certain aspects of an explicit fascist ideology, yet, as indicated above, statements touching upon the leader idea and the idea of force were definitely called for on theoretical grounds. More than this, there was a question of whether the aim of constructing a scale to correlate with E would be better served by the most indirect items or by the more direct ones, and in this first attempt it seemed the better part of wisdom to include some items of both kinds.

A second rule in item formulation was that each

item should achieve a proper balance between irrationality and objective truth. If a statement was so »wild« that very few people would agree with it, or if it contained so large an element of truth that almost everyone would agree with it, then obviously it could not distinguish between prejudiced and unprejudiced subjects, and hence was of no value. Each item had to have some degree of rational appeal, but it had to be formulated in such a way that the rational aspect was not the major factor making for agreement or disagreement. This in many cases was a highly subtle matter; e.g., social historians might conceivably agree that Item 46 (Sex orgies) is probably quite true, yet it was here regarded as a possible index of projected sexuality, the argument being that most subjects would have no basis on which to judge its truth and would respond in accordance with their feelings. Since each item contained an element of objective truth or rational justification, an individual's response to a particular item might conceivably be determined by this fact alone. Hence, no item taken by itself could be regarded as diagnostic of potential fascism. The item's worth to the scale would have to be judged mainly in terms of its discriminatory power, and the meaning of an individual's response to it would have to be inferred from his total pattern of response. If a man marks +3 on Item 46 (Sex orgies) but marks -3 or -2 on

Items 31 (Homosexuality) and 75 (Sex Crimes), it might be concluded that he is a man of knowledge and sophistication; but a +3 on Item 46, accompanying agreement with Items 31 and 75 would seem to be a fairly good indication of concern with sexuality.

Finally, it was required of each item that it contribute to the structural unity of the scale as a whole. It had to do its part in covering the diverse personality trends that entered into the broad pattern which the scale purported to measure. While it was granted that different individuals might give the same response to a given item for different reasons – and this apart from the matter of objective truth – it was necessary that the item carry sufficient meaningfulness so that any response to it could, when responses on all items were known, be interpreted in the light of our over-all theory.



## C. Results with Successive Forms of the F Scale

### 1. Statistical Properties of the Preliminary Scale (Form 78)

The preliminary F scale, made up of the 38 items listed above, was administered as a part of questionnaire Form 78 to four groups of subjects in the spring of 1945. These groups were described in Chapter III,<sup>[8]</sup> and they are listed in Table 11 (III).

The scoring of the scale followed the procedures used with the A-S, E, and PEC scales. Except in the case of negative items, a mark of +3 was scored 7, +2 was scored as 6, and so on. Items 12, 20, and 28 are negative (they state the unprejudiced position), and here, of course, a mark of +3 was scored 1, and so on. Table 2 (VII) gives the reliability coefficients, mean scores per item, and Standard Deviations for these four groups. The mean reliability of .74 is within the range ordinarily regarded as adequate for group comparisons, but well below what is required of a truly accurate instrument. It might be said that, considering the diversity of elements that went into the F scale, the degree of consistency indicated by the present figure is all that could be expected of this preliminary form of the scale. The question was whether by revisi-

on of the scale it might be possible to attain the degree of reliability that characterizes the E scale, or whether we might be dealing here – as seemed to be the case in the PEC scale – with areas of response in which people are simply not very consistent.

Table 2 (VII)

Reliability of the F Scale (Form 78)<sup>a</sup>

Property	Group				Over-all <sup>b</sup>
	A	B	C	D	
Reliability	.78	.56	.72	.88	.74
Mean (total)	3.94	3.72	3.75	3.43	3.71
Mean (odd half)	3.80	3.59	3.60	3.22	3.55
Mean (even half)	4.08	3.87	3.91	3.64	3.88
S.D. (total)	.71	.57	.70	.86	.71
S.D. (odd half)	.87	.71	.85	.94	.84
S.D. (even half)	.69	.65	.76	.84	.74
N	140	52	40	63	295
Range	2.12–5.26	2.55–4.87	2.39–5.05	1.68–5.63	1.68–5.63

<sup>a</sup> The four groups on which these data are based are:

*Group A:* U.C. Public Speaking Class Women.

*Group B:* U.C. Public Speaking Class Men.

*Group C:* U.C. Extension Psychology Class Women.

*Group D:* Professional Women.

<sup>b</sup> In obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

It may be noted that the Professional Women show considerably more consistency than do the other

groups of subjects, their reliability coefficient of .88 being in the neighborhood of that regularly obtained with the E scale. Since these women are considerably older, on the average, than our other subjects, it may be suggested that the higher reliability is due to their greater consistency of personality.

There appears to be no ready explanation for the low reliability found in the case of the Public Speaking Men. It may be noted that the Standard Deviation and the range for this group were also unusually small. Adequate explanation would require data from a larger sample of men and from an improved F scale.

Examination of Table 2 (VII) shows that there are no extremely high and no extremely low scores in any of the groups and that the obtained means are near the neutral point. The relatively narrow distribution of scores – narrow as compared with those obtained from the other scales – may be in part a result of lack of consistency within the scale: unless the items are actually expressive of the same general trend, we could hardly expect an individual to respond to the great majority of them with consistent agreement or consistent disagreement. On the other hand, it is possible that the present sample does not contain subjects who are actually extreme with respect to the pattern which the F scale was designed to measure. This circumstance (lowered »range of talent«) would tend to

lower the reliability coefficients.

The F scale correlated .53 with A-S and .65 with E, in Form 78.

## 2. Item Analysis and Revision of the Preliminary Scale

Data obtained from the initial four groups of subjects were used in attempting to improve the F scale – to increase its reliability and to shorten it somewhat, without loss in its breadth or meaningfulness. As with the other scales, the Discriminatory Power of an item provided the major statistical basis for judging its worth. Since it was intended that the F scale should not only have internal consistency but should also correlate highly with overt prejudice, attention was given both to the item's relation to the total F scale and to its ability to discriminate between high and low scorers on the A-S scale. An item's Discriminatory Power in terms of A-S (D.P.A-S) is simply the difference between the mean score of the high A-S quartile on that item and the mean score of the low A-S quartile on the item. Table 3 (VII) gives for each item the mean score, the Discriminatory Power in terms of high vs. low scorers on F (D.P.F), the D.P.F's order of merit, the D.P.A-S, the latter's order of merit and, finally, the item's rank in a distribution of the sums of the D.P.F plus the D.P.A.A-S. This final rank order was a convenient index of the item's statistical »goodness« for our over-all purpose.

Table 3 (VII)

Means and Discriminatory Powers of the F-Scale  
Items (Form 78)<sup>a</sup>

Item	Mean	D.P. <sub>Fb</sub>	Rank D.P. <sub>F</sub>	D.P. <sub>ASc</sub>	Rank D.P. <sub>AS</sub>	Final Rank <sub>d</sub> (D.P. <sub>F</sub> + D.P. <sub>AS</sub> )
2. (Astrology)	2.60	1.74	(22)	1.24	(11)	(18)
3. (Force to preserve)	3.04	1.98	(18)	1.05	(17)	(15)
6. (Women restricted)	2.93	1.75	(21)	0.41	(32)	(26)
9. (Red-blooded life)	3.99	2.04	(15)	-0.08	(35)	(29)
10. (Pearl Harbor Day)	2.22	2.20	(9)	1.37	(6)	(8)
12. (Modern church)	4.67	0.19	(38)	-1.18	(38)	(38)
14. (Rats ... germs)	4.44	1.60	(26.5)	0.85	(24)	(23.5)
17. (Familiarity)	3.33	1.86	(19)	1.56	(4)	(10)
19. (One should avoid)	3.63	0.76	(36)	0.70	(27)	(35)
20. (Progressive education)	3.28	1.07	(33)	-0.25	(37)	(37)
23. (Undying love)	3.62	2.61	(4)	1.17	(13)	(5)
24. (Things unstable)	5.01	0.79	(35)	0.88	(22)	(33)
28. (Novels or stories)	3.02	1.29	(30)	0.76	(26)	(27)
30. (Reports of atrocities)	4.20	0.43	(37)	0.66	(28)	(36)
31. (Homosexuals)	3.22	2.16	(10)	1.18	(12)	(13)
32. (Essential for learning)	3.31	1.67	(24)	1.10	(16)	(20)
35. (Law in own hands)	2.50	1.42	(29)	0.62	(29.5)	(28)
38. (Emphasis in college)	3.91	1.20	(31)	1.14	(15)	(25)
39. (Supernatural force)	3.97	2.54	(6)	1.26	(9.5)	(4)
42. (For one reason)	2.06	1.05	(34)	0.59	(31)	(34)
43. (Sciences like chemistry)	4.35	2.79	(3)	0.97	(18)	(6)
46. (Sex orgies)	3.64	2.11	(12.5)	0.93	(20)	(14)
47. (Honor)	3.00	2.09	(14)	1.65	(3)	(7)
50. (Obedience and respect)	3.72	3.09	(1)	1.55	(5)	(2)
53. (Things too intimate)	4.82	1.99	(17)	-0.23	(36)	(32)
55. (Leisure)	5.20	2.11	(12.5)	1.26	(9.5)	(11)
56. (Crime wave)	4.60	1.16	(32)	0.62	(29.5)	(31)
58. (What a man does)	3.48	1.70	(23)	0.87	(23)	(22)
59. (Always war)	4.26	2.59	(5)	1.91	(2)	(3)
60. (Important values)	4.17	1.60	(26.5)	0.31	(34)	(30)

65. (World catastrophe)	2.58	1.55	(28)	0.90	(21)	(23.5)
66. (Books and movies)	4.10	2.48	(7)	0.38	(33)	(19)
67. (Eye to profit)	3.71	2.21	(8)	0.78	(25)	(17)
70. (Plots by politicians)	3.27	1.85	(20)	1.15	(14)	(16)
73. (Infection and disease)	4.79	2.02	(16)	1.34	(8)	(12)
74. (Tireless leaders)	5.00	1.66	(25)	0.94	(19)	(21)
75. (Sex crimes)	3.26	2.81	(2)	2.07	(1)	(1)
77. (No sane person)	4.12	2.12	(11)	1.36	(7)	(9)
Mean/Person/Item	3.71	1.80		0.89		

**a** The four groups on which these data are based are: *Group A*: U.C. Public Speaking Class Women (N = 140); *Group B*: U.C. Public Speaking Class Men (N = 52); *Group C*: U.C. Extension Psychology Class Women (N = 40); *Group D*: Professional Women (N = 63). In obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

**b** D.P.F is based on the difference between the high quartile and the low quartile on the F scale distribution.

**c** D.P.AS is based on the difference between the high quartile and the low quartile on the A-S scale distribution. E.g., the D.P.AS of 1.24 on Item 2 indicates that the mean of the low quartile on A-S was 1.24 points lower than the mean of the high quartile on A-S.

**d** For each item the sum of D.P.F+D.P.AS is obtained. The final rank of an item is the rank of this sum in the distribution of sums for the whole scale.

The average D.P.F, 1.80, is considerably below that found in the case of the A-S or E scales. Yet it indicates that, in general, the items yield statistically significant differences between the high and the low quartiles. Sixteen D.P.'s are above 2, 18 fall in the range 1–2, and only 4 are below 1. The means are, in general, fairly satisfactory; they average 3.71, which

is near the neutral point of 4.0, and only 9 means are definitely too extreme, i.e., above 5.0 or below 3.0. As is to be expected, only 2 of the items with extreme means yield D.P.'s as great as 2.0.

The D.P.'s in terms of A-S are, of course, much lower; yet there are 17 items which appear to be significantly related to A-S, i.e., have a D.P.A-S greater than 1.0. Since it is the total F pattern that we expect to correlate with A-S and E, it is not necessary that each single F item by itself be significantly related to the latter. In general, items which are most discriminating in terms of F tend to discriminate best in terms of A-S, though there are some striking exceptions. In deciding whether to retain an item for use in a revised scale most weight was given to the D.P.F and to the general principles guiding our scale construction; these things being equal, the greater an item's D.P.A-S, the greater its chances of being included in the revised scale.

We may now inquire what it is that distinguishes the items which turned out well statistically from those that turned out poorly. Can any general statements be made about each of these two groups of items that can serve as guides in the formulation of new items? The first question concerns the nine groups of items chosen to represent the variables that entered into the conceptualization of F. Do most of



the items with high D.P.'s pertain to a few of the variables? Are there some variables which simply do not belong to the pattern we are considering? Three of the clusters, Sex, Authoritarian Aggression, and Authoritarian Submission, had mean D.P.'s above 2.0, the remaining clusters having mean D.P.'s in the range 1.26–1.80. Projectivity (1.70), Destructiveness and Cynicism (1.56), and Conventionalism (1.26) were the least satisfactory. However, it is to be noted that every cluster has within it at least one item with a D.P. above 2.0. At this stage, therefore, it seemed best not to eliminate any of the variables but to give attention to improving or replacing the poorer items found in each cluster.

Turning to a consideration of items which proved to be outstandingly good in the statistical sense, we note that Item 75 (Sex crimes) leads all the rest, i.e., has the highest sum of D.P.F plus D.P.A-S. This item represents rather well the ideal to which we aspired in formulating items for the F scale. Not only is there a wide distribution of responses, with a mean fairly near the neutral point, but the item combines, apparently in a very effective way, several ideas which according to theory have crucial roles in prejudice: the underlying interest in the more primitive aspects of sex, the readiness for all-out physical aggressiveness, the justification of aggression by an appeal to morali-

stic values. More than this, the item seems to be sufficiently free of any logical or automatic connection with overt prejudice. That the next best item, 50 (Obedience and respect), should be outstandingly differentiating is not surprising since this kind of authoritarianism is a well-known aspect of the fascist outlook. The device of putting the authoritarianism in a context of child training seems to remove it from the surface of ethnocentrism; but whether or not this is true, the item pertains to an aspect of the fascist philosophy that could in no case be left out of account.

Third in the rank order of goodness is Item 59, »Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.« This item, from the Destructiveness and Cynicism cluster, expresses several ideas which are particularly important in the F syndrome. In addition to an element of overt antipacifist opinion, there is contempt for men and acceptance of the »survival of the fittest« idea as a rationalization for aggressiveness. The next item, 39 (Supernatural force), seems to express very well the tendency to shift responsibility to outside forces beyond one's own control. This is a manifestation of what has been termed ego weakness; the item has also been placed in the Authoritarian Submission cluster on the ground that faith in a supernatural force is related to faith in ingroup authorities. It was not expected that the presence of religious

feeling and belief would by itself be significant for prejudice; the aim in devising the present item was to compose a statement which was so extreme that not too many subjects would agree with it and which placed enough emphasis upon »total allegiance« and obedience »without question« so that the uncritically submissive person could distinguish himself. The mean of 3.97 and the D.P.F of 2.54 indicate that this aim was largely realized. Item 23 (Undying love), which ranked fifth in order of goodness, expresses extreme moral conventionality and ingroup feeling related to the family. It has a place in both the Authoritarian Submission and the Authoritarian Aggression clusters, because it includes both allegiance to the ingroup and a punishing attitude (»He is indeed contemptible«) toward those who violate this value. The statement is so exaggerated, so expressive, as it seems, of the »protesting too much« attitude that we may wonder if strong agreement with it does not mask underlying but inhibited rebellious hostility against parents and parent figures.

Concerning all five of these items it may be said that they are highly diverse in their surface content, that they pertain to various aspects of the underlying theory – superego, ego, and id are expressed – and that with the possible exception of Item 50 (Obedience and respect) they are highly indirect in the pre-

sent sense of the term. Indeed, as one examines further the ranking of the items in terms of their Discriminatory Powers – (Sciences like chemistry), (Honor), (Pearl Harbor Day), (No sane person), (Familiarity), (Leisure), (Infection and disease) – he may note that, in general, items which are best in the statistical sense are those which seem best in their formulation and in terms of our over-all theory and method of approach.

Items which turned out to be poor in the statistical sense are, in retrospect, easy to criticize. In some instances there was a failure in formulation: the statement was so unclear or ambiguous that many of the subjects, apparently, drew from it different implications from those intended. This would seem to have been true particularly of Items 12 (Modern church) and 20 (Progressive education). In other instances, e.g., Items 24 (Things unstable), 74 (Tireless leaders), and 58 (Crime wave), the statements contained too large an element of truth or rational justification and so appealed, as shown by the high mean scores, to both high and low scorers. Again, some of the items were too crude or openly aggressive, so that most of the high scorers as well as the low scorers tended to disagree. For example, Items 42 (For one reason) and 35 (Law in own hands) have both low means and low D.P.'s.

### 3. The Second F Scale: Form 60

In preparing the new form of the questionnaire, the E and PEC scales were shortened so drastically that a comparatively long F scale (34 items) could still be used without allowing the total number of scale items to go above 60. Since we were still faced with the task of producing a reliable F scale, without sacrificing breadth or meaningfulness, it seemed the better part of wisdom not to undertake much shortening of it at this stage.

#### Table 4 (VII)

##### The F Scale: Form 60

- a. *Conventionalism*: Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.
1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
  6. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to be liked and accepted by decent people.
  53. One main trouble today is that people talk too much and work too little.
- b. *Authoritarian Submission*: Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
7. Science has carried man very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
11. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.
23. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
29. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.
32. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.
44. In order for us to do good work, it is necessary that our bosses outline carefully what is to be done and exactly how to go about it.

*c. Authoritarian Aggression:* Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

6. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to be liked and accepted by decent people.
17. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
19. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
22. The trouble with letting everybody have a say in run-

ning the government is that so many people are just naturally stupid or full of wild ideas.

34. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
39. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
49. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.
53. One main trouble today is that people talk too much and work too little.
58. Homosexuals are nothing but degenerates and ought to be severely punished.

d. *Anti-intraception*: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.

16. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things.
30. Some cases of feeblemindedness are caused by overstudy.
45. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.
53. One main trouble today is that people talk too much and work too little.

e. *Superstition and Stereotypy*: The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid

categories.

7. Science has carried man very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
11. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.
18. It is more than just chance that Japan had an earthquake on Pearl Harbor Day, December 7, 1944.
24. Some people are born with the urge to jump from high places.
30. Some cases of feeble-mindedness are caused by overstudy.
35. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
40. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.
46. It is possible that wars and social troubles will be ended once and for all by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.
50. It's a mistake to trust anybody who doesn't look you straight in the eye.

f. *Power and »Toughness«*: Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

2. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power.



5. Any red-blooded American will fight to defend his property.
17. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
19. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
32. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.
35. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
57. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret by politicians.

g. *Destructiveness and Cynicism*: Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.

10. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
25. Familiarity breeds contempt.
41. The true American way of life is disappearing so fast that force may be necessary to preserve it.

h. *Projectivity*: The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses.

36. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around so much and mix together so freely, a person has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease.
45. Nowadays more and more people are prying into mat-

ters that should remain personal and private.

46. It is possible that wars and social troubles will be ended once and for all by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.
  52. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.
  57. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret by politicians.
- i. *Sex*: Exaggerated concern with sexual »goings-on.«
34. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped or worse.
  52. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.
  58. Homosexuals are nothing but degenerates and ought to be severely punished.

The 19 items from the F scale (Form 78) that ranked highest in order of goodness were retained, in the same or slightly revised form, in the new scale. Thus, statistical differentiating power of the item was the main basis of selection. As stated above, however, the items which came out best statistically were, in general, those which seemed best from the point of view of theory, so that retaining them required no compromise with the original purpose of the scale. Of these items,

5 were changed in no way; revision of the others involved change in wording but not in essential meaning, the aim being to avoid too much uniformity of agreement or disagreement and, hence, to produce mean scores as close as possible to the neutral point.

Given 19 items of known dependability, the task was to formulate 15 additional ones which, singly, met the requirements of good items and which, taken together, covered the ground mapped out according to our theory. Here, criteria other than statistical ones played an important role. In attempting to achieve a maximum of *indirectness* we not only eliminated items which were too openly aggressive (they had low D.P.'s anyway) but retained, in a slightly revised form, Item 65 (World catastrophe) despite its relatively low D.P. (R.O. 23.5), because it expressed a theoretically important idea and appeared on the surface to be almost completely removed from »race« prejudice and fascism. In the name of *breadth*, Item 67 (Eye to profit), whose D.P. was not low (R.O. 21), was eliminated because of its too great similarity to the highly discriminating Item 59 (Always war). To cover a great variety of ideas as efficiently as possible, two or more of them were combined in the same statement, e.g., »Any *red-blooded American* will *fight* to defend his *property*« or »... people *think* too much and *work* too little.« With attention to these criteria, and to

*meaningfulness, contribution to the structural unity of the scale, and proper degree of rational justification*, 4 items from the F scale (Form 78) whose D.P. rank orders were lower than 19, were revised and 11 new items were formulated to complete the new form. The 34 items, grouped according to the variables which they were supposed to represent, are shown in table 4 (VII).

Table 5 (VII)

Reliability of the F Scale (Form 60)<sup>a</sup>

Property	Group					Over-all <sup>b</sup>
	I	II	III	IV	V	
Reliability	.86	.91	.89	.87	.81	.87
Mean (total)	3.32	3.39	3.82	3.74	3.25	3.50
Mean (odd half)	3.41	3.42	4.09	3.78	3.19	3.58
Mean (even half)	3.24	3.36	3.56	3.73	3.28	3.43
S.D. (total)	.86	.96	.93	.81	.71	.85
S.D. (odd half)	.97	1.03	.99	.77	.83	.92
S.D. (even half)	.75	.96	.97	.93	.76	.87
N	47	54	57	68	60	286
Range	1.00–5.50	1.24–5.50	1.82–4.38	2.24–5.62	1.97–5.35	1.82–5.62

<sup>a</sup> The five groups on which these data are based are:

*Group I:* University of Oregon Student Women.

*Group II:* University of Oregon and University of California Student Women.

*Group III:* University of Oregon and University of California Student Men.

*Group IV:* Oregon Service Club Men.

*Group V: Oregon Service Club Men (A Part only).*

**b** In obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

Reliability of the scale, mean score per item, S.D., and the range of scores for each of the five groups to whom the F scale (Form 60) was given are shown in Table 5 (VII). The reliability of the scale is a considerable improvement over that obtained with Form 78 (.87 as compared with .74); it is as high as that of the shortened E scale (.87 as compared with .86) and much better than the reliability of .70 for the shortened PEC scale. The mean scores are not quite so close to the neutral point as was the case with Form 78 (over-all mean of 3.5 as compared with 3.7); the range and the variability, however, are somewhat greater.<sup>9</sup>

Inspection of the Discriminatory Powers of the items, as shown in Table 6 (VII), shows once again considerable improvement over Form 78. The mean D.P.F is now 2.15 as compared with 1.80 for Form 78. Three D.P.'s are above 3.0, 18 fall in the range 2.0–3.0, 12 are in the range 1.0–2.0, and only 1 is below 1.0. The mean D.P. in terms of E, 1.53, is notably greater than the mean D.P.A-S, .89, found with Form 78. There are 28 items with a mean D.P.E greater than 1.0; these F items are significantly related to ethnocentrism at the 5 per cent level of confidence or

better. Each of the variables that entered into the F scale – Conventionalism, Superstition, etc. – is represented by items that are satisfactorily differentiating.

The correlation between the F scale (Form 60) and E is, on the average, .69. This is a considerable improvement over the results obtained with Form 78, where F correlated .53 with A-S and .65 with E, though it is still not quite as high as its intended functions require.

Table 6 (VII)

Means and Discriminatory Powers of the F-Scale  
Items (Form 60)<sup>a</sup>

Item	Mean	D.P. <sub>Fb</sub>	Rank D.P. <sub>F</sub>	D.P. <sub>EC</sub>	Rank D.P. <sub>E</sub>	Final Rank <sub>d</sub> (D.P. <sub>F</sub> + D.P. <sub>E</sub> )
1. (Obedience & respect)	4.86	2.39	(14)	1.52	(17)	(13)
2. (Will power)	4.44	2.50	(11)	1.46	(19)	(12)
5. (Red-blooded American)	5.49	1.46	(29.5)	1.18	(25.5)	(27)
6. (Bad manners)	5.30	1.80	(23)	1.56	(13.5)	(22)
7. (Science)	4.98	1.71	(24)	1.32	(23)	(25)
10. (War & conflict)	4.46	1.67	(26)	1.70	(10)	(21)
11. (Supernatural power)	3.60	2.91	(4)	1.38	(21)	(10)
12. (Germans & Japs)	3.71	3.16	(3)	2.83	(1)	(1)
16. (Cheerful things)	3.15	2.08	(20.5)	1.18	(25.5)	(23)
17. (Honor)	3.14	2.46	(12)	2.34	(4)	(7)
18. (Pearl Harbor Day)	2.19	2.51	(10)	1.83	(9)	(9)
19. (Discipline & determination)	3.68	3.17	(2)	2.28	(6.5)	(3)
22. (Not everybody in gov't.)	2.74	1.46	(29.5)	1.17	(27)	(28)
23. (Rebellious ideas)	4.30	2.70	(7)	2.29	(5)	(5)
24. (Born with urge)	2.87	2.60	(8)	2.28	(6.5)	(6)
25. (Familiarity)	3.30	2.08	(20.5)	1.33	(22)	(20)
29. (No sane person)	3.55	2.82	(6)	1.95	(8)	(8)

30. (Feebleminded)	1.84	1.43	(32.5)	0.91	(30)	(30)
32. (Devoted leaders)	4.49	2.42	(13)	1.43	(20)	(15)
34. (Sex crime)	3.43	2.83	(5)	2.52	(3)	(4)
35. (Two classes)	1.44	0.73	(34)	0.38	(34)	(34)
36. (Infection & disease)	4.80	1.68	(25)	1.03	(28)	(26)
39. (Love for parents)	3.16	3.28	(1)	2.56	(2)	(2)
40. (Astrology)	2.56	2.15	(17)	1.66	(11)	(16)
41. (Force to preserve)	2.48	2.31	(15)	1.56	(13.5)	(14)
44. (Bosses outline)	2.46	1.60	(27)	0.50	(33)	(33)
45. (Prying)	3.48	2.52	(9)	1.56	(13.5)	(11)
46. (Flood)	2.15	1.43	(32.5)	0.94	(29)	(29)
49. (Rid of immoral people)	2.74	2.12	(19)	1.56	(13.5)	(18)
50. (Mistake to trust)	2.12	1.45	(31)	0.84	(31)	(31)
52. (Sex life)	3.18	2.13	(18)	1.50	(18)	(19)
53. (Talk too much)	3.87	1.83	(22)	1.24	(24)	(24)
57. (Plots)	4.24	1.55	(28)	0.63	(32)	(32)
58. (Homosexuals)	2.29	2.20	(16)	1.54	(16)	(17)
Mean/Person/Item	3.42	2.15		1.53		

**a** The four groups on which these data are based are:

*Group I:* University of Oregon Student Women (N = 47)

*Group II:* University of Oregon and University of California Student Women (N = 54)

*Group III:* University of Oregon and University of California Student Men (N = 57)

*Group IV:* Oregon Service Club Men (N = 68)

In obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted according to N.

**b** D.P.F is based on the difference between the high quartile and the low quartile of the F scale distribution.

**c** D.P.E is based on the difference between the high quartile and the low quartile of the E scale distribution e.g., the D.P.E of 1.52 on Item 1 indicates that the mean of the low quartile on E was 1.52 points lower than the mean of the high quartile on E.

**d** For each item the sum of D.P.F + D.P.E is obtained. The final rank of an item is the rank of this sum in the distribution of sums

for the whole scale.



## 4. The Third F Scale: Forms 45 and 40

Although the F scale (Form 60) might be described as a fairly adequate instrument, it still had some obvious shortcomings, and it was hoped that these might be removed before the scale was used with numerous groups of subjects. It still contained a number of items so poor statistically that they contributed almost nothing to the purpose of the scale. Also, there were two items (numbers 12 and 18) which, despite their ranking 1 and 9 in order of goodness, had to be dropped in the early fall of 1945 because they had lost their war-period timeliness. More than this, experience had shown that when it came to working with highly diverse groups outside the University, a questionnaire shorter than Form 60 was highly desirable. The other scales having already been reduced to an absolute minimum, the F scale had now to bear some of the pruning. Yet, such pruning had to be extremely judicious if the scale was not to lose in comprehensiveness and if, as was hoped, its reliability and its correlation with E were to be raised. Thirty was the number of items decided upon.

Revision consisted mainly in discarding seven items and adding three new ones. Two excellent items were discarded because, as mentioned above, they

were no longer timely. Five items were taken out because they had relatively very low D.P.'s and because other items seemed to fulfill the same functions better: 44 (Bosses outline, R.O. 33), 50 (Mistake to trust, R.O. 31), 30 (Feebleminded, R.O. 30), 22 (Not everybody in government, R.O. 28), and 5 (Red-blooded American, R.O. 27). Several items which ranked low in terms of D.P. were thoroughly revised and kept in the new scale: 35 (Two classes, R.O. 34), 57 (Plots, R.O. 32), and 46 (Flood, R.O. 29).

One of the three new items was the following: »The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.« This is a slightly revised version of an item which appeared in the earlier forms of the PEC scale, where it had proved to be discriminatory both in terms of PEC and in terms of E. Since this item expresses rather well both conventionalism and anti-intracception, it appeared to be a promising addition to the F scale.

A second new item was, »It is best to use some prewar authorities in Germany to keep order and prevent chaos.« At the time this item was formulated – late summer 1945 – General Patton had been accused of using German Nazis and extremely conservative bigwigs to help carry out certain phases of the occupation. His critics argued that this was a poor way to secure the cooperation of democratic elements in Ger-

many; his defenders pointed to the necessity for promoting efficiency and preventing chaos. The issue was a lively one; and it appeared that an item bearing upon it might give the high scorer a chance to express his admiration for military authority, his means-centeredness, his preoccupation with order vs. chaos. (That the item did not work very well is probably due to inadequate wording: we had not dared to be sufficiently explicit about *which* prewar authorities were to be used, so that »prewar« could be taken to mean »pre-Nazi.«)

»Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering,« was the third of the new items. Here the temptation – constantly present during each revision of the F scale – to test a new hypothesis, or better, to obtain quantitative data bearing upon a phenomenon which in clinical study had appeared in relation to the general pattern of potential fascism, became too strong. The item was taken from an editorial in a prominent picture magazine, where it had appeared in a context of political reaction. It seemed well adapted to bring out the sado-masochistic theme believed to be prominent in the personality of the high scorer: he believes that he *has* suffered and, therefore, knows the important things and that those who have not succeeded in raising their status, i.e., the underprivileged, should suffer more if they hope to improve

their lot. The item did not work very well, its rank in order of goodness for men being 29. (Its D.P., 1.70, is still significant at the 5 per cent level, however.) It seems that this was partly because many subjects thought it unreasonable (the mean was 2.54), and partly because, where it was agreed with, it probably appealed to different subjects for different reasons: if it tapped the deep-lying sado-masochistic structures in some high scorers, it also appealed to the surface masochism, and perhaps to the intraceptiveness, of some low scorers.

The final F items, grouped according to the variables to which they pertain, are presented in Table 7 (VII).

### Table 7 (VII)

#### F-Scale Clusters: Forms 45 and 40

a. *Conventionalism*: Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
12. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.
37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.
41. The business man and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.

b. *Authoritarian Submission*: Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
4. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
8. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.
21. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
23. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.
42. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.
44. Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering.

c. *Authoritarian Aggression*: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

12. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.
13. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

19. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
25. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
27. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
34. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.
37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.
39. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.

d. *Anti-intracception*: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.

9. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things.
31. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.
37. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.
41. The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.

e. *Superstition and Stereotypy*: The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

4. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.
8. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.
16. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places.
26. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
29. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.
33. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earth-quake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

f. *Power and »Toughness«*: Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

2. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power.
13. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
19. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
22. It is best to use some prewar authorities in Germany to keep order and prevent chaos.
23. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted

leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

26. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
38. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

g. *Destructiveness and Cynicism*: Generalized hostility, vilification of the human.

6. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
43. Familiarity breeds contempt.

h. *Projectivity*: The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

18. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them.
31. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.
33. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earth-quake or flood that will destroy the whole world.
35. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.
38. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

i. *Sex*: Exaggerated concern with sexual »goings-on.«



25. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
35. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.
39. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.

Reliability of the scale, mean score per item, S.D., and range for each of the fourteen groups (total  $N = 1518$ ) taking Form 40 and/or 45 are given in Table 8 (VII). The average of the reliability coefficients is .90, their range .81 to .97. Not only is there a slight improvement in reliability over Form 60 (av.  $r = .87$ ) and a very marked improvement over the original Form 78 (av.  $r = .74$ ), but the scale has now been developed to a point where it meets rigorous statistical requirements. A reliability of .90 may be interpreted to mean that the scale can place individuals along a dimension – in this case a broad and complex dimension – with a small margin of error. In other words, the score attained by an individual can be relied upon in the sense that chance errors of measurement have been minimized, so that in a repetition of the scale, at a time when political-socioeconomic conditions were generally the same as before, his new score would either be the same as his first or fall within narrow li-

mits above or below it. The degree of reliability attained here is within the range which characterizes acceptable intelligence tests.

Table 8 (VII)

## Reliability of the F Scale (Forms 40 and 45)

Group	N	Reliability	Mean	S.D.	Range
<i>Form 40:</i>					
George Washington Univ. Women	132	.84	3.51	.90	1.2–5.4
California Service Club Men	63	.94	4.08	1.03	1.8–7.0
Middle-Class Men	69	.92	3.69	1.22	1.3–6.7
Middle-Class Women	154	.93	3.62	1.26	1.1–6.7
Working-Class Men	61	.88	4.19	1.18	1.8–6.9
Working-Class Women	53	.97	3.86	1.67	1.3–6.6
Los Angeles Men	117	.92	3.68	1.17	1.1–6.0
Los Angeles Women	130	.91	3.49	1.13	1.2–5.8
<b>Mean<sup>a</sup></b>	779	.91	3.76	1.20	1.3–6.4
<i>Form 45:</i>					
Testing Class Women	59	.89	3.62	.99	1.3–5.9
San Quentin Men Prisoners	110	.87	4.73	.86	2.0–6.8
Psychiatric Clinic Women <sup>b</sup>	71	.94	3.69	1.30	1.0–6.3
Psychiatric Clinic Men <sup>b</sup>	50	.89	3.82	1.01	1.7–5.9
Mean	290	.90	3.96	1.04	1.5–6.2
<i>Form 40 and Form 45:</i>					
Employment Service Men Veterans	106	.89	3.74	1.04	1.2–5.8
Maritime School Men	343	.81	4.06	.77	1.6–6.1
Mean <sup>a</sup>	449	.85	3.90	.90	1.4–5.9

Over-all mean	1518	.90	3.84	1.10	1.4–6.3
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**a** In obtaining the combined group means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

**b** Due to a substitution of forms, the F scale for the Psychiatric Clinic subjects contained only 28 items.

The means, though they vary from one group to another (a matter to be discussed later), are fairly close, on the whole, to the neutral point. As is to be expected from administration of the scale to a great variety of subjects, the range and the S.D. are greater than in previous forms. While no distribution curves have actually been made, the scatter diagrams indicate that they would be fairly normal in form (symmetrical but slightly platykurtic).

**a. INTERNAL CONSISTENCY.** The Discriminatory Powers of the scale items, as shown in Table 9 (VII), are considerably higher on the average (2.85) than in the case of Form 60 (2.15). All of the items differentiate significantly between the high and the low quartiles. It is to be noted that numerous items taken over without change from Form 60 work much better here than in that instance. This is probably due in part to the fact that the diverse groups given Form 45–40 included more extreme scorers and in part to improvement of the scale as a whole: a good item differentiates the more sharply between the upper and

lower quartiles the more successfully the total scale distinguishes individuals who are actually extreme with respect to the trends being measured.

The fact that the D.P.'s are somewhat higher, on the average, for women than for men is deserving of some comment. This phenomenon would seem to be connected with the fact that there were three groups of men – Maritime School, San Quentin Inmates, and Working-Class Men – in whose cases the reliability of the scale was relatively low (.81-.88). Since these groups of men were less educated than most of our subjects, there is considerable likelihood that they failed to understand some of the scale items, a circumstance that would work against high D.P.'s as well as against reliability. Moreover, these are the three groups who, of all those studied, obtained the highest mean scores. It can be inferred from this that there was too much general agreement with some of the items, something which, as we have seen, tends to lower the D.P. This raises the question of whether we did not encounter in these groups not only more extreme manifestations of potential fascism than had been anticipated but also patterns of prefascist personality trends that the F scale did not adequately cover. Most of the work that went into the construction and revision of the scale was performed with groups of subjects in which the high scorers were, in the main, highly

conventional. The procedure of retaining items which differentiated best within these groups was probably not the best one for constructing an instrument which would work with maximum efficiency in groups where tendencies to psychopathy and delinquency were much more pronounced. This is a matter to be discussed in more detail later.

Despite the absolute differences in the D.P.'s between men and women, items which work well for one sex tend, in general, to work well for the other. The correlation between the D.P. rank orders for the men and those for the women is .84. This is sufficient justification for averaging the D.P.'s of the two groups to obtain an over-all »order of goodness« for each item. Since the differences between men and women, in the present context, are probably as great as the differences between any two groups of the same sex in the present sample, it is highly probable that a correlation between the D.P. rankings of any two such groups would be in the neighborhood of .84. There appear to be no general or systematic differences between the items which work better for men and those which work better for women.

Mean scores for the men's groups are somewhat higher on the average than mean scores for the women's groups. This phenomenon would seem to be due primarily to the three male groups discussed

above whose scores are particularly high. If men and women of the same socioeconomic class are compared, the means are not significantly different. Moreover, items which appeal most strongly to the men are much the same as those which appeal most strongly to the women, the rank-order correlation between the means for men and those for women being .95.

b. **CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS.** As a part of an independent investigation, the E, PEC, and F scales (from Forms 40 and 45) were administered to 900 students in an Elementary Psychology Class at the University of California. It was decided not to include the data from this new college group among the general results of the present study because the total sample of subjects was already weighted too heavily on the side of young and relatively well-educated people. However, the 517 women from this psychology class constitute the only group in whose case the scales were subjected to an item-by-item correlational analysis.<sup>10</sup> The results of this analysis will be summarized here.



## Table 9 (VII)

Means and Discriminatory Powers of the F-Scale  
Items (Forms 40 And 45)<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> These data are based on all fourteen groups taking Forms 40 and 45 (see Table 8 (VII)).

Each item of the F scale was correlated with every other item. The average of the 435 coefficients was .13, the range – .05 to .44.<sup>11</sup> In addition, each item was correlated with the remainder of the scale, the mean  $r$  here being .33, the range .15 to .52. In the case of the E scale the mean interitem  $r$  was .42, and the mean item-total score  $r$ , .59. Whereas the E scale has about the same degree of unidimensionality as do acceptable intelligence tests (in the case of the 1937 Stanford-Binet Revision the average interitem  $r$  is about .38, the average item-total score  $r$ , .61), the F scale rates considerably lower in this regard. Despite the scale's relative lack of surface homogeneity, however, we are justified in speaking of an F pattern or syndrome, for the items do »hang together« in the sense that each is significantly correlated with the scale as a whole. It will be recalled in this connection that in constructing the F scale two purposes were held in mind: (a) to seek over a wide area for diverse

responses that belonged to a single syndrome, and (b) to construct an instrument which would yield a reliable prediction of scores on E. It is clear that the first purpose has been in large part realized, although the search for additional items that would help characterize the F syndrome could be continued with profit. The fact that the individual F items correlate .25 on the average with the total E scale augurs well for the fulfillment of the second purpose – a matter to which we shall turn in a moment.

Proof that the variables or groups of items used in thinking about the F scale are not clusters in the statistical sense, is contained in the data from the present group of 517 women. Although the items within each of the Form 45 F-clusters tend to intercorrelate (.11 to .24), the items in any one cluster correlate with one another no better than they do with numerous items from other clusters. We are justified in using these clusters, therefore, only as *a priori* aids to discussion.



## D. Correlations of the F Scale with E and with PEC

Correlations of F with the E and PEC scales, based on the three questionnaire forms and derived from all the groups used in the study, are shown in Table 10 (VII). The major result expressed in this table is that the correlation between E and F has increased with the successive revisions of the scale until it has reached a point (about .75 on the average in Forms 40, 45) where scores on the former can be predicted with fair accuracy from scores on the latter.

Table 10 (VII)

### Correlations of the F Scale with the A-S, E, and PEC Scales in the Several Forms of the Questionnaire

	N	F. A-S	F. E	F. PEC
<i>Groups taking Form 78:</i>				
Public Speaking Class Women	140	.55	.58	.52
Public Speaking Class Men	52	.52	.56	.45
Extension Class Women	40	.49	.74	.54
Professional Women	63	.57	.73	.65
Over-all: Form 78a	295	.53	.65	.54
<i>Groups taking Form 60:</i>				
Univ. of Oregon Student Women	47		.72	.29
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	54		.78	.49

Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	57	.58	.43
Oregon Service Club Men	68	.69	.29
Oregon Service Club Men <sup>b</sup>	60		.22
Over-all: Form 60	286	.69	.34
<i>Groups taking Form 45:</i>			
Testing Class Women	59	.79	.54
San Quentin Men Prisoners	110	.59	.23
Psychiatric Clinic Women	71	.86	.62 <sup>c</sup>
Psychiatric Clinic Men	50	.76	.57 <sup>c</sup>
Working-Class Men and Women	50	.85	.70
Employment Service Men Veterans	51	.67	.62 <sup>d</sup>
Maritime School Men	179	.56	.39 <sup>d</sup>
Over-all: Form 45	570	.73	.52
<i>Groups taking Form 40:<sup>e</sup></i>			
George Washington Univ. Women	132	.69	.53
California Service Club Men	63	.80	.59
Middle-Class Men	69	.81	.71
Working-Class Men	61	.76	.60
Middle-Class Women	154	.83	.70
Working-Class Women	53	.87	.72
Los Angeles Men	117	.82	.58
Los Angeles Women	130	.75	.61
Employment Service Men Veterans	55	.72	.62
Maritime School Men	165	.62	.39
Over-all: Form 40	999	.77	.61
Over-all: All Forms	2150	.53	.73

**a** In obtaining the over-all group means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.

**b** This group of Oregon Service Club Men received a short questionnaire form containing only the F scale and half of the PEC scale.

c For the correlations of F with PEC in the Psychiatric Clinic groups, the number of women was 45, the number of men 29, due to a substitution of forms.

d These F-PEC correlations are based on both Forms 40 and 45. Since it was considered highly unlikely that the presence or absence of 5 E items would affect the correlation of F and PEC, the two forms are taken together in order to have the advantage of the larger N's. The total N is 106 for the Employment Service Men Veterans, 343 for the Maritime School Men.

e In Form 40, it will be recalled, only the »A« half of the 10-item E scale was used.

The correlation between F and E varies rather widely from one group to another, a matter that seems to depend mainly upon the reliability of the scales themselves.<sup>12</sup> Thus, in the San Quentin group, where the reliability of F is .87 and that of E only .65, the correlation between the two scales is at the lowest, .59; while in the case of the Working-Class Women, where the reliability of F climbs to .97,<sup>13</sup> the correlation is at its maximum, .87. It is obvious, therefore, that if the reliabilities of the two scales were increased (which can be done by increasing the number of items within each) the correlation between E and F would be very high indeed.<sup>14</sup> This is not to say, however, that E and F for all practical purposes measure the same thing. A correlation of .775 means that about two-thirds of the subjects who score in the high quar-

tile on the one scale, score in the high quartile on the other, and that there are practically no reversals, i.e., cases in which a subject is high on one scale but low on the other. If one wished to use the F scale alone in order to single out subjects who were practically certain to be highly ethnocentric, i.e., in the high quartile on the present E scale, it would be necessary for him to limit himself to those scoring at the very highest extreme on F, perhaps the top 10 per cent. As pointed out earlier, there are reasons why some discrepancy between the two scales should be expected. Surely there are some individuals who have the kind of susceptibility to fascist propaganda with which the F scale is concerned but who for one reason or another tend to inhibit expressions of hostility against minority groups (subjects high on F but low on E). And we have good reason to believe that there are other people who rather freely repeat the clichés of ethnocentrism – perhaps in accordance with the climate of opinion in which they are living – without this being expressive of deep-lying trends in their personalities (subjects high on E but low on F). Such »exceptions« will be taken up in more detail later.

It is to be noted that the correlation between F and E is slightly higher on the average in the case of groups taking Form 40 than for groups taking Form 45. This means that F correlates slightly better with

the A half of the E scale than with the total E scale, and that the correlation must be still lower in the case of the B half of the scale. In several groups taking Form 45 the correlations of EA and of EB with F were calculated, in addition to the correlation of total E with F. The results appear in Table 11 (VII). In each group EA.F is notably higher than EB.F, and about the same as EA + B.F. It may be recalled that the A half of the scale refers to highly generalized ethnocentrism and contains no A-S items, while the B half is made up of four A-S items and one Negro item. It happened that this Negro item was a relatively poor one in the statistical sense (rank order, 5 for men, 10 for women), but this is not enough to account for the superiority of the EA.F correlations. It seems, rather, that the F syndrome is actually more closely related to general ethnocentrism than to anti-Semitism. This is in keeping with the finding, reported earlier, that in Form 78 the F scale correlated more highly with the E scale than with the A-S scale. Although anti-Semitism is still to be understood primarily as an aspect of general ethnocentrism, there can be no doubt but that it has some special features of its own. Some of these features are described in Chapter XVI.[15]

Table 11 (VII)

Correlations of the F Scale with Each Half and with  
the Whole of the E Scale

Group	N	Correlations		
		E <sub>A</sub> .F	E <sub>B</sub> .F	E <sub>A</sub> + B.F
San Quentin Men Prisoners	110	.56	.45	.59
Employment Service Men Veterans	51	.66	.61	.67
Maritime School Men	179	.61	.40	.56
Testing Class Women	59	.77	.66	.79
Mean		.65	.53	.65

The F syndrome bears only a moderately close relation to politico-economic conservatism, the average correlation for Forms 45 and 40 being .57. Our interpretation is that high scores on PEC may proceed either from genuine conservatism or from pseudoconservatism, and that it is the latter which is most expressive of the personality trends which the F scale measures. This is in keeping with the finding that E, which is closely related to F, also shows only moderate correlation with PEC. The E.PEC correlation is about the same as the F.PEC correlation. It would appear that general ethnocentrism, as measured by the present scales, is mainly an expression of those perso-

nality structures which the F scale measures; politico-economic conservatism, while it may have this same source, may be more dependent than E upon factors in the individual's contemporary situation.

## E. Differences in Mean F-Scale Score Among Various Groups

We may turn now to a consideration of the mean F-scale scores of different groups. These means have been set forth in Table 12 (VII). It is well to recall here what was stated at the beginning (Chapter I, C),<sup>[16]</sup> that since no steps were taken to insure that each group studied was actually representative of a larger section of the population, we are in no position to generalize from the present results on mean scores, however suggestive they might be. (A large-scale community study would be necessary in order to produce a sound estimate of the relative amounts of fascist potential in different sections of the general population. The F scale, we believe, is worthy to be used in such a study, though it would have to be modified somewhat in order to be suitable for groups with little education.) It seems well to recall, too, that the group with which a subject filled out the questionnaire does not necessarily represent a group membership that is significant for the present study. The differences with which we are here concerned are not very large, while the variability within each group is marked. Only rarely is the difference between two groups greater than one S.D. In our view, we should



find large group differences in mean F score only when membership in a group has some psychological significance, and this does not seem to be true of most of the present groups. (A study of the F-scale score in relation to group membership factors such as those covered by page 1 of the questionnaire (income, religion, etc.) would probably be rewarding. In view of the high correlation between F and E we should expect results generally similar to those found in the case of the latter scale, but discrepancies would be particularly interesting.) Nevertheless, some important sociological and psychological differences among the present groups are known to exist – indeed some of these groups have been described as »key« groups – and, if the F scale is valid, we should expect differences in mean score that are intelligible in the light of our general theory.

Table 12 (VII)

Mean F-Scale Scores of Groups Taking the Several  
Forms of the Questionnaire

Group	N	Mean	S.D.
<i>Form 78:</i>			
Public Speaking Class Women	140	3.94	.71
Public Speaking Class Men	52	3.72	.57
Extension Class Women	40	3.75	.70
Professional Women	63	3.43	.86

Over-all mean, Form 78	295	3.71	.71
<i>Form 60:</i>			
Univ. of Oregon Student Women	47	3.32	.86
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Women	54	3.39	.96
Univ. of Oregon and Univ. of California Student Men	57	3.82	.93
Oregon Service Club Men	68	3.74	.81
Oregon Service Club Men (A Form only)	60	3.25	.71
Over-all mean, Form 60	286	3.50	.85
<i>Form 45:</i>			
Testing Class Women	59	3.62	.99
San Quentin Men Prisoners	110	4.73	.86
Psychiatric Clinic Women	71	3.69	1.30
Psychiatric Clinic Men	50	3.82	1.01
Over-all mean, Form 45	290	3.96	1.04
<i>Form 40:</i>			
George Washington Univ. Women	132	3.51	.90
California Service Club Men	63	4.08	1.03
Middle-Class Women	154	3.62	1.26
Middle-Class Men	69	3.69	1.22
Working-Class Women	53	3.86	1.67
Working-Class Men	61	4.19	1.18
Los Angeles Women	130	3.49	1.13
Los Angeles Men	117	3.68	1.17
Over-all mean, Form 40	779	3.76	1.20
<i>Forms 40 and 45:</i>			
Employment Service Men Veterans	106	3.74	1.04
Maritime School Men	343	4.06	.77
Over-all mean, Forms 40 and 45	449	3.90	.90
Over-all mean, Four Forms (78, 60, 45, 40):	2099	3.78	

Of all the fourteen groups taking Form 40–45, the San Quentin Inmates obtained the highest mean score,

4.73. This mean is significantly different (C.R. = 3.2) from that of the next highest scoring group, the Working-Class Men, whose mean is 4.19. Between the San Quentin group and the lowest scoring group of men (Los Angeles Men,  $M = 3.68$ ) the difference is very marked (C.R. = 7.8). In view of all that has been written concerning the close affinity of criminality and fascism, these results should not be surprising. Since the findings on the »key« San Quentin group are analyzed in detail in Chapter XXI,<sup>[17]</sup> further discussion here is unnecessary.

Service Club Men and Working-Class Men do not differ significantly in mean F score. This will come as a surprise only to those who have become accustomed to explaining all important differences in social attitudes on the basis of socioeconomic group membership, and who look to the working man as the main carrier of liberal ideas. It is true, of course, as a matter of economic and social fact, that the crucial role in the struggle against increasing concentration of economic power will have to be played by the working people, acting in accordance with their self-interest, but it is foolhardy to underestimate the susceptibility to fascist propaganda within these masses themselves. For our part, we see no reason to suppose that the authoritarian structures with which we are concerned would be any less well developed in the working class than in

other segments of the population. If it be argued that our sample of working-class men might be an unusually reactionary one, the answer is that approximately half of this sample come either from the militantly »liberal« United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.) or from classes at the California Labor School, and that there is no reason to suppose that men from the United Seaman's Service or new members of the I.L.W.U. – who constitute the remainder of the sample – are more conservative than working men generally. For that matter, the extremely high scoring San Quentin Inmates come in very large part from the working class, and there is good reason to suppose that their general outlook depends upon their background as well as upon the circumstance of their being in prison.

It appears that differences among the present groups of men depend more upon the factor of contact with liberal organizations and liberal thought than upon socioeconomic group membership. This is the basis on which we would explain the relatively low means of the Middle-Class Men (3.69) and the Los Angeles Men (3.68), both of which are significantly different (beyond the 5 per cent level) from that of the Service Club Men (4.08). The Middle-Class Men and the Service Club Men are quite similar with respect to economic and occupational status; the difference bet-

ween them that is reflected in their F-scale mean lies, most probably, in whatever it is that disposes the former to appear at a meeting of the P.T.A. or the layman's league of a Presbyterian Church or at evening classes at the California Labor School, and the latter at a Service Club luncheon. This, in our opinion, is primarily a psychological matter; the difference lies in the degree of something which may be labelled, for the moment, a disposition toward liberalism or progressivism or humanitarianism. The Los Angeles Men, it will be recalled, were recruited primarily from the University and the movie communities. Thus, though their socioeconomic status was certainly no lower than that of the Service Club Men in the San Francisco area, the setting in which they were found was one of greater liberalism. The Maritime School Group, made up predominantly of men with working-class and lower middle-class antecedents who are out to raise their status, belongs on the basis of its mean (4.06) with the Service Club Men and the Working-Class Men, while the Psychiatric Clinic Men ( $M = 3.82$ ) and the Employment Service Veterans ( $M = 3.74$ ), who probably are more heterogeneous with respect to either class status or liberal affiliations, have intermediate positions in the rank order of means.

It has been pointed out that the fact of the men in our total sample having a higher mean than the

women is due primarily to the presence in the male sample of the outstandingly high scoring groups that have just been considered. The present data show that where social group membership is constant, the means for men are not significantly different from those of women. Thus, in the case of the Working-Class Women and the Working-Class Men, the C.R. is only 1.22, while the differences between men and women in the Psychiatric Clinic, the Los Angeles and the Middle-Class groups are practically negligible. It is to be noted, however, that in each case the men are slightly higher, and that in a larger sample the difference might become significant.

Among the women's groups, the only difference that approaches significance is that existing between the Working-Class Women ( $M = 3.86$ ), on the one hand, and the George Washington University Women ( $M = 3.51$ ) and Los Angeles Women ( $M = 3.49$ ) on the other. If a true difference exists, the explanation would seem to be the same as that advanced in the case of some of the men's groups: that the latter groups of women have been in closer touch with liberal trends.

It is of some interest to consider group differences in mean F score in relation to the mean E score of these same groups. In general, groups that score highest on F tend to score highest on E also. The most no-

table discrepancies occur in the cases of the George Washington Women, who are relatively much higher on E ( $M = 4.04$ ) than on F ( $M = 3.51$ ), and the Working-Class Men, who are slightly higher on F ( $M = 4.19$ ) than on E ( $M = 3.92$ ). It seems probable that in the case of this group of women, we have to deal with a regional difference: many observers have noted that there is more prejudice in the East than in the West. It may be, therefore, that although these College women were relatively liberal as a group, they were led by the prevailing climate of opinion to go fairly high on E. This is in keeping with the fact that the correlation between F and E in this group was one of the lowest obtained.

The group of Working-Class Men is the only one in which the mean E score is lower than the mean F score. This is probably attributable to the success of indoctrination in antidiscrimination which occurs in the »liberal« unions to which a majority of these subjects belong. Apparently, however, this indoctrination did not go so far as to modify those attitudes centering around authoritarianism, which are more pronounced in this group than in most others. One might say that if this indoctrination were dispensed with, or if propaganda having an opposite direction were substituted for it, then the results from this group would fall into line with all the others.

It has often been suggested that working-class people are relatively uninhibited in expressing the prejudice that they have and that this does not go very deep, while middle-class people are more restrained in giving vent to their – often deeper – prejudice. That nothing to support this formulation is to be found in the present data may be due most largely to the fact that our ethnocentric statements were for the most part fairly restrained, i.e., formulated in such a way that a pseudodemocratic person could agree with them and still maintain the illusion that he was not prejudiced.



## F. Validation by Case Studies: the F-Scale Responses of Mack and Larry

The responses of Mack and Larry on the F scale may now be compared with their remarks in the interview. In Table 13 (VII) are shown the scores of Mack and Larry, the group mean, and the D.P. for each of the 38 items in the F scale (Form 78), the items having been grouped according to the scheme of F-scale variables.

Table 13 (VII)

### Responses of Mack and Larry on the F Scale (Form 78)

Item	Mack	Larry	Group Mean <sup>a</sup> (N = 295)	Group D.P. <sup>a</sup>
<i>Conventionalism</i>				
12. (Modern church)	5	7	4.67	0.19
19. (One should avoid)	2	1	3.63	0.76
38. (Emphasis in the colleges)	5	2	3.91	1.20
55. (Leisure)	7	6	5.20	2.11
58. (What a man does)	6	1	3.48	1.70
60. (Important values)	5	5	4.17	1.60
Cluster mean	5.00	3.66	4.18	1.26
<i>Authoritarian Submission</i>				
20. (Progressive education)	3	1	3.28	1.07
23. (Undying love)	6	7	3.62	2.61
32. (Essential for learning)	7	6	3.61	1.67

39. (Supernatural force)	1	1	3.97	2.54
43. (Sciences like chemistry)	1	2	4.35	2.79
50. (Obedience and respect)	6	2	3.72	3.09
74. (Tireless leaders)	2	1	5.00	1.66
77. (No sane, normal person)	6	5	4.12	2.12
Cluster mean	4.00	3.13	3.96	2.19

*Authoritarian Aggression*

6. (Women restricted)	2	1	2.93	1.75
23. (Undying love)	6	7	3.62	2.61
31. (Homosexuals)	6	6	3.22	2.16
47. (Honor)	5	2	3.00	2.09
75. (Sex crimes)	6	1	3.26	2.81
Cluster mean	5.00	3.40	3.21	2.28

*Anti-intracception*

28. (Novels or stories)	5	1	3.02	1.29
38. (Emphasis in colleges)	5	2	3.91	1.20
53. (Things too intimate)	3	5	4.82	1.99
55. (Leisure)	7	6	5.20	2.11
58. (What a man does)	6	1	3.48	1.70
66. (Books and movies)	6	2	4.10	2.48
Cluster mean	5.33	2.83	4.09	1.80

*Superstition*

2. (Astrology)	5	6	2.60	1.74
10. (Pearl Harbor Day)	1	1	2.22	2.20
39. (Supernatural force)	1	1	3.97	2.54
43. (Sciences like chemistry)	1	2	4.35	2.79
65. (World catastrophe)	1	1	2.58	1.55
Cluster mean	1.80	2.20	3.78	1.70

*Power and »Toughness«*

9. (Red-blooded life)	1	2	3.99	2.04
35. (Law in own hands)	1	1	2.50	1.42
47. (Honor)	5	2	3.00	2.09
70. (Plots)	7	2	3.27	1.65
74. (Tireless leaders)	2	1	5.00	1.66
Cluster mean	3.20	1.60	3.55	1.77

*Destructiveness and Cynicism*

3. (Force to restore)	3	5	3.04	1.98
9. (Return to fundamentals)	1	2	3.99	2.04
14. (Rats ...germs)	6	5	4.44	1.60
17. (Familiarity)	3	1	3.33	1.86
24. (Things unstable)	5	5	5.01	0.79
30. (Reports of atrocities)	6	5	4.20	0.43
35. (Law in own hands)	1	1	2.50	1.42
42. (For one reason)	1	1	2.06	1.05
56. (Crime wave)	5	5	4.60	1.16
59. (Always war)	7	1	4.26	2.59
67. (Eye to profit)	7	3	3.71	2.21
Cluster mean	4.09	3.09	3.74	1.56

*Projectivity*

46. (Sex orgies)	5	2	3.64	2.11
56. (Crime wave)	5	5	4.60	1.16
65. (World catastrophe)	1	1	2.58	1.55
70. (Plots)	7	2	3.27	1.65
73. (Infection and disease)	5	1	4.79	2.02
Cluster mean	4.60	2.20	3.78	1.70

*Sex*

31. (Homosexuality)	6	6	3.22	2.16
42. (For one reason)	1	1	2.06	1.05
46. (Sex orgies)	5	2	3.64	2.11
75. (Sex crimes)	6	1	3.26	2.81
Cluster mean	4.50	2.50	3.05	2.03
Over-all mean <sup>b</sup>	4.31	2.95	3.71	1.80

<sup>a</sup> The group means and D.P.'s are based on all four groups taking Form 78 (see Table 3 (VII), note a).

<sup>b</sup> Over-all means are based on the sum of the 38 individual items, with no overlap.

The mean F-scale scores of the two men seem to be in keeping with the earlier observation that they do not

represent the most extreme cases found in the study. Mack's mean score, 4.31, is just inside the high quartile for the group of Public Speaking Men in which he was tested; it is only slightly above the average score of the Working-Class Men (4.19) and well below that of the San Quentin Group (4.73). Larry's mean score, 2.95, is barely low enough to be included in the low quartile for the Public Speaking Men. It is, however, well below any of the group means obtained in the study.

Turning to the 9 variables within the scale, it may be noted that on 7 of them Mack's mean score is above the group mean. He deviates from the group most markedly in the case of Authoritarian Aggression. This is consistent with what was set down as one of the outstanding features of his interview, that is, his tendency to blame and to condemn on moral grounds a wide variety of individuals, groups, and agencies – F[ranklin] D[elano] R[oosevelt], the New Deal, the O.W.I., the Civil Service, in addition to various ethnic minorities. That homosexuals, sex criminals, those who insult »our honor,« and anyone who does not have undying love for his parents should be regarded in the same way is not surprising. It is to be noted, however, that he does not agree that »women should be restricted in certain ways.« This inconsistency may be interpreted in the light of the following

quotation from the clinical section of his interview:<sup>18</sup>

»I hope to get married to the girl I'm going with now. She is an awfully nice companion. Most girls are interested only in a good time and want fellows with lots of money to spend. I didn't have the money for giving them a swell time. The girl I'm in love with now lived nine miles from me. She attended a rival high school. I dated her once in high school. When I got back from the army, I worked in a lumber mill. This girl had graduated from – and started teaching. Her uncle is the vice-president of the bank. I talked to him about buying an automobile that she was interested in. I looked it over for her, since I knew something about cars, and told her it was in good condition. I got started going with her that way. I found out that she wasn't interested in money, but was interested in me in spite of my discharge from the army, my poor health, and prospects. She's just very good – not beautiful, but a tremendously nice personality. She is French with some Irish in her. She has a nice figure and is very wholesome. When we get married depends on circumstances. It's quite a responsibility. She wants to get married now; she is teaching in –. I'm under the GI Bill. If I get assurance of four years in college. I might get married this spring. We're well suited; I know she's interested in me, because I have so little to offer. We're both at the proper age. I intend to work part time. I don't like her teaching; I like to support my wife. I've always had that idea. But maybe under the circumstances, that won't be fully possible. She is a good cook and that is an asset, what with my stomach condition. When I tell her that you approve of our marriage, she will be pleased, but, of course, I'm always a

man to make my own decisions.«

It seems that Mack does believe that »a woman's place is in the home,« but was prevented by the logic of his situation at the time from saying so in his questionnaire.

Sex, Anti-intracception, Conventionalism, and Projectivity, in the order named, are the other variables on which Mack is well above the group mean. Sex was not mentioned in the interview protocol given in Chapter II.[19] The following quotation from the clinical part of Mack's interview may, however, throw some light on his responses to the Sex items in the scale:

(Where did you get your sex instruction?) »I never had any from my parents, though I did get some suggestions from my aunt; no real instruction. What I know I have picked up from reading. I've listened to men talk, but accepted little of it; I weighed it in the light of what I have read.«

(What was your first sex experience?) »It was in 1940–41, the aftermath of a New Year's party in Washington. There was liquor. I was always a backward boy.«

According to well-supported theory, it is precisely the kind of sexual inhibition and »backwardness« described here, and further expressed in the extreme

conventionalism of the passage about plans for marriage, that lies behind the moralistic and punitive attitude toward the supposed sexuality of other people which is the main theme of the Sex items in the scale. The inconsistency seen in Mack's disagreement with the statement that »men are interested in women for only one reason« might be explained in the same way as was his response to Item 6 (Women restricted): agreement would contradict too sharply the facts of his present situation. It is to be noted, however, that the item (For one reason) has a very low group mean and a low D.P.

Mack's interview could serve well as a model of Anti-intrapeption. His emphasis upon practicality, efficiency, and diligence as ends in themselves, his tendency to ignore social and psychological determinants of human characteristics and human events, his failure to take into account possible inner sources of his opinions, the discrepancies between his expressed values and what appear to be his real motives, were outstanding features of his interview. The several Anti-intrapeption items of the F scale seem to have afforded him an excellent opportunity to express these same tendencies. An interesting discrepancy occurs in the case of Item 53 (Things too intimate), where his score of 3 is well below the group mean. This response is not very consistent with the pattern of values that he sets

forth in his interview, but it seems quite consistent with what he *does* in the interview: as the above passage in which he discusses his approaching marriage well illustrates, he is able within the space of an hour to come to a rather free discussion of certain intimate matters with a stranger. True, his generally deferential behavior in the interview is probably an aspect of his Authoritarian Submission, but, more than this, there is a strong indication that however much Mack may assert his independence he is really a rather lonesome and troubled young man who would like to talk with someone who understood him.

One familiar with Mack's interview might have expected him to go higher on Conventionalism. One of his major reasons for rejecting so many groups is that they violate conventional values, and his positive evaluations of ingroups are in the same terms – honesty, charity, thrift, diligence, etc. His ideas about work and about love and marriage seem to be utterly conventional. True, his mean score for Conventionalism is as high as it is for any other variable save Anti-intraception, and one reason why he does not stand out more sharply from the group is that the group mean itself is high – higher than for any of the other variables. Furthermore, the Conventionalism items, as a group, were not very discriminating, the mean D.P., 1.26, being the lowest of those obtained for the se-



veral variables. Item 19 (One should avoid), on which Mack's score is below the group mean, does not discriminate between the high and low quartiles; that he should not agree with it seems consistent with his expressed value for independence. It is interesting that despite his rejection of religion in the interview, he refuses to criticize the modern church when invited to do so by Item 12. His conventionalism will not allow him to attack so well-established an institution.

From Mack's interview (Chapter II)[20] we inferred that one reason he accuses various groups and agencies of wishing to establish a closely cohesive and selfishly exploitive ingroup was that he wished to do the same thing himself; unable to justify such anti-social wishes, he sees them as existing not in himself but in the world around him. This is projectivity in a rather extreme form, and if Mack had not gone above the group mean on this variable, in his scale responses, we should have had to conclude that something was radically wrong with the scale. His score of 7 on Item 70 (Plot) seems perfectly in keeping with what he had to say about politics in his interview. His responses to Items 46 (Sex orgies) and 73 (Infection and disease) are consistent with the picture of sexual inhibition given above. That he is well below the group mean on Item 65 (World catastrophe) seems attributable to the value for hard-headed scientificness

which he expressed both in his interview and in his response to items under the heading of Superstition. It is notable that his scientific »realism« does not insure that he keeps his feet on the ground when it comes to interpreting social events. (Indeed, it seems to have the opposite effect, and one might inquire if this is not generally true.)

Mack stands only slightly above the group mean on Destructiveness and Cynicism. This is a reminder of the fact that his interview leaves the impression of a relatively »mild case«; he makes no rabid statements, nor does he show any taste for violence. Attention to the individual items of the Destructiveness and Cynicism group shows that it is those pertaining to open or all-out aggression on which he scores at or below the mean, while he goes well above the mean on items that have to do primarily with cynicism. It is interesting to recall, in this connection, his outstandingly high score on Authoritarian Aggression. One might say that Mack cannot express aggression directly unless it is done in the name of some moral authority or unless it is against some group that has been rejected on moral grounds.

It might be suggested that another way in which Mack handles aggression is by means of cynicism. There was certainly no want of cynicism in his interview – the bureaus grab power, the civil servants

think only of themselves, Roosevelt selfishly seeks a fourth term, etc. – and he obtains top scores on the items most expressive of this trend: 30 (Reports of atrocities), 59 (Always war), 67 (Eye to profit). This is, of course, hypothesizing that Mack has unconscious aggressive tendencies which are projected onto human nature and the world. Something like a high-water mark in cynicism is reached by Mack when he agrees, rather emphatically, with both Item 30 (Reports of atrocities are exaggerated) and Item 48 (Germans and Japs should be wiped out) of the E scale: in agreeing with the former he is saying that the Germans were not as bad as they were pictured; in agreeing with the latter he is saying that nevertheless we ought to wipe out as many of them as possible.

On the strength of Mack's interview, we should expect him to obtain one of his highest mean scores on Authoritarian Submission. Glorification of such in-group authorities as General Marshall, the War Department, the big capitalists, and God as »strictly a man,« was one of the interview's outstanding features. Yet his scale score on this variable (4.0) is at the group mean. Consideration of the items which pertain to this variable can effect some reconciliation of scale and interview, but it also reveals certain weaknesses in the Form 78 scale. The items on which Mack scores well above the mean – 23 (Undying love), 32 (Es-

sential for learning), 50 (Obedience and respect), and 77 (No sane, normal person) – are those which express Authoritarian Submission in its purest form: three of them have to do with family loyalty and the third with authoritarian education. When it comes to the items which have to do with religion, however – 39 (Supernatural force) and 43 (Sciences like chemistry) – and in which ideas and feelings first experienced, presumably, in relationships with parents are now represented on a cosmic plane, his value for the objective-scientific comes to the fore and his scores are as low as they could be. One might say that Mack's submissive tendencies are insufficiently sublimated to permit their expression in abstract religious terms; the forces which are important for him are more tangible; they have concrete existence either in men or in physical objects. In this light, it is surprising that he does not agree with Item 74 (Tireless leaders). This item, be it noted, has a very high group mean and a relatively low Discriminatory Power. It seems likely that for some of the truly submissive subjects, like Mack, the item is too open, comes too close home, so that in responding they go contrary to their strongest feeling, while the great majority of the subjects, for whom the item was not emotionally involving, responded in accordance with the element of objective truth in the statement. Rephrasing of this

item in later forms seems to have improved it by minimizing the rational aspect and by putting the emphasis more squarely on leadership. Another poor item, it seems, is 20 (Progressive education). Liberals and potential fascists alike, very probably, are attracted by the word »progressive.« That Mack is no real supporter of progressive education is attested to by his enthusiastic endorsement of Item 32 (Essential for learning) which is about as clear a statement of educational reactionism as could be found.

Mack is below the group mean on the rather unsatisfactory Power and »Toughness« cluster. All the items of this cluster have been discussed above. The correspondence between interview and scale lies in the fact that in neither place does he show any strong inclination to be a tough and aggressive fellow. It is in his admiration for power and in his willingness to submit to it, rather than in any wish to be an aggressive leader, that his potentiality for fascism lies.

Enough has been said about Mack's extraceptive outlook, as seen both in his interview and in the scale responses discussed above, so that his very low score on Superstition is no more than is to be expected. The surprising thing, perhaps, is that he should agree with Item 2 (Astrology), when the great majority of the subjects do not. His agreement here suggests that his relative lack of superstition is not based upon a ge-

nuine identification with science as a way of life, but rather upon his general need to appear hard-headed and realistic and unlikely to be »taken in.«

In general, there is rather close correspondence between Mack's interview and his scale responses. Discrepancies appear chiefly when the scale, which concentrates upon things thought to be generally significant, fails to catch something which is relatively specific and unique, and, more commonly, when the particular scale item is deficient and fails to discriminate between high and low scorers. There is reason to believe that the latter difficulty has been largely overcome in the revisions of the scale.

Turning to a consideration of Larry's case, it may be noted first, that he scores below the group mean on all the F scale variables save one, Authoritarian Aggression. He deviates most widely from the mean, in the low direction, on Power and »Toughness,« Projectivity, and Anti-intracception; then come Superstition and Authoritarian Submission; and he comes close to the mean on Destructiveness and Cynicism, Sex, and Conventionalism.

Less can be said about the relative lack of these tendencies in Larry than about their operation in Mack. Larry agrees with none of the statements in the Power and »Toughness« cluster, and this accords with the interview's picture of him as a rather soft and ag-

reeable young man. He agrees with only one of the Projectivity statements, Item 56 (Crime wave), and even here his score is barely above the group mean on a statistically poor item. His lack of this tendency was commented upon in the discussion of his interview, where his willingness to admit his – not too lofty – motives and his inclination to find the origins of his own views were noteworthy. A low score on Anti-intraception is certainly to be expected from a man who gives considerable attention to his own feelings, makes a positive value of pleasure, says he likes to »philosophize,« and discusses psychological determinants of prejudice – as Larry did in his interview. Inconsistencies appear in the case of Items 55 (Leisure) and 53 (Things too intimate), where he goes somewhat above the mean; the former may be taken as an expression of his conventionality, while the latter would appear to be connected with his special problem – »that disease« (tuberculosis) that he had.

There was nothing in Larry's interview to suggest that he was superstitious and, hence, it is to be expected that he should obtain a low score on the Superstition variable. Why he should agree with the astrology item is a question. Perhaps it should not be surprising to find an element of mysticism in this weak and rather passive character. Authoritarian Submission was rather prominent in Larry's interview. He made it

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clear that he has a great deal of respect for his family and that he has had little occasion to rebel against them either in deed or in thought. That he is still below the mean makes it clear that in order to be high on this variable something more than ordinary respect for proper authority is required: the submission must be exaggerated or overdone, and it must be generalized to include other objects besides family members. Two of the three items on which Larry goes above the mean – 23 (Undying love) and 77 (No sane, normal person) – refer specifically to ingroup feelings in regard to the family; the third, 32 (Essential for learning), gives him an opportunity to express his conventionality.

Larry is below the group mean on Destructiveness and Cynicism, but the naive optimism and friendliness toward the world which he showed in his interview is enough to raise the question of why he is not still lower. One thing to note is that the items on which he goes up have, in general, high group means and low D.P.'s. It seems that these items approach close enough to being clichés so that most people agree with them, and Larry is enough of a conformist to go along.

In connection with Larry's score on Sex, which is .55 below the group mean, the following quotation from the clinical section of his interview is enlighten-

ing.

(Sex?) »No great problem. I thought about girls all the time, as boys will, and I looked at them. I started out with them at about 15. I liked them a lot and associated with them at school and in the neighborhood. You know, you have the usual sexual desires, but you don't let them bother you.«

(Sex morals?) »I feel a girl should remain a virgin until 21 or 22 anyway. If she expects to marry soon after that, she should wait until after marriage, but if she is a career girl or doesn't want to get married, then an affair with an unmarried man is OK if they keep it quiet and secluded so the moral standards of others are not lowered. She should pick out one fellow to have a sex relation with, not carry on with several.«

(You?) »Not until after I came out of the hospital, when I was 23 or 24. Since then I've had several affairs, lasting a few weeks or a month. I won't marry until I have more security. She almost has to be a virgin, though not necessarily. I lost respect for the women I slept with. I know that's selfish, but I guess that's the way most fellows are.«

Although this is conventional enough – »the way most fellows are,« as Larry says – it does not bespeak the kind of inhibition which we conceive to lie behind high scores on the Sex items. Actually, Larry's score on this variable would have been very low were it not for his score of 6 on Item 31 (Homosexuality). It is

possible that he is not free of worry in this area – but this is a matter that had best be left until it is time to discuss the clinical material itself.

Enough has been said about Larry's conventionalism to make it appear reasonable that he should be close to the mean on this variable. A problem is presented by the fact that he is actually above the mean on Authoritarian Aggression. True, his score is still far below that of Mack, but Larry's interview gave the impression of a young man who would hardly want to punish anybody, and it is a criticism of the scale that it fails to confirm this impression. The two items on which his score goes up are 31 (Homosexuals), which was discussed above, and 23 (Undying love). This latter item, though it has an element of punishment in it, also expresses Authoritarian Submission, and Larry's response is probably to be explained on the basis of his family loyalty. The group means and D.P.'s of the Authoritarian Aggression items are, relatively, quite satisfactory. It seems that in regard to the present variable, the F scale was not a fine enough instrument to give the true picture in Larry's case.

The differences between Larry and Mack seem to be reflected fairly well in their F-scale responses. Mack scores higher than Larry on all the variables save one, Superstition. Mack is more than 2 points higher on Anti-intracception, Projectivity, and Sex,

more than 1 point higher on Power and »Toughness,« Authoritarian Aggression, and Conventionalism, and 1.00 and .87 higher, respectively, on Destructiveness and Cynicism, and Authoritarian Submission. It is particularly interesting that the variables which are most differentiating, that is, Anti-intracception, Projectivity, and Sex, are those which seem to be at the greatest distance from the overt content of fascist ideology. They are variables that seem to have their sources deep within the personality and to be relatively impervious to superficial changes in the external situation. It will remain for later chapters to show that as we go deeper into the person the differentiation between high and low scorers becomes more clear-cut and dependable.

## G. Conclusion

The attempt to construct a scale that would measure prejudice without appearing to have this aim and without mentioning the name of any minority group seems to have been fairly successful. The correlation of .75 between the E and the F scale means that scores on the former may be predicted with fair accuracy from scores on the latter. That we have achieved the second purpose underlying the F scale – to construct an instrument that would yield an estimate of fascist receptivity at the personality level – has still to be demonstrated.

Numerous variables in areas not ordinarily covered by studies of political, economic, and social ideology have been attacked directly; and they have been found to form a syndrome and to correlate significantly with antidemocratic trends in areas covered by the A-S, E, and PEC scales. This means, at the least, that the conception of a potentially fascistic pattern can be considerably extended, and that the hypothesis of central personality dispositions which give rise to this pattern is lent considerable support. It remains to be shown conclusively, however, that the variables with which the F scale has been concerned are, in reality, variables of personality. If it is true that they are, then they

will be exposed directly as we consider findings from procedures designed especially for the investigation of personality and in which the individual is allowed to express himself spontaneously. If our major hypothesis is correct, then the clinical investigations soon to be reported should not only substantiate the findings of the present chapter, but give a deeper understanding of the potentially fascistic pattern and of its development within the individual.

## Fußnoten

[1 See below, pp. 248ff.]

2 Herbert S. Conrad and R. Nevitt Sanford, »Scales for the Measurement of War-Optimism: I. Military Optimism; II. Optimism on the Consequences of the War,« *The Journal of Psychology* 16 (1943), pp. 285–311; *Idem*, »Some Specific War Attitudes of College Students,« *The Journal of Psychology* 17 (1944), pp. 153–186; R. Nevitt Sanford, »American Conscience and the Coming Peace,« *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 38 (1943), pp. 158–165; R. Nevitt Sanford and Herbert S. Conrad, »High and Low Morale as Exemplified in Two Cases,« *Character and Personality* 13 (1944), pp. 207–227; R. Nevitt Sanford, Herbert S. Conrad and Kate Franck, »Psychological Determinants of Optimism regarding the Consequences of the War,« *The Journal of Psychology* 22 (1946), pp. 207–235; R. Nevitt Sanford and Herbert S. Conrad, »Some Personality Correlates of Morale,« *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 38 (1943), pp. 3–20.

3 T.W. Adorno, »Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda,« *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*, ed. Ernst Simmel (New York: International Universities Press,



1946 [auch GS 8, ⇒ S. 397ff.]); *Idem*, »The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Speeches« [GS 9.1, ⇒ pp. 7ff.]; Institute of Social Research, *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, ed. Max Horkheimer (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1936); *Idem*, *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9 (1941); *Idem*, *Studies in Anti-Semitism: A Report to the American Jewish Committee*, 4 vols. (unpublished: August, 1944); *Idem*, *Anti-Semitism within American Labor: A Report to the Jewish Labor Committee*, 4 vols. (unpublished: May, 1945).

4 Erich Fromm (*Escape from Freedom* [New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941]), Erick H. Erikson (»Hitler's Imagery and German Youth,« *Psychiatry* 5 [1942], pp. 475–493), Arthur H. Maslow (»The Authoritarian Character Structure,« *The Journal of Social Psychology* 18 [1943], pp. 401–411), George B. Chisholm (»The Reestablishment of Peacetime Society,« *Psychiatry* 9 [1946], pp. 3–21), and Wilhelm Reich (*The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, trans. Theodore P. Wolfe [New York: Orgone Institute Press, 1946]) are among the writers whose thinking about authoritarianism has influenced our own.

5 Henry A. Murray, *et al.*, *Explorations in Personality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

6 Although no items pertaining specifically to stereotypy appear in Form 78 of the F scale, several such items do find a place in the later forms; hence, it seems well to introduce this concept into the discussion at this point.

[7 Daniel J. Levinson, »Ethnocentrism in Relation to Intelligence and Education,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 280–288.]

[8 Daniel J. Levinson, »The Study of Anti-Semitic Ideology,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 57–101.]

9 It may be reported here that in the case of the University of Oregon Student Women Form 60 of the questionnaire was administered in two parts: Part A contained the F scale and one half of the PEC scale and Part B, administered a day later, contained the E scale and the other half of the PEC scale. The purpose of this proceeding was to test whether responses to the items of one scale were affected by the presence within the same questionnaire of items from other scales. Apparently this variation in the manner of administration made little or no difference. When the results for the University of Oregon Student Women (Group 1) are compared with those for the University of Oregon and University of California Student Women (Group 2) – a fairly similar group – the diffe-

rences in reliability, mean score, and S.D. appear to be insignificant. The same is true in the cases of the E and PEC scales, and reference to Table 14 (IV) and to Table 5 (V) will show. The mean for the group of Oregon Service Club Men (Group V) who received only the A part of Form 60 does seem to be somewhat lower than that of the other group of Oregon Service Club Men. This difference cannot, however, be attributed to the difference in the form of the questionnaire. More important, probably, is the fact that Group V, in contrast to the other group, received the questionnaire *after* having listened to a talk on »What to do with Germany.« There was at least an implicit connection between the content of the talk and the content of the F scale; as one of the subjects who sensed this connection said afterwards to our staff member, »You should have given the questionnaire before your talk.«

10 This analysis was made possible by a grant-in-aid from the Social Science Research Council.

11 Fisher's  $Z_r$  was used in computing the average  $r$ .

12 The correlation between E and F does not seem to depend upon whether the two scales are administered at different times, or at the same time with items from the one scale interspersed among those of the other. The correlation obtained in the case of the University of Oregon Student Women, who were given Form 60

in two parts, is not only similar to that obtained, with the use of the regular Form 60, in the case of the University of Oregon and University of California Student Women, but it is virtually the same as the mean E. F correlation for all groups of subjects.

**13** The reliability of the »A« half of the E scale, which was given as a part of Form 40 to that group, was not calculated.

**14** The correlation coefficient which, theoretically, would result if two scales were perfectly reliable, i.e., if the average obtained  $r$  were corrected for attenuation, is about .9. This indicates a striking correspondence, though not a complete identity, of what is measured by the two scales.

[**15** See below, pp. 265ff.]

[**16** See above, pp. 173ff.]

[**17** William R. Morrow, »Criminality and Anti-Democratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 817–890.]

**18** Throughout the book, the interviewer's report of the interview is given in small type. Quotation marks within this material indicate a verbatim record of the subject's statements.

[19 R. Nevitt Sanford, »The Contrasting Ideologies of Two College Men: A Preliminary View,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 31–56.]

[20 Sanford, »The Contrasting Ideologies of Two College Men: A Preliminary View.«]

## Part IV

### Qualitative Studies of Ideology

#### Introductory Remarks<sup>[1]</sup>

The present volume has so far offered findings from our research ranging from surface ideology to largely unconscious psychological traits of our subjects. The direction of research and the order of presentation were suggested by the nature of the ideological data themselves; they could not be derived solely from external factors, such as economic status, group membership, or religion; but rather the evidence pointed unmistakably to the role played by motivational forces in the personality. However, the study did not move mechanically from the ideological to the psychological; rather, we were constantly aware of the structural unity of the two. It thus seems permissible that we reverse the procedure now and ask: what is the meaning of the subjects' overt opinions and attitudes in the areas covered by the A-S, E, and PEC scales, when they are considered in the light of our psychological findings, particularly those deriving from the F-scale and the clinical sections of the interviews? By answering this question we may come closer to an

integration of the various aspects of a study which is centered in the problem of the relationship between ideology and personality.

As was natural, the material for this task was mainly taken from the nonclinical parts of the interviews. Not only did these data promise to yield additional evidence bearing on the major issues discussed thus far, but the wealth of detailed and elaborate statements which our subjects had formulated spontaneously and in their own way, offered numerous psychological leads. There is good reason to believe that the nonclinical sections of the interviews constitute through their inherent structure a link between ideology and personality. However, attention was not limited to this interrelationship; at the same time an attempt was made to obtain a more colorful picture of the various ideologies themselves than was possible as long as we limited ourselves to the standard questionnaires.

Since the data from the questionnaire and from the Thematic Apperception Test and the clinical parts of the interviews had been subjected to thorough statistical treatment, quantification of the present material, though desirable, did not seem necessary. The aim, rather, was to develop for the problem areas under consideration, a phenomenology based on theoretical formulations and illustrated by quotations

from the interviews. This procedure, it was hoped, would yield not only more information about the specific structure of the ideologies and the manner in which personality is expressed in them but also a further differentiation of the guiding theoretical concepts themselves.

The advantages of this supplementary procedure are several. It permits us to exploit the richness and concreteness of »live« interviews to a degree otherwise hardly attainable. What is lost for want of strict discipline in interpretation may be gained by flexibility and closeness to the phenomena. Rare or even unique statements may be elucidated by the discussion. Such statements, often of an extreme nature, may throw considerable light on potentialities which lie within supposedly »normal« areas, just as illness helps us to understand health. At the same time, attention to the consistency of the interpretation of these statements with the over-all picture provides a safeguard against arbitrariness.

A subjective or what might be called speculative element has a place in this method, just as it does in psychoanalysis, from which many of our categories have been drawn. If, in places, the analysis seems to jump to conclusions, the interpretations should be regarded as hypotheses for further research, and the continuous interaction of the various methods of the



study should be recalled: some of the measured variables discussed in earlier chapters were based on speculations put forward in this part.

In view of the discussions in Chapters III[2] and IV[3] it was not deemed necessary to differentiate between A-S and E in the treatment of the interview material. While the generally close correlation of anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism could be taken for granted on the basis of previous results, more specific accounts of the nature of their interrelation, as well as of certain deviations, were incorporated into the first chapter of the present part (Chapter XVI).[4]

The chapter which discusses various syndromes found in high and low scorers (XIX)[5] is also included in this part. Although from a strictly logical point of view it may not belong here, it seemed nevertheless appropriate to include it, since it is based almost entirely on interview material and focused on the interconnection between ideology and personality. The syndromes evolved in this chapter should be followed up by quantitative investigation.

## Fußnoten

[1 The author of these »Introductory Remarks« is not given.]

[2 Daniel J. Levinson, »The Study of Anti-Semitic Ideology,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 57–101.]

[3 *Idem*, »The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 102–150.]

[4 See below, pp. 265ff.]

[5 See below, pp. 454ff.]

## Chapter XVI

### Prejudice in the Interview Material

#### A. Introduction

Our study grew out of specific investigations into anti-Semitism. As our work advanced, however, the emphasis gradually shifted. We came to regard it as our main task not to analyze anti-Semitism or any other antiminority prejudice as a sociopsychological phenomenon *per se*, but rather to examine the relation of antiminority prejudice to broader ideological and characterological patterns. Thus anti-Semitism gradually all but disappeared as a topic of our questionnaire and in our interview schedule it was only one among many topics which had to be covered.

Another investigation, carried through parallel to our research and partly by the same staff members of the Institute of Social Research, i.e., the study on anti-Semitism within labor,<sup>1</sup> concentrated on the question of anti-Semitism, but at the same time was concerned with sociopsychological issues akin to those presented in the present volume. While the bulk of the material to be discussed in this chapter is taken from the section on prejudice of the Berkeley interviews, an at-

tempt was made to utilize, at least in a supplementary form, some of the ideas of the Labor Study as hypotheses for further investigation. This was done as a part of the work carried out in Los Angeles. In collaboration with J.F. Brown and F[rederick] Pollock we drew up an additional section of the interview schedule devoted to specific questions about Jews. These questions were derived for the most part from the material gathered through the »screened interviews« of the Labor Study. The aim of this new section of the interview schedule was to see if it was possible to establish certain differential patterns within the general structure of prejudice. The list of questions follows. Not all of these questions were put to every subject, nor was the exact wording of the questions always the same, but most of the ground marked off by the questions was covered in each case.

#### *List of Questions Pertaining to Jews*

Do you think there is a Jewish problem? If yes, in what sense? Do you care about it?

Have you had any experience with Jews? What kind? Do you remember names of persons involved and other specific data?

If not, on what is your opinion based?

Did you have any contrary experiences (or hear about such experiences) with Jewish individuals?

If you had – would it change your opinion? If not, why

not?

Can you tell a Jew from other people? How?

What do you know about the Jewish religion?

Are there Christians that are as bad as Jews? Is their percentage as high or higher than the percentage of bad Jews?

How do Jews behave at work? What about the alleged Jewish industriousness?

Is it true that the Jews have an undue influence in movies, radio, literature, and universities?

If yes – what is particularly bad about it? What should be done about it?

Is it true that the Jews have an undue influence in business, politics, labor, etc.?

If yes – what kind of an influence? Should something be done to curb it?

What did the Nazis do to the German Jews? What do you think about it? Is there such a problem here? What would you do to solve it?

What do you blame them most for? Are they: aggressive, bad-mannered; controlling the banks; black marketeers; cheating; Christ killers; clannish; Communists; corrupting; dirty; draft dodgers; exploiters; hiding their identity; too intellectual; Internationalists; overcrowding many jobs; lazy; controlling movies; money-minded; noisy; overassimilative; overbearing; oversexed; looking for privileges; quarrelsome; running the country; too smart; spoiling nice neighborhoods; owning too many stores; undisciplined; unethical against Gentiles; upstarts; shunning hard manual labor; forming a world conspiracy?

Do you favor social discrimination or special legisla-

tion?

Shall a Jew be treated as an individual or as a member of a group?

How do your suggestions go along with constitutional rights?

Do you object to personal contacts with individual Jews?

Do you consider Jews more as a nuisance or more as a menace?

Could you imagine yourself marrying a Jew?

Do you like to discuss the Jewish issue?

What would you do if you were a Jew?

Can a Jew ever become a real American?

The additional interview material taught us more about prevailing overt patterns of anti-Semitism than about its inner dynamics. It is probably fair to say that the detailed questions proved most helpful in understanding the phenomena of psychological *conflict* in prejudice – the problems characterized in Chapter V[2] as »pseudo-democratism.« Another significant observation has to do with the reactions of our interviewees to the list of »bad Jewish traits« presented to them. Most answers to this list read »all-inclusive,« that is to say, very little differentiation takes place. The prejudiced subjects tend to subscribe to any reproach against the Jews, provided they do not have to produce these objections themselves but rather find

them pre-established, as if they were commonly accepted. This observation could be interpreted in different ways. Either it may be indicative of the »inner consistency« of anti-Semitic ideology, or it may testify to the mental rigidity of our high scorers, and this apart from the fact that the method of multiple choice may itself make for automatic reactions. Although our questionnaire studies gave evidence of marked consistency within anti-Semitic ideology, it would hardly be enough to account for the all-inclusiveness of the present responses. It seems that one must think in terms of automatization, though it is impossible to say conclusively whether this is due to the »high« mentality or to the shortcomings of our procedure. In all probability, the presentation of extreme anti-Semitic statements as if they were no longer disreputable but rather something which can be sensibly discussed, works as a kind of antidote for the superego and may stimulate imitation even in cases where the individual's »own« reactions would be less violent. This consideration may throw some light upon the phenomenon of the whole German people tolerating the most extreme anti-Semitic measures, although it is highly to be doubted that the individuals themselves were more anti-Semitic than our high-scoring subjects. A pragmatic inference to be drawn from this hypothesis would be that, in so far as possible, pseudo-

rational discussions of anti-Semitism should be avoided. One might refute factual anti-Semitic statements or explain the dynamics responsible for anti-Semitism, but he should not enter the sphere of the »Jewish problem.« As things stand now, the acknowledgment of a »Jewish problem,« after the European genocide, suggests, however subtly, that there might have been some justification for what the Nazis did.

The whole material on ideology has been taken from 63 Los Angeles interviews in addition to the pertinent sections of those gathered in Berkeley (see Chapter IX).[3]

It should be stressed that once again the *subjective* aspect is in the foreground. The selection of our sample excluded an investigation into the role played by the »object« – that is to say, the Jews – in the formation of prejudice. We do not deny that the object plays a role, but we devote our attention to the forms of reaction directed towards the Jew, not to the basis of these reactions within the »object.« This is due to a hypothesis with which we started and which has been given strong support in Chapter III,[4] namely, that anti-Semitic prejudice has little to do with the qualities of those against whom it is directed. Our interest is centered in the high-scoring subjects.

In organizing the present chapter, we start with the general assumption that the – largely unconscious –



hostility resulting from frustration and repression and socially diverted from its true object, *needs* a substitute object through which it may obtain a realistic aspect and thus dodge, as it were, more radical manifestations of a blocking of the subject's relationship to reality, e.g., psychosis. This »object« of unconscious destructiveness, far from being a superficial »scapegoat,« must have certain characteristics in order to fulfill its role. It must be tangible enough; and yet not *too* tangible, lest it be exploded by its own realism. It must have a sufficient historical backing and appear as an indisputable element of tradition. It must be defined in rigid and well-known stereotypes. Finally, the object must possess features, or at least be capable of being perceived and interpreted in terms of features, which harmonize with the destructive tendencies of the prejudiced subject. Some of these features, such as »clannishness« aid rationalization; others, such as the expression of weakness or masochism, provide psychologically adequate stimuli for destructiveness. There can be hardly any doubt that all these requirements are fulfilled by the phenomenon of the Jew. This is not to say that Jews *must* draw hatred upon themselves, or that there is an absolute historical necessity which makes them, rather than others, the ideal target of social aggressiveness. Suffice it to say that they *can* perform this function in the psychologi-

cal households of many people. The problem of the »uniqueness« of the Jewish phenomenon and hence of anti-Semitism could be approached only by recourse to a theory which is beyond the scope of this study. Such a theory would neither enumerate a diversity of »factors« nor single out a specific one as »the« cause but rather develop a unified framework within which all the »elements« are linked together consistently. This would amount to nothing less than a theory of modern society as a whole.

We shall first give some evidence of the »functional« character of anti-Semitism, that is to say, its relative independence of the object. Then we shall point out the problem of *cui bono*: anti-Semitism as a device for effortless »orientation« in a cold, alienated, and largely ununderstandable world. As a parallel to our analysis of political and economic ideologies, it will be shown that this »orientation« is achieved by stereotypy. The gap between this stereotypy on the one hand and real experience and the still-accepted standards of democracy on the other, leads to a *conflict* situation, something which is clearly set forth in a number of our interviews. We then take up what appears to be the resolution of this conflict: the underlying anti-Semitism of our cultural climate, keyed to the prejudiced person's own unconscious or preconscious wishes, proves in the more extreme cases to be stron-

ger than either conscience or official democratic values. This leads up to the evidence of the destructive character of anti-Semitic reactions. As remnants of the conflict, there remain traces of sympathy for, or rather »appreciation« of, certain Jewish traits which, however, when viewed more closely, also show negative implications.

Some more specific observations about the structure of anti-Jewish prejudice will be added. Their focal point is the differentiation of anti-Semitism according to the subject's own social identifications. This survey of anti-Semitic features and dynamics will then be supplemented by a few remarks on the attitudes of low-scoring subjects. Finally, we shall offer some evidence of the broader social significance of anti-Semitism: its intrinsic denial of the principles of American democracy.

## B. The »Functional« Character of Anti-Semitism

The psychological dynamisms that »call for« the anti-Semitic outlet – most essentially, we believe, the ambivalence of authoritarian and rebellious trends – have been analyzed in detail in other sections of this book. Here we limit ourselves to some extreme but concrete evidence of the fact that anti-Semitism is not so much dependent upon the nature of the object as upon the subject's own psychological wants and needs.

There are a number of cases in which the »functional« character of prejudice is obvious. Here we find subjects who are prejudiced *per se*, but with whom it is relatively accidental against what group their prejudice is directed. We content ourselves with two examples. *5051* is a generally high-scoring man, one of a few Boy Scout leaders. He has strong, though unconscious, fascist leanings. Although anti-Semitic, he tries to mitigate his bias by certain semirational qualifications. Here, the following statement occurs:

»Sometimes we hear that the average Jew is smarter in business than the average white man. I do not believe this. I would hate to believe it. What the Jews should learn is to educate their bad individuals to be more cooperative and agreeable. Actually there is more underhanded-

ness amongst Armenians than there is amongst Jews, but the Armenians aren't nearly as conspicuous and noisy. Mind you, I have known some Jews whom I consider my equal in every way and I like very much.«

This is somewhat reminiscent of Poe's famous story about the double murder in the Rue Morgue where the savage cries of an orangutan are mistaken by bystanders as words of all kinds of different foreign languages, to wit, languages particularly strange to each of the listeners who happen to be foreigners themselves. The primary hostile reaction is directed against foreigners *per se*, who are perceived as »uncanny.« This infantile fear of the strange is only subsequently »filled up« with the imagery of a specific group, stereotyped and handy for this purpose. The Jews are favorite stand-ins for the child's »bad man.« The transference of unconscious fear to the particular object, however, the latter being of a secondary nature only, always maintains an aspect of accidentalness. Thus, as soon as other factors interfere, the aggression may be deflected, at least in part, from the Jews and to another group, preferably one of still greater social distance. Pseudodemocratic ideology and the professed desire to promote militantly what he conceives to be American ideals are marked in our Boy Scout leader, 5051, and he considers himself not conservative but »predominantly liberal«; hence he tempers his anti-Semitism

and anti-Negroism by referring to a third group. He summons the Armenians in order to prove that he is not »prejudiced,« but at the same time his formulation is such that the usual anti-Semitic stereotypes can easily be maintained. Even his exoneration of the Jews with regard to their supposed »smartness« is actually a device for the glorification of the ingroup: he hates to think that »we are less smart than they.« While anti-Semitism is functional with regard to the object choice on a more superficial level, its deeper determinants still seem to be much more rigid.

An extreme case of what might be called »mobile« prejudice is *M 1225a*, of the Maritime School group. Though his questionnaire scores are only medium, the interview shows strong traces of a »manipulative« anti-Semite. The beginning of the minorities section of his interview is as follows:

(What do you think of the race-minority problem?) »I definitely think there is a problem. I'd probably be prejudiced there. Like the Negro situation. They could act more human. ... It would be less of a problem.«

His aggression is absorbed by the Negroes, in the »idiosyncratic« manner that can otherwise be observed among extreme anti-Semites, all of whose aggression appears to be directed against Jews.

»I wouldn't sail on a ship if I had to sail with a Negro. To me, they have an offensive smell. Course, the Chinese say we smell like sheep.«

It may be mentioned that a subject of the Labor Study, a Negro woman, complained about the smell of the Jews. The present subject concentrates on the Negroes, exonerating the Jews, though in an equivocal way:

(What about the Jewish problem?) »I don't believe there is much of a problem there. They're too smart to have a problem. Well, they are good business men.« (Too much influence?) »I believe they have a lot of influence.« (In what areas?) »Well, motion picture industry.« (Do they abuse it?) »Well, the thing you hear an awful lot about is help the Jews, help the Jews. But you never hear anything about helping other races or nationalities.« (Do they abuse their influence in the movies?) »If they do, they do it in such a way that it is not offensive.«

Here again, anti-Semitic stereotype is maintained descriptively whereas the shift of actual hatred to the Negroes – which cannot be accounted for by the course of the interview – affects the superimposed value judgments. The twist with regard to the term »problem« should be noted. By denying the existence of a »Jewish problem,« he consciously takes sides with the unbiased. By interpreting the word, however,

as meaning »having difficulties,« and emphasizing that the Jews are »too smart to *have* a problem,« he expresses unwittingly his own rejection. In accordance with his »smartness« theory, his pro-Jewish statements have a rationalistic ring clearly indicative of the subject's ambivalence: all race hatred is »envy« but he leaves little doubt that in his mind there is some reason for this envy, e.g., his acceptance of the myth that the Jews controlled German industry.

This interview points to a way in which our picture of ethnocentrism may be differentiated. Although the correlation between anti-Semitism and anti-Negroism is undoubtedly high, a fact which stands out in our interviews as well as in our questionnaire studies (cf. Chapter IV),<sup>[5]</sup> this is not to say that prejudice is a single compact mass. Readiness to accept statements hostile to minority groups may well be conceived as a more or less unitary trait, but when, in the interview situation, subjects are allowed to express themselves spontaneously it is not uncommon for one minority more than the others to appear, for the moment at least, as an object of special hatred. This phenomenon may be elucidated by reference to persecution mania which, as has been pointed out frequently, has many structural features in common with anti-Semitism. While the paranoid is beset by an over-all hatred, he nevertheless tends to »pick« his enemy, to molest cer-



tain individuals who draw his attention upon themselves: he falls, as it were, negatively in love. Something similar may hold good for the potentially fascist character. As soon as he has achieved a specific and concrete countercathexis, which is indispensable to his fabrication of a social pseudoreality, he may »canalize« his otherwise free-floating aggressiveness and then leave alone other potential objects of persecution. Naturally, these processes come to the fore in the dialectics of the interview rather than in the scales, which hardly allow the subject freely to »express« himself.

It may be added that subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks. The latter, like the Armenians, are liberally endowed with traits otherwise associated with the imagery of the Jew.

One more aspect of the »functional« character of anti-Semitism should be mentioned. We encountered quite frequently members of other minority groups, with strong »conformist« tendencies, who were outspokenly anti-Semitic. Hardly any traces of solidarity among the different outgroups could be found. The pattern is rather one of »shifting the onus,« of defamation of other groups in order to put one's own social status in a better light. An example is 5023, a »psychoneurotic with anxiety state,« Mexican by

birth:

Being an American of Mexican ancestry, he identifies with the white race and feels »we are superior people.« He particularly dislikes the Negroes and completely dislikes Jews. He feels that they are all alike and wants as little as possible to do with them. Full of contradiction as this subject is, it is not surprising to find that he would marry a Jewess if he really loved her. On the other hand he would control both Negroes and Jews and »keep them in their place.«

5068 is regarded by the interviewer as representing a »pattern probably quite frequent in second-generation Americans who describe themselves as Italian-Americans.« His prejudice is of the politico-fascist brand, distinctly colored by paranoid fantasies:

He is of pure Italian extraction and naturalized here at the time of the first World War. He is very proud of this extraction and for a long time in the early days of Mussolini was active in Italian-American organizations. He still feels that the war against Italy was very unfortunate. Concerning the other minorities he is quite prejudiced. The Mexicans he feels are enough like the Italians so that if they were educated enough it would be all right. At the present time, however, he feels that they need much education. He believes that the California Japanese were more than correctly handled and that those about whom there is no question should be gradually allowed back. He described the Negro situation as a tough one. He believes there

should be definite laws particularly with regard to racial intermarriage and that the color line should also be drawn »regarding where people can live.« »Despite what they say, the Southern Negroes are really the happiest one.« »The trouble with Jews is that they are all Communists and for this reason dangerous.« His own relations with them have only been fair. In his business relations he says they are »chiselers« and »stick together.« Concerning a solution to this problem, he says, »The Jews should actually educate their own. The way the Jews stick together shows that they actually have more prejudice against the Gentiles than the Gentiles have against them.« He illustrates this with a long story which I was not able to get in detail about some acquaintance of his who married into a Jewish family and was not allowed to eat off the same dishes with them.

We may mention, furthermore, 5052, an anti-Semitic man of Spanish-Negro descent, with strong homosexual tendencies. He is a nightclub entertainer, and the interviewer summarizes his impression in the statement that this man wants to say, »I am not a Negro, I am an entertainer.« Here the element of social identification in an outcast is clearly responsible for his prejudice.

Finally, reference should be made to a curiosity, the interview of a Turk, otherwise not evaluated because of his somewhat subnormal intelligence. He indulged in violent anti-Semitic diatribes until it came out near the end of the interview that he was Jewish himself.

The whole complex of anti-Semitism among minority groups, and among Jews themselves, offers serious problems and deserves a study of its own. Even the casual observations provided by our sample suffice to corroborate the suspicion that those who suffer from social pressure may frequently tend to transfer this pressure onto others rather than to join hands with their fellow victims.

### C. The Imaginary Foe

Our examples of the »functional« character of anti-Semitism, and of the relative ease by which prejudice can be switched from one object to another, point in one direction: the hypothesis that prejudice, according to its intrinsic content, is but superficially, if at all, related to the specific nature of its object. We shall now give more direct support for this hypothesis, the relation of which to clinical categories such as stereotypy, incapacity to have »experience,« projectivity, and power fantasies is not far to seek. This support is supplied by statements which are either plainly self-contradictory or incompatible with facts and of a manifestly imaginary character. Since the usual »self-contradictions« of the anti-Semite can, however, frequently be explained on the basis that they involve different layers of reality and different psychological urges which are still reconcilable in the over-all »*Weltanschauung*« of the anti-Semite, we concern ourselves here mainly with evidence of imaginary constructs. The fantasies with which we shall deal are so well known from everyday life that their significance for the structure of anti-Semitism can be taken for granted. They are merely highlighted by our research. One might say that these fantasies occur whene-

ver stereotypes »run wild,« that is to say, make themselves completely independent from interaction with reality. When these »emancipated« stereotypes are forcibly brought back into relation with reality, blatant distortions appear. The content of the examples of stereotyped fantasy which we collected has to do predominantly with ideas of excessive power attributed to the chosen foe. The disproportion between the relative social weakness of the object and its supposed sinister omnipotence is by itself evidence that the projective mechanism is at work.

We shall first give some examples of omnipotence fantasies projected upon a whole outgroup abstractly, as it were, and then show how the application of such ideas to factual experience comes close to paranoid delusion.

5054, a middle-aged woman with fairly high scores on all the scales, who is greatly concerned with herself and characterized by a »domineering« manner, claims that she has always tried »to see the other side« and even to »fight prejudice on every side.« She derives her feelings of tolerance from the contrast with her husband whom she characterized as extremely anti-Jewish (he hates all Jews and makes no exceptions) whereas she is willing to make exceptions. Her actual attitude is described as follows:

She would not subscribe to a »racist theory,« but does not think that the Jews will change much, but rather that they will tend to become »more aggressive.« She also believes that »they will eventually run the country, whether we like it or not.«

The usual stereotype of undue Jewish influence in politics and economy is inflated to the assertion of threatening over-all domination. It is easy to guess that the countermeasures which such subjects have in mind are no less totalitarian than their persecution ideas, even if they do not dare to say so in so many words.

Similar is case *5061a*, chosen as a mixed case (she is high-middle on E, but low on F and PEC), but actually, as proved by the interview, markedly ethnocentric. In her statement, the vividness of the fantasies about the almighty Jew seems to be equalled by the intensity of her vindictiveness.

»My relations with the Jews have been anything but pleasant.« When asked to be more specific it was impossible for her to name individual incidents. She described them, however, as »pushing everybody about, aggressive, clan-ish, moneyminded. ... The Jews are practically taking over the country. They are getting into everything. It is not that they are smarter, but they work so hard to get control. They are all alike.« When asked if she did not feel that there were variations in the Jewish temperament as in any other, she said, »No, I don't think so. I think

there is something that makes them all stick together and try to hold on to everything. I have Jewish friends and I have tried not to treat them antagonistically, but sooner or later they have also turned out to be aggressive and obnoxious. ... I think the percentage of very bad Jews is very much greater than the percentage of bad Gentiles. ... My husband feels exactly the same way on this whole problem. As a matter of fact, I don't go as far as he does. He didn't like many things about Hitler, but he did feel that Hitler did a good job on the Jews. He feels that we will come in this country to a place where we have to do something about it.«

Sometimes the projective aspect of the fantasies of Jewish domination comes into the open. Those whose half-conscious wishes culminate in the idea of the abolition of democracy and the rule of the strong, call those antidemocratic whose only hope lies in the maintenance of democratic rights. *5018* is a 32-year-old ex-marine gunnery sergeant who scores high on all the scales. He is suspected by the interviewer of being »somewhat paranoid.« He knows »one cannot consider Jews a race, but they are all alike. They have too much power but I guess it's really our fault.« This is followed up by the statement:

He would handle the Jews by outlawing them from business domination. He thinks that all others who feel the same could get into business and compete with them and perhaps overcome them, but adds, »it would be better to



ship them to Palestine and let them gyp one another. I have had some experiences with them and a few were good soldiers but not very many.« The respondent went on to imply that lax democratic methods cannot solve the problem because »they won't cooperate in a democracy.«

The implicitly antidemocratic feelings of this subject are evidenced by his speaking derogatorily about lax democratic methods: his blaming the Jews for lack of democratic cooperation is manifestly a rationalization.

One more aspect of unrealistic imagery of the Jew should at least be mentioned. It is the contention that the Jews »are everywhere.« Omnipresence sometimes displaces omnipotence, perhaps because no actual »Jewish rule« can be pretended to exist, so that the image-ridden subject has to seek a different outlet for his power fantasy in ideas of dangerous, mysterious ubiquity. This is fused with another psychological element. To the highly prejudiced subject the idea of the total right of the ingroup, and of its tolerating nothing which does not strictly »belong,« is all-pervasive. This is projected upon the Jews. Whereas the high scorer apparently cannot stand any »intruder« – ultimately nothing that is not strictly like himself – he sees this totality of presence in those whom he hates and whom he feels justified in exterminating because one otherwise »could not get rid of them.« The following example shows the idea of Jewish omnipresence

applied to personal experience, thus revealing its proximity to delusion.

6070, a 40-year-old woman, is high-middle on the E scale and particularly vehement about the Jews:

»I don't like Jews. The Jew is always crying. They are taking our country over from us. They are aggressive. They suffer from every lust. Last summer I met the famous musician X, and before I really knew him he wanted me to sign an affidavit to help bring his family into this country. Finally I had to flatly refuse and told him I want no more Jews here. Roosevelt started bringing the Jews into the government, and that is the chief cause of our difficulties today. The Jews arranged it so they were discriminated for in the draft. I favor a legislative discrimination against the Jews along American, not Hitler lines. Everybody knows that the Jews are back of the Communists. This X person almost drove me nuts. I had made the mistake of inviting him to be my guest at my beach club. He arrived with ten other Jews who were uninvited. They always cause trouble. If one gets in a place, he brings two more and those two bring two more.«

This quotation is remarkable for more reasons than that it exemplifies the »Jews are everywhere« complex. It is the expression of Jewish *weakness* – that they are »always crying« – which is perverted into ubiquity. The refugee, forced to leave his country, appears as he who *wants* to intrude and to expand over the whole earth, and it is hardly too far-fetched to as-

sume that this imagery is at least partly derived from the fact of persecution itself. Moreover, the quotation gives evidence of a certain ambivalence of the extreme anti-Semite which points in the direction of »negatively falling in love.« This woman had *invited* the celebrity to her club, doubtless attracted by his fame, but used the contact, once it had been established, merely in order to personalize her aggressiveness.

Another example of the merging of semipsychotic idiosyncrasies and wild anti-Jewish imagery is the 26-year-old woman, 5004. She scores high on the F scale and high-middle on E and PEC. Asked about Jewish religion, she produces an answer which partakes of the age-old image of »uncanniness.« »I know very little, but I would be afraid to go into a synagogue.« This has to be evaluated in relation to her statement about Nazi atrocities:

»I am not particularly sorry because of what the Germans did to the Jews. I feel Jews would do the same type of thing to me.«

The persecution fantasy of what the Jews *might* do to her, is used, in authentic paranoid style, as a justification of the genocide committed by the Nazis.

Our last two examples refer to the distortions that occur when experience is viewed through the lens of congealed stereotypy. *M 732c* of the Veterans Group,

who scores generally high on the scales, shows this pattern of distorted experience with regard to both Negroes and Jews. As to the former:

»You never see a Negro driving (an ordinary car of which subject mentions a number of examples) but only a Cadillac or a Packard. ... They always dress gaudy. They have that tendency to show off. ... Since the Negro has that feeling that he isn't up to par, he's always trying to show off. ... Even though he can't afford it, he will buy an expensive car just to make a show. ...« Subject mentions that the brightest girl in a class at subject's school happens to be a Negro and he explains her outstandingness in the class in terms of Negro overcompensation for what he seems to be implying is her inherent inferiority.

The assertion about the Negro's Cadillac speaks for itself. As to the story about the student, it indicates in personalized terms the aspect of inescapability inherent in hostile stereotypy. To the prejudiced, the Negro is »dull«; if he meets, however, one of outstanding achievement, it is supposed to be mere overcompensation, the exception that proves the rule. No matter what the Negro is or does, he is condemned.

As to the »Jewish problem«:

»As far as being good and shrewd businessmen, that's about all I have to say about *them*. They're *white* people, that's one thing. ... Of course, they have the Jewish instinct, whatever that is. ... I've heard they have a busi-

ness nose. ... I imagine the Jewish people are more *obsequious*. ... For example, *somehow* a Jewish barber will entice you to come to *his* chair.« Subject elaborates here a definite fantasy of some mysterious influence by Jews. ... »They're mighty shrewd businessmen, and you don't have much chance« (competing with Jews).

The story about the barber seems to be a retrogression towards early infantile, magical patterns of thinking.

*F* 359, a 48-year-old accountant in a government department, is, according to the interviewer, a cultured and educated woman. This, however, does not keep her from paranoid story-telling as soon as the critical area of race relations, which serves as a kind of free-for-all, is entered. (She is in the high quartile on E, though low on both F and PEC.) Her distortions refer both to Negroes and to Jews:

Subject considers this a very serious problem and she thinks that it is going to get worse. The Negroes are going to get worse. She experienced a riot in Washington; there was shooting; street-car windows were broken, and when a white would get into the Negro section of the car, the shooting would start. The white man would have to lie on the floor. She did not dare to go out at night. One day the Negroes were having a procession and some of them started pushing her off the sidewalk. When she asked them not to push, they looked so insolent that she thought they would start a riot, and her companion said, »Let's get out of here or we will start a riot.« A friend of hers told her

that she had asked her maid to work on a Thursday, but the maid had refused because she said it was »push and shove« day – the day they shoved the whites off the sidewalk. Another friend of hers in Los Angeles told her not to let her maid use her vacuum cleaner because they tamper with it in such a way as to cause it to tear your rugs. One day she caught the maid using a file on her vacuum cleaner and asked her what she was doing. The maid replied, »»Oh, I'm just trying to fix this thing.« They just want to get revenge on whites. One cannot give them equal rights yet, they are not ready for it; we will have to educate them first.« Subject would not want to sit next to a Negro in a theatre or restaurant. She cited the case of a drugstore man who addressed a Negro janitor, a cleaner, as »Mr.« »You just can't do that to them or they will say, »Ah'm as good as white folks.«« (Outcome?) »I think there will be trouble.« She expects riots and bloodshed.

(Jews?) »Well, they are to blame too, I think. They just cannot do business straight, they have to be underhanded – truth has no meaning for them in business.« ('What has been your personal experience?') She cited the case of a friend who is interested in photography and bought some second-hand cameras from pawn shops. One day when he was in one, a woman came in with a set of false teeth. She was told that they were not worth anything (there was some gold in them). Finally, the Jew gave her a few dollars for them. As soon as she had gone out, he turned to the man and said, »She didn't know it, but see that platinum under here?« In other words the teeth were worth many times what he gave for them. Subject's friend did not get gypped because he knew them and called their bluff.

It is often advocated as the best means of improving inter-cultural relations that as many personal contacts as possible be established between the different groups. While the value of such contacts in some cases of anti-Semitism is to be acknowledged, the material presented in this section argues for certain qualifications, at least in the case of the more extreme patterns of prejudice. There is no simple gap between experience and stereotypy. Stereotypy is a device for looking at things comfortably; since, however, it feeds on deep-lying unconscious sources, the distortions which occur are not to be corrected merely by taking a *real* look. Rather, experience itself is predetermined by stereotypy. The persons whose interviews on minority issues have just been discussed share one decisive trait. Even if brought together with minority group members as different from the stereotype as possible, they will perceive them through the glasses of stereotypy, and will hold against them whatever they are and do. Since this tendency is by no means confined to people who are actually »cranky« (rather, the whole complex of the Jew is a kind of recognized red-light district of legitimized psychotic distortions), this inaccessibility to experience may not be limited to people of the kind discussed here, but may well operate in much milder cases. This should be taken into account

by any well-planned policy of defense. Optimism with regard to the hygienic effects of personal contacts should be discarded. One cannot »correct« stereotypy by experience; he has to reconstitute the capacity for *having* experiences in order to prevent the growth of ideas which are malignant in the most literal, clinical sense.



## D. Anti-Semitism for What?

It is a basic hypothesis of psychoanalysis that symptoms »make sense« in so far as they fulfill a specific function within the individual's psychological economy – that they are to be regarded, as a rule, as vicarious wish-fulfillments of, or as defenses against, repressed urges. Our previous discussion has shown the irrational aspect of anti-Semitic attitudes and opinions. Since their content is irreconcilable with reality, we are certainly entitled to call them symptoms. But they are symptoms which can hardly be explained by the mechanisms of neurosis; and at the same time, the anti-Semitic individual as such, the potentially fascist character, is certainly not a psychotic. The ultimate theoretical explanation of an entirely irrational symptom which nevertheless does not appear to affect the »normality« of those who show the symptom is beyond the scope of the present research. However, we feel justified in asking the question: *cui bono?* What purposes within the lives of our subjects are served by anti-Semitic ways of thinking? A final answer could be provided only by going back to the primary causes for the establishment and freezing of stereotypes. An approach to such an answer has been set forth in earlier chapters. Here, we limit ourselves to a level closer

to the surface of the ego and ask: what does anti-Semitism »give« to the subject within the concrete configurations of his adult experience?

Some of the functions of prejudice may doubtless be called rational. One does not need to conjure up deeper motivations in order to understand the attitude of the farmer who wants to get hold of the property of his Japanese neighbor. One may also call rational the attitude of those who aim at a fascist dictatorship and accept prejudice as part of an over-all platform, though in this case the question of rationality becomes complicated, since neither the goal of such a dictatorship seems to be rational in terms of the individual's interest, nor can the wholesale automatized acceptance of a ready-made formula be called rational either. What we are interested in, for the moment, however, is a problem of a somewhat different order. What good does accrue to the actual adjustment of otherwise »sensible« persons when they subscribe to ideas which have no basis in reality and which we ordinarily associate with maladjustment?

In order to provide a provisional answer to this question, we may anticipate one of the conclusions from our consideration of the political and economic sections of the interview (Chapter XVII):<sup>[6]</sup> the all-pervasive ignorance and confusion of our subjects when it comes to social matters beyond the range of

their most immediate experience. The objectification of social processes, their obedience to intrinsic supra-individual laws, seems to result in an intellectual alienation of the individual from society. This alienation is experienced by the individual as disorientation, with concomitant fear and uncertainty. As will be seen, political stereotypy and personalization can be understood as devices for overcoming this uncomfortable state of affairs. Images of the politician and of the bureaucrat can be understood as signposts of orientation and as projections of the fears created by disorientation. Similar functions seem to be performed by the »irrational« imagery of the Jew. He is, for the highly prejudiced subject, extremely stereotyped; at the same time, he is more personalized than any other bogey in so far as he is not defined by a profession or by his role in social life, but by his human existence as such. For these reasons, as well as for historical ones, he is much better qualified for the psychological function of the »bad man« than the bureaucrats or politicians, who, incidentally, are often but handy substitutes for the real object of hatred, the Jew. The latter's alienness seems to provide the handiest formula for dealing with the alienation of society. Charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation. The

less anti-Jewish imagery is related to actual experience and the more it is kept »pure,« as it were, from contamination by reality, the less it seems to be exposed to disturbance by the dialectics of experience, which it keeps away through its own rigidity. It is the Great Panacea, providing at once intellectual equilibrium, countercathexis, and a canalization of wishes for a »change.«

Anti-Semitic writers and agitators from Chamberlain to Rosenberg and Hitler have always maintained that the existence of the Jews is the *key* to everything. By talking with individuals of fascist leanings, one can learn the psychological implications of this »key« idea. Their more-or-less cryptic hints frequently reveal a kind of sinister pride; they speak as if they were in the know and had solved a riddle otherwise unsolved by mankind (no matter how often their solution has been already expressed). They raise literally or figuratively their forefinger, sometimes with a smile of superior indulgence; they know the answer for everything and present to their partners in discussion the absolute security of those who have cut off the contacts by which any modification of their formula may occur. Probably it is this delusion-like security which casts its spell over those who feel insecure. By his very ignorance or confusion or semi-erudition the anti-Semite can often conquer the position of a pro-

found wizard. The more primitive his drastic formulae are, due to their stereotypy, the more appealing they are at the same time, since they reduce the complicated to the elementary, no matter how the logic of this reduction may work. The superiority thus gained does not remain on the intellectual level. Since the cliché regularly makes the outgroup bad and the ingroup good, the anti-Semitic pattern of orientation offers emotional, narcissistic gratifications which tend to break down the barriers of rational self-criticism.

It is these psychological instruments upon which fascist agitators play incessantly. They would hardly do so if there were no susceptibility for spurious orientation among their listeners and readers. Here we are concerned only with the evidence for such susceptibility among people who are by no means overt fascist followers. We limit ourselves to three nerve points of the pseudocognitive lure of anti-Semitism: the idea that the Jews are a »problem,« the assertion that they are all alike, and the claim that Jews can be recognized as such without exception.

The contention that the Jews, or the Negroes, are a »problem« is regularly found in our interviews with prejudiced subjects. We may quote one example picked at random and then briefly discuss the theoretical implications of the »problem« idea.

The prelaw student, 105, when asked, »What about

other groups?» states:

»Well, the Jews are a ticklish problem – not the whole race; there are both good and bad. But there are more bad than good.«

The term »problem« is taken over from the sphere of science and is used to give the impression of searching, responsible deliberation. By referring to a problem, one implicitly claims personal aloofness from the matter in question – a kind of detachment and higher objectivity. This, of course, is an excellent rationalization for prejudice. It serves to give the impression that one's attitudes are not motivated subjectively but have resulted from hard thinking and mature experience. The subject who makes use of this device maintains a discursive attitude in the interview; he qualifies, quasi-empirically, what he has to say, and is ready to admit exceptions. Yet these qualifications and exceptions only scratch the surface. As soon as the existence of a »Jewish problem« is admitted, anti-Semitism has won its first surreptitious victory. This is made possible by the equivocal nature of the term itself; it can be both a neutral issue of analysis and, as indicated by the every-day use of the term »problematic« for a dubious character, a negative entity. There is no doubt that the relations between Jews and non-Jews do present a problem in the objective

sense of the term, but when »the Jewish problem« is referred to, the emphasis is subtly shifted. While the veneer of objectivity is maintained, the implication is that the *Jews* are the problem, a problem, that is, to the rest of society. It is but one step from this position to the implicit notion that this problem has to be dealt with according to its own special requirements, i.e., the problematic nature of the Jews, and that this will naturally lead outside the bounds of democratic procedure. Moreover, the »problem« calls for a *solution*. As soon as the Jews themselves are stamped as this problem, they are transformed into objects, not only to »judges« of superior insight but also to the perpetrators of *an action*; far from being regarded as subjects, they are treated as terms of a mathematical equation. To call for a »solution of the Jewish problem« results in their being reduced to »material« for manipulation.

It should be added that the »problem« idea, which made deep inroads into public opinion through Nazi propaganda and the Nazi example, is also to be found in the interviews of low-scoring subjects. Here, however, it assumes regularly the aspect of a *protest*. Unprejudiced subjects try to restore the objective, »sociological« meaning of the term, generally insisting on the fact that the so-called »Jewish problem« is actually the problem of the non-Jews. However, the very use of the term may be partially indicative, even with

unprejudiced persons, of a certain ambivalence or at least indifference, as in the case of 5047, who scored low on the E scale but high on F and PEC.

»Yes, I think there is a so-called Jewish problem and a Negro problem, but essentially I believe that it is really a majority problem.« He felt that there was a need for more education of the ignorant masses and for improving economic conditions so that there would not be a necessity for seeking a scapegoat. Generally, his understanding of the problems seemed to be quite sound, and he expressed disagreement with anti-Semitism and discrimination against Negroes. However, the manner in which he approached the matter and his tendency to treat it as a purely academic problem seemed to indicate that he was not thoroughly convinced of his statements and was merely using verbal clichés.

The term »problem« itself seems to suggest a too naive idea of common-sense justice, following the pattern of democratic compromise in areas where decisions should be made only according to the merits of the case. The man who speaks about the »problem« is easily tempted to say that there are two sides to every problem, with the comfortable consequence that the Jews *must* have done something wrong, if they were exterminated. This pattern of conformist »sensibleness« lends itself very easily to the defense of various kinds of irrationality.



The statement that the Jews are all alike not only dispenses with all disturbing factors but also, by its sweep, gives to the judge the grandiose air of a person who sees the whole without allowing himself to be deflected by petty details – an intellectual leader. At the same time, the »all alike« idea rationalizes the glance at the individual case as a mere specimen of some generality which can be taken care of by general measures which are the more radical, since they call for no exceptions. We give but one example of a case where traces of »knowing better« still survive although the »all alike« idea leads up to the wildest fantasies. *F 116* is middle on the E scale, but when the question of the Jews is raised:

(Jews?) »Now this is where I really do have strong feeling. I am not very proud of it. I don't think it is good to be so prejudiced but I can't help it.« (What do you dislike about Jews?) »Everything. I can't say one good thing for them.« (Are there any exceptions?) »No, I have never met one single one that was an exception. I used to hope I would. It isn't pleasant to feel the way I do. I would be just as nice and civil as I could, but it would end the same way. They cheat, take advantage.« (Is it possible that you know some Jewish people and like them without knowing they are Jews?) »Oh no, I don't think any Jew can hide it. I always know them.« (How do they look?) »Attractive. Very well dressed. And as though they knew exactly what they wanted.« (How well have you known Jews?) »Well, I never knew any in childhood. In fact, I

never knew one until we moved to San Francisco, 10 years ago. He was our landlord. It was terrible. I had a lovely home in Denver and I hated to leave. And here I was stuck in an ugly apartment and he did everything to make it worse. If the rent was due on Sunday, he was there bright and early. After that I knew lots of them. I had Jewish bosses. There are Jews in the bank. They are everywhere – always in the money. My next-door neighbor is a Jew. I decided to be civil. After all, I can't move now and I might as well be neighborly. They borrow our lawn mower. They *say* it is because you can't buy one during the war. But of course lawn mowers cost money. We had a party last week and they called the police. I called her the next day because I suspected them. She said she did it so I asked if she didn't think she should have called me first. She said a man was singing in the yard and woke her baby and she got so upset she called the police. I asked her if she realized that her baby screamed for 3 months after she brought him home from the hospital. Ever since then she has been just grovelling and I hate that even worse.«

»Knowing better« is mentioned not infrequently by high scorers: they realize they »should« not think that way, but stick to their prejudice under a kind of compulsion which is apparently stronger than the moral and rational counteragencies available to them. In addition to this phenomenon, there is hardly any aspect of the anti-Semitic syndrome discussed in this chapter which could not be illustrated by this quotation from a truly »all-out,« totalitarian anti-Semite. She omits

nothing. Her insatiability is indicative of the tremendous libidinous energy she has invested in her Jewish complex. Acting out her anti-Semitism obviously works with her as a wish-fulfillment, both with regard to aggressiveness and with regard to the desire for intellectual superiority as indicated by her cooperation in the present study »in the interests of science.« Her personal attitude partakes of that sinister contempt shown by those who feel themselves to be »in the know« with respect to all kinds of dark secrets.

Her most characteristic attitude is one of pessimism – she dismisses many matters with a downward glance, a shrug of the shoulders, and a sigh.

The idea of the »Jew spotter« was introduced in the Labor Study, where it proved to be the most discriminating item. We used it only in a supplementary way, in work with the Los Angeles sample, but there can be no doubt that people who are extreme on A-S will regularly allege that they can recognize Jews at once. This is the most drastic expression of the »orientation« mechanism which we have seen to be so essential a feature of the prejudiced outlook. At the same time, it can frequently be observed that the actual variety of Jews, which could hardly escape notice, leads to a high amount of vagueness with regard to the criteria according to which Jews might be spotted; this

vagueness does not, however, interfere with the definiteness of the spotter's claim. One example for this configuration will suffice. It is interesting because of the strange mixture of fantasy and real observation.

5039, a 27-year-old student at the University of Southern California and a war veteran, who scores high on E:

»Yes, I think I can ... of course, you can't always, I know. But usually they have different features: larger nose, and I think differently shaped faces, more narrow, and different mannerisms. ... But mainly they talk too much and they have different attitudes. Almost always they will counter a question with another question (gives examples from school); they are freer with criticism; tend to talk in big terms and generally more aggressive – at least I notice that immediately. ...«

## E. Two Kinds of Jews

The stereotypes just discussed have been interpreted as means for pseudo-orientation in an estranged world, and at the same time as devices for »mastering« this world by being able completely to pigeon-hole its negative aspects. The »problematizing« attitude puts the resentful person in the position of one who is rationally discriminating; the assertion that all the Jews are alike transposes the »problem« into the realm of systematic and complete knowledge, without a »loophole,« as it were; the pretension of being able unfailingly to recognize Jews raises the claim that the subject is actually the judge in matters where the judgment is supposed to have been pronounced once and for all. In addition, there is another stereotype of »orientation« which deserves closer attention because it shows most clearly the »topographical« function and because it crops up spontaneously with great frequency in the interview material. It is even more indicative of the »pseudorational« element in anti-Semitic prejudice than is the manner of speaking about the »Jewish problem.« We refer to the standard division of Jews into two groups, the good ones and the bad ones, a division frequently expressed in terms of the »white« Jews and the »kikes.« It may be objected that

this division cannot be taken as an index of subjective attitudes, since it has its basis in the object itself, namely, the different degrees of Jewish assimilation. We shall be able to demonstrate that this objection does not hold true and that we have to cope with an attitudinal pattern largely independent of the structure of the minority group to which it is applied.

It has been established in previous chapters that the mentality of the prejudiced subject is characterized by thinking in terms of rigidly contrasting ingroups and outgroups. In the stereotype here under consideration, this dichotomy is projected upon the outgroups themselves, or at least upon one particular out-group. This is partly due no doubt to the automatization of black and white thinking which tends to »cut in two« whatever is being considered. It is also due to the desire to maintain an air of objectivity while expressing one's hostilities, and perhaps even to a mental reservation of the prejudiced person who does not want to deliver himself completely to ways of thinking which he still regards as »forbidden.« The »two kinds« stereotype thus has to be viewed as a compromise between antagonistic tendencies within the prejudiced person himself. This would lead to the supposition that people who make this division are rarely *extreme* high scorers; a supposition which seems to be largely borne out by our data. In terms of our »orientation« theory

we should expect that the »two kinds« idea serves as a makeshift for bridging the gap between general stereotypy and personal experience. Thus, the »good« outgroup members would be those whom the subject personally knows, whereas the »bad« ones would be those at a greater social distance – a distinction obviously related to the differences between assimilated and nonassimilated sectors of the outgroup. This again is at least partly corroborated, though it will be seen that the »two kinds« idea is in many respects so vague and abstract that it does not even coincide with the division between the known and the unknown. As a device for overcoming stereotypy the »two kinds« concept is spurious because it is thoroughly stereotyped itself.

5007, who scores high on all the scales, comments as follows:

»Most of the Jews I have known have been white Jews, and they are very charming people. Jews are aggressive, clannish, overcrowd nice neighborhoods, and are money-minded. At least the ›non-white Jews.« My experiences have been of two sorts. Some Jews are amongst the most charming and educated people I know. Other experiences have been less friendly. On the whole, I think Jews in the professions are all right, but in commerce they seem to be quite objectionable.«

Here it can be seen clearly how the over-all stereoty-

py, as suggested by the list of »objectionable Jewish traits,« struggles with the stereotype of a dichotomy, which in this case represents the more humanitarian trend. It is conceived in terms of acquaintances vs. others, but this is complicated by a second division, that between »professional« Jews (supposedly of higher education and morality) and »business« Jews, who are charged with being ruthless money-makers and cheats.

This, however, is not the classical form of the »two kinds« idea. The latter is expressed, rather, by the above-mentioned Boy Scout leader, *5051*, the man who brings the Armenians into play:

»Now take the Jews. There are good and bad amongst all races. We know that, and we know that Jews are a religion, not a race; but the trouble is that there are two types of Jews. There are the white Jews and the kikes. My pet theory is that the white Jews hate the kikes just as much as we do. I even knew a good Jew who ran a store and threw some kikes out, calling them kikes and saying he didn't want their business.«

Research on anti-Semitism among Jews would probably corroborate this »pet« idea. In Germany at least, the »autochthonous« Jews used to discriminate heavily against refugees and immigrants from the East and often enough comforted themselves with the idea that the Nazi policies were directed merely against the



»*Ostjuden*.« Distinctions of this sort seem to promote gradual persecution of Jews, group by group, with the aid of the smooth rationalization that only those are to be excluded who do not belong anyway. It is a structural element of anti-Semitic persecution that it starts with limited objectives, but goes on and on without being stopped. It is through this structure that the »two kinds« stereotype assumes its sinister aspect. The division between »whites« and »kikes,« arbitrary and unjust in itself, invariably turns against the so-called »whites« who become the »kikes« of tomorrow.

Evidence of the independence of the division from its object is offered by the all-around high scorer, *M 1229m*, of the Maritime School group, who divides the Jews in a manner employed by other Southerners with regard to the Negroes. Here a certain break between general race prejudice and a relative freedom of more personal attitudes and experiences seems to exist.

(Jewish problem?) »Not a terrific problem. I get along with them. Jews in the South are different from those in the North. Not so grasping in the South.« (Daughter marrying a Jew?) »O.K.; no problem. Large number of Jewish families in Galveston. No prejudice against Jews in Texas.«

This making of private exceptions is sometimes, as by the mildly anti-Semitic radio writer *5003*, expressed as follows:

He doesn't know about Jews. »Some of my best friends are Jews.«

In spite of the innumerable jokes, both European and American, about the »some of my best friends« cliché, it survives tenaciously. Apparently it combines felicitously the merits of »human interest« – supposedly personal experience – with a bow to the superego which does not seriously impede the underlying hostility.

Occasionally the concessions made to personal acquaintances are explained by the interspersion of racial theories, and thus a mildly paranoid touch is added. An example is the generally »high« woman, *F 109*:

Father Scotch-Irish, mother English-Irish. Subject is not identified with any of these. »I have an age-old feeling against Jews, some against Negroes. Jews stick together, are out for money; they gyp you. Jews are in big businesses. It seems they will be running the country before long. I know some people of Jewish descent who are very nice, but they're not full-blooded Jews. Jews have large noses, are slight in stature, little sly Jews. The women have dark hair, dark eyes, are sort of loud.«

This girl student, by the way, to whom the »education« idea is all-important, is among those who show traces of bad conscience.

Subject knows she's prejudiced; she thinks she needs educating too, by working with people of different races.

The intrinsic weakness of the »best friend« idea, which simulates human experience without truly expressing it, comes into the open in the following quotation, where the line between the friend and the »kikes« is drawn in such a way that even the »friend« is not fully admitted.

(Jews?) »There are Jews and Jews. I have a very good girl friend who is a Jew – never enters into our relationship except that she is in a Jewish sorority.« (Would you want her in your sorority?) »Well ... (pause) ... I don't think I'd have any objections.« (Would you let in all Jewish girls?) »No. One Jew is alright but you get a whole mob and ...!« (What happens?) »They get into anything and they'll control it – they'll group together for their own interests – the kike Jew is as dishonest as they come. Find them on Fillmore Street in San Francisco. I have had no experience with kike Jews. I think that's created in my family. Father feels strongly against them – I don't know why.« (Nazis?) »That's unnecessary – they have a right to exist – no reason for excluding them as long as they don't try to overstep the rights of others. I knew a lot of Jews in high school. They kept pretty much to themselves. Don't

think I'm echoing. I would like Jews as long as they don't reflect typical Jewish qualities. Typical Jewish nose, mouth, voice. The presence of a Jew creates feelings of tension. Squeaky voice, long, pointed nose. Couldn't name anti-Semitic groups in this country but think they exist.«

Particular attention should be called to the statement of this girl, described by the interviewer as being »tight all over,« that the presence of a Jew creates feelings of tension. There is reason to believe that this is a common experience. It would hardly suffice to attribute this uneasiness solely to repressed guilt feelings, or to the effect of some »strangeness« as such. At least the concrete aspects of this strangeness in social contacts needs further elucidation. We venture the hypothesis that it is due to a certain discomfort and uneasiness on the Jew's own part in non-Jewish Company, and on a certain antagonism of the Jews, deeply rooted in history, against »genial« conviviality and harmless abandonment of oneself in order to enjoy the moment. Since this may be one concrete factor making for anti-Semitism, independent of traditional stereotypy, this whole complex should be followed up most carefully in future research.

As to the evidence for our assertion that the »two kinds« idea is not object-bound but rather a structural psychological pattern, we limit ourselves to two ex-

amples. The student nurse, *5013*, whose scale scores are generally high:

Feels towards the Japanese and the Mexicans and Negroes very much as she does toward the Jews. In all cases she holds to a sort of bifurcation theory, that is, that there are good Japanese and that they should be allowed to return to California, but there are bad ones and they should not. The Mexicans also fall into two groups, as do the Negroes. When it is pointed out to her that people of her own extraction probably also fall into good and bad groups, she admits this but feels that the line between the good and the bad is not as great in her case. She feels that the Negro problem is probably of greater importance than the other minorities but says that she speaks at the hospital to the colored nurses and doctors. At this point she related a long anecdote about taking care of a female Negro patient who had told her that the Negroes had brought their problems on themselves by aspiring to equality with the whites. She feels that this was a very wise Negress and agrees with her.

In the case of Southerners, the »two kinds« idea is frequently applied to the Negroes, those in the South being praised, and those who went away being denounced for demanding an equality to which they were not entitled. In so far as the Southern »white man's nigger« is more subservient and a better object of exploitation in the eyes of these subjects, this attitude, with its patriarchal and feudalistic rationaliza-

tions, can be called semirealistic. But the construct of »two kinds of Negroes« often results in quite a different connotation, as in the case of *F 340a*. She is high on F and PEC and middle on E.

»The Negroes are getting so arrogant now, they come to the employment office and say they don't like this kind of a job and that kind of a job. However, there are some who are employed at the employment office and they are very nice and intelligent. There are nice ones and bad ones among us. The Negroes who have always lived in Oakland are all right; they don't know what to do with all those who are coming in from the South either. They all carry knives; if you do something they don't like, they ›will get even with you, they will slice you up.««

Here, the »two kinds« idea results in plain persecution fantasies.

## F. The Anti-Semite's Dilemma

If anti-Semitism is a »symptom« which fulfills an »economic« function within the subject's psychology, one is led to postulate that this symptom is not simply »there,« as a mere expression of what the subject happens to be, but that it is the outcome of a conflict. It owes its very irrationality to psychological dynamics which force the individual, at least in certain areas, to abandon the reality principle. The conception of prejudice as a symptom resulting from a conflict has been elucidated in earlier chapters. Here, we are concerned not so much with the clinical evidence of conflict determinants as with the traces of conflict within the phenomenon of anti-Semitism itself. Some evidence bearing on this point has already been presented in the last sections. The »problem« idea as well as the dichotomy applied to the outgroup represent a kind of compromise between underlying urges and hostile stereotypes on the one hand, and the demands of conscience and the weight of concrete experience on the other. The subject who »discusses« the Jews usually wants to maintain some sense of proportion, at least formally, even though the content of his rational considerations is spurious and his supposed insight itself is warped by the very same instinctual

urges which it is called upon to check.

The standard form under which conflict appears in statements of high-scoring subjects is, as indicated above, »I shouldn't, but. ...« This formula is the result of a remarkable displacement. It has been pointed out that the anti-Semite is torn between negative stereotypy and personal experiences which contradict this stereotypy.<sup>7</sup> As soon as the subject reflects, however, upon his own attitude, the relation between stereotypy and experience appears in reverse. He regards tolerance as the general law, as the stereotype as it were, and personalizes his own stereotyped hostility, presenting it as the inescapable result either of experience or of idiosyncrasies which are stronger than he is himself. This can be accounted for partly by the officially prevailing democratic ideology which stams prejudice as something wrong. It has also to be considered that the superego, being constituted as the psychological agency of society within the individual, regularly assumes an aspect of universality which easily appears to the subject, driven by wishes for instinctual gratification, as »rigid law.« This, however, hardly tells the whole story. The discrepancy between experience and stereotype is put into the service of the prejudiced attitude. The prejudiced subject is dimly aware that the content of the stereotype is imaginary and that his own experience represents truth. Yet, for deeper psy-



chological reasons, he wants to stick to the stereotype. This he achieves by transforming the latter into an expression of his personality and the anti-stereotypical elements into an abstract obligation. This displacement is enhanced by his innermost conviction that the supposed stereotypes of tolerance are not so strong socially as he pretends. He realizes that while he appears to rebel against the slogans of democracy and equality, for reasons that are strictly personal, he is actually backed by powerful social trends. And yet he will claim, at the same time, that he acts as a sincere and independent person who does not care what others think. Moreover, he relies on the idea that one's own feelings are always stronger than conventions, that he simply has to follow them, and that his prejudice is a kind of fatality which cannot be changed. This seems to be a common pattern by which the anti-Semite's conflict situation is rationalized in a way favorable to prejudice.

This pattern manifests itself objectively in a characteristic contradiction: that between general pretensions of being unbiased, and prejudiced statements as soon as specific issues are raised. 5056, a 29-year-old housewife, with high scores on all the scales,

Stated that she and her husband have no particular dislike for *any* group of people. (This statement is interesting when contrasted with her very high E-score, and with the

statements which follow.) »The Negro, however, should be kept with his own people. I would not want my niece marrying a Negro, and I would not want Negro neighbors.« To subject there is quite a Negro problem – »it is probably the most important minority problem.« She prefers »the way things are in the South; the Negroes seem so happy down there. Actually, they should have a separate state. This doesn't mean that we should snub them. The separate state would be very good, because, although we should govern them, they could run it themselves.«

The underlying conflict could not be expressed more authentically than in the contradiction contained in the last statement. The subject tries to display an unbiased attitude toward Jews:

It is interesting to note that she objected rather strongly to discussing the Jews and the Negroes in the same context and protested when they were presented contiguously in the interview. »I would just as soon have Jews around – in fact, I have some Jewish friends. Some are overbearing, but then some Gentiles are overbearing too.«

But as soon as it comes to her »personal« attitude, she falls for the stereotype and resolves the conflict by an aloofness which amounts for all practical purposes to an endorsement of anti-Semitism:

When asked about Jewish traits, she first mentioned »the Jewish nose.« In addition, she believes Jews have a cer-

tain set of personality traits all their own, which will never change. »They want to argue all the time; some are greedy (though some aren't, in fact, some are generous); they talk with their hands and are dramatic in their speech.« She believes the dislike of the Jews is increasing, to which trend she objects. »Think we're being selfish when we act that way just as we accuse the Jews of being.« She doesn't like to hear attacks on the Jews, but she wouldn't defend them by argument. This seems to be both a function of her dislike for argumentation as well as a certain attitude of noninvolvement in or detachment from the whole question of anti-Semitism.

The subjective mirroring of the conflict between stereotype and experience in reverse, resulting in rigidity of the supposed experience, is clearly exemplified in the statements of *M 1230a*, middle scorer of the Maritime School group:

(What do you think of the problem of racial minorities?)  
»Well, for the foreigners coming in, it's quite a question. This is supposed to be a melting pot. But shouldn't let too many of them in. ... And then the Negro problem. ... I try to be liberal, but I was raised in a Jim Crow state. ... I don't think I would ever fall in with giving the Negroes equal rights in every way. ... And yet, foreigners, you have a natural dislike for them. Yet, all of us were once foreigners ...«

The anti-Semite's dilemma may be epitomized by quoting verbatim the following statements of the girl

student 5005, who is high on both the E and F scales, but low on PEC.

»I don't think there should be a Jewish problem. People should not be discriminated against, but judged on their individual merits. I don't like it to be called a problem. Certainly I'm against prejudice. Jews are aggressive, bad-mannered, clannish, intellectual, clean, overcrowd neighborhoods, noisy, and oversexed. I will admit that my opinion is not based on much contact, however; I hear these things all the time. There are very few Jewish students in my school, and I have already referred to my good contact with the one girl.«

Here the contradiction between judgment and experience is so striking that the existence of prejudice can be accounted for only by strong psychological urges.

## G. Prosecutor as Judge

In terms of ideology, the anti-Semite's conflict is between the current, culturally »approved« stereotypes of prejudice and the officially prevailing standards of democracy and human equality. Viewed psychologically, the conflict is between certain foreconscious or repressed id tendencies on the one hand and the superego, or its more or less externalized, conventional substitute, on the other. It is hard to predict or even to explain satisfactorily, on the basis of our data, which way this conflict will be decided in each individual case, though we may hypothesize that as soon as prejudice in any amount is allowed to enter a person's manifest ways of thinking, the scales weigh heavily in favor of an ever-increasing expansion of his prejudice. We are furthermore entitled to expect this result of the conflict in all cases where the potentially fascist personality syndrome is established. If the conflict within the individual has been decided *against* the Jews, the decision itself is almost without exception rationalized moralistically. It is as if the internal powers of prejudice, after the defeat of the counter-tendencies, would consummate their victory by taking the opposing energies, which they have defeated, into their own service. The superego becomes the spokesman of

the id, as it were – a dynamic configuration, incidentally, which is not altogether new to psychoanalysis. We might call the urges expressing themselves in anti-Semitism the prosecutor, and conscience the judge, within the personality, and say that the two are fused. The Jews have to face, in the prejudiced personality, the parody of a trial. This is part of the psychological explanation of why the chances of the Jews making a successful defense against the prejudiced personality are so slim. It may be noted that the judiciary practice in Nazi Germany followed exactly the same pattern, that the Jews were never given a chance, in the Third Reich, to speak for their own cause, either in private law suits or collectively. It will be seen that the expropriation of the superego by the fascist character, with underlying unconscious guilt feelings which must be violently silenced at any price, contributes decisively to the transformation of »cultural discrimination« into an insatiably hostile attitude feeding upon destructive urges.

There is a clear index of the conquest of the superego by anti-Semitic ideology: the assertion that the responsibility for everything the Jews have to suffer, and more particularly, for the genocide committed by the Nazis, rests with the victims rather than with their persecutors. The anti-Semite avails himself of a cliché which seems to make this idea acceptable once and

for all: that the Jews »brought it on themselves« no matter what »it« may be. *M 107*, the young man who marked every question on the questionnaire scale either +3 or -3 but averaged high on all three scales, is a good example of this pattern of rationalization, following the dubious logic of »where there is smoke there must be fire«:

»I never understood why Hitler was so brutal toward them. There must have been some reason for it, something to provoke it. Some say he had to show his authority, but I doubt it. I suspect the Jews contributed a great deal to it.«

How the moralistic construct of Jewish responsibility leads to a complete reversal between victim and murderer is strikingly demonstrated by one subject, *5064*, another one of the Los Angeles Boy Scout leaders and a butcher by trade. He scores high on both the E and F scale although lower on PEC. While still officially condemning the German atrocities, he makes a surprising suggestion:

»No American can approve of what the Nazis did to the Jews. I really hope that the Jews will do something about it before we come to any such position here. The solution is in the education, particularly of the minority.«

This type of mental perversion seems to utilize an

idea taken from the stock of traditional liberalistic wisdom: God helps those who help themselves. The Jews are in jeopardy, therefore it is up to the Jews. In a cultural climate where success has come to be a major measuring rod for any value, the precarious situation of the Jews works as an argument against them. The affinity of this attitude and the »no pity for the poor« theme, to be discussed in the chapter on politics, can hardly be overlooked. The same line of thought occurs in the interview of another Boy Scout leader, the Austrian-born and somewhat over-Americanized 55-year-old 5044, who is consistently high on all scales:

»The Jews should take the lead rather than the Gentiles. After all, the Jews are the ones who may get into serious trouble. They shouldn't walk on other people's feet.«

While the Jews »bring it upon themselves,« the Nazis' extermination policy is either justified or regarded as a Jewish exaggeration itself, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. The high-scoring man, *M 359*, departmental manager for a leather Company, is one of those who have »a large number of very close Jewish friends.« Despite this he is high on both the E and PEC scales, although lower on F. Nor does it prevent the following interview episode:



(Nazi treatment?) »Unable to convince myself that the treatment was limited to Jews. This seems to me to be Jewish propaganda to solicit sympathy and help by overemphasizing their hardships, though I have no sympathy for the Nazi's treatment of *peoples*.«

The mercilessness accompanying the semi-apologetic attitude towards the Nazis can be seen in this subject's pseudorational statements on Palestine: while apparently wishing to »give the Jews a chance,« he simultaneously excludes any prospects of success by referring to the Jew's supposedly unchangeably bad nature:

(Solution?) »Sending them to Palestine is silly because it's not big enough. A good idea to have a country of their own, but big enough so that they can go ahead with their daily pursuits in a normal way, but the Jews would not be happy. They are only happy to have others work for them.«

The explanatory idea that the »Jews brought it upon themselves« is used as a rationalization for destructive wishes which otherwise would not be allowed to pass the censorship of the ego. In some cases this is disguised as a statement of fact; e.g., by 5012, a 21-year-old discharged naval petty officer, who scores high on all scales:

»I don't want anything to do with them. They are a nuisance, but not a menace. They will get whatever they deserve as a result of their behavior.«

The high-scoring woman *F 103*, however, who used to be a social welfare student but has changed to decorative art, lets the cat out of the bag:

»I don't blame the Nazis at all for what they did to the Jews. That sounds terrible, I know, but if the Jews acted the way they do here, I don't blame them. I've never had any bad personal experiences with Jews, it's just the way they act. Don't help your fellow man; that's their creed.«

Here the interrelation between death-wish and moralistic rationalization becomes truly terrifying. Particularly noteworthy is the subject's underscoring of her own irrationality, in spite of her rationalization concerning the Jews' innate badness. Her confession that she never had any bad experiences with Jews highlights an important aspect of the whole phenomenon of anti-Semitic extremism. It is the fantastic disproportion between the Jewish »guilt« – even as conceived by the anti-Semite himself – and the judgment that is pronounced. In previous sections the role played by the theme of »exchange« in the mentality of the prejudiced person has been discussed. Frequently our high-scoring subjects complain that they never get

their full share, that they are being exploited by everybody. This sense of victimization goes hand in hand with very strong underlying possessive and appropriative desires. Accordingly, when the subjects speak about the »justice« to be meted out to the Jews they express their own desire for an unjust state of affairs in which the exchange of equivalents has been replaced by distribution according to unmediated and irrational power relationships. This is expressed negatively towards the Jews: they should get *more* punishment – infinitely more – than they »deserve.« Ordinarily, it would never occur even to a very aggressive person that somebody who is bad-mannered or even a cheat should be punished by death. Where the Jews are concerned, however, the transition from accusations which are not only flimsy but unsubstantial even if they were true, to suggestions of the severest kinds of treatment seems to work quite smoothly. This is indicative of one of the most pernicious features of the potentially fascist character.

The logical property of stereotypes, that is, their all-comprehensiveness which allows for no deviations, is not only well adapted to meet certain requirements of the prejudiced outlook; it is, by itself, an expression of a psychological trait which probably could be fully understood only in connection with the theory of paranoia and the paranoid »system« which always

tends to include everything, to tolerate nothing which cannot be identified by the subject's formula. The extremely prejudiced person tends toward »psychological totalitarianism,« something which seems to be almost a microcosmic image of the totalitarian state at which he aims. Nothing can be left untouched, as it were; everything must be made »equal« to the ego-ideal of a rigidly conceived and hypostatized ingroup. The outgroup, the chosen foe, represents an eternal challenge. As long as anything different survives, the fascist character feels threatened, no matter how weak the other being may be. It is as if the anti-Semite could not sleep quietly until he has transformed the whole world into the very same paranoid system by which he is beset: the Nazis went far beyond their official anti-Semitic program. This mechanism makes for the complete disproportion between »guilt« and punishment. The extreme anti-Semite simply cannot stop. By a logic of his own, which is of an archaic nature, much closer to associational transitions than to discursive inferences, he reaches, after having started from relatively mild accusations, the wildest conclusions, tantamount in the last analysis to the pronouncement of death sentences against those whom he literally »cannot stand.« This mechanism was encountered in the »screened« interviews of the Labor Study where subjects frequently »talked themselves into anti-Semi-

tism.« Our interview schedule, more strictly standardized, prevented us from catching the latter phenomenon. Yet we have striking testimony of the disproportion between guilt and punishment in some of our cases. It is here that the »expropriation« of the superego by the anti-Semite's punitive moralism obtains its full significance. This removes the last obstacle to psychological totalitarianism. There are no inhibitions left by which the associational crescendo of destructive ideas could be checked. Hatred is reproduced and enhanced in an almost automatized, compulsive manner, which is both utterly detached from the reality of the object and completely alien to the ego. It may be added that, viewed sociologically, the disproportion between guilt and punishment shows that to the extreme anti-Semite the whole idea of rational law has become a sham even though he dwells on orderliness and legalitarian niceties. He is ready to sacrifice his own ideology of equivalents as soon as he has the power to get the major share for himself. Psychologically, the idea of eternal Jewish guilt can be understood as a projection of the prejudiced person's own repressed guilt feelings; ideologically, it is a mere epiphenomenon, a rationalization in the strictest sense. In the extreme case, the psychological focal point is the wish to kill the object of his hatred. It is only afterwards that he looks for reasons why the Jews

»must« be killed, and these reasons can never suffice fully to justify his extermination fantasies. This, however, does not »cure« the anti-Semite, once he has succeeded in expropriating his conscience. The disproportion between the guilt and the punishment induces him, rather, to pursue his hatred beyond any limits and thus to prove to himself and to others that he *must* be right. This is the ultimate function of ideas such as »the Jews brought it upon themselves« or the more generalized formula »there must be something to it.« The extreme anti-Semite silences the remnants of his own conscience by the extremeness of his attitude. He seems to terrorize himself even while he terrorizes others.

The sham trial of rationalizations put on by the prejudiced person sometimes makes for a kind of defense of the Jews. But this psychological defense is all too reminiscent of the technique of the Nazi courts. It is permitted only in order to satisfy the formalized and hollow wish for legality, the empty shell of expropriated conscience. The defense must always remain impotent. Whatever good is said about the Jews sounds like an ironical or hypocritical variation of standard blames. Thus, reference is frequently made to the mythical »good family life« of the Jews, a comment which, however thinly, veils the accusation of conspiratorial clannishness; and this is accompanied by in-

sincere protestations of envy of these Jewish qualities, the implication being that the anti-Semitic subject gets the worst deal in life because his noble nature prevents him from the practice of connivance. Still another type of mock-defense can be observed in our interviews. It is the assertion that the Jews are so clever; that they are »smarter« than the Gentiles, and that one has to admire them on this account. The mechanism at work here involves a double set of values which makes itself felt throughout contemporary culture. On the one hand, there are the »ideals« of magnanimity, unselfishness, justice, and love to which one has to pay lip service. On the other hand, there are the standards of achievement, success, and status which one has to follow in one's actual life. This double set of values is applied to the Jews in reverse, as it were. They are praised for their supposed or actual living up to the standards which the anti-Semite himself actually follows and simultaneously, they are condemned for their violation of the very same moral code of which he has successfully rid himself. The phraseology of conscience is used in order to take back the moral credit given to the chosen foe in order to appease one's own conscience. Even the praise apportioned to the Jews is used as supporting evidence for their pre-established guilt.

The point being developed here, as well as other

features of the prejudiced mentality, is illustrated by the following description of 5039, a 27-year-old veteran student, high on E and middle on the other scales, who is described by the interviewer as a »rather egocentric person.«

In rebelling against his father's teachings, he has dissociated himself from the church, but nevertheless strongly identifies himself as a Gentile in contrast to the Jews. He explained this on the basis of having grown up in a neighborhood ... where he was the only Gentile in a Jewish community and where he was made to feel that he was an »outsider.« He feels that there is a basic conflict in the religious teachings and upbringing of Christians as against Jews, which is largely responsible for the incompatibility of the two groups. He stated that the Christian religion stresses the pacifistic teaching of »turning the other cheek,« thus causing youth to become »maladjusted and submissive,« whereas the Jewish religion spurs youth to achievement and aggression, on the basis that »your fathers have suffered, therefore it is now up to you to prove yourself.« Therefore, he feels that a truly religious Christian is bound to be »outdone« by ambitious and aggressive Jews. ... He did not seem aware that he was generalizing from his own particular experience and environment.

That the objectivity of these reflections about the supposedly realistic education instigated by Judaism is a mere fake and actually serves as a pretext for boundless hostility is shown by this subject's answer to the



specific question referring to Hitler's atrocities:

»Well, if I had been in Germany, I think I would have done the same. ... I suppose I could have been a Nazi. ... I think discipline is a good thing. ...«

Whereas this subject's statements on Jewish smartness are overtly hostile, and limited to the imagined disadvantages of Gentiles in competition with Jews, the smartness idea is sometimes expressed with an air of mock humbleness. An example is afforded by the high-scoring man *M 104*, a former engineering student who has changed to law:

He said »you hear that our country is run by Jewish capitalists, that Jewish capitalists wield all the power here. If this is true, it means that our own people aren't smart enough. If our people know the way the Jews are, and can't do the same thing, more power to the Jews. If they know how the Jews work, they should be able to do it just as well.« He doesn't »want to admit that the others aren't as smart as the Jews, and that's what it would mean if this country is run by Jewish capitalists. If they're smarter than we are, let them run it.«

But the magnanimous ending of the quotation has sinister implications. A tiny shift of emphasis suffices to transform it into the idea that the Jews, because of their sinister cleverness, run the country, that we have

to get rid of them and that, since Jewish smartness makes constitutional procedures ineffective, this can be done only by violent means. That the idea of Jewish omnipotence through smartness is a mere projection becomes nowhere clearer than in the case of the consistently high-scoring woman *F 105*. She is crippled as a result of infantile paralysis in early childhood. She consummates the idea of Jewish smartness – of the Jews »taking over the business affairs of the nation« – by the expectation of a bloody uprising of the Jews which is but a superficially veiled projection of her own wish for anti-Jewish pogroms:

»The white people have decided that we're the thing – the white vs. black and yellow. I think there's going to be a Jewish uprising after the war. I'm not against the Jews. Those I've had contact with were very nice. Of course, I've seen some I didn't like, too.« (What didn't you like about them?) »They're loud and they seem to like attention. They're always trying to be at the top of something. I've heard stories about how they'll stab friends in the back, etc., but I have still to see to believe.« (Uprising?) »I think there will be bloodshed over it in this country.« (Do you think it will be justified?) »There's no doubt that they're taking over the business affairs of the nation. I don't think it's right that refugees should be taken care of the way they are. I think they should take care of their own problems.«

It is noteworthy that when coming into the open with the »bloodshed« idea, this subject does not state clearly whose blood is going to be spilled. While putting the blame for the riots she wishes for upon non-existent Jewish rioters, she leaves it open that it will be the Jews, after all, who are going to be killed. There may be more to this, however. To extreme anti-Semites the idea of bloodshed seems to become independent, an end in itself as it were. On the deepest level, they do not differentiate so very strictly between subject and object. The underlying destructive urge pertains both to the enemy and to oneself. Destructiveness is truly »totalitarian.«

As a summary of the structure of anti-Semitic extremism dealt with in this section, we present in some detail the comments on the Jews of the only interviewee who openly endorses the idea of genocide. This is 5006, a dentistry student and contractor who scores high throughout the questionnaire. He suffers from color-blindness and from psychogenic sexual impotence, determined, according to the interviewer, by a severe Oedipus complex. His radical wishes for the extermination of the Jews are probably conditioned by severe, early childhood traumata: projections of his own castration fear. His exaggerated in-group identification seems to be concomitant with an underlying feeling of weakness: he simply does not

wish to become acquainted with what is different, apparently because he deems it dangerous.

He is a native-born American, and his grandfather was brought to this country at four. He has never been out of America, nor does he want to go out. Once he went to Tijuana and »that was enough.« He has great pride in being an American.

To him, the minorities are characterized, above all, by their potential strength: »The trouble with the Jews is that they are too strong.« The strength of the out-groups is expressed in symbols of potency – fertility and money:

»Of course, there is a problem. The Negroes produce so rapidly that they will populate the world, while the Jews get all of the money.«

As to the basis of his anti-Semitism, he has the following to say:

»I have never had any good experiences with them.« (This is qualified in a second interview where he remembers, as a college athlete, being taken on a private yacht to Catalina by Jews who were »very nice.«) They have invariably attempted to cheat him and his family in business and are in every way inconsiderate. He tells a long story which I was not able to get verbatim about buying a fur coat as a Christmas present for his mother, at which time

the Jewish salesman misread the price tag, quoting a price \$100 cheaper than it actually was. They closed the sale and he insisted on taking the coat after the salesman's error had been noticed. This gave him considerable satisfaction, and he said, »That was a case where I out-Jewed a Jew.«

His references to bad experiences are quite vague except in the case where he »out-Jewed the Jew« – another indication of the projective character of the »smartness« theme. The qualification in favor of the rich Jewish yacht owner shows the complication of anti-Semitism through class consciousness, particularly in cases of such strong upward social mobility as that found in this subject. It took even the Nazis some time to convince themselves, their followers, and the wealthiest Jewish groups that the latter should share the fate of poor cattle dealers and immigrants from Eastern Europe.

The tenets of individualism are altered by this subject as follows:

»They should be treated, I suppose, like individuals; but after all, they are all alike.«

Of course »everyone can tell a Jew.« The distinction between in- and outgroup obtains an almost metaphysical weight: even the imaginary possibility of the dis-

appearance of the dichotomy is excluded:

»I couldn't be a Jew.«

As to the relation between guilt and punishment and its outcome, he finds a formula which cannot be surpassed:

»I think what Hitler did to the Jews was all right. When I was having trouble with a competing contractor, I often thought, I wish Hitler would come here. No, I don't favor discrimination by legislation. I think the time will come when we will have to kill the bastards.«

## H. The Misfit Bourgeois

Our analysis has led us to the extreme consequence of anti-Semitism, the overt wish for the extermination of the Jews. The extremist's superego has been transformed into an extrapunitive agency of unbridled aggression. We have seen that this consequence consummates the intrinsic irrationality of anti-Semitism by establishing a complete disproportion between the »guilt« and the punishment of the chosen victim. Anti-Semitism, however, does not exhaust itself in the old formula by which it is characterized in Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*, »tut nichts, der Jude wird verbrannt« – the Jew is going to be burnt anyway, no matter how things are, or what could be said in his favor. Irrational and merciless wholesale condemnation is kept alive by the maintenance of a small number of highly stereotyped reproaches of the Jews which, while largely irrational themselves, give a mock semblance of justification to the death sentence. By constructing the nature of the Jew as unalterably bad, as innately corrupt, any possibility of change and reconciliation seems to be excluded. The more invariant the negative qualities of the Jew appear to be, the more they tend to leave open only one way of »solution«: the eradication of those who cannot improve. This

pattern of *quasi-natural* incorrigibility is much more important to anti-Semites than is the content of the standard reproaches themselves, the latter being frequently quite harmless and essentially incompatible with the inferences to which they lead those who hate. While these reproaches are so widespread and well known that further evidence of their frequency and intensity is unnecessary, it is worthwhile to follow up some of their aspects which came out clearly in our interviews and which seem to throw some additional light on the phenomena concerned.

It is profitable to examine these reproaches from a sociological point of view. Our sample, in contrast to that of the Labor Study, was predominantly middle class. The San Quentin Group is the only striking exception, but its qualification of *Lumpenproletariat* as well as the prison situation, with its intrinsic emphasis on »official« moral values, makes it impossible to compare this group with the rest of the sample in terms of working-class identification. This identification is usually not very strong even among workers in this country. The general middle-class character of our sample colors the specific nature of the decisive accusations made against the Jews. If our basic hypothesis concerning the largely projective character of anti-Semitism is correct, the Jews are blamed, in social terms, for those properties which by their existence,



sociologically ambiguous though it may be, impinge on sensitive spots in the class identification of the different prejudiced groups. To the true proletarian, the Jew is primarily the bourgeois. The workingman is likely to perceive the Jew, above all, as an agent of the economic sphere of the middle-man, as the executor of capitalist tendencies. The Jew is he who »presents the bill.«

To the anti-Semitic members of the middle classes, the imagery of the Jew seems to have a somewhat different structure. The middle classes themselves experience to a certain degree the same threats to the economic basis of their existence which hang over the heads of the Jews. They are themselves on the defensive and struggle desperately for the maintenance of their status. Hence, they accentuate just the opposite of what working men are likely to complain about, namely, that the Jews are not real bourgeois, that they do not really »belong.« By building up an image of the Jew out of traits which signify his failures in middle-class identification, the middle-class member is able subjectively to enhance the social status of his ingroup which is endangered by processes having nothing to do with ingroup-outgroup relations. To the middle-class anti-Semite, the Jew is likely to be regarded as the *misfit* bourgeois, as it were, he who did not succeed in living up to the standards of today's

American civilization and who is a kind of obsolete and uncomfortable remnant of the past. The term »misfit« is actually applied to the Jew by some of our prejudiced subjects. The less the Jew qualifies as a legitimate member of the middle classes, the more easily can he be excluded from a group which, in the wake of monopolization, tends toward the *numerus clausus* anyway. If the usurper complex to be discussed in the section on politics and economics really belongs to an over-all pattern, the Jew functions, for the potentially fascist mentality, as the usurper par excellence. He is the peddler, impudently disguised as a respectable citizen and businessman.

The most characteristic anti-Jewish remarks appearing in our interviews fall within this frame of thinking, although motifs of a more »proletarian« anti-Semitism, such as the idea of the Jewish exploiter or of the Jews dodging hard manual labor, are not lacking. The division between proletarian and middle-class anti-Semitism should not be exaggerated. The traits ascribed to Jews by working men have often the aspect of the »misfit bourgeois« too. What appear to the worker as symptoms of capitalist exploitiveness can easily be transformed by the middle classes into the reproach of dishonesty, a flagrant violation of bourgeois ethics, one of the main tenets of which is, after all, the praise of good honest labor. The stereotypes

here in question transcend the frontiers of the classes; it is only their function that changes, and hence the difference in emphasis.

The construct of the »misfit bourgeois« can easily be articulated according to three major groups of motifs: first, that of Jewish weakness and its psychological correlates, second, the middle-class identification of the Jews as an overcompensation that has essentially failed, third, the intrinsic disloyalty of the Jews to the class with which they vainly attempt to identify themselves, a disloyalty which is viewed as an expression of their abortive identification and of their nature as an objectionable, isolated, and »clannish« ingroup. The first two of these objections may have some basis in reality. There is considerable evidence, e.g., the recent studies by Anton Lourie, of Jewish masochism and its basis in religious psychology. The third objection seems to be predominantly projective and one of the major rationalizations of the wish to »get rid of the whole bunch.«

The idea of Jewish weakness is epitomized by *F 114*, a woman consistently high on all scales, who is a surgical nurse of partly Jewish descent:

»I have a cousin who was in love with me and wanted to marry me. He was more Jewish than I. I loved him, but wouldn't marry him. I told him why – because he's Jewish. He is now married to a Gentile with two children.

He's more anti-Semitic than I. That's true of so many Jews – like they were lame or hunchback. They hate it or resent it.«

It is perhaps characteristic that such overt statements on Jewish weakness are made frequently either by persons who are themselves being identified with the Jews or – with a more positive accent – by low-scoring subjects. The prejudiced individual, whose hatred is stimulated by weakness, rather tends to stress, on the surface, the strength of the Jews who »wield undue influence« and »own everything.« An example of the low-scorer's attitude towards Jewish weakness is the statement of 5055, an otherwise thoroughly liberal man of 73 years who scored low on all the scales. He feels

»that this protective philosophy of the Jews has led to a situation where they do stimulate antagonism in other people.«

In cases of extreme low scorers the awareness of Jewish weakness sometimes leads to identification: they assume the role of Jews themselves, consciously in order to antagonize anti-Semitic acquaintances, unconsciously, possibly, in order to atone for anti-Semitism by at least figuratively suffering the same humiliations under which they know the Jews live. Here

belongs the case of a 20-year-old, somewhat neurotic interior decorator, 5028, who is in open rebellion against his father but strongly attached to his mother:

The subject and his sister are alike in that they both admire Jewish people. He told of jokes that they had played upon some of their father's relatives who are extremely anti-Semitic by pretending that a great grandfather on the maternal side was Jewish. The subject explained that many persons in his mother's family »look a little Jewish because they have long noses.« The paternal cousin to whom they were talking »almost committed suicide« at the thought. The subject volunteered the comment that perhaps one reason he likes Jews is that he »has never known any who were objectionable.«

To the prejudiced person, the imagery of Jewish weakness, combined as it is with the rationalization of strength, sometimes strikes a peculiar note, remarkable because of its close harmony with one of the standard themes of American fascist agitators. It is the image of the Jewish refugee who is depicted simultaneously as strong (»He takes the jobs away from our American boys«) and as weak (»He is a dirty outcast«). There is reason enough to believe that the second motive is the decisive one. The high-scoring man *M 105* makes the following statement:

»A lot of Jewish immigrants are coming to this country.

They get a soft life, and they take over. You can't deal with one, and a lot of them are awful dirty, though they have money.«

Aggressiveness against the refugees comes to the fore even in cases which are otherwise, according to the interviewer, only mildly anti-Semitic. 5036 is a jazz musician, at the present time drawing unemployment insurance. He is high on E and F, although lower on PEC.

Although he denies any outgroup antagonisms, many of these are implicit and at the surface level. He is most vehement in his belief that refugees should not assume citizenship and should be sent home when time and conditions permit it.

The psychological determination of this subject's hatred of the refugee competitors can be inferred the more safely since he acknowledges that

»There is no doubt that the Jews are talented in music.«

He sets against this only the vague standard accusation:

»but they are so clannish and aggressive and loud that sometimes I can't stand them.« On several occasions he claims that the aggressiveness and selfish demands of

Jews within smaller bands he had tried to organize caused their failure. »These Jews would never really get a feeling of pride in the organization. They would always leave you the minute they had a better offer; and in trying to meet offers they had, I went broke twice.« On the other hand, he says some Jews are undoubtedly outstandingly cultured people.

The refugees, as those who are objectively weak, are regularly blamed for having a domineering attitude and a drive for power. While there may be some basis for the objection of aggressiveness in certain institutionalized Jewish reaction formations, such as the Jewish habit of »pleading,« this stereotype helps at the same time to alleviate the anti-Semite's discomfort about violating the principle of democratic asylum: it is not he but the fugitives who are supposed to disregard the rules of hospitality. 5043, a middle-aged housewife with extremely high scores on all the scales, alleges that the Jews

are loud and often aggressive. (Here she gave an example of women at the market who push themselves forward.) She specifically distinguishes between »refugees« and other Jews and feels that the »type we have been getting in the neighborhood lately« is definitely clannish, unintelligent, and generally undesirable.

The stereotype of Jewish aggressiveness shows a cha-

racteristic of anti-Semitic thinking which deserves closer investigation. It is the mixing, in allegations against the Jews, of crudely physical acts of aggression with hypotheses of a more psychological nature. Just as the idea of »Jewish blood« ranges from the fear of »pollution of the race,« where the term blood is used only figuratively, to the hysteria of bodily »poisoning« inflicted by Jewish blood donors, the imagery of aggressiveness ranges from the Jews using their elbows when standing in a queue to their allegedly ruthless business practices. This suggests the retrogressive, »mythological« feature of some anti-Semitism. Mental dispositions are translated into physical reality both in order to soothe the fear of the incomprehensible »alien mentality« and to add a sense of the real to that which is actually only projective. This retranslation probably throws some light on the over-all insistence of the anti-Semite on Jewish physical traits.

5067 »is a portly, rather maternal-looking woman who looks all of her forty-eight years.« She was chosen as a mixed case with high E and PEC. She does not differentiate at all between the physical and the psychological aspect of Jewish »aggressiveness«:

»I do not like their coercive aggression in business. They are not only aggressive, but they should also be segregated. They are always pushing people aside. I noticed



nearly every time when there was pushing in the innumerable lines we had to wait in during the war, it was a Jew who started the pushing. I feel a real revulsion towards Jews.«

In other cases, the idea of aggressiveness is used in the exclusively social sense of »intrusiveness.« Sometimes one gets a glimpse into the mechanism behind this standard reproach. It probably has to do with the all-pervasive feeling of social isolation, which is overcompensated for in innumerable middle-class »social activities.« Against this background of emotion the Jews, as the classic agents of circulation, are perceived and probably envied as those who are not isolated, but have »contacts« everywhere. This idea is closely associated with that of clannishness, which also implies the imagery of some kind of togetherness from which the members of the real in-group pretend to be excluded. The aforementioned *F 105* finds the formula:

»They seem to know everybody; they pull strings; they are like a clan, more united than any race. They have friends everywhere who can do the right thing.«

Finally, it should be mentioned that there is some evidence in our material that the basis of the stereotype »aggressiveness« lies in repressed sexuality. The Jews

are supposed to be unencumbered by the standards of Puritan morality, and the more strictly one adheres oneself to these standards, the more eagerly are the supposed sex habits of the Jews depicted as sordid. What goes uncensored in the case of Jewish »rich food« becomes intolerable in the sphere of supposedly uninhibited and there-fore repulsive sensuality. Some insight into this matter is afforded by the 42-year-old woman, *F 118*, a public health nurse – a person, incidentally, whose outgroup hatred is focused on organized labor rather than on minorities and whose score on A-S is middle, while she scores high on PEC and F.

She could not imagine herself marrying a Jew. She then proceeded to relate that actually she once had an opportunity to marry a Jew. One time, when she returned home for the summer after being in New York for a while, she met a very intelligent lawyer who worked in the same office as her brother. He was very well-educated and knew languages. She had dates with him and saw quite a lot of him for three weeks, until one day he said to her, »There is one thing I want to tell you about myself. You have never met my family and I had not intended that you should meet them. However, there is one thing that I want to ask you, and that is whether you would object to marrying a Jew?« She said that it was as if she had been struck a great blow. He did not look Jewish, his name was not Jewish, and he even sang in the choir of her church, so that she never suspected that he was Jewish.

She just sat there without saying a word – and that was his answer. She then went on to add that it was very bad for him, because all the girls staying in her boarding house then found out that he was Jewish and it also became known at his place of work and made things bad for him there. Subject saw him again ten years later and felt that he did look more Jewish, but added that that was perhaps because she now knew that he was Jewish. The thing that is most impossible to her in the idea of marrying a Jew is the thought of bearing *Jewish children*.

It is noteworthy that the resistance of this woman was brought about only by her knowledge of the man's Jewish descent, not by any of his own characteristics. It is hardly going too far to assume that the stereotype has re-enacted old childhood taboos against sexuality and that it was only afterwards that these were turned against the Jew as an individual. Primary attraction is the basis for subsequent repulsion.

The close relations of the ubiquitous idea of clannishness to the reproach of aggressiveness has become obvious in previous examples. Suffice it to say here that clannishness appears as the justification for excluding the aggressive »intruder«: he always »remains a Jew« and wants to cheat those by whom he wishes to be accepted. At the same time, the idea of clannishness consummates the imagery of Jewish togetherness, of a warm, family-like, archaic and very »ingroup-like« texture of the outgroup which seems to

be denied to those who are thoroughly formed by American civilization and obey the rules of technological rationality.

The underlying attractiveness of the Jewish »clan« is accentuated by the statement of *M 102*, a subject scoring high on all scales:

»The Jewish kids I knew in high school were the sons and daughters of the prominent Jewish businessmen, and they were very clannish. It's hard to say what ought to be done about it. It doesn't seem to bother them what people think. That is a natural characteristic. It doesn't do any good to try to exclude them from business because some of them are the smartest businessmen we have. Most of them are out of Germany by now, and I suppose they'll get back. Some are very crafty about sticking together and getting ahead in business, getting capital. People in Germany will feel the need of Jewish businessmen and they will pool their capital and make a start there.« (What about Jewish women?) »Some of them are very attractive, and some are very clannish. They are dominated by the men; it's all in their creed.«

The more patriarchal structure of the Jewish family, whether it be real or imagined, seems to work as an element of sexual attraction. Jewish women are supposed »to do everything for men« – just what the Gentile American girl is expected not to do. At the same time, however, the idea of sexual fulfillment tends to diminish, in American culture, the social

value of the women who offer this fulfillment. Here again, the praise of one Jewish quality is prone to tilt over into its opposite.

How the idea of clannishness can sometimes obtain features of an obsession laden with violent resentment is shown in the case of *F 113*, a young woman who is high on the E scale but somewhat lower on F and PEC. She is an attractive, somewhat neurotic girl of 26, a subject from the Extension Class group. She resents both Jewish names and those who dared to change them. When speaking about Jewish acquaintances, she makes a point of their owning »a chain of burlesque houses,« being rich as well as somewhat disreputable. In her statement about Jewish family life, it is remarkable how closely some observations which have a ring of truth are knit together with somewhat paranoid ideas about the selfishness determining the Jewish behavior in question and with a harsh evaluation of it as a »guilt«:

»The worst experience with them I had was when I was overseas operator in Hawaii a couple of years ago. I had to monitor all the calls that went to New York so I listened to just thousands of conversations. And ninety percent of them were rich Jews calling up their families. That is the only really good thing I can say for them – their devotion to their families. But all purely selfish. The money they spent – and the time – on just purely selfish calls.« (Business calls?) »Well I worked mostly at night. But the

other girls said it was the same people making business calls during the day.« (How did you know they were Jews?) »Their voices and the things they said. Selfish.« (Could there have been Jews you didn't recognize?) »I don't think so. You get so you always know a Jewish voice.«

## I. Observations on Low-Scoring Subjects

Throughout this chapter, we have concentrated on the phenomena of anti-Semitism and their structural interconnections. We have abstained from a detailed discussion of the minority attitudes of the non-anti-Semite and of the anti-anti-Semite. Obviously, it is more difficult and less promising to analyze the absence of highly specific opinions and attitudes than it is to deal with their existence. We have been able, it seems, in the study as a whole to draw a fairly complete picture of the low scorers, ranging from surface ideology to characterological determinants. Their general tendency to be disinterested in so-called racial questions, however, limits the supply of pertinent information. Moreover, the pragmatic aspect of our study naturally requires a closer scrutiny of the danger zone than of areas which can be discounted as a potential for fascism. By and large, the attitudes of the high scorers suffice to define, *e contrario*, the attitudes of the »lows« which are, in many respects, set polemically against the anti-Semitic imagery prevailing in our cultural climate.

Yet a number of observations concerning the low scorers may be allowed, not only in order to round out the picture, but also because the low scorers, in their

responses to questions about minorities, go beyond a simple negation of the prejudiced person's opinions and attitudes, and throw some additional light upon the nonfascist character.

An over-all characteristic of the low scorer's attitude towards Jews is emphatic rationality. This has a double aspect. On the one hand, the general tendency towards intractableness so characteristic of low scorers expresses itself specifically in the racial area through self-reflection: anti-Semitism presents itself to the low scorers as the problem of the anti-Semite, not of the Jew. On the other hand, racial problems and minority traits are viewed within historical and sociological perspective and thus seen to be open to rational insight and change, instead of being hypostatized in a rigidly irrational manner.

An example of self-reflection in racial matters is *M 910*, a student-minister, consistently low on all scales, who has strong intellectual leanings and, like most low scorers, a tendency toward hesitation, doubt, and qualifications of his own opinions. He traces back prejudice, in a plain-spoken though somewhat primitive manner, to the difficulties of the minority haters, not to the object of their hatred:

(What do you feel are the causes of prejudice?) »Probably the largest reason is the insecurity or fear of insecurity that the person has himself. The people in my community



who have talked loudest about the Japs are the ones who have since taken over (the properties left by the Japanese) ... and they're afraid they'll come back ... and they're afraid of them as competitors because they work harder. ...« (You fell it's mainly an economic conflict?) »Well, it isn't altogether economic, and I don't think it will be solved on an economic basis. ... All people have some kind of insecurity. It may be pretty well concealed, and they may not know what it is, and it may not have anything to do with the Japanese, but they'll take it out on them. People are funny (laughs) and are cruel.« (What ought to be done to combat prejudice?) »I think one thing that could be done – kinda regimentation – is to get the facts, it would help, though it wouldn't solve the problem ... e.g., that there is no necessity for separating Negro and white blood in blood banks, and there are a lot of people who think that the Japanese are a treacherous race, and that it's transmitted through heredity. ... Of course, a lot of it is irrational.«

As to the emphasis on dynamic factors versus supposedly innate qualities, the most striking illustration is provided by *M 203*, a thoroughly liberal teacher, head of the English department in a junior college. He, too, is low on all scales. His whole philosophy is positivistic, with a strong interest in semantics, though he does not »think they should make a panacea out of semantics.« His general outlook on minority problems is summarized by his statement on the Japanese:

»If the Germans were changed in one generation by the Nazis, then the Japanese can be changed in a democratic way in one or two generations. Anybody can become anything under the proper conditions.«

Consequently, when discussing anti-Semitism, he chooses as an explanation a historical element, the maliciously super-imposed Jewish names. The arbitrariness of the selection of this specific factor can probably be accounted for by the interviewee's semanticist hobby:

»Anti-Semitism is a little different. Semites are not so easily identified. I guess their name is about the main thing. For instance, from your name I guess you're Jewish though I wouldn't know to look at you. Are you?« (Yes.) (Subject is quite open about these things. The only sign of inhibition was that it was hard for him to use the word »Jew« as he preferred the word »Semite« at first, but later he used the word »Jew« also.)

This subject's readiness to discuss the interviewer's Jewishness is significant. To him, the word Jew is not a magic word, nor is being Jewish a disgrace: thus he does not feel inhibited about mentioning it in relation to the person with whom he is talking. It is hard to imagine that a high scorer would casually discuss the origins of an interviewer except on occasions when he feels on the defensive and wants to hurt the fellow:

»You are a Jew yourself, aren't you?«

The rationality of the unprejudiced subjects expresses itself, above all, in their rejection of anti-minority stereotypes. Frequently, this rejection is of a conscious, articulate nature: they take the concept of individuality seriously. We refer again to *M 910*. His utterance shows a definite sense of proportion even in his rejection of stereotypy: he does not deny the existence of physical racial characteristics, but regards them as nonessential:

»Well, I wouldn't be tricked into making a statement about any people as a group. The Japanese I've known I've liked very well. I know there are some Japanese who aren't so nice. ... We had a Japanese girl stand up with us at the altar and a Chinese girl too ... in 1942 when there was some pretty tense feeling.« (Do you feel that any racial group has certain distinguishing characteristics?)  
»No, not at all. Of course you have biological characteristics the height of the bridge of the nose or pigmentation.«

A similar line is followed in the Los Angeles interview 5030, of a 33-year-old Stanford graduate who served for four years in the navy, finally becoming a Lieutenant Commander. His scores on all scales are low. He is judged by the interviewer to be an extremely astute, successful individual:

»The Negroes, Jews, and all minority groups are having a very difficult time. I think many people dislike them because of their physical characteristics. They are really in a very bad spot. Such things as the FEPC help a lot and I favor both state and national laws concerning this issue. So many people are not willing to admit that many Negroes are intelligent, superior, and capable individuals. Their environment has held them back as a race. I have had both good and bad experiences with members of these groups but have never considered the people as belonging to a certain race or religion. I always take them for what they are worth as individuals. Yesterday I had a nice experience. There is a girl in one of my classes who is part Negro. She is a very superior and capable individual and I am sure the most intelligent member of the class. I have often thought I would like to visit with her but a suitable opportunity has never presented itself. Yesterday I, after much hesitation and fumbling, invited her to have a cup of coffee with me. Her acceptance was much more gracious than my invitation and we had a nice visit. I think the reason for my hesitation was simply a fear of what other people might think. I once had a Jewish roommate and he was the best roommate I have ever had.«

An extreme example of fully conscious anti-stereotypy is 5046, an executive secretary in the movie industry, in her late thirties, actively engaged in the labor movement. Her questionnaire scores are low for all scales. If some of her formulations suggest a »ticket low,«<sup>8</sup> it should be kept in mind that her rejection of

stereotypy even prevents her from building up automatically a pro-Jewish stereotype. She is no »Jew lover,« but seems truly to appraise people as individuals. As a matter of fact, she has just severed a relationship with a Jewish man:

When the interviewer began questioning subject on the Jewish problem, it became apparent immediately that she »knew all the answers.« She stated: »Yes, there is a problem ... but I don't think we should call it a Jewish problem; it really is a Christian problem ... question of educating the Gentiles who practice anti-Semitism.« When given the check list, she laughed and said: »Of course, one can't generalize ... these are the stereotypes used by the anti-Semites to blame the Jews for certain faults ... I don't think one should label any group like this ... it is dangerous, especially in regard to the Jews, because one has to evaluate the individual on his or her own merits.« None of the other questions brought out even a trace of anti-Semitism, and throughout, her answers indicated a consistent, almost militant stand *against* anti-Semitism. She feels that anti-Semitism is one of the most dangerous trends in this country and feels that only solution must be sought through widespread education along liberal lines and through extensive intermarriage. She feels rather optimistic about the process of assimilation, although she is quite alarmed about the increase of anti-Semitism during recent years. Hitler's race theory and persecution of the Jews should be combatted on every front, in whatever form it may appear. She stated: »I have also known some Jewish people whom I decidedly did not like, and some of

them were quite aggressive, but I would never generalize that therefore ›all Jews‹ were aggressive ... if only we could make people see that *some* people are aggressive for certain reasons, usually because of insecurity, and Jews are not aggressive because they are Jews.«

As pointed out in great detail in the chapters on the personality aspects of the interview material, the low scorers' rationality, their rejection of projective imagery and automatized judgment, does not involve as a rule emotional coldness and detachment. Although they are more rational than the »highs« in so far as their judgment seems to be less determined by repressed unconscious factors, they are simultaneously less blocked in positive cathexes and in the expression of them. This refers not only to their general psychological make-up but also to their specific minority attitudes. The prejudiced person discusses the Jews as an »object« while he actually hates; the unprejudiced person displays sympathy even when he pretends simply to judge objectively. The link between this sympathy and rationality is the idea of *justice*, which has come to work, in certain people, spontaneously, almost as if it were instinctual. To the low scorer, racial discrimination violates the basic principle of the equality of all men. In the name of human rights he tends to identify himself with those who are discriminated against and who thus appeal to his own sponta-

neous feeling of solidarity with the oppressed.

Here are a few examples of this specific configuration. *M 113*, a »religious low scorer« whose F scale shows higher trends and whose PEC scale was still higher:

(Minority problem?) »In a speech the other day in Public Speaking I said that democracy is mainly respect for minority groups.« (Vague, little verbalized ideas.) »They have gotten a dirty deal, as most minorities do.«

Similarly, in *M 320*, a consistently low-scoring student of landscape architecture, protest against unfairness works as a »rationalization« for emotional identification which otherwise might not be allowed to come into the open.

»I'm very much pro-Negro, myself. I think I'm in favor of almost any minority that's discriminated against unfairly ...« (What about the Jewish problem?) »I don't see why it should be a problem at all. I think that in Europe the Jews should be allowed to live and have their businesses, etc., the same as anyone else.«

Or the young woman *F 129*, also low on all scales, a somewhat high-strung person who, according to the interviewer, is moved by any disturbing subject – including race prejudice – to tears and flushes:

(And how do you feel about Jews?) »Why, I don't feel any way about them except upset at the way they are treated. There are good and bad in all races but I am inclined to be even more tolerant about the shortcomings of people who are always persecuted and criticized.« (Could you have married a Jew?) »Why of course, if I had fallen in love with one.« (Why do you think Jews are persecuted?) »I don't know except some people have to hate.«

There are indications that the low scorers' affect-laden sense of justice is not a mere surface ideology, or a means of narcissistic gratification in one's own humanitarianism, but that it has a real basis within the personality and is only presented afterwards, as it were, in theoretical terms. The sympathy for the underdog leads towards action, towards attempts to correct in concrete, individual situations what is felt to be general unfairness. A pertinent case was 5030 (see p. [320]). We give one further illustration: *F 126*, who is low on E and PEC and only slightly higher on F. She is a good-looking young woman, »very articulate and whimsical, with much charm and humor.« She studies journalism and says that her real desire is to do »creative writing«:

»I remember when I was in junior high, there was only one Jewish boy in our class. We were always having parties and affairs and he was left out. At first I didn't even understand why. He was a very nice boy, smart, and



good-looking. But they left him out because he was a Jew. Well, I made it my business to be his special friend, not only invited him to my parties, but paid particular attention to him. That was one time it was really good to be one of the leading kids. The others began to treat him the same way, and he was just one of the crowd from then on. I never have been able to stand to see anyone be mean to anyone else. The same at the shipyards. I always made it a point to get acquainted with Negroes and Jews. They talked frankly with me, too, and I certainly found out what some of their problems are. Whenever I could, I would bring it into a story, too. Not directly about race prejudice, but nice stories about Negroes for instance. People have so many wrong ideas. I sometimes think it is just hopeless.«

The general attitude of the low scorers towards the Jews profoundly affects their evaluation of so-called Jewish traits. It has been said above (pp. [275] ff.) that high scorers perceive the Jew altogether differently: their psychological make-up functions as a frame of reference even for their supposedly »immediate,« everyday experiences. Something similar applies, in reverse, to the unprejudiced. Yet the diffuseness and inarticulateness of the objective »Jewish traits,« complex as they are, is reflected by the low scorers' attitude no less than by the various projections of the high scorers. There is universal sympathy among the unprejudiced subjects, but no unanimity. Sometimes they try to *explain* Jewish traits; sometimes they

simply deny their existence; sometimes they take an emphatically positive, admiring stand towards those traits.

The explanatory method is applied to the most widespread idea of a Jewish trait, that of clannishness, by *M 202*, a 35-year-old construction engineer, with the lowest possible score on E, but with certain deviations from the usual picture of the low scorer with regard to PEC and also to F – a person who, according to the interviewer, »is conservative but not fascist.«

In response to a question about how he would characterize the Jews, subject replied that they were a close-knit family with certain inborn characteristics like any other racial group. For instance, the Germans »must always be right,« the English – here the interviewer interrupted, pointing out that she wished to know what he thought of the Jews. He replied that the Jews had not been accepted in a certain society and that this had led to their becoming a very close-knit family. The reason for this is that they have certain characteristics. On being asked to be more specific, his reply was they have a tendency to sharp dealing. Of course he doesn't blame them because he would probably do the same if he had the chance and if he were smart enough.

In this case, the wish to »explain,« frequently an instrument for rationalizations, seems to mediate between broad-mindedness on the one hand and powerful

anti-minority stereotypes, which are still there below the surface, on the other. As a matter of fact, the pro-Jewish apologies of the subject are followed by a rather unfriendly story about a supposed conspiracy among three Jewish bidders for a vast quantity of scrap-iron. The guess that the explanatory attitude may sometimes cover up ambivalence seems to be corroborated by *M 310*, an assistant manager for an advertising agency, who scored low on all scales. Nevertheless, his theorizing presupposes the acceptance of the stereotype of Jewish money-mindedness:

(Characteristic Jewish traits?) »Well, I think it is true that Jews, as a group, are more concerned with money. ... Perhaps because persecuted for so long. ... It's some small security in a money economy, that is, a money culture. Some security to be able to defend themselves with money. I also think they are better than average Gentiles at making money because forced to be usurers during the Middle Ages, etc.«

Subjects whose scores are at the lowest extreme often tend simply to *deny* the existence of any Jewish traits, sometimes with a violence that seems to be due more to the impact of their own conscience than to an objective appraisal of the minority members. Here »neurotic« traits, which are often found in extremely unprejudiced subjects, may easily enter the picture. The vehicle by which they try to argue away Jewish traits

is insight into the mechanisms of projectivity and stereotypy, i.e., into the subjective factors making for anti-Semitism.

*M 112*, a »quiet, reserved, well-mannered sophomore of 18 years,« whose scale scores are all low, simply subscribes to the »envy« theory:

(Jews?) »Not an educational problem in this case. People just prejudiced. Want to keep them out of good positions, etc. People make up wild stories, like that the Jews have too much money, control the country, etc.; it's just to keep them back.« (Your contacts?) »No Negroes in my school. Jews were like anyone else. I'd never know they were Jewish if they hadn't told me.«

*5041* (whose scale scores are all low), a 59-year-old housewife who had studied to be a professional pianist, combines the denial of Jewish traits with reference to bygone ages and with the rejection of resentful generalizations:

»I think there is a Jewish problem – but I don't think that they are different ... not that there is anything inherent in them that they should be set apart or treated differently. ... There are historical reasons for their persecution ... it is not their fault. Well, you can't apply any of these traits to the Jews as a group. Jews are not a race. ... These terms might apply to some individuals, to Christians as well as Jews ... you have some aggressive people, but they are not aggressive because they are Jewish ... it's usually so-

something that the other person does not like ... say they appear to be more intellectual and some succeed, outdoing others, this causes resentment, and then they are called aggressive. ...«

An extreme of denial is achieved by the »easy-going« low scorer, *M 1206a*, of the Maritime School Group, who »is a highly introspective person and shows much inhibition against rejecting another person or group, even on the basis of principles founded in reality.« His scores on all the scales are low:

(Most characteristic traits of Negroes?) »Well, I don't think there is such a thing. They have the same traits the white men have. ... I don't believe any nationality has any characteristics. ...«

Sometimes the intense emotions behind the denial of Jewish traits find a somewhat irrational expression. *F 125* (low on E and F, but high on PEC) is a student who would like to become a drama teacher and who finds »the movies very stereotyped.« Her indignation was stirred up by our own study.

»I was mad at some questions in your questionnaire, especially about the Jewish atmosphere. The Irish people and other national groups give an atmosphere to the place in which they live, but only the Jewish atmosphere is stamped as something bad. I don't find that the ways of li-

ving of the Jews are different at all.«

If the prejudiced subjects, for reasons of general conformity and in order to obtain »social confirmation,« frequently stress that practically everybody is anti-Semitic, some low scorers go so far as not only to deny the existence of Jewish traits, but even of anti-Semitism. A case in point is the somewhat muddle-headed *M 115*, characterized as a typical conventional and conservative fraternity man who, however, is within the low quartile on the F scale though in the middle quartile on E and in the high quartile on PEC:

(What about the Jewish problem?) »There's not much persecution now in the United States. There shouldn't be any. The only reason for persecuting the Jew is that he is smarter than the next guy, as far as I can see.«

As to the appreciation of the specific qualities of Jews and of other minorities, we content ourselves with two examples which may throw light on significant areas. *F 128*, a 17-year-old girl, is low on F and PEC but slightly higher on E. She is studying social work and is interested in child welfare, but not »in any kind of a career«:

»I guess I have had a better education than many people. We have entertained Negroes in our home as long as I

can remember. I have known all sorts of people – lots of them very eccentric people – in music and art groups. The first good friends I ever had were Jewish boys and girls. I don't know why some people hate Negroes and Jews. With Jewish people perhaps they are a little afraid, because lots of Jews are smarter than other people.«

The interesting element of this statement is contained in the word »eccentric.« It refers to what is »different,« to what is branded as slightly abnormal by standards of conformity, but which expresses individualization, the development of human traits which have not been performed, as it were, by the social machinery of contemporary civilization. To this subject, the very »alienness« of minorities with respect to the rigid patterns of the highly organized mass society of today, represents the human, which she otherwise might feel to be lacking among the »right people.« The Jewish »failure« to become completely absorbed by the American cultural climate presents itself to this subject as a merit, as a triumph of autonomy and resistance against the leveling impact of the »melting pot.«

5050, a radio news commentator with progressive political affiliations, who is low on all three scales, denies the existence of Jewish traits but emphasizes a point rarely acknowledged: the patience of the minorities in the face of persecution. His praise of this attitu-

de actually contains a critical element which may, by the implication of cowardice, be indicative of some hidden hostility. He blames the minorities for political reasons because they do not take a more energetic stand against American reaction:

He tries at all times to show that there are no so-called »Jewish traits,« and that people such as described by Budd Schulberg in »What Makes Sammy Run« can and do occur quite as frequently among Gentiles. Then he usually points to a man like Rankin or Bilbo as an example of an obnoxious »Gentile.« »I admire both the Negro and the Jewish people for their great patience in swallowing discrimination. ... If I were in their shoes, I would start a really militant fight against the oppressors.« He still feels that too many Jews and Negroes are too apathetic and rather let the other fellow do the fighting. ... he feels that had the Jews been more alert, Hitler might have been stopped, or at least prevented from perpetrating the extreme atrocities. Again and again he stated that all forms of discrimination can and must be wiped out by *direct political action*.

One last characteristic of the unprejudiced attitude toward minority questions should be mentioned: the absence of fatalism. Not only do unprejudiced subjects, in the realm of their conscious convictions, appear to be set against ideas such as those of the inevitability of human badness or the perennial nature of any character traits, but on a deeper level, as suggested in



Chapters XIV<sup>[9]</sup> and XV,<sup>[10]</sup> they appear to be relatively free of destructive urges and punitive fantasies. They look at things in a historical and sociological way rather than hypostatizing the existent as something ultimately given. This point of view expresses itself also in their concept of the future relationships between majority and minority. 5008, low on E, in the middle quartile on F, and high on PEC, is a middle-aged woman who worked as a ghost writer, then as a literary agent, and is now employed as secretary to a radio show. In keeping with the low scorers' rejection of stereotypy, she sees the solution of the problem of anti-Semitism, however naively, in the establishment of personal contacts.

She holds nothing but good wishes for the intelligent immigrants and refugees who have come here recently, but feels that many of them have been undesirable. Concerning Negroes she reports that as a Republican she believes their position should be very much bettered, but says this is a difficult problem. Concerning Jews she says, »Before I went to work, I probably had a slight anti-Jewish feeling,« but in several positions she has worked with and for Jews, and found them very charming, intelligent, and interesting people. She thinks the racial problem most in need of solution is that of anti-Semitism, and feels that if more »anti-Semites would mingle with Jews the way I have« it could be avoided. She believes in the FEPC and thinks that socioeconomic discrimination should be outlawed. When it was pointed out that this is a

more New Deal type of political notion, she simply said, »Well, it can't all be bad.«

This attitude, which stresses human spontaneity and freedom of action rather than rigid, authoritarian laws of nature, does not, however, lead toward »official optimism.« The unprejudiced subjects' sensitivity to the suffering of human beings, their compassion, makes them keenly aware of the dangers of racial persecution. It is the high scorer who would say, »It can't happen here,« thus apparently detaching himself from the »objective« course of history with which he actually identifies himself; the low scorer knows that it could happen, but wants to do something about it.

5058, low on all three scales, is a 29-year-old veteran of upper-middle-class background whose main identification lies with »liberals« and »intellectuals.«

He is very concerned about the problem of minority groups in this country. »I do a lot of talking about it – hoping to reduce prejudice and to encourage tolerance. In fact, I feel so concerned about this thing I would almost be willing to set myself up in Pershing Square. I tried to do a little crusading in the Navy but without much success.« Subject is very pessimistic about the possibility of a solution to the »minority problem« which seems to stem largely from his failure to modify the opinions of the people with whom he has argued. He feels that dislike of the Jews is increasing because he has heard more talk against

them lately. »Of course that might be because I am exposed to it more lately, both while I was in the Navy and in my present job.« He does not feel that the Jews have too much influence in this country, nor does he believe that the Jews are a political force in America. He is certain that they did their part in the war effort. When asked about »basically Jewish traits,« he was not able to respond since to him this term means practically nothing. »Jews are all so different from each other that we cannot speak of there being something ›basically Jewish‹ about them.«

## J. Conclusion

It has often been said that anti-Semitism works as the spearhead of antidemocratic forces. The phrase sounds a bit hackneyed and apologetic: the minority most immediately threatened seems to make an all-too-eager attempt to enlist the support of the majority by claiming that it is the latter's interest and not their own which really finds itself in jeopardy today. Looking back, however, at the material surveyed in this, and other chapters, it has to be recognized that a link between anti-Semitism and antidemocratic feeling exists. True, those who wish to exterminate the Jews do not, as is sometimes claimed, wish to exterminate afterwards the Irish or the Protestants. But the limitation of human rights which is consummated in their idea of a special treatment of the Jews, not only logically implies the ultimate abolition of the democratic form of government and, hence, of the legal protection of the individual, but it is frequently associated quite consciously, by high-scoring interviewees, with overt antidemocratic ideas. We conclude this chapter with two examples of what appear to be the inescapable antidemocratic consequences of anti-Semitism. *M 106*, a man high on the E, F, and PEC scales, still pretends to be democratic; but it is not difficult to

infer what is in the back of his mind:

»Hitler's plan – well, Hitler carried things just a little too far. There was some justification – some are bad, but not all. But Hitler went on the idea that a rotten apple in the barrel will spoil all the rest of them.« He doesn't approve of ruthless persecution. »If Hitler had handled the Jews as a minority group, had segregated them and set certain standards for them to live by, there would be less trouble for Hitler now.« (Same problem in this country now?) »Same problem, but it's handled much better because we're a democratic country.«

While the suggestion that a minority be segregated is incompatible with the basic concepts of the same »democratic country« of which the subject professes to be proud, the metaphor of the rotten apple in the barrel conjures up the imagery of »evil germs« which is associated with appalling regularity with the dream of an effective germicide.

Perversion of a so-called democrat is manifested in *5019*, another man whose scale scores are all high. He is a 20-year-old laborer, characterized above all, by his blind, authoritarian acceptance of his humble position in life. At the same time, he »dislikes timid people« and has »great admiration for real leaders«:

Respondent believes that the »laws of democracy should favor white, Gentile people,« yet he »would not openly

persecute Jews in the way the Hitler program treated them.«

The reservation of the second sentence is disavowed by the momentum of the convictions expressed in the first one.

## Fußnoten

1 Institute of Social Research, *Anti-Semitism within American Labor: A Report to the Jewish Labor Committee*, 4 vols. (unpublished: May, 1945).

[2 Daniel J. Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 151–207.]

[3 Else Frenkel-Brunswik, »The Interviews as an Approach to the Prejudiced Personality,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 291–336.]

[4 Daniel J. Levinson, »The Study of Anti-Semitic Ideology,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 57–101.]

[5 Daniel J. Levinson, »The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 102–150.]

[6 See below, pp. 332ff.]

7 The most drastic evidence for this hypothesis is, of course, the habit of differentiating between those Jews with whom the subject is acquainted, and who are »good,« and the rest of them, who are the »kikes.« In

certain cases this contradiction is both concretized and cleared up etiologically. We refer here to case 5057, discussed in detail in Chapter XIX, where the subject's bias is practically explained by himself as the outcome of resentment aroused by a childhood experience with a Jewish delictessen man. See the »rigid low scorer« in Chapter XIX [below, p. 492].

[8](#) See the »rigid low scorer« in Chapter XIX [below, p. 492].

[[9](#) Betty Aron, »The Thematic Apperception Test in the Study of Prejudiced and Unprejudiced Individuals,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 489–544.]

[[10](#) Daniel J. Levinson, »Projective Questions in the Study of Personality and Ideology,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 545–600.]



## Chapter XVII

### Politics and Economics in the Interview Material

#### A. Introduction

The questionnaire findings on political and economic ideology have been analyzed in Chapter V.<sup>[1]</sup> It is now our task to study the interview material referring to the same topics. The purpose is, first of all, to concretize our insight into these ideologies. If we investigated, in Chapter V, into the responses of our subjects to a number of set, standardized political and economic ideas and slogans with which they are daily confronted, we shall now try to form a picture of »what they really think« – with the qualification that we shall also have to find out whether we are entitled to expect autonomous and spontaneous opinions from the majority of them. It is obvious that the answer to such problems, unless they should be made the very center of research, can be given only in a less rigorous way than was the case with the quantitative analysis of questionnaire responses, and that the results are of a more tentative nature. Their convincing power lies more in the consistency of specific interpretations with facts previously established than in any indispu-

table »proof« that one or the other of the ideological mechanisms under review prevail within a majority of subjects or within certain groups.

Again, our interpretations of ideology will go below the realm of surface opinion, and will be related to the psychological results of our study. It is not our aim merely to add some padding to our figures. As stated in the Introductory Remarks to this part, we would rather gain insight into the links between ideological opinions and psychological determinants. We do not pretend that psychology is the cause and ideology the effect. But we try to interrelate both as intimately as possible, guided by the assumption that ideological irrationalities just as other irrationalities of overt human behavior are concomitant with unconscious psychological conflicts. We combed through the interview material with particular attention to such irrationalities and to statements revealing something about the dynamics of personality. The establishment of plausible configurations involving both dynamic motivation and ideological rationalization seems to us the foremost means of achieving that consistency on which the evidence of the discussions to follow largely depends. The data discussed so far permit at least the assumption that personality could be regarded as *one* determinant of ideology.

Yet it is just the area with which we are now con-

cerned that most strongly forbids any simple reduction to terms of personality. Our construct of the »potentially fascist character« was largely based on the division between high and low scorers. Whereas this division retains its value for numerous topics of political and economic ideology and can be substantiated, on a deeper level, probably for *all* ideological issues, there appears to be at work another determinant which, in numerous issues, blurs the distinction between high and low scorers and refuses to be stated unequivocally in terms of personality. This determinant may be called our general cultural climate, and particularly the ideological influence upon the people of most media for moulding public opinion. If our cultural climate has been standardized under the impact of social control and technological concentration to an extent never known before, we may expect that the thinking habits of individuals reflect this standardization as well as the dynamics of their own personalities. These personalities may, indeed, be the product of this very same standardization to a much higher degree than a naive observer is led to believe. In other words, we have to expect a kind of ideological »over-all pattern« in our interviewees which, though by no means indifferent to the dichotomy of high and low scorers, transcends its boundaries. Our data afford ample evidence that such an ideological over-all pattern exists in fact.

It is a major question for this chapter whether this over-all ideological pattern, perhaps even more than the specific susceptibility of our high scorers to fascist propaganda, does not entail the danger of a large-scale following of antidemocratic movements if they should get under way with powerful support.

The importance of this diagnosis, if it should be corroborated sufficiently by our data, is self-evident, its most immediate implication being that the fight against such a general potential cannot be carried through only educationally on a purely psychological level, but that it requires at the same time decisive changes of that cultural climate which makes for the over-all pattern. Methodologically, the importance of this aspect of our study lies in the fact that it relativizes, somewhat, the distinction between high vs. low scorers; this distinction, if taken as absolute, may easily lead to a »psychologizing« bias that would neglect the objective, supra-individual social forces operating in our society.

The introduction of the concept of an over-all pattern just in this ideological area may appear paradoxical at first glance. Since most political and economic issues are overt and relatively simple with reference to the blunt division between progressivism and reactionism, one should expect the difference to be particularly marked here. This, however, is not borne out by

the facts. It is hard to escape the impression that there is much more actual similarity between high and low scorers in the political and economic section of the interviews than in more remote and complicated regions. To be sure, there are some topics which are as clearly discriminatory as some of the more extreme anti-Semitic ideas discussed in the preceding chapter. One hardly needs any research in order to establish that high scorers tend to be anti- and low scorers pro-Roosevelt, that high scorers more often want a »strong« foreign policy and low scorers favor reconciliation, that high scorers indignantly reject communism and low scorers tend to discuss it on a more discursive plane. However, there is a large number of what might be called more formal constituents of political ideology which seem to permeate the whole pattern while, by their own momentum, making for reactionary and potentially fascist persuasions. Here belong, as will be discussed in detail, general ignorance and confusion in political matters, the habits of »ticket thinking« and »personalization,« resentment of unions, of government interference in business, of income limitations, and a number of other trends.

The existence of such an over-all pattern in politics need not be surprising, when the whole context of our study is considered. As a matter of fact, the problem itself is derived from our quantitative findings. After

we once administered the PEC scale, no close relation between politics and anti-Semitism could be expected. Chapter V<sup>2</sup> offered the evidence that the correlation of PEC with either anti-Semitism or ethnocentrism was never very high. There were some subjects high on PEC but low on E, others high on E but middle or low on PEC. This means that in this area particularly we cannot speak in categorical terms of high vs. low scorers. We shall see if this is borne out by a consideration of the interviews: both what the weakening of our basic distinction means qualitatively and whether and how we still can differentiate successfully in this area.

If a trend that differentiates statistically between high and low scorers on E – the »highs« being higher on it – appears very commonly in the interviews of all subjects, then we must conclude that it is a trend in culture itself. In this chapter we shall be particularly concerned with these outstanding features. The evidence that they are potentially fascistic is the fact that they »go« statistically, psychologically, and in every other respect with high scale scores; if they also occur with considerable frequency in interviews of low scorers it must be because we are living in potentially fascist times.

If a subject is low on *all* scales, but still shows trends which look potentially fascist, then one might

say that the scales and other techniques do not cover everything, that the potential fascism of the trend is hypothetical as far as the statistical evidence goes, and that one might perform an empirical study to see if it really does go with what we know of the subject. We expect our discussion at least to shed some light on this methodological problem.

As far as the differentiation between high and low scorers goes, it is obvious that an over-all pattern would necessitate more differentiated characterizations than those previously employed. This can be hinted at only occasionally throughout this chapter. Sometimes high and low scorers are similar in what they say in politico-economic terms, but different in some more subtle way; just as sometimes they are superficially different but similar with respect to underlying trends.

Political and economic facts are subject to rapid change. This holds particularly true for the last few years. When our material was gathered, mainly throughout 1945, Russia was an ally; today, the tension between this country and the Soviet Union overshadows all other issues. Such changes make a valid interpretation of political ideology difficult and precarious. Thus, it might well be that anti-Russian sentiments, which were in 1945 part and parcel of a general pattern of reactionism, largely conditioned subjec-

tively, would be of a much more »realistic« nature today, or at least they would fall to a greater extent within the »over-all pattern,« being less differentiating *per se* between high and low scorers. Moreover, in all probability the typical high scorer has become even more articulate with regard to Russia. It is hard to imagine that Mack would still stick to his statement that »Joe« Stalin was all right. Our interpretation, of course, had to stick to the situation of 1945 in order to give an adequate picture of the relationship between ideology and personality factors. However, it should be emphasized that the PEC scale as well as its follow-up in the interviews depends to a much higher degree on external events than do the other scales. This is why we never expected that the correlations of PEC with E and F would be very high, and it is quite possible that under the new political circumstances the direction of some of the more superficial relationships might have changed. Ideology is so sensitive to political dynamics that even some interpretations formulated comparatively lately, when the bulk of the chapter had been written, should be qualified at publication time. Yet we may claim that the general trend of events has been entirely in accord with the general formulations reached in the discussion to follow.

With regard to the organization of the chapter we



shall deal first with the more formal constituents of political and economic ideology and later with a number of specific political issues. The problem of cultural over-all pattern vs. psychological differentiation occurs in both sections, though the presuppositions of the over-all pattern belong mainly to the first one.

## B. Formal Constituents of Political Thinking

### 1. Ignorance and Confusion<sup>3</sup>

The evaluation of the political statements contained in our interview material has to be considered in relation to the widespread ignorance and confusion of our subjects in political matters, a phenomenon which might well surpass what even a skeptical observer should have anticipated. If people do not know what they are talking about, the concept of »opinion,« which is basic to any approach to ideology, loses much of its meaning. This does not imply that the material becomes insignificant but rather that it cannot be interpreted in factual categories but must be related to the sociopsychological structure of the subject being investigated. In other words, the material itself calls for that personality analysis which marks the general strategy of our research. It is in the light of this analysis that the ideology of our subjects is now to be re-evaluated.

While ignorance and confusion marks the political statements of both high and low scorers, it is, nevertheless, by no means »neutral« with regard to the problem of susceptibility to fascist propaganda. Our general impression is that ignorance and confusion is

more widespread among high than among low scorers. This would be consistent with our previous observations on the general »anti-intellectual« attitude of high scorers. In addition, the official optimism of the high scorer tends to exclude that kind of critical analysis of existent conditions on which rational political judgment depends. A man who is prone to identify himself *a priori* with the world as it is has little incentive to penetrate it intellectually and to distinguish between essence and surface. The »practical« bias of the high scorers, their emotional detachment from everything that is beyond their well defined range of action, is another factor contributing to their disinterestedness in, and lack of, political knowledge. However this may be, there is reason to believe that ignorance itself works in favor of general reactionary trends. This belief, based on consistent observations particularly in backward rural areas everywhere, has been epitomized by the old German social-democratic adage that anti-Semitism is the »socialism of the dolt.« All modern fascist movements, including the practices of contemporary American demagogues, have aimed at the ignorant; they have consciously manipulated the facts in a way that could lead to success only with those who were not acquainted with the facts. Ignorance with respect to the complexities of contemporary society makes for a state of general

uncertainty and anxiety, which is the ideal breeding ground for the modern type of reactionary mass movement. Such movements are always »populist« and maliciously anti-intellectual. It is not accidental that fascism has never evolved any consistent social theory, but has persistently denounced theoretical thinking and knowledge as »alienation from the grass-roots.« The existence of such ignorance and confusion as we find in the interviews of subjects, particularly when we consider the relatively high educational level which they as a group represent, has to be regarded as ominous, no matter whether the subjects in question score high or low on our scales. The configuration of technical skill and the »realism« of »looking after oneself« on the one hand, and of the stubborn refusal intellectually to penetrate reality on the other, is the very climate in which fascist movements can prosper. Where this outlook prevails, a critical situation may easily lead to the general acceptance of formulae which are today still regarded as prerogatives of the »lunatic fringe.«

Sometimes ignorance is explicitly commented upon by our interviewers. But even if we do not regard their impression as sufficient proof, there is evidence enough within the material, be it that the statements betray a striking lack of information, be it that the interviewee confesses his disinterestedness in po-

litics or his lack of knowledge. The latter attitude, incidentally, is particularly frequent with women, and often it is accompanied by self-accusing statements.

It is hard to distinguish between simple ignorance and confusedness, that is to say, between the state of simply not knowing the facts, and the state which exists when people without sufficient intellectual training grow muddle-headed under the incessant attack of all kinds of mass communication and propaganda and do not know what to make of the facts they have. It seems as if confusion were the effect of ignorance: as if those who do not know but feel somehow obliged to have political opinions, because of some vague idea about the requirements of democracy, help themselves with scurrilous ways of thinking and sometimes with forthright bluff.

The few quotations to follow are picked at random as illustrations of a phenomenon which is well-nigh universal, but for the very few exceptional cases of people who take a conscious and explicit interest in politics.

An example of ignorance, covered up by pompous phraseology, is the following statement by *M 117*, a low-scoring man from the University Extension Group. He is a semi-educated sailor with high-school background and widely read, but generally muddle-headed.

(American political scene?) »We have a good basis for our political system. The majority of people are not interested or equipped enough to understand politics, so that the biggest proportion of U.S. politics is governed by the capitalistic system.«

To this man, the existence or nonexistence of capitalism in this country is simply a matter of »education.«

A »bluffer« is the veteran *M 732c*, a high-scoring man with high-school education, who always starts with sentences which sound up-to-date but rarely finishes them:

(What does he think of political trends today?) »I would say that now we're in a very sad case. Worse off than two years ago – well, the situation with Russia in Iran – and these strikes that are coming on – quite a deal of good statesmanship to fix the world up ...«

The subject's statements abound with qualifications and evasions:

»I feel somehow that they (i.e., the unions) are progressing in a way but in other ways they are not. I think all things will work out for the best. But I really think they should not go into politics. ... I am not very well versed on. ...«

Asked about the most dangerous threats to present form of government:

»Well, let's see ... well, we might have another war in the U.S.A. Since the U.S. itself is a huge melting pot. ... I imagine in the U.S. there are a lot of people who hated to see Hitler die and are pro-German – and maybe one of these little groups will ... catch on.«

A San Quentin prisoner, *M 621A*, who scores low on the E and PEC scales and middle on F, regards Russia as the most dangerous threat. When asked what ought to be done, he answers:

»Well, people should limit political parties to at least two groups and not have all these socialists and communists, etc.« (What to do with socialists and communists?) »Well, they could still believe in their own ideal ... let them have a voice in the election but should not be allowed to have any power.« (You mean they should not be allowed to put up any candidates?) »No, unless they get a majority.«

One of the most extreme examples in the high-scoring woman *F 121*, who »was never good at school work« and apparently had very little general education.

Not interested, not informed. Thinks Roosevelt has been good and should see us through the war. Otherwise has no opinions. She had written on the side of the questionnaire, asking about political parties: »Don't know these

parties.«

Again, *5016*, a housewife, graduated from high school, high on F and E but middle on PEC, referred to by the interviewer as »being of moderately high intelligence,« says:

»I hear that communists and socialists are both bad.«

By contrast, *5052*, the Spanish-Negro entertainer, high on F and PEC, middle on E, has an opinion of his own on communism and apparently some sympathy with communists, but his opinion is no less startling:

»All of the people in the entertainment world who are communists are good guys.«

On further questioning it comes out that according to his opinion:

Communism seems to be a sort of social club which holds meetings and raises money for worthy causes.

Somewhat exceptional is the statement of the moderately low-scoring callhouse girl, *5035*, who, before she chose the profession of prostitute, was a graduate of the University of California. She is strongly interested



in union activities and actually lost her former job as a dancing teacher because of such activities, but refused on the questionnaire to mark any questions with regard to political groups, for which she gives the following explanation:

»I am very confused about politics because I talk about them a great deal with our clients here and they all have different opinions. It was a struggle for me to get through economics in college.«

In practical issues, however, her views are very liberal and even radical.

The self-accusing attitude of women with regard to political matters seems to be most common among medium and low scorers; this is consistent with the latter's general introspective and self-critical attitude.

An example is the 17-year-old student of social work, *F 128*, who is middle on E and F but high on PEC:

»I am a little ashamed about this subject. I hate to be ignorant about anything but frankly, I don't know anything about politics. I am for Roosevelt, of course, but I don't think I have developed any ideas of my own. Mother and Jim talk about things, but it is mostly social work shop. I intend to read a lot and think a lot about things because I believe all intelligent people should have ideas.«

Interesting also is the low scorer, *F 517*, a 20-year-old freshman student majoring in music, who accuses herself of ignorance and dependence, though her general attitude, particularly with regard to minority questions, shows that she is rather articulate and outspoken and that she differs from her parents.

»I don't know much about it. I'm quite dependent – I get my opinions from my father. He is a die-hard Republican. He did not like Roosevelt but I think he did some good things (such as making things better for the poor people).«

It would go beyond the scope of the present study to attempt a full explanation of political ignorance so strikingly in contrast to the level of information in many other matters and to the highly rational way in which most of our subjects decide about the means and ends of their own lives. The ultimate reason for this ignorance might well be the opaqueness of the social, economic, and political situation to all those who are not in full command of all the resources of stored knowledge and theoretical thinking. In its present phase, our social system tends objectively and automatically to produce »curtains« which make it impossible for the naive person really to see what it is all about. These objective conditions are enhanced by powerful economic and social forces which, purposely

or automatically, keep the people ignorant. The very fact that our social system is on the defense, as it were, that capitalism, instead of expanding the old way and opening up innumerable opportunities to the people, has to maintain itself somewhat precariously and to block critical insights which were regarded as »progressive« one hundred years ago but are viewed as potentially dangerous today, makes for a one-sided presentation of the facts, for manipulated information, and for certain shifts of emphasis which tend to check the universal enlightenment otherwise furthered by the technological development of communications. Once again, as in the era of the transition from feudalism to middle-class society, knowing too much has assumed a subversive touch, as it were. This tendency is met halfway by the »authoritarian« frame of mind of large sections of the population. The transformation of our social system from something dynamic into something conservative, a *status quo*, struggling for its perpetuation, is reflected by the attitudes and opinions of all those who, for reasons of vested interests or psychological conditions, identify themselves with the existing setup. In order not to undermine their own pattern of identification, they unconsciously do not *want* to know too much and are ready to accept superficial or distorted information as long as it confirms the world in which they want to go on living. It would be erro-

neous to ascribe the general state of ignorance and confusion in political matters to natural stupidity or to the mythological »immaturity« of the people. Stupidity may be due to psychological repressions more than to a basic lack of the capacity for thinking. Only in this way, it seems, can the low level of political intelligence even among our college sample be understood. They find it difficult to think and even to learn because they are afraid they might think the wrong thoughts or learn the wrong things. It may be added that this fear, probably often due to the father's refusal to tell the child more than he is supposedly capable of understanding, is continuously reinforced by an educational system which tends to discourage anything supposedly »speculative,« or which cannot be corroborated by surface findings, and stated in terms of »facts and figures.«

The discrepancy brought about by the absence of political training and the abundance of political news with which the population is flooded and which actually or fictitiously presupposes such training, is only one among many aspects of this general condition. With reference to the specific focus of our research, two aspects of political ignorance may be emphasized. One is that being »intelligent« today means largely to look after one's self, to take care of one's advantages whereas, to use Veblen's words, »idle cu-

riosity« is discouraged. Since the pertinence of economic and political matters to private existence, however, is largely obscured to the population even now, they do not bother about things which apparently have little bearing on their fate and upon which they have, as they are dimly aware, not too much influence.

The second aspect of ignorance which has to be stressed here, is of a more psychological nature. Political news and comment like all other information poured out by the radio, the press, and the newsreels, is generally absorbed during leisure time and falls, in a certain way, within the framework of »entertainment.« Politics is viewed in much the same way as sport or the movies, not as something directly involved with one's own participation in the process of production. Viewed within this frame of reference, however, politics is necessarily »disappointing.« It appears to people conditioned by an industrial culture and its specific kinds of »entertainment values« as drab, cold, dry – as boring. This may be enhanced by that undercurrent of American tradition which regards politics somehow as a dirty business with which a respectable person should have but little to do. Disappointment in politics as a leisure-time activity which pays no quick returns probably makes for indifference, and it is quite possible that the prevailing ignorance is due not merely to unfamiliarity with the facts

but also a kind of resistance against what is supposed to serve as a pastime and mostly tends to be disagreeable. A pattern most often to be observed, perhaps, among women, namely, skipping the political sections of newspapers, where information is available, and turning immediately to gossip columns, crime stories, the woman's page, and so forth, may be an extreme expression of something more general.

To sum up, political ignorance would seem to be specifically determined by the fact that political knowledge as a rule does not primarily help to further individual aims in reality, whereas, on the other hand, it does not help the individual to evade reality either.

## 2. Ticket Thinking and Personalization in Politics

The frame of mind concomitant with ignorance and confusion may be called one of lack of political experience in the sense that the whole sphere of politics and economics is »aloof« from the subject, that he does not reach it with concrete innervations, insights, and reactions but has to contend with it in an indirect, alienated way. Yet, politics and economics, alien as they may be from individual life, and largely beyond the reach of individual decision and action, decisively affect the individual's fate. In our present society, in the era of all-comprising social organization and total war, even the most naive person becomes aware of the impact of the politico-economic sphere. Here belongs, of course, primarily the war situation, where literally life and death of the individual depend on apparently far-away political dynamics. But also issues such as the role of unionism in American economy, strikes, the development of free enterprise toward monopolism and therewith the question of state control, make themselves felt apparently down to the most private and intimate realms of the individual.

This, against the background of ignorance and confusion, makes for anxiety on the ego level that ties in only too well with childhood anxieties. The individual

has to cope with problems which he actually does not understand, and he has to develop certain techniques of orientation, however crude and fallacious they may be, which help him to find his way through the dark, as it were.<sup>4</sup> These means fulfill a dual function: on the one hand, they provide the individual with a kind of knowledge, or with substitutes for knowledge, which makes it possible for him to take a stand where it is expected of him, whilst he is actually not equipped to do so. On the other hand, by themselves they alleviate psychologically the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty and provide the individual with the illusion of some kind of intellectual security, of something he can stick to even if he feels, underneath, the inadequacy of his opinions.

The task of how to understand the »ununderstandable,« paradoxical in itself, leads toward a paradoxical solution, that is to say, the subjects tend to employ two devices which contradict each other, a contradiction that expresses the impasse in which many people find themselves. These two devices are *stereotypy* and *personalization*. It is easy to see that these »devices« are repetitions of infantile patterns. The specific interaction of stereotypy and prejudice has been discussed in detail in the preceding chapter. It may now be appropriate to review ideological stereotypy and its counterpart, personalization, in a broader context, and



to relate it to more fundamental principles long established by psychology. Rigid dichotomies, such as that between »good and bad,« »we and the others,« »I and the world« date back to our earliest developmental phases. While serving as necessary constructs in order to enable us to cope, by mental anticipation and rough organization, with an otherwise chaotic reality, even the stereotypes of the child bear the hallmark of stunted experience and anxiety. They point back to the »chaotic« nature of reality, and its clash with the omnipotence fantasies of earliest infancy. Our stereotypes are both tools and scars: the »bad man« is the stereotype par excellence. At the same time, the psychological ambiguity inherent in the use of stereotypes, which are both necessary and constricting forces, stimulate regularly a countertendency. We try, by a kind of ritual, to soften the otherwise rigid, to make human, close, part of ourselves (or the family) that which appears, because of its very alienness, threatening. The child who is afraid of the bad man is at the same time tempted to call every stranger »uncle.« The traumatic element in both these attitudes continuously serves as an obstacle to the reality principle, although both also function as means of adjustment. When transformed into character traits, the mechanisms involved make more and more for irrationality. The opaqueness of the present political and eco-

conomic situation for the average person provides an ideal opportunity for retrogression to the infantile level of stereotypy and personalization. The political rationalizations used by the uninformed and confused are compulsive revivals of irrational mechanisms never overcome during the individual's growth. This seems to be one of the main links between opinions and psychological determinants.

Once again, stereotypy helps to organize what appears to the ignorant as chaotic: the less he is able to enter into a really cognitive process, the more stubbornly he clings to certain patterns, belief in which saves him the trouble of really going into the matter.

Where the rigidly compulsive nature of the stereotype cuts off the dialectics of trial and error, stultification enters the picture. Stereotypy becomes – to use J.F. Brown's term – stereopathy. This is the case in the political area where a firm bulk of ignorance and lack of any relation to the objective material forbids any real experience. In addition, industrial standardization of innumerable phenomena of modern life enhances stereotypical thinking. The more stereotyped life itself becomes, the more the stereopath feels in the right, sees his frame of thinking vindicated by reality. Modern mass communications, moulded after industrial production, spread a whole system of stereotypes which, while still being fundamentally »ununder-

standable« to the individual, allow him at any moment to appear as being up to date and »knowing all about it.« Thus, stereotyped thinking in political matters is almost inescapable.

However, the adult individual, like the child, has to pay a heavy price for the comfort he draws from stereotypy. The stereotype, while being a means of translating reality in a kind of multiple-choice questionnaire where every issue is subsumed and can be decided by a plus or minus mark, keeps the world as aloof, abstract, »nonexperienced« as it was before. Moreover, since it is above all the alienness and coldness of political reality which causes the individual's anxieties, these anxieties are not fully remedied by a device which itself reflects the threatening, streamlining process of the real social world. Thus, stereotypy calls again for its very opposite: personalization. Here, the term assumes a very definite meaning: the tendency to describe objective social and economic processes, political programs, internal and external tensions in terms of some person identified with the case in question rather than taking the trouble to perform the impersonal intellectual operations required by the abstractness of the social processes themselves.

*Both stereotypy and personalization are inadequate to reality.* Their interpretation may therefore be regarded as a first step in the direction of understand-

ding the complex of »psychotic« thinking which appears to be a crucial characteristic of the fascist character. It is obvious, however, that this subjective failure to grasp reality is not primarily and exclusively a matter of the psychological dynamics of the individuals involved, but is in some part due to reality itself, to the relationship or lack of relationship between this reality and the individual. Stereotypy misses reality in so far as it dodges the concrete and contents itself with preconceived, rigid, and overgeneralized ideas to which the individual attributes a kind of magical omnipotence. Conversely, personalization dodges the real abstractness, that is to say, the »reification« of a social reality which is determined by property relations and in which the human beings themselves are, as it were, mere appendages. Stereotypy and personalization are two divergent parts of an actually nonexperienced world, parts which are not only irreconcilable with each other, but which also do not allow for any addition which would reconstruct the picture of the real.

a. CASES OF POLITICAL TICKET THINKING.  
We limit ourselves to describing a few cases of political stereotypy.

*M 359* from the University Extension Testing Class is departmental manager for a leather company. He is high on E and PEC but middle on F. While imbued

with authoritarian ideas he shows a certain imaginativeness and general disposition to discursive argumentation somewhat different from the typical high scorer's mentality. It is thus the more striking to find that the political section of his interview is completely abstract and cliché-like. Just because this subject is by no means a fanatic, his statements serve well to illustrate how ignorance is covered up by phraseology, and how the stereotypes, borrowed from the vernacular of current newspaper editorials, make for the acceptance of reactionary trends. In order to give a concrete picture of how this mechanism works, his political statements are given in full. This may also supply us with an example of how the various topics with which we shall have to deal in detail afterwards form a kind of ideological unit once a person is under the sway of political semi-information:

(Political trends?) »I am not very happy by the outward aspect of things, too much politics instead of a basis of equality and justice for all men. Running of the entire country is determined by the party in power, not very optimistic outlook. Under Roosevelt, the people were willing to turn entire schedule of living over to the government, wanted everything done for them. (Main problem?) No question but the problem of placing our servicemen back into employment, giving them a degree of happiness is a major problem. If not handled soon, may produce a serious danger. More firm organization of servicemen.«

(What might do?) »Boycott the politicians and establish the old-time government that we should have had all along.« (What is this?) »Government of, by, and for the people.« Subject emphasizes the moderate, average man is the serviceman. (Unions?) »Not satisfied with them. One characteristic is especially unsatisfactory. Theory is wonderful and would hate to see them abolished, but too much tendency to level all men, all standards of workmanship and effort by equalizing pay. Other objection is not enough democratic attitude by the membership, generally controlled by minority group.« Subject emphasizes the compulsion imposed upon men to join but not to participate with the results of ignorant union leaders. He emphasizes the need to raise the standards of voting by members and to require rotation of office and high qualifications for officers. He compares these adversely with business leaders.

(Government control?) »There is too much tendency to level everything, doesn't give man opportunity to excel.« Subject emphasizes the mediocrity of government workers, pay is insufficient to attract the best calibre of men and no incentive plans, etc.

(Threats to present government?) »Probably most dangerous threat to our government today, and that also applies to union organization, and life in general, is disinterest, the tendency to let the other fellow do it on the part of great numbers of people so that things go on the way a few selfish men determine.«

The decisive twist is achieved by jumping from the very abstract idea of »equality and justice for all men«

to the equally formalistic condemnation of »running the country by the party in power« – which happens to be the party of the New Deal. The vague cliché of an all-comprising democracy serves as an instrument against any specific democratic contents. It should not be overlooked, however, that some of his statements on unions – where he has some experience – make sense.

*M 1225a*, a medium scorer who has been eighteen months at sea and is strongly interested in engineering, is a good example of stereotypy in politics employed by otherwise moderate people, and of its intimate relationship to ignorance. To this man one of the greatest political problems today is »the unions.« Describing them, he applies indiscriminately and without entering into the matter three current clichés – that of the social danger, that of government interference, and that of the luxurious life of union leaders – simply by repeating certain formulae without caring much about their interconnection or their consistency:

»For one thing they have too much power. Cross between the socialistic part of the union and the government ... seems to go to the other extreme. Government investigation ...« (subject seems rather confused in his ideas here). »The unions ... socialistic form in there. I know, I belonged to a few unions. They get up there and then call you brother and then drive off in a Cadillac. ... Nine times out of ten the heads of the unions don't know anything of

the trade. It's a good racket. ...«

Most of his subsequent answers are closely in line with a general pattern of reactionism, formulated mostly in terms of »I don't believe in it« without discussing the issue itself. The following passages may suffice as an illustration.

(\$25,000 limit on salaries?) »I don't believe in that.«

(Most dangerous threats to present form of government?) »I believe it's in the government itself. Too many powers of its own.«

(What ought to be done?) »Going to have to solve a lot of other problems first. Get goods back on the market.«

(What about this conflict between Russia on the one hand and England and this country on the other?) »I don't particularly care for Russia and I don't particularly care for England.«

In this case, clichés are manifestly used in order to cover up lack of information. It is as if each question to which he does not know any specific answer conjures up the carry-overs of innumerable press slogans which he repeats in order to demonstrate that he is one of those who do not like to be told and do like to think. Underlying is only a rigid pattern of yeas and nays. He is aware of how a man of his general political outlook should react to each political issue but he



is not aware of the issues themselves. He therefore supplements his plus and minus marks by phrases which more often than not are mere gaucheries.

*F 139* belongs to the type which is to be characterized in Chapter XIX<sup>[5]</sup> as »rigid low.« Her most outstanding trait is her violent hatred of alcohol – which suggests deeper-lying »high« trends. Liquors are her Jews, as it were. She regards herself as a Christian Socialist and solves most problems not by discussing them but referring to what the religious socialist should think.

The break between her opinions and any kind of substantial experience is evidenced by the following statement:

»My favorite world statesman is Litvinov. I think the most dramatic speech of modern times is the one he made at the Geneva Conference when he pleaded for collective security. It has made us very happy to see the fog of ignorance and distrust surrounding the Soviet Union clearing away during this war. Things are not settled yet, though. There are many fascists in this country who would fight Roosevelt if they could.«

She has a ready-made formula for the problem of non-violence in international affairs:

»Of course, I am an internationalist. Would I be a true Christian if I weren't? And I have always been a pacifist.

Wars are completely unnecessary. This one was. That is, it could have been avoided if the democratic people had recognized their own interest early enough and taken the proper steps. But they did not. And now we ask ourselves: would the interests of the people of the world be advanced by a fascist victory? Obviously they would not. So we must support this war completely because we are faced with a clear choice and cannot avoid it.«

She offers a clear example of the association of stereotypy and personalization. Whereas her political persuasion should induce her to think in objective socioeconomic terms, she actually thinks in terms of favorite people, preferably famous ones, of humans who are public institutions as it were – of »human stereotypes.«

»My second favorite world statesman is our own President although, perhaps, I should say Mrs. Roosevelt. I don't think he would have been anything without her. She really made him what he is. I believe the Roosevelts have a very sincere interest in people and their welfare. There is one thing that bothers me about them though – specially Mrs. Roosevelt – that is – liquor. She is not against it and it seems to me she should know how much we would be improved as a people without it.«

She exhibits a significant characteristic of the low scorers' political stereotypy: a kind of mechanical belief in the triumph of progress, the counterpart to the

high scorers' frequent references to impending doom which is also a keynote of the above-quoted political statements of *M* 359.

»All one has to do is look backward to feel optimistic. I would not be a true Christian if I did not believe that man's progress is upward. We are so much farther along than we were a century ago. Social legislation that was only a dream is an accomplished fact.«

**b. EXAMPLES OF PERSONALIZATION.** The tendency towards personalization feeds on the American tradition of personal democracy as expressed most strikingly by the power delegated to the executive branch of the government by our Constitution, and also on that aspect of traditional American liberalism which regards competition as a contest between men, where the better man is likely to conquer. Cause and effect seem to be somewhat reversed: whereas in market economy the supposedly »better man« is defined by competitive success, people have come to think that success falls to the better man. Consistent with this is the highly personalized character of political propaganda, particularly in electioneering where the objective issues at stake are mostly hidden behind the exaltation of the individuals involved, often in categories which have but very little to do with the functions those individuals are supposed to fulfill. The ideal of

a democracy, where the people have their immediate say, is frequently misused under conditions of today's mass society, as an ideology which covers up the omnipotence of objective social tendencies and, more specifically, the control exercised by the party machines.

The material on personalization is both abundant and monotonous. A few examples may suffice.

The low-scoring man, *M 116*, prefers [Henry A.] Wallace to [Thomas E.] Dewey because

»Wallace is the better man and I usually vote for the better man.«

Here personalization is the more striking since these two figures are actually defined by objectively antagonistic platforms, whereas it is more than doubtful whether the interviewee, or, for that matter, the great majority of the American people, is in any position to say what they are like »as men.«

The high-scoring man, *M 102*, employs almost literally the same expression as *M 116*:

»... put down Democratic, but I never thought much about the party. I don't vote for the party but for the best man.«

Professed belief in political theories is no antidote for

personalization. *M 117*, another »low« man, regards himself as a »scientific socialist« and is full of confidence in sociological psychology. But when asked about American parties, he comes out with the following statement:

»I don't know about that. I'm only interested in the man and his abilities. I don't care what party he belongs to.« (What man do you like?) »F.D.R. is one of the greatest. I did not like him when he was elected but I admit I was wrong. He did a marvelous job. He was concerned with the benefit of the country. Truman is doing a good job so far. The Senators and congressmen are run-of-the-mill. Dewey is outstanding, I think; he has potentialities. He is apparently sincere and honest and concerned with the whole country. He did a good job as District Attorney.«

More aspects of personalization will be described when our interviewees' attitudes towards Roosevelt are under consideration. Here, we content ourselves with suggesting two qualities which seem to play a great role in the personalization complex and which recur regularly in our high scorers' statements about Dewey: Honesty and Sincerity.

*F 114*, a high-scoring woman, knows that Dewey »is strong, young, courageous, honest. He may have faults, but they're useful faults. I felt he was a strong, young person.« Obviously, this statement is linked to the adulation of strength that plays so large a role in

the psychology of our high scorers (cf. Chapter VII).[6] The honesty of the former D.A. is derived from his much-advertised drive against political racketeering and corruption. He is supposed to be honest because he has exterminated, according to his propagandist build-up, the dishonest. Honesty seems largely to be a rationalization for vindictiveness. Speaking psychologically, the image of Dewey is a projection of the punitive superego, or rather one of those collective images which replace the superego in an externalized, rigid form. The praise of his honesty, together with the repeated emphasis on his strength and youth, fall within the »strong man« pattern.

*F 117*, another high scorer, of the Professional Women group, has a maximal score on A-S and is generally extremely conservative. Her similarly personalized appraisal of Dewey strikes a slightly different note but fits within the same pattern:

She feels that Dewey knows the value of money better than Roosevelt, because he came from a family that did not have too much.

The punitiveness behind the praise of the honest man shows itself in this example as hatred against comfortable living, against the »snobbish upper class« who supposedly enjoy the things which one has to deny to oneself. Dewey, *per contra*, is the symbol of

one's own frustrations and is unconsciously, i.e., sado-masochistically, expected to perpetuate frustration. What he seems to stand for within the minds of the high-scoring subjects is a state of affairs in which everybody has »learned the value of a dollar.« Identification with him is easy because as a prospective President he has the halo of power whereas his frugality is that of the middle-class subject herself.

Perhaps it is not accidental that infatuation with honesty is particularly frequent among women. They see life from the consumer's side; they do not want to be cheated, and therefore the noisy promise of honesty has some appeal to them.

As to the differentiation between high and low scorers with regard to personalization, an impression may tentatively be formulated which is hard to substantiate but consistent with our clinical findings. The element of personalization that counts most heavily with the low scorers seems to be confidence, the idea that public figures are good, friendly fathers who take care of one, or of the »underdog.« It seems to be derived from an actual life relationship to one's parents, from unblocked positive transference. This observation will be brought into relief when the attitude of our subjects towards Roosevelt is discussed. Conversely, the personal trait most appreciated by the high scorer seems to be strength. Social power and control, the

ultimate focus of their identification, is translated by the personalization mechanism into a quality inherent in certain individuals. The symbols of the powers that be are drawn from the imagery of a stern father to whom one »looks up.« One last aspect of personalization may be mentioned. To know something about a person helps one to seem »informed« without actually going into the matter: it is easier to talk about names than about issues, while at the same time the names are recognized identification marks for all current topics. Thus, spurious personalization is an ideal behavior pattern for the semi-erudite, a device somewhere in the middle between complete ignorance and that kind of »knowledge« which is being promoted by mass communication and industrialized culture.

To sum up: ever more anonymous and opaque social processes make it increasingly difficult to integrate the limited sphere of one's personal life experience with objective social dynamics. Social alienation is hidden by a surface phenomenon in which the very opposite is being stressed: personalization of political attitudes and habits offers compensation for the dehumanization of the social sphere which is at the bottom of most of today's grievances. As less and less actually depends on individual spontaneity in our political and social organization, the more people are likely to cling to the idea that the man is everything and to seek



a substitute for their own social impotence in the supposed omnipotence of great personalities.

### 3. Surface Ideology and Real Opinion

The alienation between the political sphere and the life experience of the individual, which the latter often tries to master by psychologically determined intellectual makeshifts such as stereotypy and personalization, sometimes results in a gap between what the subject professes to think about politics and economy and what he really thinks. His »official« ideology conforms to what he supposes he *has* to think; his real ideas are an expression of his more immediate personal needs as well as of his psychological urges. The »official« ideology pertains to the objectified, alienated sphere of the political, the »real opinion« to the subject's own sphere, and the contradiction between the two expresses their irreconcilability.

Since this formal structure of political thinking has an immediate bearing upon one of the key phenomena of susceptibility to fascism, namely upon pseudoconservatism, it may be appropriate to offer a few examples here.

*F 116*, a prejudiced woman of the University Extension Group, offers an example of a conflict between surface ideology and real attitude through her somewhat deviate pattern of scale scores: she is middle on E and F but low on PEC. In her case, the

deeper determinants are doubtless potentially fascist as evidenced particularly by her strong racial prejudice against both Negroes and Jews. In other political issues the picture is highly ambivalent. Characteristically, she classes herself as a Democrat, but voted for [Wendell] Willkie and then for Dewey. She »wasn't against Roosevelt,« but her statement that »no man is indispensable« thinly veils her underlying hostility. She

»knew what Hoover stood for, and I had no use for him. But that didn't mean I had to worship Roosevelt. He was a good man, but when I heard people weeping and wailing over his death, I was just disgusted. As though he were indispensable.«

The amazing irregularity is an emphatically pro-Russian statement and an outspokenly antifascist attitude in international politics:

»Now, I am a great admirer of Russia. Perhaps I shouldn't say it out loud, but I am. I think they are really trying to do something for all the people. Of course there was a lot of suffering and bloodshed but think of what they had to struggle against. My husband really gets disturbed about this. He says I ought to go to Russia if I like communism so much. He says that to admire communism is to want a change and he thinks it is very wrong for me to even sound as though I wanted any change when we have enough and are comfortable and are getting along all

right. I tell him that is very selfish and also that some people under the Czar might have felt that way but when the situation got so bad there was a revolution they got wiped out too.« (American Communists?) »Well, I couldn't say because I don't really know anything about them.

I don't hold the United States blameless. I think we have lots of faults. We talk now as though we had always hated war and tried to stop this one. That isn't true. There were ways to stop this war if they had wanted to. I remember when Mussolini moved on Ethiopia. I always think of that as the real beginning of this war. And we were not interested in stopping that. My husband doesn't like me to criticize the United States.«

The frequent interspersions of this statement with reference to disagreements with her husband, from whom she is »very much different politically« and with whom she has »terrible arguments« leads us to assume that her »progressive« political views in areas apparently not highly affect-laden by her are rationalizations of her strong resentment of the man of whom she says »I don't think we can live for ourselves alone.« One is tempted to hypothesize that she wants him to get mad at her when she speaks in favor of Russia. In her case, the broad-mindedness and rationality of surface opinion seems to be conditioned by strong underlying, repressed irrationalities:

Interviewer did not have much success with very perso-

nal data. She turned aside questions that came close to her deeper feelings. There was no depth to the discussion of her husband.

When it comes, however, to political topics which, for some reason unexplored in the interview, really mean something to this subject, she forgets all about her own rationality and gives vent to her vindictiveness though with a bad conscience, as evidenced by her previously quoted statement (Chapter XVI)[7] that she is »not very proud« of her anti-Semitic bias.

*M 320*, of the University Extension Testing Class, is a low-scoring man, hesitant, apologetic, shy, and unaggressive. He wants to become a landscape architect. His political views are consciously liberal and definitely nonprejudiced. He struggles to maintain his liberalism continuously, but this is not easy for him with regard to certain political matters, his impulses in many instances disavowing what he states. He begins with the typical low scorer's statement:

»I am afraid I don't have as many ideas about politics and government as I should, but I think – a lot of people are more liberal now than they have been recently. Possibly some like the change that is taking place in England – I don't know.«

He first takes a mildly anti-strike attitude:

»I don't know, I cannot see that, as just a straight demand, without taking into consideration the company and its ties and all that. I have not read much about that but ... in a large company ... maybe they might be able to take it, all right, but in little shops ... and if it did go through, and even if it did not have disastrous (effects) on business closing ... price rises would make it come out even anyway. I guess I am really not in favor of strikes but I can see it just about. ...«

Then he talks himself into a more definite stand against strikes, introduced by the still democratic »getting together« formula.

»They ought to get together and give, maybe, a 20 per cent or 30 per cent raise, then maybe kinda split it ... and these strikes ... just start at the wrong end ... because if the strike is settled ... they still have to come to some sort of agreement ... and it's gonna be forced and men'll be driven ... I guess human nature just is not that way but. ...«

The last statement, rather confused, actually belongs to the high-scorer pattern concerning the inherent badness of human nature (cf. Chapter VII).[8]

After he has made this turn, he goes on with the usual high scorer's condemnation of PAC, government control, etc., and ends up with an ambivalent statement about minimum wage-hour legislation:

»Well, things like that I guess if – I guess they are necessary – I guess maybe I am an idealist – I don't think there should have been a minimum wage law because I think the employer should pay his employee a living wage and if he cannot pay that, well, the person does not have to work there but if the employer cannot pay that, he is not going to stay in business. ...«

It is the general trend rather than any specific statement which bears witness to the wish to be politically progressive and the very definite changes of mind as soon as concrete issues are raised. This man's »political instincts« – if this term is allowed – are against his official progressiveness. One might well infer from this observation that one can differentiate better between political potentials by looking at deeper psychological impulses than by looking at avowed ideology.

Something similar can be observed with the medium-scoring man *M 118*, of the Extension Psychology Class group, a registered Democrat. He was middle on A-S but low on F and low-middle on E. It is the interviewer's impression that he is potentially »low« but that certain personality factors prevent him from going all the way. The exceptional aspect about him may well be explained through the conflict between different opinional layers. In terms of »big« and comparatively abstract political issues, he comes out with

a »progressive« statement.

»There is a trend toward socialism, I don't know how modified. The conflict between labor and business will probably be mediated by the government. The government will probably hold the balance of power in labor-business conflicts. The emphasis now is on free enterprise but that often results in monopoly, the big concerns squeezing the little guys to death. There is too much of a gap between the rich and the poor. People climb up by pushing others down, with no regulation. For this reason, government should have more influence, economically, whether or not it goes as far as socialism.«

The interviewer happened to ride with the subject from Berkeley to San Francisco and continued the discussion in a more informal, unofficial way, touching the subject matter of unionism. In this context a classic example of the gap between official ideology and political thinking in terms of one's own immediate interests occurred:

He thinks the C.I.O. is better than the A.F. of L. and he thinks that unions ought to extend their functions even more in political and educational and higher management brackets, but he himself won't join the Federal Workers Union which he would be eligible to join because he feels they are not enough concerned with the problems of the higher level incomes, that they are too much interested in keeping the wages of the poorer groups above a certain



minimum. He wishes they would be concerned with promotions and upgrading and developing good criteria by which people could be promoted.

The Canadian *M* 934, again a »medium« of the Public Speaking Class, is studying to become a minister. He calls himself »very far over on the left wing« but qualifies this immediately by the statement:

»... I'm of a practical nature and I would not vote for the socialists ... especially if I thought they would get in.«

To him, the practical is irreconcilable with socialism. The latter is all right as an idea, as a stimulant, as it were, but heaven forbid that it should materialize.

»I would vote ... only to maintain socialist opposition ... to keep the existing government from going too far to the right ... but don't think they have the experience to ... put their socialist program into effect ... and I think their program has to be modified.«

He praises the British Labour Government but actually only because it has not carried through a socialist program, an abstinence interpreted by the interviewee as a sign of »political experience.«

»Well ... I think they were ready for the job ... aren't trying to change social order in one fell swoop ... I think that is

an evidence of their maturity.«

This subject wants to be endowed with the prestige of a leftwing intellectual while at the same time, as an empirical being, he is manifestly afraid of a concrete materialization of ideas to which he subscribes in the abstract.

It is hardly accidental that in these cases the overt ideology is always progressive, the real opinion of an opposite character. This would seem to have something to do with established democracy in this country, which makes the expression of democratic ideas the thing to be done, while the opposite is, in a certain way, unorthodox. There is reason to believe that the fascist potential today shows itself largely in the maintenance of traditional ideas which may be called either liberal or conservative, whereas the underlying »political instinct,« fed largely by unconscious forces of the personality, is completely different. This will be elaborated in the following section.

## 4. Pseudoconservatism

Our analysis of the questionnaire findings on PEC (Chapter V)[9] has led to a differentiation between those who are high on PEC but low on E, and those who are high on both. This distinction was interpreted in terms of genuine and pseudoconservatives, the former supporting not only capitalism in its liberal, individualistic form but also those tenets of traditional Americanism which are definitely antirepressive and sincerely democratic, as indicated by an unqualified rejection of antiminority prejudices. Our interview material allows us to give more relief to this construct and also to qualify it in certain respects. Before we go into some details of the pseudoconservative's ideology, we should stress that our assumption of a pseudoconservative pattern of ideology is in agreement with the total trend of our psychological findings. The idea is that the potentially fascist character, in the specific sense given to this concept through our studies, is not only on the overt level but throughout the make-up of his personality a pseudoconservative rather than a genuine conservative. The psychological structure that corresponds to pseudoconservatism is conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness on the ego level, with violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destruc-

tiveness in the unconscious sphere. These contradictory trends are borne out particularly in those sections of our study where the range between the two poles of the unconscious and the conscious is widest, above all, where the T[hematic] A[pperception] T[est] is considered in relation to the clinical parts of the interviews. Traits such as authoritarian aggressiveness and vindictiveness may be regarded as intermediary between these antagonistic trends of the prejudiced personality. When turning to ideology which belongs in the context of psychological determinants here under discussion, to the realm of rationalization, it should be remembered that rationalizations of »forbidden« impulses, such as the drive for destruction, never completely succeed. While rationalization emasculates those urges which are subject to taboos, it does not make them disappear completely but allows them to express themselves in a »tolerable,« modified, indirect way, conforming to the social requirements which the ego is ready to accept. Hence even the overt ideology of pseudoconservative persons is by no means unambiguously conservative, as they would have us believe, not a mere reaction-formation against underlying rebelliousness; rather, it indirectly admits the very same destructive tendencies which are held at bay by the individual's rigid identification with an externalized superego. This break-through of the non-

conservative element is enhanced by certain supra-individual changes in today's ideology in which traditional values, such as the inalienable rights of each human being, are subject to a rarely articulate but nevertheless very severe attack by ascendent forces of crude repression, of virtual condemnation of anything that is deemed weak. There is reason to believe that those developmental tendencies of our society which point into the direction of some more or less fascist, state capitalist organization bring to the fore formerly hidden tendencies of violence and discrimination in ideology. All fascist movements officially employ traditional ideas and values but actually give them an entirely different, antihumanistic meaning. The reason that the pseudoconservative seems to be such a characteristically modern phenomenon is not that any new psychological element has been added to this particular syndrome, which was probably established during the last four centuries, but that objective social conditions make it easier for the character structure in question to express itself in its avowed opinions. It is one of the unpleasant results of our studies, which has to be faced squarely, that this process of social acceptance of pseudoconservatism has gone a long way – that it has secured an indubitable mass basis. In the opinions of a number of representative high scorers, ideas both of political conservatism and traditional li-

beralism are frequently neutralized and used as a mere cloak for repressive and ultimately destructive wishes. The pseudoconservative is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them against more or less fictitious dangers, consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition.

The pattern of pseudoconservatism is unfolded in the interviewer's description of *M 109*, another high-scoring man, a semifascist parole officer:

On his questionnaire, this man writes down »Republican« as the political party of his preference, and then scratches it out. He agrees with the anti-New Deal Democrats and the Willkie-type Republicans and disagrees with the New Deal Democrats and the traditional Republicans. This is cleared up in his interview when he says that the party does not mean anything, the candidate is the thing.<sup>10</sup>

Asked what is his conception of the Willkie-type Republican, he says he thinks of the Willkie supporters as the same as the Dewey supporters. Big business favored both Willkie and Dewey.

The score 67 on PEC is high-middle. An examination of the individual items seems to show that he is not a true conservative in the sense of the rugged individual. True, he agrees with most of the PEC items, going to plus 3 on the Child-should-learn-the-value-of-the-dollar and the Morgan and Ford items, but marking most of the others plus 1 or plus 2, but, be it noted, he does not agree that depressions are like headaches, that businessmen are

more important than artists and professors; and he believes the government should guarantee everybody an income, that there should be increased taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals, and that socialized medicine would be a good thing. He goes to plus 3 on the last item. Thus, it appears that he favors some kind of social function on the part of the government, but believes that the control should be in the proper hands. This is cleared up by the interview. Before becoming a policeman 6 $\frac{1}{2}$  years ago, this man was in the hospital insurance business. He says he had first to battle with the A.M.A., who did not favor any kind of medical insurance; and later he thought it wise to give up the business because state medicine was in the offing.

In summing up his position concerning medical insurance, he says:

»I like the collectiveness of it, but believe private business could do it better than the government. The doctors have butchered the thing and the politicians would do worse. People need this sort of thing and I like it in theory if it is run right.«

Thus it becomes clear, according to the interviewer, that he has some kind of collectivistic value system but believes that the control should be in the hands of the group with whom he can identify himself. This is clearly the Ford and Morgan sort of group rather than labor unions which he opposes.

The decisive thing about this man is that he has, in spite of his general reactionism and his all-pervasive ideas of power – which are evidenced by most of the other sections of the interview – socialistic leanings. This, however, does not refer to socialism in the sense of nationalizing the means of production but to his outspoken though inarticulate wish that the system of free enterprise and competition should be replaced by a state-capitalist integration where the economically strongest group, that is to say, heavy industry, takes control and organizes the whole life process of society without further interference by democratic dissension or by groups whom he regards as being in control only on account of the process of formal democracy, but not on the basis of the »legitimate« real economic power behind them.

This »socialist,« or rather, pseudosocialist, element of pseudoconservatism, actually defined only by anti-liberalism, serves as the democratic cloak for antidemocratic wishes. Formal democracy seems to this kind of thinking to be too far away from »the people,« and the people will have their rights only if the »inefficient« democratic processes are substituted by some rather ill-defined strong-arm system.

*M 651A*, another high-scoring man, a San Quentin prisoner, convicted of first-degree murder, is a good example of pseudodemocratism as a particular aspect



of pseudoconservatism.

(What do you think of political trends today?) »We have got a persecutor in California for governor ... don't put that in. They call it a democracy ... democracy is the best type of government but (inefficient). ...«

Subject criticizes President Roosevelt strongly, especially his NRA. He mentions his father's being pushed out of a job partly because of NRA, but he appears to be a little confused in this reference:

»Democracy is good when it is used right. I believe that too few people control the money in the country. I don't believe in communism ... but there is so many *little* people who never have anything. ...«

Subject mentioned his grandmother's only receiving \$30 a month pension which, he says, she cannot live on ... law ought to be changed in that respect ... subject emphasizes the need of extending old-age insurance to people too old to benefit by recent legislation ...<sup>11</sup>

An exceedingly serious dynamics is involved here. It cannot be disputed that formal democracy, under the present economic system, does not suffice to guarantee permanently, to the bulk of the population, satisfaction of the most elementary wants and needs, whereas at the same time the democratic form of government is presented as if – to use a favorite phrase

of our subjects – it were as close to an ideal society as it could be. The resentment caused by this contradiction is turned by those who fail to recognize its economic roots against the form of democracy itself. Because it does not fulfill what it promises, they regard it as a »swindle« and are ready to exchange it for a system which sacrifices all claims to human dignity and justice, but of which they expect vaguely some kind of a guarantee of their lives by better planning and organization. Even the most extreme concept of the tradition of American democracy is summoned by the pseudoconservative way of political thinking: the concept of revolution. However, it has become emasculated. There is only a vague idea of violent change, without any concrete reference to the people's aims involved – moreover, of a change which has in common with revolution only the aspect of a sudden and violent break but otherwise looks rather like an administrative measure. This is the spiteful, rebellious yet intrinsically passive idea which became famous after the former Prince of Wales visited the distressed areas of North England: the idea that »something should be done about it.« It occurs literally in the interview of the high-scoring woman, *F 105*, a 37-year-old crippled, frustrated housewife with strong paranoid traits. She had voted for Roosevelt every time because »I just decided I'd be a Democrat.« Asked why, she continues

as follows:

»I don't know. I'm just primarily against capitalism, and the Republicans are capitalistic. The Democrats have tried to give the working class a break. Father has voted for [Norman M.] Thomas for years. He thinks eventually the world will come to that. But he's never made an issue of it.« (Are your ideals a reflection of his attitude?) »Oh, it could be. I'm not conscious of it. I voted as soon as I was able to. (What do you think will happen after the war?) Probably the Republicans will be in again. I think the American public is a very changing type. Probably I'll change too. The world's in such a chaotic mess, something should be done. We're going to have to learn to live with one another, the whole world.«

The phoniness of this subject's supposed progressiveness comes out in the section on minorities where she proves to be a rabid anti-Semite.

In order to guess the significance of the dull wish of this woman for a radical change it has to be confronted with the stand another pseudoconservative takes, the violently anti-Semitic San Quentin inmate, *M 661 A*, a robber. He plays, according to the interviewer, the bored *décadent* satiated with »too much experience« and derives from this attitude a fake aristocratic ideology which serves as a pretext for violent oppression of those whom he deems weak. He pays »very little attention to politics, except that I think we

are headed for communism, and I am thumbs down on it.« Asked why, he comes forward with the following confession:

»For one thing, I have never forgiven the Russians for the revolution. ... I consider them murders and not assassinations and I haven't forgiven Russia any more than I have forgiven France for her revolution, or Mexico ... in other words, I still believe in the Old Order and I believe we were happiest under Hoover and should have kept him. I think I would have had more money under him too and I don't believe in inheritance taxes. If I earn \$100,000 by the sweat of my brow, I ought to be able to leave it to whomever I please. I guess I really don't believe that all men are created free and equal.«

While he still accepts the traditional critique of government interference in the name of rugged individualism, he would favor such government control if it were exercised by the strong. Here the criminal is in complete agreement with the aforementioned (p. [362]) parole officer, *M 109*:

(What about government controls over business?) »I half-approve. I certainly think that somebody should be over. ... I believe in government control because it makes it less of – I really don't believe in democracy; if we know somebody's at the helm, we can't have revolutions and things. But I have never read much on politics and I don't think I have a right to say much.«

That the idea of the »right people« is actually behind *M 661A's* political philosophy is shown by his explanation of why he objects to all revolutions:

»They overthrow the established order ... and they are always made by people who never had anything. ... I've never seen a communist who came from the right strata of society. ... I did read George Bernard Shaw's (book on socialism).«

One may differentiate between two kinds of pseudo-conservatives: those who profess to believe in democracy and are actually antidemocratic, and those who call themselves conservative while surreptitiously indulging in subversive wishes. This differentiation, however, is somewhat rationalistic. It does not amount to much, either in terms of psychological motivations or of actual political decision. It seems to pertain merely to thin rationalizations: the core of the phenomenon is both times identical. The just-quoted *661A* belongs to the pseudoconservative group in the narrower sense and so does *M 105*, a pre-law student high on all scales, who stresses his conservative background while admitting overt fascist leanings:

»Naturally, I get my Republican sentiments from my parents. But recently I have read more for myself, and I

agree with them. ... We are a conservative family. We hate anything to do with socialism. My father regretted that he voted for F.D.R. in 1932. Father wrote to Senator Reynolds of South Carolina about the Nationalist Party. It's not America First, it's not really isolationist, but we believe that our country is being sold down the river.«

The overt link between father-fixation as discussed in the clinical chapters (Part II)[12] and authoritarian persuasions in politics should be stressed. He uses a phrase familiar with fascists when they were faced with the defeat of Germany and the German system and yet somehow wished to cling to their negative Utopia.

»America is fighting the war but we will lose the peace if we win the war. I can't see what I can possibly get out of it.«

Conversely, a striking example of pseudodemocratism in the narrower sense is offered at the beginning of the political section of the interview of the high-scoring man *M 108*, a strongly fascistic student of insect toxicology, discussed in the chapter on typology as representative of the extreme »manipulative« syndrome. He is against Roosevelt, against the New Deal, and against practically any social humanitarian idea. At the next moment, however, he says he did feel that he was »somewhat of a socialist.«

This is literally the pattern by which the German Nazis denounced the Weimar Republic in the name of authority unchecked by democratic control, exalted the sacredness of private property, and simultaneously inserted the word socialist into the vernacular of their own party. It is obvious that this kind of »socialism,« which actually amounts merely to the curtailment of individual liberties in the name of some ill-defined collectivity, blends very well with the desire for authoritarian control as expressed by those who style themselves as conservatives. Here the overt incompatibility between private interests (what he »gets out of it«) and objective political logic (the certainty of an Allied victory) is by hook and crook put into the service of profascist postwar defeatism. No matter how it goes, democracy must lose. Psychologically, the destructive »impending doom« pattern is involved.

This defeatism is characteristic of another trait of pseudoconservative political philosophy: sympathy with the fascist enemy, Hitler's Germany. This is easily rationalized as humane magnanimity and even as the democratic wish to give everybody a fair deal. It is the fifth-column mentality on which Hitlerian propaganda in democratic countries drew heavily before the war and which has by no means been uprooted.

*M 106*, a College student high on all scales, fairly rational in many respects, seems at first sight to be

critical of Germany. By tracing grandiloquently the sources of German fascism to supposedly profound historical roots, largely invented themselves by fascist propaganda, however, he slips into an apologetic attitude:

»German people have always been aggressive, have loved parades, have always had a big army. They received an unfair peace after the last war. The treaty of Versailles was obviously unfair to them, and because they were hard up, they were willing to listen to a young man like Hitler when he came along. If there had been a better peace, there'd be no trouble now. Hitler came along with promises, and people were willing to go for him. They had huge unemployment, inflation, and so on.«

The legend of the »unjust« treaty of Versailles must feed on tremendous psychological resources – unconscious guilt feelings against the established symbol of prowess – in non-German countries: otherwise it could not have survived the Hitlerian war. That this subject's explanations of Hitler really mean sympathy is evidenced by a subsequent statement on Hitler's policy of exterminating the Jews, already quoted in Chapter XVI[13].

»Well, Hitler, carried things just a little too far. There was some justification – some are bad, but not all. But Hitler went on the idea that a rotten apple in the barrel will spoil



all the rest of them.«

Still, even this subject clings to the democratic cloak and refrains from overt fascism. Asked about the Jews in this country he answers:

»Same problem but it's handled much better, because we're a democratic country.«

While pseudoconservatism is, of course, predominantly a trait of high scorers, it is by no means lacking among low scorers. This pertains particularly to the apologetic attitude toward the Nazis. Thus, *F 113*, a woman low on prejudice though high on F, a young student of mathematics, calls herself »rather conservative.« Her »official« ideology is set against bigotry. But referring to her Irish descent, she resents the English and this leads her to pro-German statements which, in harmony with her F score, more than merely hint at underlying fascist leanings:

»I am prejudiced against England. England gave a dirty deal to the Irish people. England says the Nazis are black and Russia is white, but I think England is black. She goes around conquering people and is not just at all; and I am opposed to Russia. It is true that they took up the cause of the people, but on the whole they are not right, and their type of government is inferior to ours.« (What about the Nazis?) »The Germans lost everything; they

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just got hopeless. I don't believe in dividing Germany just in order to make Russia and England richer. It isn't true that Germany started the war – for war two people are necessary. It is not fair to put all the burden on one nation. The Germans will only feel more persecuted and fight more. One should leave the Germans to themselves. There is much too much emphasis on how cruel the Nazis are. The Germans did not have a just peace. We can't put our own Nazi regime in to run the Germans. The Russians will cause the next war. The devastation in Germany has been just too great. I am pessimistic because people believe that everybody is bad who is down, and those are good who are strong, and the strong ones cut in pieces the one who is down, and they are just practical and not just.«

The decisive shift occurs when the subject, after demanding »fairness« with regard to the problem of war guilt, protests against »too much emphasis« on Nazi atrocities.

**EXCURSUS ON THE MEANING OF PSEUDO-CONSERVATISM.** The introduction of the term pseudoconservative which may often be replaced by pseudoliberal and even pseudoprogressive, necessitates a brief theoretical discussion of what is »pseudo« about the subjects in question and whether and to what extent the notion of genuine political ideologies can be upheld. All these terms have to be handled with the utmost caution and should never be hyposta-

tized. The distinction between pseudo and genuine political ideologies has been introduced mainly in order to avoid the pitfall of oversimplification, of identifying the prejudiced person, and the prospective fascist in general, with »reactionism.« It has been established beyond any doubt that fascism in terms of efficient organization and technological achievement has many »progressive« features. Moreover, it has been recognized long before our study that the general idea of »preserving the American way of living,« as soon as it assumes the features of vigilantism, hides violently aggressive and destructive tendencies which pertain both to overt political manifestations and to character traits. However, it has to be emphasized that the idea of the genuineness of an attitude or of behavior set against its »overplaying,« is somehow as problematic as that of, say, normality. Whether a person is a genuine or a pseudoconservative in overt political terms can be decided only in critical situations when he has to decide on his actions. As far as the distinction pertains to psychological determinants, it has to be relativized. Since all our psychological urges are permeated by identifications of all levels and types, it is impossible ever completely to sever the »genuine« from what is »imitation.« It would be obviously nonsensical to call ungentle those traits of a person which are based on the identification with his father.

The idea of an absolute individual *per se*, completely identical with itself and with nothing else, is an empty abstraction. There is no psychological borderline between the genuine and the »assumed.« Nor can the relation between the two ever be regarded as a static one. Today's pseudoconservative may become the genuine conservative of tomorrow.

In the light of these considerations, it will be of some methodological importance to formulate the distinction between »genuine« and »pseudo« with care. The simplest procedure, of course, would be to define both concepts operationally in terms of cluster relationships of the questionnaire and also of the interviews. One would have to call roughly pseudoconservative those who show blatant contradictions between their acceptance of all kinds of conventional and traditional values – by no means only in the political sphere – and their simultaneous acceptance of the more destructive clusters of the F scale, such as cynicism, punitiveness, and violent anti-Semitism. Yet, this procedure is somewhat arbitrary and mechanical. At its best, it would define the terms but never help to understand their implicit etiology. It would be more satisfactory to base the distinction on a psychological hypothesis that makes sense. An hypothesis that might serve is one that takes as its point of departure the differentiation between *successful or unsuccessful*

*identification*. This would imply that the »genuine« conservative characters would be those who essentially or at least temporarily succeeded in their identification with authoritarian patterns without considerable carry-overs of their emotional conflicts – without strong ambivalence and destructive countertendencies. Conversely, the »pseudo« traits are characteristic of those whose authoritarian identification succeeded only on a superficial level. They are forced to overdo it continuously in order to convince themselves and the others that they belong, to quote the revolution-hater of San Quentin, to the right strata of society. The stubborn energy which they employ in order to accept conformist values constantly threatens to shatter these values themselves, to make them turn into their opposite, just as their »fanatical« eagerness to defend God and Country makes them join lunatic fringe rackets and sympathize with the enemies of their country.

Even this distinction, however, can claim only limited validity and is subject to psychological dynamics. We know from Freud that the identification with the father is always of a precarious nature and even in the »genuine« cases, where it seems to be well established, it may break down under the impact of a situation which substitutes the paternal superego by collectivized authority of the fascist brand.

Yet, with all these qualifications, the distinction still can claim some justification under present conditions. It may be permissible to contrast the pseudo-conservatives so far discussed with a »genuine« conservative taken from the Los Angeles sample which, as pointed out in Chapter I, included – in contrast to the Berkeley sample – a number of actual or self-styled members of the upper class.

*F 5008* is low on E, middle on F, and high on PEC. She is a woman of old American stock, a direct descendant of Jefferson. She is apparently free of any vindictive sense of her social status and lays no emphasis on her good family or on her being a real member of the »right strata of society.« She is definitely nonprejudiced. Her T.A.T. shows traits of a somewhat neurotic overoptimism which may or may not be a product of reaction-formation. One might venture that the »genuine« conservatives who still survive and whose number is probably shrinking, may develop an increasingly bad conscience because they become aware of the rapid development of important conservative layers of American society into the direction of labor baiting and race hatred. The more this tendency increases, the more the »genuine« conservative seems to feel compelled to profess democratic ideals, even if they are somewhat incompatible with his own upbringing and psychological patterns. If this observati-



on could be generalized, it would imply that the »genuine« conservatives are more and more driven into the liberal camp by today's social dynamics. This may help to explain why it is so hard to find any striking examples for genuine conservatism among high scorers.

If our assumption is correct, that pseudoconservatism is based – as far as its psychological aspect is concerned – on incomplete identification, it becomes understandable why it is linked to a trait which also plays a considerable role within the pattern of conventionality: identification with higher social groups. The identification that failed is probably in most cases that with the father. Those people in whom this failure does not result in any real antagonism to authority, who accept the authoritarian pattern without, however, internalizing it, are likely to be those who identify themselves sociologically with higher social groups. This would be in harmony with the fact that the fascist movement in Germany drew heavily on frustrated middle-class people of all kinds: of those who had lost their economic basis without being ready to admit their being *déclassé*; of those who did not see any chances for themselves but the shortcut of joining a powerful movement which promised them jobs and ultimately a successful war. This socioeconomic aspect of pseudoconservatism is often hard to distin-

guish from the psychological one. To the prospective fascist his social identification is as precarious as that with the father. At the social root of this phenomenon is probably the fact that to rise by the means of »normal« economic competition becomes increasingly difficult, so that people who want to »make it« – which leads back to the psychological situation – are forced to seek other ways in order to be admitted into the ruling group. They must look for a kind of »cooptation,« somewhat after the fashion of those who want to be admitted to a smart club. Snobbery, so violently denounced by the fascist, probably for reasons of projection, has been democratized and is part and parcel of their own mental make-up: who wants to make a »career« must really rely on »pull and climbing« rather than on individual merit in business or the professions. Identification with higher groups is the presupposition for climbing, or at least appears so to the outsider, whereas the »genuine« conservative group is utterly allergic to it. However, the man who often, in accordance with the old Horatio Alger ideology, maintains his own »upward social mobility« draws from it at least some narcissistic gratifications and felicitously anticipates internally a status which he ultimately hopes to attain in reality.

Here two examples of high scorers may be quoted, both again taken from the Los Angeles group.

5006, an extreme high scorer on all scales, one of the few of our interviewees who actually admitted that they want to kill the Jews (see his interview in Chapter XVI, p. [307, above]), is the grandson of a dentist, whereas his father failed to become one, and he hopes fervently to regain the grandfather's social status. As to the problem of failure in identification, it is significant in this case that the image of the father is replaced by that of the grandfather – just as the idea of »having seen better times,« of a good family background clouded over by recent economic developments, played a large role with the prefascist, postinflation generation in Germany.

5013, who is also extremely high on all scales, describes her father as a doctor, whereas he is actually a chiropractor – a habit which seems to be largely shared by the chiropractors themselves. If the German example teaches anything and if our concept of semierudition proves to be correct, one may expect that non-academic »scientists« and »doctors« are strongly attracted by the fascist platform.<sup>14</sup>

## 5. The Usurpation Complex

The goal toward which the pseudoconservative mentality strives – diffusedly and semiconsciously – is to establish a dictatorship of the economically strongest group. This is to be achieved by means of a mass movement, one which promises security and privileges to the so-called »little man« (that is to say, worried members of the middle and lower middle class who still cling to their status and their supposed independence), if they join with the right people at the right time. This wish appears throughout pseudoconservative ideology in mirrored reflection. Government by representation is accused of perverting democracy. Roosevelt and the New Deal particularly are said to have usurped power and to have entrenched themselves dictatorially. Thus pseudoconservatives accuse the progressives of the very thing which they would like to do, and they utilize their indictment as a pretext for »throwing the rascals out.« They call for a defense of democracy against its »abuses« and would, through attacking the »abuses,« ultimately abolish democracy altogether. Pseudoconservative ideology harmonizes completely with psychological projectivity.

One may well ask why people so concerned with power, if they really see the Roosevelt policy as a

strong-armed dictatorship, do not endorse it and feel happy about it. The reasons, it would seem, are several. First, the social types representative of pseudo-conservatism are not or do not regard themselves as beneficiaries of the New Deal. It appears to them as a government for the unemployed and for labor; and even if they themselves received some benefits from WPA or the closed shop, they are resentful about it because this demonstrates to them what they are least willing to admit: that their belonging to the middle classes has lost its economic foundation. Second, to them, the Roosevelt administration never was really strong enough. They sense very well the degree to which the New Deal was handicapped by the Supreme Court and by Congress; they know or have an inkling of the concessions Roosevelt had to make – he had to give conspicuous jobs to several men opposed to his political line, e.g., Jesse Jones; they cry »dictator« because they realize that the New Deal was no dictatorship at all and that it did not fit within the authoritarian pattern of their over-all ideology. Thirdly, their idea of the strong man, no matter in what glowing personalized terms it may be expressed, is colored by an image of real strength: the backing of the most powerful industrial groups. To them, progressives in the government are real usurpers, not so much because they have acquired by shrewd and illegal ma-

nipulation rights incompatible with American democracy, but rather because they assume a power position which should be reserved for the »right people.« Pseudoconservatives have an underlying sense of »legitimacy«: legitimate rulers are those who are actually in command of the machinery of production – not those who owe their ephemeral power to formal political processes. This last motif, which also plays a heavy role in the prehistory of German fascism, is to be taken the more seriously because it does not altogether contradict social reality. As long as democracy is really a formal system of political government which made, under Roosevelt, certain inroads into economic fields but never touched upon the economic fundamentals, it is true that the life of the people depends on the economic organization of the country and, in the last analysis, on those who control American industry, more than on the chosen representatives of the people. Pseudoconservatives sense an element of untruth in the idea of »their« democratic government, and realize that they do not really determine their fate as social beings by going to the polls. Resentment of this state of affairs, however, is not directed against the dangerous contradiction between economic inequality and formal political equality but against the democratic form as such. Instead of trying to give to this form its adequate content, they want to

do away with the form of democracy itself and to bring about the direct control of those whom they deem the most powerful anyway.

This background of the dictatorship idea, that democracy is no reality under prevailing conditions, may be evidenced by two quotations from medium-scoring men. *M 1223h* follows up his statement that the Democrats are going communistic and that the unions should be curbed, by the statement, »The people aren't running the country.«

*M 1225a* speaks cautiously about democracy: »It's supposed to be a government of the people by representation.«

Asked whether we had it in this country he answers bluntly: No, but qualifies this immediately with the statement – a pretty standardized one – »We have as close to it as there is.«

Similarly, *M 1223h* qualifies his critique by the contention that »America is still fairly democratic but going away from democracy too fast.«

The contradictory utterances of these two men, apart from wishful thinking, indicate that they are perturbed by the antagonism between formal political democracy and actual social control. They just reach the point where they see this antagonism. They did not dare, however, to explain it but rather retract their own opinions in order not to become »unrealistic.«

Conformism works as a brake on their political thinking.

A few examples of the usurpation fantasy proper follow.

*M 208*, who obtained a middle score on E and F and a high score on PEC, insists, according to his interviewer,

that President Roosevelt lost the popular vote by several thousand votes, according to counts he and his rather made following the news reports over the radio, implying that the official count had been incorrect.

While this man is for »initiative and competition, against government bungling and inefficiencies,« he has boundless confidence in social control exercised by the proper organization:

»The best organizations for a citizen to belong to in order to influence the conditions in his community are local Chambers of Commerce. By improving your city, you make it attractive and create wealth.« He said the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce was something he belonged to and his organization would send out postcards very soon to every single individual in the city in a huge membership drive.

*M 656*, a high-scoring prison inmate (grand theft and forgery), was interviewed shortly after President Roo-



sevelt's death and when asked what he regarded as the greatest danger facing this country, said

»the government we just had, the one that brought on the war, the Nazi-dictatorship.«

The high-scoring man *M 108*, the aforementioned insect toxicologist, is convinced that Roosevelt only carried out [Herbert] Hoover's ideas, a statement not infrequent among prejudiced subjects who regard the New Deal as usurpation in so far as it has »stolen« its ideas from its opponents. Asked further about Roosevelt, he goes on:

»he usurped power that was necessary to do something – he took a lot more power than a lot. ... He has been in too long, and there were deals on the fire that we don't know about with Churchill or Stalin.«

In the end the usurper idea coincides with that of the conspirator who makes »secret deals« detrimental to his country.

The frequency and intensity of the usurper idea, together with the fantastic nature of many of the pertinent assertions in our material justifies our calling it a »complex,« that is to say, looking for a widespread and stable psychological configuration on which this idea feeds. As far as we know, no attention has been

given to this complex in psychological literature, though the frequency of usurpation conflicts throughout occidental drama warrants the assumption that there must be some deep-rooted basis in instinctual dynamics for it. Suffice it to recollect that Shakespeare's most famous tragedies: Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth, Julius Caesar, and Richard III deal in one way or the other with usurpation, and that the usurper theme runs as a red thread through the whole dramatic work of Schiller, from Franz Moor in the »Robbers« to Demetrius. On a sociopsychological level, that is to say comparatively abstractly and superficially, an explanation is easy at hand. The existence of power and privilege, demanding sacrifices of all those who do not share in its advantages, provokes resentment and hurts deeply the longing for equality and justice evolved throughout the history of our culture. In the depth of his heart, everyone regards any privilege as illegitimate. Yet one is forced continuously, in order to get along in the world as it is, to adjust oneself to the system of power relationships that actually defines this world. This process has been going on over the ages, and its results have become part and parcel of today's personalities. This means that people have learned to repress their resentment of privilege and to accept as legitimate just that which is suspected of being illegitimate. But since human sufferings from

the survival of privilege have never ceased, adjustment to it has never become complete. Hence the prevailing attitude towards privileges is essentially ambivalent. While it is being accepted consciously, the underlying resentment is displaced unconsciously. This is done in such a way that a kind of emotional compromise between our forced acceptance of the existence of power, and resistance against it, is reached. Resentment is shifted from the »legitimate« representatives of power to those who want to take it away from them, who identify themselves, in their aims, with power but violate, at the same time, the code of existent power relations. The ideal object of this shift is the political usurper in whom one can denounce »greed for power« while at the same time taking a positive stand with regard to established power. Still, sympathy with the usurper survives at the bottom. It is the conflict between this sympathy and our displaced aggressiveness which qualifies him for dramatic conflict.

There is reason to believe, however, that this line of thought does not fully explain the usurper complex. Much more deep-lying, archaic mechanisms seem to be involved. As a rule, the usurper complex is linked with the problem of the family. The usurper is he who claims to be the member of a family to which he does not belong, or at least to pretend to rights due to an-

other family. It may be noted that even in the Oedipus legend, the usurper complex is involved in so far as Oedipus believes himself to be the real child of his foster-parents, and this error accounts for his tragic entanglement. We venture, with all due reservation, the hypothesis that this has something to do with an observation that can be made not infrequently: that people are afraid of not really being the children of their parents. This fear may be based on the dim awareness that the order of the family, which stands for civilization in the form in which we know it, is not identical with »nature« – that our biological origin does not coincide with the institutional framework of marriage and monogamy, that »the stork brings us from the pond.« We sense that the shelter of civilization is not safe, that the house of the family is built on shaky ground. We project our uneasiness upon the usurper, the image of him who is not his parents' child, who becomes psychologically a kind of ritualized, institutional »victim« whose annihilation is unconsciously supposed to bring us rest and security. It may very well be that our tendency to »look for the usurper« has its origin in psychological resources as deep as those here suggested.

## 6. F.D.R.

The usurpation complex is focused on Roosevelt, whose name evokes the sharpest differences between high and low scorers that are to be found in the interview material on politico-economic topics.

It hardly needs to be said that all the statements touching upon the late president are personalized. The political issues involved appear mainly as qualities of the man himself. He is criticized and praised because he is this or that, not because he stands for this or that. The most drastic accusation is that of war-monger. This accusation often assumes the form of those conspiracy fantasies which are so highly characteristic of the usurper complex.

The high-scoring man *M 664c*, serving a San Quentin term of one year for forgery and check writing, professes to have been originally pro-Roosevelt.

»Hell, at that (election) I was strong for Roosevelt, we had an awful depression, one thing he'd done for that state he put that dam there. ... We didn't need the war though.« (Why did we get into it?) »Started sending that iron over to Japan and then helping England. ...«

The idea of the »red Roosevelt« belongs to the same class of objections and paranoid exaggerations of po-

litical antipathies. Though much more common among subjects who score high on E and PEC, it can sometimes be found in the statements of low scorers. Note the remarks of *F 140*, a young nursery school helper, rated according to her questionnaire score as low on E but high on A-S and PEC. She first refers to her father.

(Is your father anti-Roosevelt?) »Oh, sure he is. He just don't have any use for Roosevelt. It's all communism that is what he says.« (And what do you think about it?) »Oh, I don't know. I guess he's right. He ought to know. That's all he thinks about – politics, politics.«

Sometimes the suspicion that Roosevelt was a Russo-ophile war-monger is cloaked by legalistic argumentations, such as the statement that he left the country illegally during the war.

*F 101*, a woman who stands high on all scales, a somewhat frustrated young college student, relates that her father is »extremely anti-Roosevelt,« and, when asked why, answers:

»No president is supposed to leave the country without the consent of Congress, and he goes whenever he feels like it. He is being a little too dictatorial.«

With regard to domestic politics, *F 359*, the accoun-

tant in a government department who was quoted before (Chapter XVI, p. [280]), states quite clearly and in fairly objective terms the contradiction which seems at the hub of anti-Roosevelt sentiment:

Subject did not like Roosevelt because of WPA. It creates a class of lazy people who would rather get \$20 a week than work. She feels that Roosevelt did not accomplish what he set out to do – raise the standard of the poorer classes.

The conceptions of communist, internationalist, and war-monger are close to another one previously mentioned – that of the snob. Just as the fascist agitator persistently mixes up radicals and bankers, claiming that the latter financed the revolution and that the former seek financial gains, the contradictory ideas of an ultraleftist and an exclusive person alienated from the people are brought together by anti-Roosevelt sentiment. One may venture the hypothesis that the ultimate content of both objections is the same: the resentment of the frustrated middle-class person against those who represent the idea of happiness, be it by wanting other people – even the »lazy ones« – to be happy, be it that they are enjoying life themselves. This irrationality can be grasped better on the level of personality than on that of ideology.

*M 1223h*, of the Maritime School, with medium

scores on E and PEC, but high on F, does not like Roosevelt – »a socialite; got too much power.« Similarly, the high-scoring married women *F 117*, 37 years old, employed in a Public Health Department,

feels that Roosevelt does not know how to handle money; he was born with a great deal. Now he throws it around – »millions here and millions there.«

This is the exact opposite of the praise of Dewey, whose more humble origin is supposed to guarantee thriftiness. The »democratic cloak« of the pseudoconservative consists, in cases like these, in the assertion that measures taken for the benefit of the people cannot be approved because the one who carried them out is not one of the people and therefore, in a way, has no right to act in their behalf – he is a usurper. Really folksy men, one might suppose, would rather let them starve.

The idea that the late President was too old and too ill, and that the New Deal was decrepit plays a particular role among anti-Roosevelt arguments. The dark forebodings about Roosevelt's death have come true. Yet, one may suspect here a psychological element: the fear of his death often rationalizes the wish for it. Moreover, the idea of his supposed old age pertains to the illegitimacy complex: he should give way to others, to the »young generation,« to fresh blood. This



is in keeping with the fact that German Nazism often denounced the over-age of the representatives of the Weimar Republic, and that Italian fascism heavily emphasized the idea of youth *per se*. Ultimately, some light is shed on the whole complex of the President's age and illness by our clinical findings, pertaining to the tendency of our high scorers to praise physical health and vigor as the outstanding quality of their parents, particularly of the mother (pp. 340ff.).<sup>[15]</sup> This is due to the general »externalization« of values, the anti-intracaptiveness of the prejudiced personalities who seem to be continuously afraid of illnesses. If there is an interconnection between at least some syndromes of high scorers and psychotic dispositions, one may also think of the disproportionate role played by the concern with one's own body in many schizophrenics – a phenomenon linked to the mechanisms of »depersonalization«<sup>16</sup> which represents the extreme of the »ego-alienness« of the id characteristic of the high scoring subject. It should be remembered once again how large a role was played by ideas such as physical health, purity of the blood, and syphilophobia throughout fascist ideology.

*M 104*, a high scoring young man of the Public Speaking Class, who changed from studying engineering to law is an example:

Subject would have voted for Dewey. The whole New Deal has become very stagnant, old, and decrepit. He feels Roosevelt has done some fine things, some of his experiments were about as good a cure as you could get for the depression, but it is now time for a change in party, a new President, younger blood.

As in most cases, the argument has, of course, a »rational« aspect too – the Roosevelt government held office for a longer period than any other one in American history. However, the complaints about »too long« are uttered only in the name of »changing the guard,« not in the name of concrete progressive ideas which could be brought about by younger people.

Resentment against old people has a psychological aspect by which it seems to be linked to anti-Semitism. There is reason to believe that some subjects displace their hostility against the father upon aged persons and the notion of old age as such. Old people are, as it were, earmarked for death. In accordance with this pattern, the image of the Jew often bears features of the old man, thus allowing for the discharge of repressed hostility against the father. Judaism is regarded, not incidentally, as the religion of the father and Christianity that of the son. The most emphatic stereotype of the Jew, that of the inhabitant of the Eastern ghetto, bears attributes of the old, such as the beard or worn and obsolete clothes.

Hostility for the aged has, to be sure, a sociological as well as a psychological aspect: old people who cannot work any more are regarded as useless and are, therefore, rejected. But this idea, like those just discussed, has little immediate bearing upon the person of Roosevelt; rather, they are transferred to him after aggression has turned against him. The universally ambivalent role of the President as a father figure thus makes itself felt.

As to those who are *in favor* of Roosevelt, there are two clear-cut main motifs which are almost the reverse of those found in the Roosevelt haters. The man »who thinks too much of himself and assumes dictatorial powers« is now praised as a great personality; the leftist and initiator of the New Deal is loved as a friend of the underdog.

The »great personality« motif appears in the statement of the low-scoring man, *M 711*, an interviewer in government employment, with many of the typical »low« characteristics of mildness, gentleness, and indecision.

(Roosevelt) »seemed to be the only man the country had produced that seemed to have the qualifications for the assignment (of war). ... I'd say his ability to get along with other people ... had been pretty responsible in the unification of our country.«

The young woman, *F 126*, scores low on A-S and E, middle on F, and high on PEC. She is studying journalism but actually is interested in »creative writing.« She states

that her brother-in-law can find so many things to criticize and, of course, there are plenty. »But I think the President is for the underdog, and I've always been for the underdog.«

The high-scoring man, *M 102*, a student of seismology who went to college because he did not want to be »lined up as just an electrician,« praises Roosevelt's »talent«:

»Well, if another candidate had approached Roosevelt, I'd have voted for him. But, no other candidate approached his talent.«

*M 106*, another high-scoring man, again characterized by upward social mobility, is pro-Roosevelt for reasons that are just the opposite of those given by one group of his critics for disliking him, although he too suffers from the »old age« complex.

»Roosevelt has done a wonderful job but we should have a young man. Roosevelt stabilized the nation's currency, helped on unemployment, has handled foreign relations marvelously. He is a common man, goes fishing, takes

time for relaxation – that's what I like. Mrs. Roosevelt has been active in political and social affairs.«

The explanation of the deviation of this highly prejudiced man, who is beset by power ideas and objects to the Jews because they supposedly strive for power, is that he himself

»had infantile paralysis, and you appreciate what Roosevelt has done.«

The inference may be allowed that if the same man is praised by some people as a »common man« and by others blamed as a »socialite,« these judgments express subjective value scales rather than objective facts.

The established status of a President of the United States, the irrefutable success of Roosevelt, and, one may add, his tremendous impact as a symbolic father figure on the unconscious, seem in more cases than this particular one to check the usurper complex of the pseudoconservative and allow only for vague attacks about which there is something half-hearted, as if they were being made with a bad conscience.

## 7. Bureaucrats and Politicians

There is no mercy, however, for those to whom Roosevelt is supposed to have delegated power. They are usurpers, parasites, know nothing about the people, and should, one may well assume, be replaced by the »right men.« The wealth of statements against bureaucrats and politicians in our interview material is tremendous. Although it comes mostly from high scorers, it is by no means confined to them, and may again be regarded as one of those patterns of political ideology which spread over the well-defined border lines of right vs. left.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze the amount of truth inherent in American distrust of professional politics. Nor should it be denied that a tremendously swollen bureaucratic apparatus, such as that which was necessitated by war conditions and which was, to a certain extent, safe from public criticism, develops unpleasant features, and that the machinery has an inbound tendency to entrench itself and to perpetuate itself for its own sake. However, as one analyzes carefully the standard criticism of the bureaucrats and politicians, he finds very little evidence of such observations, very few specific indictments of bureaucratic institutions which prove them to be in-

competent. It is impossible to escape the impression that »the bureaucrat,« with the help of some sections of the press, and some radio commentators, has become a magic word, that he functions as a scapegoat to be blamed indiscriminately for all kinds of unsatisfactory conditions, somewhat reminiscent of the anti-Semitic imagery of the Jew with which that of the bureaucrat is often enough merged. At any rate, the frequency and intensity of antibureaucratic and antipolitician invectives is quite out of proportion with any possible experience. Resentment about the »alienation« of the political sphere as a whole, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, is turned against those who represent the political sphere. The bureaucrat is the personalization of ununderstandable politics, of a depersonalized world.

Striking examples of this general attitude of high scorers are provided by the above-quoted political statements of Mack (p. 34)[17] and of the markedly anti-Semitic manager of a leather factory, M 359 (p. [348] of this chapter).

Sometimes the invectives against politics terminate in tautologies: politics is blamed for being too political.

*M 1230a* is a young welder who wanted to study engineering. He scores high on E but low on F and PEC.

(What thinking of political trends today?) »Well, they're very disrupted. We discussed them a lot, and a lot of things we don't like. The administration seems to be so tied up in politics. ... Statesmanship is gone completely. ... Can't believe anything you read in the newspapers. We read the newspapers mainly to laugh. ...«

The last passage is characteristic of the alienation from politics which expresses itself in a complete, and by no means altogether unjustified, distrust of the reliability of any news which has gone through the filter of a system of communications controlled by vested interests. This distrust, however, is shifted to the scapegoat, the bureaucrat and the politician, usually attacked by the same press which is this subject's laughing stock.

*F 120*, a high-scoring woman, differentiates between Roosevelt and the bureaucracy.<sup>18</sup>

(Roosevelt and the New Deal?) »I admired him, in fact I voted for him, although I did not approve of a lot of things about the New Deal. All the bureaus. I would not have minded the spending if it had gone to help people. But I resented all the wasted motion – professional people digging ditches – and especially the expensive agencies stuffed with do-nothings, bureaucrats.«

*M 1214b*, a medium scorer of the Maritime School, is



antipolitical in a traditionalistic way, the ultimate direction of which is still undetermined.

»No respect for politicians: bunch of windbags. They try to sound people out and follow along.« (This is just the opposite of the usual argument according to which the politicians are too independent. This particular twist may indicate the underlying awareness of the *weakness* of the representatives of formal democracy [-TWA].) »They are not sincere public servants. Roosevelt, Lincoln, Jefferson, and Bryan are exceptions. Wilson was also sincere.« Subject has no respect for Harding or Coolidge.

Finally, an example from a low scorer. *M 112*, asked about politics, simply states:

»I don't like it. We can get along without it. Don't think that people should be just politicians. Should have an ordinary life, just hold office at times. Not be trained for politics and nothing else, should know what people want and do it. Not control things for themselves or others.«

The tone of this accusation is markedly different from the phraseology of the high scorers. This man seems really to be worried lest bureaucracy should become reified, an end in itself, rather than democratically expressing the wishes of the people.

The motivation of the low scorers' criticism of bureaucrats and politicians seems largely to vary from

that of the high scorers; phenomenologically, however, it reminds so much of the latter that one is led to fear that in a critical situation quite a few antipolitical low scorers may be caught by a fascist movement.

## 8. There Will Be No Utopia

The political thinking of high scorers is consummated by the way they approach the ultimate political problem: their attitude toward the concept of an »ideal society.« Their opinional pattern not only concerns the means but also the ultimate social ends.

According to the frame of mind which is being analyzed here, there is no utopia and, one may add, there should be no utopia. One has to be »realistic.« This notion of realism, however, does not refer to the necessity of judging and accounting on the basis of objective, factual insight, but rather to the postulate that one recognizes from the very beginning the overwhelming superiority of the existent over the individual and his intentions, that one advocates an adjustment implying resignation with regard to any kind of basic improvements, that one gives up anything that may be called a daydream, and reshapes oneself into an appendage of the social machinery. This is reflected by political opinion in so far as any kind of utopian idea in politics is excluded altogether.

It must be pointed out that an anti-utopia complex seems to occur in the interviews of low scorers even more frequently than in those of high scorers, perhaps because the former are more ready to admit their own

worries and are less under the impact of »official optimism.« This differentiation between the stand taken by high and low scorers against utopia seems to be corroborated by the study »Psychological Determinants of Optimism regarding the Consequences of the War« by Sanford, Conrad, and Franck.<sup>19</sup> Official optimism, the »keep smiling« attitude, goes with underlying traits of contempt for human nature, as expressed by the cynicism cluster of the F scale, which differentiates clearly between high and low scorers. Conversely, low scorers are much more ready to admit negative facts in general, and particularly with regard to themselves, on a surface level, being less spellbound by the conventional cliché that »everything is fine,« but they show, on a deeper level of their opinions, much greater confidence in the innate potentialities of the human race. One may epitomize the difference dynamically by stating that the high scorers deny utopia because they ultimately do not *want* it to materialize, whereas anti-utopian statements of the low scorers are derived from a rejection of the official ideology of »God's own country.« The latter are skeptical about utopia, because they take its realization seriously and therefore take a critical view of the existent, even up to the point where they acknowledge the threat exercised by the impact of prevailing conditions against just those human potentialities in which they trust in

the depth of their hearts.

*M 345* is a high-scoring man of the University Extension Testing Class group. He scores high on E and PEC but low on F. When asked about what he thinks of an ideal society, his answer reads:

»I don't think there is such a thing without changing everything, including the people in it. Always some people unusually wealthy, always some unusually miserable economically.«

This answer is significant in many respects. The denial of the possibility of an ideal society is based on the assumption that otherwise everything ought to be changed – an idea apparently unbearable to the subject. Rather than change everything, that is to say, to disobey ultimate respect for the existent, the world should be left as bad as it is. The argument that first the people should be changed before the world can be changed belongs to the old anti-utopian armory. It leads to a vicious circle, since, under prevailing external conditions, no such internal change can ever be expected, and, actually, those who speak in this way do not even admit its possibility, but rather assume the eternal and intrinsic badness of human nature, following the pattern of cynicism discussed in the chapter on the F scale. Simultaneously wealth and poverty which are obviously the products of social conditions

are hypostatized by the subject as if they were inborn, natural qualities. This both exonerates society and helps to establish the idea of unchangeability on which the denunciation of utopia feeds. We venture the hypothesis that the brief statement of this subject bares a pattern of thinking which is exceedingly widespread, but which few people would epitomize as overtly as he does.

To the aforementioned *M 105*, who comes as close to overt fascism as any of our subjects, the idea of natural qualities excluding an ideal society is related immediately to the most pressing issue: the abolition of war.

»Naturally, I like America best. The question is, is it worth while to give up what we have in order to have world trade? The Japs make cheap products and can undersell us. What I'm afraid of is a perpetual lend-lease. If we do trade with other nations we should have the cash. World trade would not prevent war. The fighting instinct is there.«

The significant fact about his statement is that the assumption of a »fighting instinct,« which apparently is never supposed to disappear, is related in an overrealistic manner to economic advantages, cash, sticking to what one has, and so on. Incidentally, this is the same man who speaks against the present war be-

cause he »can't see what he can possibly get out of it.«

Self-contradictory is a statement by the executive secretary, *F 340B*, a medium-scoring woman, whose personality as a whole, as well as her ready-made political opinions, come closer to the type of the high scorer than her questionnaire leads us to believe. In terms of surface opinion she wants to be »idealistic,« in terms of her specific reactions she is under the spell of »realism,« the cult of the existent.

»I'm not happy about our foreign policy here – it's not definite enough, and not idealistic enough.« (What are your specific criticisms?) »It is not much of anything: seems we haven't got any foreign policy.« (What kind of foreign policy would you like to see?) »I would like to see the four freedoms, the Atlantic Charter actually applied in other countries. Then we also have to be realistic about it, but we have to strive to be idealistic – to realize the ideals eventually.«

There is something pathetic about this statement. For the contention that one has to be »realistic« in order ultimately to realize the ideals is certainly true. Taken *in abstracto*, however, and without specific concepts as to how this could be achieved, the truth becomes perverted into a lie, denoting only that »it cannot be done« while the individual still maintains the good conscience that she would be only too happy if it were

possible.

Psychologically, the anti-utopian pattern of political thinking is related to sadomasochistic traits. They manifest themselves strikingly in the statement of the high-scoring San Quentin inmate, *M 662A*, who comes fairly close to the »tough-guy« syndrome discussed in Chapter XIX[20]. When asked »what is an ideal society like,« he answers: »Plenty of work for everybody; have all the strikes stopped.«

To the naiveté of this man, who certainly belongs to the poorest strata himself, the image of the present order has been petrified to such an extent that he cannot even conceive of a social system where, because of rational organization, each individual has *less* to work – to him the ideal is that everybody *can* work, which does not only include satisfaction of basic needs but also efforts which might easily be dispensed with today. The idea that some strict order should prevail is so overpowering to him that utopia becomes a society where no strikes are to be tolerated any more, rather than a society where strikes would be unnecessary.

It should be mentioned that the general denial of utopianism is sometimes reversed by the subjects whose statements we are scrutinizing here, when they speak about the United States.

Thus, *M 619*, a low scorer of the San Quentin



group, led by the prison situation to complete political resignation, still feels:

»... I think part of the reason America has become the greatest country in the world is that because the dreams a man makes might come true.«

Of course, this is to be understood primarily as an expression of the dream that can be measured by the dollars and cents an individual can make, but it should not be forgotten that among the ideological foundations of American liberalism there is also a utopian element which, under certain conditions, may break through and overcome the gospel of supposed realism.

Apparently, the anti-utopian somehow feels uneasy about his own »realism,« and seeks an outlet by attributing to the reality with which he is most strongly intensified, his own country, some of the utopian qualities he otherwise disavows.

Only the low- to medium-scoring San Quentin murderer, *M 628B*, a man who has nothing to lose in life, says bluntly:

»This country educates people, but in the so-called American way. ... I don't believe this is the best country. Maybe in a materialistic way. ... I would not value my life by material things.«

The undertone of this statement is, similar to *M 619*, one of fatalistic resignation. Even low scorers who are not anti-utopian cannot think of utopia but in a quasi-fatalistic way: as if it were something preconceived, fixed once and for all; something which one has to »look up« rather than think and realize oneself. *M 711*:

(What is ideal society like?) »That's an awfully difficult question. Isn't it based on the four freedoms?«

## 9. No Pity for the Poor

One should expect that a frame of mind which regards everything as basically bad should at least favor, in the area of politics and social measures, as much help for those who suffer as possible. But the philosophy of the anti-utopian pessimists is not tinged by Schopenhauerian mercy. The general pattern we are investigating here is characterized by an all-pervasive feature. These subjects want no pity for the poor, neither here nor abroad. This trait seems to be strictly confined to high scorers and to be one of the most differentiating features in political philosophy. At this point, the interrelatedness of some ideas measured by the PEC scale and certain attitudes caught by the F scale should be stressed. Abolition of the dole, rejection of state interference with the »natural« play of supply and demand on the labor market, the spirit of the adage »who does not work, shall not eat« belong to the traditional wisdom of economic rugged individualism and are stressed by all those who regard the liberal system as being endangered by socialism. At the same time, the ideas involved have a tinge of punitiveness and authoritarian aggressiveness which makes them ideal receptacles of some typical psychological urges of the prejudiced character. Here goes,

for example, the conviction that people would not work unless subject to pressure – a way of reasoning closely related to vilification of human nature and cynicism. The mechanism of projectivity is also involved: the potentially fascist character blames the poor who need assistance for the very same passivity and greediness which he has learned not to admit to his own consciousness.

Examples: The extremely high-scoring San Quentin inmate, *M 664C*, whose F score is outstanding, shows clearly the psychological aspect of this particular ideology. He regards as the »major problem« facing this country the fact that it might do something for the starving people abroad. His statement shows also the intimate interrelation between the »no pity for the poor« and the fatalism complexes.

»Christ, we licked those other countries and now we're gonna feed 'em. ... I think we ought to let 'em starve, especially them Japs. ... Lucky I don't have any relations killed in this war, I'd go out and kill me some Japs. ... We're gonna have another depression and gonna have another war too in a few years.«

By contrast, *M 658*, another high-scoring convict with certain psychopathic traits, turn his affects against the unemployed rather than against the Japanese:

»I believe everybody should have an opportunity. Should not be any unemployment. Only reason they are unemployed, they are lazy like me.«

This may be regarded as one of the most authentic examples of sadomasochistic thinking in our interviews. He wants others to be treated harshly because he despises himself: his punitiveness is obviously a projection of his own guilt feelings.

Women are freer of the »no pity for the poor« complex. They rather overcompensate for it in terms of social welfare and charity which is, as indicated previously, a »high« value anyway. The following statement may be regarded as characteristic of the woman who humiliates him whom she pretends to help, and actually does not help at all but just makes herself feel important.

*F 359*, a high scorer who combines conventionality with somewhat paranoid ideas about the Negroes:

Subject thinks that the poorer people should be taken care of by state or community projects. People in the community should get together, like people, for instance, who are good at organizing boys' clubs; or they might organize dances and hold them at one person's house one week, and at somebody else's the next week. Everybody should contribute something; take up a small collection. In the case of a poor section it might get the funds from the city. One might also call on public funds for buildings, if nee-

ded.

The attitude of indifference to the lot of the poor together with admiration for rich and successful people sheds light on the potential attitude of the high scorers toward the prospective victims of fascism in a critical situation. Those who humiliate mentally those who are down-trodden anyway, are more than likely to react the same way when an outgroup is being »liquidated.« This attitude has, of course, strong sociological determinants: upward social mobility, identification with the higher class to whom they wish to belong themselves, recognition of universal competition as a measuring rod for what a person is worth, and the wish to keep down the potential threat of the disinherited masses. These sociological motives, however, are inseparably bound up with the psychological mechanisms indicated above. The specific infantile implications may be indicated as follows: identification with the poor is quite enticing for children, since the world of the poor appears to them in many ways less restricted than their own, whilst they somehow sense the similarity between the social status of a child in an adult society and the status of the poor in a rich man's world. This identification is repressed at an early phase for the sake of »upward mobility,« and also – even if the children are poor themselves – for the sake

of the reality principle in general which tolerates compassion only as an ideology or as »charity« but not in its more spontaneous manifestations. They project the »punishment« they have received for their own compassion upon the downtrodden by regarding poverty as something the poor »brought upon themselves.« The same formula, incidentally, plays a decisive role in anti-Semitism.

## 10. Education Instead of Social Change

The complement of the »no pity for the poor« complex is the overemphasis given to the education of people within the political sections of our interviews. The frequent reference to this topic is the more significant since it does not appear in the interview schedule. Nobody will deny the desirability of political education. It is hard to overlook, however, that the ideal of education often serves as a rationalization for social privileges. People who do not want to confess to antidemocratic leanings prefer to take the stand that democracy would be all right if only people were educated and more »mature.« This condition, naturally, would here and now exclude from political activities those who, on account of their economic situation, need most urgently a social change. This, of course, is never stated in so many words. If, however, as once happened, an overtly fascist man speaks in favor of the abolition of the poll tax in the South, and wants to replace it by an »intelligence test,« there is little doubt about the ultimate purpose. The adulation of »education« occurs quite frequently among uneducated people – perhaps because, for some reason beyond the scope of the present study, education has come to be a kind of a panacea in American ideology. None of our



subjects ever takes the trouble of defining to what the mysterious »education« should refer: whether it pertains to the general educational level or whether some special kind of political education is envisaged and how it should be carried out.

The education complex is not confined to high or medium scorers but seems to be more frequent with them than with low scorers. Some examples are given.

*M 1230A*, a high-scoring man of the Maritime School Group, states,

(What is an ideal society like?) »It would take generations of breeding to bring everybody to the same educational standards ... though not to have such *great* classes ... although I think we should always have class distinction ... some initiative to try to improve yourself.«

Here it is obvious that the education idea serves as a subtle device by which the anti-utopian can act to prevent a change and yet appear progressive. It is also characteristic that the stress put on a long drawn-out educational process is concomitant with the idea that there always *should* be some class distinction.

Similarly, the Canadian *M 934*, a medium scorer, endorses the education idea as a »brake,« this time on the labor movement. He believes:

»The important thing in the labor movement today is education of the rank and file. I just don't think labor is ready to take more influence today.«

It may be noted at random that the more production processes are standardized, the less special training is required, the more technological progress leads toward a certain enlightenment of the masses, the emptier the postulate of education becomes. Our subjects stick to it in a rather fetishistic way.

For the very high-scoring woman, *F 104*, majoring in Spanish and interested in business, the political demarcation line between her ingroup, the Republicans, and the Democrats coincides with that of education.

»The type of people I have known who are Democrats are usually uneducated people who really don't know what is happening. The present administration has made a mess of things.«

Thus the education ideology interprets the fact that the Democratic Party is more of a lower-class party than the Republicans.

Among low scorers the education idea is somewhat mixed up with the traditional socialist wish for enlightenment. Frequently, there occurs a complaint about the lethargy and the lack of political interest of the masses – from which, regularly, the subjects ex-

empt themselves. In this context we may mention again the phraseological statement of our sailor, *M 117*:

»We have a good basis for our political system. The majority of people are not interested or equipped enough to understand politics, so that the big proportion of U.S. politics is governed by the capitalistic system.«

The education complex leads us back to where our analysis started, to the ignorance and confusion which clouds the political thinking of most of our sample. It is possible that the education complex somehow expresses the awareness that one really does not know what one talks about when one discusses politics – often enough the praise of education follows, with low scorers, self-accusations on account of their lack of knowledge. However, the vague idea of education takes care of the experience of ignorance rather summarily by a slogan and reliance on an isolated factor of cultural life, thus dispensing with the effort of political thinking. Moreover, it serves in most cases the purpose of projecting one's own ignorance onto others so that one may appear informed oneself.

One last observation may prove to be significant. Whereas the praise of education is heavily accentuated by high scorers, it is at the same time one of the most frequently heard anti-Semitic statements that

»the Jews are all out for education« – generally associated with the assertion that they dodge hard manual labor. We may suspect that there is, at the hub of the education complex, the vague realization that this culture excludes the bulk of those whom it embraces from real participation in its more subtle gratifications. While the awkward talk about education expresses longing for a state of affairs where one is no longer stunted by the requirements of »being practical,« fury about one's own educational frustration is projected upon the chosen foe who is supposed to possess what one has to deny to oneself.

## C. Some Political and Economic Topics

Our previous discussion was, in accordance with the general approach of our study, formulated in subjective, rather than objective terms. That is to say, we have focused our interest on the patterns of political thinking of our interviewees, rather than on the stand they take with regard to objective political issues. As a matter of course our approach led also to a discussion of numerous political topics such as, for example, the evaluation of Roosevelt, the problem of government »bureaucracy,« attitudes taken toward »ideal society,« etc. No strict dichotomy between the subjective and objective political issues could be made. What remains now to be discussed are the attitudes of our subjects toward those political topics of the interview schedule so far not covered, though some of them, particularly with regard to the bureaucrat complex and the problem of government control of business, have been touched upon.

## 1. Unions

The problem of unionism was heavily emphasized in our interview schedule because it is a very timely politico-economic topic, and because we expected it to be highly discriminatory. The questionnaire item, »Labor Unions should become stronger and have more influence generally,« did indeed prove to be discriminating in the statistical sense (D.P., 3.16 for men and 3.49 for women on Forms 40–45), but the interview protocols offer ample warning against any such primitive formula as low-score = pro-union, high-score = anti-union. A certain amount of criticism of unions is universal and there is no lack of otherwise outspoken low scorers who deviate with regard to the union question. Unambiguously pro-union are only a small number of politically conscious and highly articulate left-wingers. Otherwise, there are strong reservations with respect to unions throughout our sample. High and low scorers differ more in the way these reservations are made than in the simple pro vs. anti dimension. A critical attitude is taken by people who do not belong to unions, as well as by those who are members.

Some differences between questionnaire and interview might be expected on the basis that the question-

naire calls for more or less forthright statements, whereas the interview allows the subjects to elaborate their ideas in all their complexity. Here, it would seem, the interview comes closer to the subjects' real opinion than does the questionnaire. Since the organization of labor and the issue of the closed shop affects the lives of most people in some immediate way, the factor of »alienation« and the accompanying ignorance and confusion plays a lesser part than it does, say, when people discuss »all those bureaus« far away in Washington.

Thus, the critical sentiment expressed with regard to the unions has to be taken very seriously. This criticism must not be identified automatically with reactionism. Here more than anywhere else, there is some basis in reality, and the complaints are, generally, much more reasonable, show much more common sense than when it comes to issues such as the politicians or the Jews. Labor organizations have more or less to adapt themselves to the prevailing conditions of an economic life ruled by huge combines, and thus they tend to become »monopolies.« This means discomfort for innumerable persons who in their business are faced with a power which interferes with what they still feel to be their individual right as free competitors. They have to yield an extra part of their profit to what labor demands from them, over and

above the price for the commodity which they buy, the laborer's working power. This appears to them as a mere tribute to the power of the organization. It is significant, however, that at least the high scorers resent labor monopolies but not their model, industrial monopolization as such. This is not surprising. The population has much more direct contact with the labor organizations than with the organizations of industry. People have to negotiate with their local unions about extra pay, overtime, wage increases, and working conditions, while Detroit, where their car is being made and priced, is far away. Of course, deeper-lying motives of social identification are also involved.

The monopolization of labor affects also the workers themselves who feel bossed by the huge organization upon which they exercise very little influence as individuals and who, if they are not admitted, feel hopelessly »outgrouped.« This nucleus of experience in the critique of organized labor has to be recognized lest one rush to conclusions.

The element of partial truth in the critique of labor is among the most dangerous fascist potentials in this country. While there are quite a few points in the critique of labor which cannot be refuted, they are easily chosen as points of departure, in order to do away with unions altogether, replacing them by government-controlled corporations – one of the main econo-



mic objectives of fascists everywhere. No analysis of the fascist potential is valid which does not give account of the agglomerate of rational critique and irrational hatred in the people's attitude toward labor. Some characteristic reactions of our interviewees may, at least, illustrate the problem.

We begin with examples of an attitude toward labor which is very widespread among low scorers: the acceptance of unions with more or less incisive qualifications. Obviously, antilabor attitudes among otherwise »progressive« people are particularly important for broader issues of prognosis.

*M 310*, a thoroughly liberal and progressive member of the University Extension Testing Class, speaks about the »so-called free enterprise system which really is monopoly.« To the question about the 30 per cent wage increase demanded by labor, he answers:

»Well, don't like to see anybody set an arbitrary figure for any demand. At the same time very sympathetic to wage demands. E.g. the auto workers right now. On the other hand, the bakery workers in San Francisco are striking merely for a base rate, although all of them are making above that now: they are just thinking of the future. ... I am for unions, but I think we should recognize that sometimes they become selfish-interest groups. ... Disappointed in the labor movement as a reform vehicle, their only interest is in higher wages for their own small group, especially A.F. of L. craft unions or monopolies.«

Behind this statement looms the dim consciousness that today's labor movement, instead of aiming at a better society, is satisfied with securing certain advantages and privileges within the present setup. This is just the opposite of the typical high scorer's complaint that unions have become too political, a matter to be discussed later.

*M 112*, a low-scoring college sophomore, senses the danger that cumbersome, mammoth unions might become undemocratic. He is antimonopoly in the sense that he hopes to stop social trends by breaking down highly centralized units into smaller ones.

»I don't like large organizations. There should be local unions, local companies, never very large. There is Kaiser, but he's not so bad. Standard Oil is not good or I.G. Farben of Germany.«

*M 620*, a low-scoring convict, is typical of those who resent the interference of organized labor with the functioning of the machinery of production as a whole:

(What do you think of political trends today?) »Well, I believe seriously that labor is going to have to acquire a sense of responsibility. ... Well, to me a contract is more or less sacred.« Subject objects to strikes in general, especially to jurisdictional strikes. (What about 30% increase

in wage demands?) »I believe if the unions are willing to work they should have it. But if they give no returns, completely unjustified.« (What about G.M. strike?) »Should be settled as quickly as possible, one way or the other. ... I believe both labor and business sort of ignore the little fellow. ... I am sort of bitter about this strike business. ... I feel labor should have more responsibility.«

*M 711*, an extreme low scorer of the Employment Service Veterans group, mixes up the collectivistic power of unions with the threat of fascism and makes, by projection, Hitler a pro-union man:

(How do you feel about labor unions?) »I don't know frankly on that. In theory I'm very much in favor of labor unions.« (How do you feel about 30% wage increase demand?) »Well, I do not approve ... because I think any wage increase demand should be made in relation to living costs.« (How do you mean that?) »As a matter of fact, I just don't think about it ... 30% wage increase won't mean a damn thing if living costs go up too.« (What about G.M.'s labor union demand for increased wages, with no increase in prices?) »Yes ... but I think wages and prices have to hit a stabilization. ...« (Interviewer reads question # 4, stating that labor unions should become stronger, and refers to subject's disagreeing a little with this item and asks for elaboration.) »Well, my disagreement on that – I'm perhaps thinking that labor unions becoming stronger would lead to a state of fascism. ... After all, didn't Hitler use the labor unions in his early days, increasing labor unions and making them stronger. ... I

know we have labor unions in San Francisco which are simply little empires. On the other hand, we have others that are working for the general good. ... I certainly don't think they should be controlled as some of our senators seem to want them.«

*F 340B* has been mentioned before. She is of the University Extension Testing Class and scores middle on E, low on F, and high on PEC. She differentiates between the positive function of unions and their inherent evils which she describes in personalistic terms as »capitalistic« themselves.

(What do you think of labor unions in general?) »I think they are necessary – as an idea they are fine, but in practice – I have had the misfortune to meet some of the labor leaders in this area, and it was very disillusioning to me.« (In what way?) »Well, if there ever were ›capitalists,‹ they were every bit of it, running their organization just like running a business – to squeeze everything out of it.« (What do you think should be done about that?) »Well, they should not object to having their financial statements audited – should be more open about it.« (Do you think standards should be set up then, by the government perhaps?) »Yes, I think I would rather see a strong public opinion do it – makes them realize they should be more fair-minded and open.«

Although no scoring has been done, the impression created by careful perusal of the whole interview ma-

terial is that the attitude which accepts unions as a necessary evil is the average one, at least among those who are not articulately reactionary.

There is an exceedingly small number of unqualified pro-labor statements. The two examples to follow stem from San Quentin, both, of course, from low scorers.

*M 628B*, a murderer:

(What do you think of labor unions?) »Definitely in favor of the closed shop. I don't believe in private enterprise as in this country. If it was what they say it is, I would be in favor of it. ... I don't suppose the Constitution, but ... we don't live by it. ... This story of work hard, my boy, and you'll be great one day is fine ... but when you won't clothe and house, etc. the masses, I'll say that's an outrage. ...«

*M 619*, a sex criminal characterized by the psychiatrist as »simple schizophrenic,« is not altogether uncritical of labor but believes that the weaknesses of the unions are gradually disappearing: his unqualified acceptance is based on a somewhat empty general idea of progress.

(How do you feel about labor leaders today?) »The A.F. of L., I am in favor of it very much. The C.I.O., formerly I was not in favor of it, but as time moves on, the people seem to accept it more and more. I'm inclined to feel the

faults of its inception have been ironed out ... of course, the unions in the beginning used pretty high-handed methods, but perhaps the end will justify the means they took.«

One particular aspect of critical feelings toward labor should be stressed. It is the idea that unions should not engage in politics. Since this has nothing to do with those economic experiences with labor at which the complaints of many people aim, it is a matter of plain ideology, derived very probably from some belief that according to American tradition unions offer a means of »bargaining,« of obtaining higher shares, and should not meddle in other issues. The anger about wage disputes and strikes is displaced and becomes rationalized by hasty identification of organized labor and communism. Since unions in this country are incomparably less political and class-conscious than anywhere else, this objection is of an entirely different order from those previously discussed: it is truly an expression of reactionism. However, in this area the reactionary ideology is so strongly backed by preconceived notions that it infiltrates easily into the opinion of people of whom it could hardly be expected.

*M 621A* is serving a term in San Quentin for theft. He scores low on E and F but high on PEC.

»I admire unions, but they shouldn't agitate.« (Evidently referring to any political activities.) »They shouldn't try to get more money, but should help people more. They should want to keep prices down like anyone else ... unions have no business in politics.«

*M 627*, another San Quentin man, scores low on E and PEC but high on F. He is a psychopathic alcoholic convicted for what seems to be a minor sex offense.

(What about the P.A.C. of the C.I.O.?) »No, politics should be let alone. Keep politics out of any organization. I just feel that labor and politics won't mix.« (Do you think it ought to be prohibited?) »Yessir.«

Finally just one example from a San Quentin high scorer, *M 656A*, who is by no means extreme:

(P.A.C.?) »Well, I don't say they should go into politics, they should work through their representatives ... as a whole they shouldn't enter into politics.« (Why not?) »If they go into politics, they're demanding a lot on the side, where rightfully they should take it to the lawful legislative body. ... As far as I am concerned, politics shouldn't enter into business, and these unions are a business.«

That many statements of forthright hostility to labor can be found in our material is not astonishing. The striking fact, however, is that such statements occur

not only among high scorers but again also among medium and low scorers.

We again limit ourselves to a few examples which will give an idea of the structure of unqualified anti-unionism.

*M 202*, a construction engineer, scoring generally very low, is nevertheless strongly identified with the entrepreneurs. His interviewer, as was mentioned above (p. [324]), called him »a person who is conservative but not fascist.« His invectives against labor, however, make this evaluation appear to be a little too optimistic. As an interesting deviation, a full account of his antilabor stand should be given.

In connection with the discussion of his work subject was asked about his attitude toward labor unions. His response was, »I am hipped about unions; there you have a hole in me!« He joined a company as a strike-breaker in 1935. He took on a job as a chemist. At that time he was just out of California and there was a depression on. He had no strong feeling about unions then, but just wanted a job. However, he did feel that a man had a right to work if he wanted to, and he had no compunction about taking another man's job. He continued with the company after the strike was over. He described himself as a »company man,« and, consequently, as having the company point of view. When he works for a company he is one hundred per cent for that company's interests, otherwise he would not stay with them. He has two objections to unions: (1) their policy of assuming that older men are better than



younger men and giving the better jobs to them rather than to newcomers; (2) the closed shop. He thinks men should be allowed to »enjoy their work.« If men know that they are going to be kept on a job even if they don't work hard, it does not encourage them to do their best. For example, he hired two shop stewards whom he found were no good, so he fired them; but the union demanded that he take them back, which he had to do, as otherwise he would have had no one to work for him. If a man sees that the fellow next to him goes slow on the job and yet makes the same wages, he will have no incentive to work hard and pretty soon he, too, will slow down. The unions should not prevent a man from working who does not want to join a union. The interviewer suggested that the main purpose of the closed shop was to bargain for rates of pay. Subject replied that if a group of men would band together to rate themselves and ask for more pay for the skilled workers, or to work out better means of production, that would be all right. If a company is not willing to pay for skilled work, they don't need to work there. By way of a summary, it may be pointed out that the subject's objections to unions boil down to a feeling that unions not only do not foster hard work, but even discourage it.

This case seems to be that of a man who, although politically unbiased, became highly antagonistic to labor through concrete experience. It should be emphasized that, in spite of his own description of himself as a »company man,« he by no means admires businessmen, thinks that poverty could be done away

with by changes in our social system, and favors government control in many respects. His views may be summarized as being torn by a conflict between very progressive general ideology and violent reactionary impulses within the sphere of his own immediate interests – a configuration that may be indicative of a dangerous pattern of potentialities in many »liberals.« It seems, however, that the inconsistency of this subject is not so much due to psychological factors as to his professional position. His reactionary traits are derived from his function as a member of the technological hierarchy who has to look out for »efficiency« and finds that union interference tends to lower this efficiency rather than to enhance it. Thus his attitude is not really so inconsistent as it appears on the surface: one might rather say that his over-all progressiveness clashes with his technological progressiveness because the two kinds of progress by no means harmonize objectively under the present conditions of production.

The 22-year-old woman, *F 316A*, is structurally similar. She is a low scorer who turns violently antilabor on account of some grudges she has developed in her work as a junior chemist in an oil development company.

Subject feels that the present labor situation is very bad because of all the strikes and that industry is really ham-

strung. The big unions are asking too much. (What about the union at S.?) »The S. union (C.I.O.) is undemocratic because the department heads and the junior chemists make all the decisions, then tell the members about it at meetings, and they are not even members of the union.« (You also have a company union at S., don't you?) »You mean the Association of Industrial Scientists? It is not a company union« (rather angrily). »That was a dirty trick of the C.I.O. – or rather not a dirty trick but a ruse – to accuse it of being a company union, because then it could not be registered with the W.P.B. and so could not become a bargaining agent for the employees. They thought if they could prevent it from being registered for one or two years that it would die. Because it is not the bargaining agent it cannot make a contract for the workers, it can only hint to the company what it would like. Although the A.I.S. only has a chapter at S., I don't think it is company dominated, although I have no proof.« (Don't the laboratory assistants get paid almost as much as the junior chemists?) »Yes, when the junior chemists were getting only \$170 a month and the C.I.O. secured a raise to \$180 for the laboratory assistants, the company had to raise the junior chemists to \$200 a month. The C.I.O. complains that they do all the work and yet the junior chemists won't join.« (Was not the raise a good thing?) »Yes, but I still would like to see what the A.I.S. could do if it were registered: maybe it wouldn't do anything.«

As to the high scorers, the key theme of their antilabor ideology is that of the *racket*. They regard the pressure exercised by organized labor as illegitimate in a way comparable to organized crime and conspiracy –

the latter being one of the high scorers' favorite topics anyway. To them, whose moralism has been emphasized from time to time in this book, the concept of the free market coincides with the moral law, and any factors which introduce, as it were, an extra-economic element into the business sphere are regarded by them as irregular. Incidentally, this suspicion does not pertain to industrial monopolies and their pricing agreements but merely to the supposedly monopolistic structure of unions. Here again the idea of »legitimacy« – of identification with the strong – comes into play. Industrial combines seem, according to this kind of thinking, to be the outgrowth of a »natural« tendency, labor organizations a banding together of people who want to get more than their due share.

Viewed from a purely psychological angle the idea of »labor racketeering« seems to be of a nature similar to the stereotype of Jewish clannishness. It dates back to the lack of an adequately internalized identification with paternal authority during the Oedipus situation. It is our general assumption that the typical high scorers, above all, fear the father and try to side with him in order to participate in his power. The »racketeers« are those who by demanding too much (though the subject wants as much himself) run the risk of arousing the father's anger – and hence the subject's castration anxiety. This anxiety, reflecting the subject's

own guilt feelings, is relieved by projection. Thinking in terms of in- and outgroup, the high scorer who wants to »outgroup« the others is continuously prone to call them the ingroup. The more he tends himself, on account of his pretense to »status,« to circumvent the »normal« channels of free competition, the more he is likely to blame those he deems weak for the very same thing. Workers become »racketeers,« criminals to him as soon as they organize. They appear as the guilty ones after the pattern of »peddler bites dog.« Such psychological tendencies are, of course, magnetically attracted by any elements of reality which fit into the projective pattern. Here, labor organizations afford a rare opportunity.

*M 352*, a shift foreman who calls himself a »head operator,« scores high on all scales.

»Well, at Standard Oil, no unions recognized. I've never been a union man. Through union there is strength, if it's run okay, but a lot of unions of today have developed into a racket, and a source of political influence. The C.I.O. Political Action Committee particularly ... politics and unionism shouldn't become too involved. The unions shouldn't become a political organization; and the A.F.L. has developed into a racket for making money. The officers keep themselves in positions practically until they die, with no strings on how they use the money, and that should be controlled ... but if the local organization can run itself in an orderly fashion, okay, if the officers are

conservative, but the minute they get too liberal, use a strike as a first weapon instead of as a last resort ... etc.«

Here, as in many instances, critique is directed against the largeness of unions *per se*; with the romantic idea that purely local organization, being less institutionalized, would be better automatically.

*M* 658, the San Quentin man quoted above, goes so far as plainly to advocate the abolition of unions:

(Political trends today?) »Oh, I think we are going to be ruled by a lot of clowns, by a lot of labor unions. ... Look at all these working stiffs ... that don't know anything else, but how to drive a nail ... they try to run things, because a few hundred thousands of them get together.«  
(What ought to be done?) »Straighten them out, show them where they belong. ... Take away their charters.«  
(Meaning?) »Well, every union has to have a charter. Abolish them. If necessary, abolish their meetings.«  
(What about strikes?) »That's what I'm thinking of ... they're a detriment to the country.« (How should strikes be handled?) »Refuse to reemploy them, or fine them, I don't believe in sweat shops either, but this quittin' when you're making \$150 a week anyway – kind of silly. Create inflation.« (Subject had earlier made a remark in discussing vocation and income – which interviewer neglected to record – to the effect that he himself thinks in terms of saving perhaps \$500 or so, e.g., by theatre work, and then quitting for a while. Note subject's highly exaggerated fantasies of wartime wages.)

A few statements of extreme anti-unionism can be found among the Los Angeles sample. Perhaps the 20-year-old boy, *5014*, high on E and PEC and middle on F, represents a certain kind of war veterans' anti-unionism:

When asked about organized labor he says: »I am against it.« He doesn't know the difference between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. but he feels »like many of the veterans, we worked for nothing while the workers at home were on strike and making good money.«

The contrast between this subject's hostility and his complete lack of information is striking.

*5031–5032* are a husband and wife in a very high income group. Both are high on PEC, low on F, and low-middle on E. For them violent anti-unionism is concomitant again with contempt for human nature: they regard unionism simply as a device of the lazy ones to dodge labor.

Both of them are antilabor. The husband is quite vehement about this. Although he expects prosperity to continue he feels it will be at the cost of a continual fight against labor's demands. He feels that labor's demands are unreasonable and that with labor's recent victories that »even if one met labor's demands one certainly does not get a day's work out of carpenters, plumbers, etc.« Both of them claim to be without prejudice with regard to va-

rious minorities. It is interesting, however, that they did raise the issue of the acceptance of Jewish children in the school where their son went.

*F 5043*, an extremely high-scoring middle-aged housewife, belongs to that school of potential fascists who find that »everything is a mess.« She first creates in true »we-the-mothers« style the imagery of a desperate crisis and then puts the blame on the labor situation.

»I have never seen anything like this,« she lamented when asked about the labor situation. »What have our boys been fighting for? Why, they come back to find that they have to go without a lot of things ... not even a place to live ... all because of the strikes.« Thus she blames labor for the present crises and resents the growth and strength of labor unions. She also feels that there is an irreconcilable breach between veterans and the workers and fears internal strife. She also blames the strikers for the growing trend of unemployment and is very pessimistic about the possibility of full employment. However, she does not feel that there is too much government interference and is rather vague about the role of big business and free enterprise. In fact, she seems to harbor only very strong antilabor and antistrike feelings, without any strong convictions on other issues. »It's just a terrible mess,« she repeated, and she does not think the layman should get his hands dirty by »messing with politics.«

Whereas the low scorers who generally take a »pro,



but« attitude toward unions insist on the soundness of the principle but object that unions are »going too far,« getting more, as it were, than their share, the typical high scorers blame them indiscriminately for the supposedly critical social situation, for the standardization of life (*5001* and *5003*), and for forthright dictatorial aims. To the high scorers anti-unionism is no longer an expression of dissatisfaction with concrete conditions from which they might have suffered, but a plank in the platform of reactionism which also automatically includes anti-Semitism, hostility toward foreign countries, hatred of the New Deal, and all those hostile attitudes which are integrated in the negative imagery of American society underlying fascist and semifascist propaganda.

## 2. Business and Government

As was to be expected, the general ideological pattern pertaining to government interference in business is highly consistent with that which pertains to labor. The average opinion – if such a term, without proper quantification, is allowed – seems to be that a certain degree of government control is indispensable, particularly in wartime, but that it contradicts basically the principle of economic liberalism. State interference still falls within the category of the necessary evil. To the high scorers in particular the government interference in business is just another aspect of the usurpation complex, a matter of dictatorial arbitrariness jeopardizing the rights of the hard-working money earners. But it should be noted again that there is no sharp line between high and low scorers with regard to government interference, whilst the *how*, the way in which both groups express their critical attitude, differentiates.

The following examples of a partly positive attitude toward government interference are chosen from medium and high scorers.

*F 340A*, of the Extension Testing Class, a young clerk, is middle on E but high on F and PEC. She is interesting because of a certain attitude of intellectual

fairness expressing itself in attempts to see also the other side of the picture: an »antiparanoid« trait of the American frame of mind which, incidentally, is among the strongest bulwarks against fascism as far as subjective factors are concerned.

She doesn't believe in government control of industry. Maybe it would be all right for the government to take over transportation, gas, electricity, and water. (Why?) Maybe they could do it cheaper; she is not sure about that. Anyway, if there was a strike, like on the Key System they would be holding up everything and the government could make them go back to work. »When the government tells you to do something, you do it.«

The quotation shows an ambiguous element in the affirmation of government interference: whereas the latter is resented as a violation of liberalism, it is, simultaneously, appreciated as a potential means to keep organized labor at bay. It should be remembered that the National Socialists always complained about the »Welfare State« of Weimar but later on surpassed by far any state interference ever attempted by German socialist governments.

The high-scoring parole officer, *M 109*, is reminiscent of *F 340A* in so far as his support for some kind of government interference is authoritarian rather than favorable to any restrictions on the anarchy of free enterprise or to rational planing for the sake of all. (Cf.

quotations on pp. [362, 366 above.]

Those who are outspokenly set against government controls again comprise both low and high scorers. Here, of course, the low scorers are particularly interesting.

The already quoted *M 711*, an »easy going« low scorer, is opposed to state interference simply because he feels a fascist potential in it, apparently unaware of the progressive function this interference had under Roosevelt:

(Government control?) »I don't. There, again, that could be a road to a fascist state eventually. Certain controls would have to be exercised.«

In spite of his leftist ideology this man shows symptoms of a confusion which may make him the prey of pseudoprogressive slogans of fascist propaganda: it is the same man who justifies his anti-union attitude with the spurious assertion that Hitler was in favor of unions.

*M 204*, another low scorer, a young man of the Psychiatric Clinic group, suffering from anxiety neurosis, calls himself a socialist and feels that the New Deal was too conservative, but states, nevertheless:

The government should not be completely in control of everything. Favors something like the Scandinavian sy-

stem: CCF, full employment, labor government, favors cooperatives. »I think it will come that way in this country. Government control can be run wrong. Instead we should preserve individual freedom and work through education.«

To sum up: the low scorers' criticism of government interference is based on the traditional idea of freedom, the fear of an authoritarian abolition of democratic institutions, and an individualistic way of living. This makes for a potential resistance against any attempts at a planned economy. There is a possibility that a good many traditional values of American democratism and liberalism, if naively maintained within the setup of today's society, may radically change their objective functions without the subjects even being aware of it. In an era in which »rugged individualism« actually has resulted in far-reaching social control, all the ideals concomitant with an uncritical individualistic concept of liberty may simply serve to play into the hands of the most powerful groups.

The statements against government control of our high scorers are of a completely different kind. To them, unionism, New Dealism, government control are all the same, the rule of those who should not rule. Here resentment of government interference is fused with the »no pity for the poor« complex.

The San Quentin »tough guy,« *M 664b*:

(Political trends today?) »Well, the way it's agoing now, I think it's a detriment to our country.« (How do you mean that?) »I think a person should earn a living instead of expecting the government to give it to him. I don't believe in this New Deal and I don't believe in labor running the country. ...If a man can't make a profit in his business, he'll close it down. ...«

The San Quentin murderer, *M 651a*, who is serving a life sentence, is set against government interference, his point of view being that of the businessman who talks »common sense.«

(What about government controls over business?) »No, I believe in free enterprise. I believe that business should be able to conduct their own business, except during the war we had to have ceiling prices. ...But competitive business makes low prices. ...«

It may be noted that the feeling, even of the high scorers, with regard to government control as such, though it represents to them the hated New Deal, does not seem to be as »violent« as their anti-unionism. This may be partly due to the authoritarian undercurrent which, somehow, makes them respect, to a certain extent, any strong government, even if it is built on lines different from their own, partly from the rational insight into the necessity of some government

interference. Many of our interviews were conducted during or shortly after the war, at a time when it was obvious that nothing could be achieved without government control, and it is this fact to which reference is frequently made, mostly as a qualification of the rejection of government control. This, however, certainly depends largely on the situation, and if interviews should be conducted today, the picture would very probably be different.

There is one particular issue which deserves some attention in this connection, the attitude of our subjects toward monopolism. On the one hand, monopolies are the outgrowth of free enterprise, the consummation of rugged individualism; on the other hand, they tend to assume that kind of noncompetitive control which is rejected when exercised by the government. Probably no »public opinion« concerning monopoly has crystallized so far, mainly because much fewer people are aware of the anonymous and objective power of big combines than are aware of official legal measures of the state. However, a few examples may illustrate how the problem of institutionalized superbusiness is reflected in the minds of some of our subjects.

*M 115*, a conventional but nonfascistic fraternity man, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC, is set against »this Marxian stuff,« but nevertheless,

feels:

»Big business should be controlled when it gets too large. In some fields, like transportation, power, etc., large-scale organization is necessary. The main thing there is to prevent monopoly, and to have limitations on profits.«

The unresolved contradiction between this man's strongly antisocialist and equally outspoken antimonopoly attitudes, is in all probability characteristic of a very large section of the population. In practice, it amounts to an artificial »holding up« of economic developmental tendencies, rather than to a clear-cut economic concept. Those layers of the European middle class which were finally enlisted by fascism were also not infrequently set, in ideology, against the big combines.

*M 118*, a low-scoring man of the University Extension Testing Class, sees the problem but is still so deeply imbued with traditional economic concepts that he is prevented from following his logic to its conclusions.

»The emphasis now is on ›free enterprise,‹ but that often results in monopoly, the big concerns squeezing the little guys to death. There is too much of a gap between the rich and the poor. People climb up by pushing others down, with no regulation. For this reason, government should have more influence economically, whether or not



it goes as far as socialism.«

The same man criticizes Wallace for being »too impractical.« One cannot escape the impression that monopolism is used as a vague negative formula but that very few subjects are actually aware of the impact of monopolization on their lives. The union issue, in particular, plays a much bigger role in over-all ideology.

### 3. Political Issues Close to the Subjects

It has been pointed out in the early part of this chapter that political confusion and ignorance, and the gap between surface ideology and concrete reactions, are partly due to the fact that the political sphere, even today, seems to most Americans too far away from their own experiences and their own pressing interests. Here we go briefly into a discussion of some political and economic topics of the interview schedule which, for imaginary or actual reasons, are *closer* to the hearts of our subjects, in order to form at least an impression on how they behave with regard to these matters, and whether their behavior differs markedly from that in the field of »high politics.«

First, an illustration of what may be called »imaginary closeness.« Our interview schedule contained at least one question which was, in the middle of its realistic surroundings, of a »projective« nature. It was concerned with the \$25,000 income limit. Neither is this question a pressing political issue nor could many of our interviewees be expected to have any immediate personal interest in limitations of income on such a high level. The answers to this question, which would deserve a thoroughgoing analysis of its own, are indicative of an element of the American dream much

more than of political attitudes. There were exceedingly few among our subjects who wanted to accept such an income limitation. The utmost concession they made was the acknowledgment that one can live on this amount. The prevailing view, however, was that, in a free country, every person should be allowed to earn as much as he can, notwithstanding the fact that the chance to make as much today has become largely illusory. It is as if the American kind of utopia was still much more that of the shoeshine boy who becomes a railroad king, than that of a world without poverty. The dream of unrestricted happiness has found its refuge, one might almost say its sole refuge, in the somewhat infantile fantasy of infinite wealth to be gathered by the individual. It goes without saying that this dream works in favor of the *status quo*; that the identification of the individual with the tycoon, in terms of the chance to become one himself, helps to perpetuate big business control.

Among those subjects who are outspokenly in favor of the income limit is the San Quentin check-writer, *M 664C*, a high-scoring man, so full of fury and envy against everything that he does not even like the wealthy.

(What about \$25,000 limit on salaries?) »What the hell is that for? That's no more than fair; hell, that's too much money anyway.«

The apparent radicalism of this man can be appreciated only if one recollects that it is he who is outraged by the idea of feeding starving countries.

The very widespread feeling of our subjects on the \$25,000 income limit can be summed up in the eager plea of *M 621A*, of the San Quentin Group, a low scorer on E and F but a high scorer on PEC.

»They shouldn't do that. If a man has the ability, more power to him.«

The next few topics are characteristic of the aforementioned tendency of our subjects to become more rational and »progressive« as soon as institutions or measures of a supposedly »socialistic« nature, from which the individual feels he can draw immediate benefits, are brought into the discussion. OPA and health insurance are examples.

Our interviews seem to show that OPA, also a »bureaucratic« agency of government interference, is very generally accepted. Here are a few examples, picked at random:

Again *M 621A*:

(OPA?) »I think it's done a very wonderful thing in this country. May have gone too far, e.g., in the housing situation in San Diego.« (Subject thinks the OPA should have

solved the housing situation.)

One of the few exceptions is the wealthy Los Angeles couple, *5031* and *5032*, who are »disgusted and fed up with the New Deal, priorities, and all this damn red tape created by OPA.«

Most others are in favor of OPA, sometimes, however, with a certain strain of punitiveness, such as the San Quentin low scorer, *M 627*, already quoted:

»Well, the OPA is doing a good job if they control this black market.«

This comes out most strongly in the interview of the San Quentin high scorer *M 658*, the man who wants to abolish labor unions.

»If (the OPA) had an iron glove underneath their kid gloves, be all right. They fine a guy \$100 – for making \$100,000.«

The general appreciation of OPA is the more interesting since this institution has been under constant newspaper attacks for many years. But here the advantages, particularly with regard to the housing situation, are so obvious that ideological invectives apparently lose some of their impact on the population. To demand the abolition of OPA because of the

»damn red tape« in Washington may mean that one has no roof over one's head.

Something similar holds true of health insurance. High and low scorers, with very few exceptions, concur in its appreciation. *M 656A*, a high scorer of the San Quentin Group, serving a term for second-degree murder, after having stated that a person can live on \$25,000 a year but should be allowed to make what he is capable of making, and who certainly cannot be called a socialist, answers to the question about public health insurance, »I'm for it.«

The above quoted easy-going, low-scoring man, *M 711*, is enthusiastic:

»Public health insurance? Unqualifiedly yes ... important as almost any measure of ideal society.«

Finally, our attention should be directed toward an economic area which is of the utmost importance for the formative processes of fascism. This is taxes. It is perhaps the point at which pent-up social fury is most freely given vent. With the high scorers, this fury is never directed overtly against basic conditions but has nevertheless the undertone of desired violent action. The man who bangs his fist on the table and complains about heavy taxation is a »natural candidate« for totalitarian movements. Not only are taxes associated with a supposedly spendthrift democratic go-

vernment giving away millions to idlers and bureaucrats, but it is the very point where people feel, to put it in the words of one of our subjects, that this world does not really belong to the people. Here they feel immediately that they are required to make sacrifices for which they do not get any visible returns, just as one of our subjects complains that he cannot see what he can get out of the war. The indirect advantages each individual may draw from taxes paid are obscure to him. He can only see that he has to give something without getting anything back, and this, in itself, seems to contradict the concept of exchange upon which the free market idea of liberalism is built. However, the extraordinary amount of libido attached to the complex of taxes, even in a boom period, such as the years when our subjects were interviewed, seems to confirm the hypothesis that it draws on deeper sources of the personality as much as on the surface resentment of being deprived of a considerable part of one's income without visible advantages to the individual. The rage against the rational tax system is an explosion of the irrational hatred against the irrational taxation of the individual by society. The Nazis knew very well how to exploit the complex of the »taxpayer's money.« They went so far as to grant, during the first years of their rule, a kind of tax amnesty, publicized by Goering. When they had to resort to heavier

taxation than ever before they camouflaged it most skilfully as charity, voluntary donations, and so forth, and collected large amounts of money by illegal threats, rather than by official tax legislation.

Here are a few examples of the antitaxation complex:

The high-scoring man, *M 105*, who is violently anti-Semitic and associated with the »lunatic fringe,« says:

»It is the taxpayer's money that has been put into South America; other countries will think we are fools.«

*M 345*, a radar engineer of the Extension Testing Class, who scores middle on E, low on F, but high on PEC, believes:

(What about government control of business?) »It has gotten to the point where it is requiring too much of the citizens' tax money and time.«

Again, the taxpayer's complex is not limited to high scorers. The low-scoring man, *M 116*, the deviate case of a conformist, conventional conservative definitely opposed to prejudice, strongly identified with his father, accepts his Republican views:

»... also because businessmen generally don't like the



taxes.«

In case of a new economic crisis, where unemployment would necessitate high taxation of people whose incomes have shrunk, this complex would undoubtedly play an exceptionally dangerous role. The threat is the more serious since, in such a situation, a government which would not impose taxes would fail, while one which would take steps in this direction would invariably antagonize the very same group from which totalitarian movements most likely draw their support.

## 4. Foreign Policy and Russia

Lack of information on the part of our subjects prevails, even more than anywhere else, in the area of foreign politics. There are usually rather vague and misty ideas about international conflicts, interspersed with morsels of information on some individual topics with which the subjects either happen to be familiar or to which they have taken a fancy. The general mood is one of disappointment, anxiety, and vague discontent, as symbolically epitomized by the medium-scoring woman, *F 340B*: »Seems we haven't got any foreign policy.«

This may easily be a mere echo of newspaper statements frequently made at the time of the study by columnists such as Walter Lippman and Dorothy Thompson. Repeating them transforms the feeling of insecurity and disorientation of many of our subjects into the semblance of critical superiority. More than in any other political sphere, our subjects live »from hand to mouth« in the area of international affairs.

There is a striking lack of a sense of proportion, of balanced judgment, considering the importance or unimportance of topics of foreign politics.

One illustration, stemming from the »easy going« low scorer *M 711*:

(Major problems facing country?) »Hard question to answer ... Perhaps the main one is how we're going to fit in with the rest of the world. ... I'm a little concerned about what we seem to be doing in China. ... If we are a carrier of the torch of the Four Freedoms, I think we are a little inconsistent in our maneuverings in China and Indonesia.«

This statement seems to be a »day residue« of continuous newspaper reading rather than the expression of autonomous thinking. Yet it should be noted that it remains within the anti-imperialist frame of reference of the low scorer.

The symbol of political uneasiness is the atom bomb which is dreaded everywhere. The stand taken toward the atom bomb seems to differentiate the high from the low scorers. As is to be expected, also for psychological reasons, the high scorers are all out for secrecy. Here, as elsewhere, they »want to keep what we have.«

*M 662A*, the San Quentin »tough guy,« high on all scales:

(Threats to present form of government?) »Atom bomb. If these other countries get it, they're going to use it on us and we're going to have to look out for Russia. ...I'm for Russia, but ... I think sooner or later we're going to go to war with them.«

As to the prospect of a devastating war, this man seems to take a fatalistic view as if it were a natural catastrophe rather than something dependent on humans. This is in keeping with our clinical knowledge of the male high scorers' psychological passivity (cf. p. 575).[21]

The low scorers either want to outlaw the atom bomb or to make the secret public:

*M 627*, the alcoholic sex-offender, low on E and PEC but high on F:

(Major problems facing this country?) »Well, I think this atom bomb.« (Solution?) ... »Well, it ought to be outlawed and money appropriated to see if we can't use that power for good.«

*F 515*, the »genuine liberal« who is to be discussed in detail in Chapter XIX (p. [505, below]), pleads for international atomic control:

»Truman doesn't want to give away the secret of the atom bomb – I think he should. It's already out anyway.«

Although the over-all ideology is fear of war, the high scorer's attitude indicates that, while deeming war inevitable, they have some underlying sympathy for war-making, such as that found in the Los Angeles

high-scoring radio writer *5003* characterized as highly neurotic:

As for the world state, he expects anything at the present time. »Why shouldn't we have further wars? We are animals and have animal instincts and Darwin showed us it is the survival of the fittest. I'd like to believe in the spiritual brotherhood of men, but it's the strong man who wins.«

This kind of phrasing, »why shouldn't we have further wars,« is indicative of his agreement with the idea, in spite of his talk of spiritual brotherhood. The use that is often made of the Darwinian slogan of the survival of the fittest in order to rationalize crude aggressiveness, may be significant of the fascist potential within American »naturalism,« although it is supposedly linked to progressive ideals and enlightenment.

*5009*, a 32-year-old teaching principal in a small California town, who scores high on all scales, rationalizes his belief in a forthcoming war differently:

He expects no warless world and thinks that the next war will be with Russia. »The United States has always ranged itself against dictatorship.«

While he shows the typical high scorers' attitude – psychologically linked to cynicism and contempt for man – of regarding war as unavoidable, he justifies a

policy which actually may lead to war with a democratic ideal: the stand to be taken against dictatorships.

A third aspect of subscribing to the war idea comes up in the interview of the aforementioned *5031*, a wealthy building contractor. He

feels that perhaps we had better go to war with Russia now and get it over with.

Here the high scorer's typical cynicism, a fusion of contempt for man, exaggerated down-to-earthness, and underlying destructiveness, is allowed uncensored expression. Whereas in the sphere of private morale such psychological urges are held at bay by the acceptance of more or less conventionalized humane standards, they are let loose in the sphere of international politics where there seems to be as little of a collective superego as there is of a truly powerful supranational control agency.

The all-too-ready assumption that war cannot be abolished – which, according to this man, could be hoped for only if military men ran the UNO – is fused with the administrative, quasi-technical, idea that one »should get it over with« as soon as possible, that Russia should be taken care of. War and peace become matters of technological expediency. The political consequence of this way of thinking is self-expla-

natory.

As with many other political topics, attitude toward Russia, whether for or against, does not by itself differentiate with any sharpness between high and low scorers. There is, first, a kind of »pseudo-low« attitude toward Russia. It falls in line with the general admiration of power in high scorers and is positive only as far as Russian military successes are concerned. It turns into hostility where Russian strength is presented as potentially dangerous. This happens with the San Quentin inmate *M 621A*, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC. He expresses his true anti-Russian feelings by means of personalization:

(Major problems facing country today?) »I think Russia. ...« (Subject fears a war with Russia sooner or later over the atom bomb.) »Russia wants control of territory in China, so do the United States and England.« (What do you dislike most about Russia?) »Well, a little bit too aggressive. Of course, they've done some wonderful things. Five year plan, educated themselves.« (What good things about Russia?) »Lots of stamina to stand up under hardship.« (Objections?) »I met quite a few Russians. Don't like them, because they seem to be overbearing.« (How do you mean?) »They like to have their own way. ...« (Subject met the Russians he has been exposed to in Shanghai, chiefly Russian merchants.) »They really believe in ›taking‹ you. They are not very clean ... I didn't have any very definite ideas before.«

It may be noted how close this man's attitude toward the Russians comes to certain anti-Semitic stereotypes. However, he has nothing against the Jews; as a matter of fact his wife is Jewish. In this case anti-Russianism may be a phenomenon of displacement.

However, there is also a »genuine« low scorer's negative attitude against Russia, based on aversion to totalitarianism. Here, the Psychiatric Clinic patient *M 204*, suffering from anxiety neurosis, a moderate socialist and militant pacifist, with low scores on all scales, fits in:

He is a little skeptical about the Soviet Union, disapproving of their totalitarian methods, but being interested in »their interesting experiment.«

Another example is *M 310*, a liberal of the Extension Testing Class with an unusually low score, assistant manager for an advertising agency, whose criticism touches upon formal democratism while at the same time he is repelled by the oligarchic aspects of Russian government:

(Your understanding of democracy?) »Government of, for, and by the people. Government by majority, directed to its achieving good results for the people. May be a difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, in that sense, may be democracy in Russia. I don't think it necessarily takes our voting system, although I like (democratic



voting). ...« (You are critical of Soviet Russia?) »I don't like the concentration of political power in so few hands.«

Sometimes this kind of critique assumes, with low scorers, the aspect of disagreement with American communists because of their wholesale endorsement of Russian politics.

*M 203*, a teacher, »liberal but not radical,« with low scores on all scales:

»It is good to have intelligent, liberal leadership, rather than radical leadership, which would be bad.« (Example?) »Well, like the communists in this country: they are not intelligent, they are too radical, and there is too much line which is determined by Russia. For instance, Roosevelt was less rigid and learned more by his mistakes.«

It should be noted that this man is an outspoken anti-fascist who finds it »disgraceful that [Theodor Gilmore] Bilbo should be in Congress.«

As to the pro-Russian attitude found among low scorers, it cannot be overlooked that it has sometimes a somewhat mechanical outlook. Here the element of stereotypy comes clearly to the fore in low scorers. As an example *M 713A* may serve. He is a young veteran, studying landscape architecture, whose scores are all low.

(How do you feel about Soviet Russia?) »A very wonderful experiment. ... I believe that if left alone will be the greatest power in a few years.« (Disagreement with the communists' line?) »Just in the matter of approach. Their approach is a little too violent, though I can see the reason for that. ... I think we ought to approach it a little more gradually. ... If went into communism would just be like the army. ... Maybe take a hundred years – we are working gradually toward it.«

It is a question whether the idea of a gradual development: is compatible with the theory of dialectical materialism officially accepted in Russia, or whether it is indicative of a dubious element in the subject's appreciation of the »wonderful experiment.« It should be noted that the idea of socialism as an »experiment« stems from the vernacular of middle-class »common sense« and it tends to replace the traditional socialist concept of class struggle with the image of a kind of joint, unanimous venture – as if society as a whole, as it is today, were ready to try socialism regardless of the influence of existing property relations. This pattern of thinking is at least inconsistent with the very same social theory to which our subject seems to subscribe. Anyway, he, like any of our other subjects, goes little into matters of Marxian doctrine or of specific Russian issues, but contents himself with rather a summary positive stand.

And then there is the idea of the »greatest power.«

That this idea is not exceptional among low scorers, in other words, that a positive stand toward Russia may have something to do with the Russian successes on the battlefields and in international competition, rather than with the system, is corroborated by the San Quentin inmate *M 619*, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC, the man who does not believe in any real utopia:

»Well, Russia is undoubtedly one of the most powerful nations in the world today. They've risen to power in the last few years and made more progress than any other country.«

Our general impression concerning our subjects' attitude towards Russia may be summed up as follows. To the vast majority of Americans, the very existence of the Soviet Union constitutes a source of continuous uneasiness. The emergence and survival of a system that has done away with free enterprise seems to them a threat to the basic tenets of the culture of this country, to the »American way,« by the mere fact that it has shattered the belief in liberal economy and liberal political organization as a »natural« eternal phenomenon which excludes any other rational form of society. On the other hand, the success of Russia, particularly her performance during the war, appeals strongly to the American belief that values can be tested by the

outcome, by whether they »work« – which is a profoundly liberalistic idea by itself. The way our subjects cope with this inconsistency of evaluation differentiates between high and low scorers. To the former, the Soviet Union, incompatible with their frame of reference, should be done away with as the extreme expression of the »foreign,« of what is also in a psychological sense »strange,« more than anything else. Even the fact that Russia has proved successful in some respects is put into the service of this fantasy: frequently, Russian power is exaggerated, with a highly ambivalent undertone comparable to the stereotypes about »Jewish world power.« To the low scorers Russia is rarely less »strange« – an attitude which has doubtless some basis in reality. But they try to master this sense of strangeness in a different way, by taking an objective attitude of »appreciation,« combining understanding with detachment and a dash of superiority. When they express more outspoken sympathies for the Soviet Union, they do so by implicitly translating Russian phenomena into ideas more familiar to Americans, often by presenting the Russian system as something more harmless and »democratic« than it is, as a kind of pioneering venture somehow reminiscent of our own tradition. Yet indices of a certain inner aloofness are rarely missing. The low scorers' pro-Russian sympathies seem to be

of a somewhat indirect nature, either by rigid acceptance of an extraneous »ticket« or by identification based on theoretical thinking and moral reflections rather than on an immediate feeling that this is »my« cause. Their appraisal of Russia frequently assumes an air of hesitant, benevolent expectancy – let us see how they will manage. This contains both an element of authentic rationality and the potential of their swinging against Russia under the cover of handy rationalizations if pressure of public opinion should urge such a change.

## 5. Communism

The complex, Russia, is closely associated with the complex of communism in the minds of our subjects. This is all the more the case since communism has ceased to be in the public mind an entirely new form of society, based on a complete break in the economic setup, and has become bluntly identified with the Russian government and Russian influence on international politics. Hardly any reference to the basic issue of nationalization of the means of production as a part of the communist program has been found in our sample – a negative result which is significant enough with regard to the historical dynamics to which the concept of communism has been subjected during the last two decades.

Among the high scorers the only feature of the old idea that seems to have survived is the »bogy« of communism. The more the latter concept is emptied of any specific content, the more it is being transformed into a receptacle for all kinds of hostile projections, many of them on an infantile level somehow reminiscent of the presentation of evil forces in comic strips. Practically all features of »high« thinking are absorbed by this imagery. The vagueness of the notion of communism, which makes it an unknown and

inscrutable quantity, may even contribute to the negative affects attached to it.

Among the crudest expressions of these feelings is that of our insect toxicologist *M 108*, by whom the problem of communism is stated in terms of plain ethnocentrism:

(Why is he against communism?) »Well, it is foreign. Socialism, o.k. – you respect a man who is a socialist but a communist comes from a foreign country and he has no business here.«

*F 111*, who scores high on E, middle on F, and low on PEC, is a young girl who wants to become a diplomat because she is »mad at England and Russia.« Her idea of communism has an involuntarily parodistic ring:

(Political outgroups?) »Fascists and communists. I don't like the totalitarian ideas of the fascists, the centralization of the communists. In Russia nothing is private, everything goes to one man. They have violent ways of doing things.«

To the mind of this woman, the idea of political dictatorship has turned into the bogey of a kind of economic supra-individualism, just as if Stalin claimed ownership of her typewriter.

By a similarly irrational twist another high scorer,

*M 664B*, an uneducated and unintelligent sex offender of the San Quentin group, with high scores on all scales, simply associates communism with the danger of war:

»If labor keeps getting more power, we'll be like Russia. That's what causes wars.«

The complete irrationality, not to say idiocy, of the last three examples shows what vast psychological resources fascist propaganda can rely on when denouncing a more or less imaginary communism without taking the trouble to discuss any real political or economic issues.

If representatives of this attitude enter upon any argumentation at all, it is, the last examples indicate, centered in the facile, though not completely spurious identification of communism and fascism which displaces hostility against the defeated enemy upon the foe to be.

Low scorers are not immune in this respect. Thus the low-scoring student-minister *M 910* is of the following opinion:

(How do you feel about Russia's government?) »I think there is very little difference between fascism and communism as it's *practiced* in Russia. The 1936 Constitution is a marvelous *document*. I think it's five hundred



years ahead of our Constitution because it guarantees *social* rights instead of individual rights but when man hasn't any rights except as a member of the Communist Party. ... I think it's capitalistic. ...« (What is the nature of your objections to Russia?) »Well, first of all, I think it was Russia that carried the ball in entering this veto power into the UNO which I think will be the death of the thing right now. ... Russia has got the things right where she wants them. We think we're the leaders but we fool ourselves. ...« (Subject objects strongly to deceitful diplomacy.)

High scorers who make less intellectual effort simply find communism not individualistic enough. The standard phraseology they employ contrasts nicely with the belief in spiritual independence which they profess. We quote as an example *F 106*, a high scorer of the Public Speaking Class group, a young teacher:

(Political outgroups?) »Communists have some good ideas but I don't think too much of them. They don't give the individuals enough mind of their own.«

Sometimes the identification of communism and fascism is accompanied by paranoid twists in the Elders of Zion style. *M 345*, our radar field engineer:

(What do you think of the P.A.C.?) »Never found any definite information on the C.I.O. ... but ... C.I.O. seems the agency to turn international, certainly has got all the ear-

marks, not because of being labor union, but just because of the way they compare.« (Subject compares communism to Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, telling exactly what he planned to do and how, and then doing it.) »C.I.O. has followed the lines of action very similar to pronounced policies of Comintern – even their name, Congress for Industrial Workers; not much faith in the communists succeeding. Their aim is tight little control of their own group.«

The mix-up of Comintern, CIO, and *Mein Kampf* is the appropriate climate for panic, and subsequent violent action.

But this climate by no means prevails. There is one quite frequently noted way of dealing with the problem of communism which safeguards the aspects of detached objectivity while allowing for good-natured rejection. It reminds one of the story of the boy who, when offered some very sour dish and asked whether he liked it answered: »Excellent – when I'll be grown up.« Communism is a good thing *for the others*, particularly for »those foreigners,« from whom it has been imported anyway. This technique is employed by both high and low scorers. 5008, the liberal-minded Jefferson descendant:

»The communists may be able to do something in the Soviet Union, but they would utterly fail here.«

In *M 115*, the low-scoring fraternity man, the argument has a noticeable taint of contempt for the have-nots. This is the man who wants »none of this Marxian stuff.«

»... but in poorer countries, like in Russia, Germany, etc., it's necessary in some modified form; but not in America. We have too much here already, that is we are too developed already.«

The subject is not struck by the idea that a collectivistic economy might be easier in an industrially highly advanced, mature country, rather than more difficult. To him, communism is simply identified with enhancement of material productive powers through more efficient organization. He seems to be afraid of overproduction as if this concept would still make sense in an economy no longer dependent upon the contingencies of the market.

Even the extreme low scorer *M 1206a*, of the Maritime School group, who believes that America will eventually become a socialistic country,

thinks that Russia has a wonderful system of government – for Russia – »though I don't think we could transplant its system to this country ... though we should watch her and get ideas to build our own country better.«

In this case the argument is mitigated by an element of thoughtfulness which is an accordance with the stand taken by this subject with regard to the Communist Party in this country;

»Well, I don't know a great deal about it. I believe that if a man wants to be a communist, that's not only his privilege, but his duty ... to try and convince as many people as he can. ...« Subject objects vigorously to red-baiting tactics. ... »I think that Russia will be the most democratic country in the world in time. ... Joe has been a little ruthless at times, but. ...«

Sometimes the argument is fused with the idea that socialism would not be »practical,« for purely economic reasons which are mostly taken from the very sphere of a profit system which is supposed to be replaced under socialism by an economic organization moulded after the needs of the population. *F* 359, the previously (pp. [280, 381]) quoted high-scoring accountant in a government department:

Subject thinks that communism is all right for Russia, but not for this country, although the trend seems to be more and more that way. She believes in private ownership of property and the private enterprise system. She considers it more efficient. She is not so sure about government ownership of public utilities such as water, etc. She thinks that they probably operate better under private ownership, that the costs are lower.

The interviews of other subjects show an unmistakably condescending overtone of this same argument, such as *M 107*, a medical student who scores high on E but middle on F and PEC:

»We can cooperate with Russia; if they want communism they have to have it.«

This type of liberal approach, of which, incidentally, the Hitler regime profited during the whole Chamberlain era of noninterference, is not as broad-minded as it may appear. It often hides the conviction that there is no objective truth in politics, that every country, as every individual, may behave as it likes and that the only thing that counts is success. It is precisely this pragmatization of politics which ultimately defines fascist philosophy.

Obviously, the relationship between anticommunism and fascist potential as measured by our scales should not be oversimplified. In some of our earlier studies the correlation between anti-Semitism and anticommunism was very high,<sup>22</sup> but there is reason to believe that it would not be so high today, not, at least, at the surface level. During the last several years all the propaganda machinery of the country has been devoted to promoting anticommunist feeling in the sense of an irrational »scare« and there are probably

not many people, except followers of the »party line,« who have been able to resist the incessant ideological pressure. At the same time, during the past two or three years it may have become more »conventional« to be overtly opposed to anti-Semitism, if the large number of magazine articles, books, and films with wide circulation can be regarded as symptomatic of a trend. The underlying character structure has little bearing on such fluctuations. If they could be ascertained, they would demonstrate the extreme importance of propaganda in political matters. Propaganda, when directed to the antidemocratic potential in the people, determines to a large extent the choice of the social objects of psychological aggressiveness.

## Fußnoten

[1 Daniel J. Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 151–207.]

2 Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism.«

3 After completion of the study, the writer of this chapter became acquainted with the pertinent article by Ralph H. Gundlach, »Confusion among Undergraduates in Political and Economic Ideas,« *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 32 (1937), pp. 357–367.

4 This has been pointed out with regard to the imagery of the Jews. See Chapter XVI [above, pp. 265ff.].

[5 See below, pp. 454ff.]

[6 See above, pp. 185ff.]

[7 See above, p. 287.]

[8 See above, pp. 207ff.]

[9 Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism.«

10 Personalization, as indicated by these sentences, has an obvious fascist potential. It enhances the individual as against any objective anonymous system of checks and balances, against democratic control. Behind the adulation of the »great man« looms, in the present situation, the readiness to »follow the leader.«]

11 This case is described in detail in Chapter XXI under the name of »Ronald.« [William R. Morrow, »Criminality and Antidemocratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 817–890.]

[12 *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 291–486.]

[13 See above, p. 330.]

14 The role played by shady pseudo-medicine in Nazi Germany is sociologically linked to the ascendance of *déclassé* intellectuals under National Socialism, psychologically to the paranoid twist of Nazi ideology as well as of the personalities of many leaders. There is a direct interconnection between the doctrine of »purity of blood« and the glorification of sundry purifiers of the body. The first academic chair created by Hitler was one for »natural healing.« His own physician was a quack, Himmler's a chiropractor, and Rudolf Hess encouraged all kinds of superstitious approaches to



medicine. It should be noted that analogous tendencies make themselves felt in the American »lunatic fringe.« One of our native crackpot agitators combines Jew-baiting with a »health food« campaign, directed against the *delikatessen* which are not only denounced as being Jewish but also as unwholesome. The imagery of Jewish food throughout the fascist ideology deserves careful examination.

[15 Else Frenkel-Brunswik, »Parents and Childhood as Seen through the Interviews,« Chapter X, *The Authoritarian Personality*.]

16 Cf. Otto Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1945), pp. 418–420.

[17 R. Nevitt Sanford, »The Contrasting Ideologies of Two College Men: A Preliminary View,« Chapter II, *The Authoritarian Personality*.]

18 This observation is in accordance with experience in Nazi Germany where all kinds of criticism and jokes about the party hierarchy were whispered everywhere, whilst Hitler seems to have been largely exempted from this kind of criticism. One heard frequently the remark: »The Führer does not know about these things« – even when concentration camps were concerned.

19 R. Nevitt Sanford, Herbert S. Conrad and Kate Franck, »Psychological Determinants of Optimism regarding the Consequences of the War,« *The Journal of Psychology* 22 (1946), pp. 207–235.

[20 See below, pp. 481ff.]

[21 Daniel J. Levinson, »Projective Questions in the Study of Personality and Ideology,« Chapter XV, *The Authoritarian Personality*.]

22 Cf. Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, »A Scale for the Measurement of Anti-Semitism,« *The Journal of Psychology* 17 (1944), pp. 339–370.

## Chapter XVIII

### Some Aspects of Religious Ideology as Revealed in the Interview Material

#### A. Introduction

The relationship between prejudice and religion played a relatively minor role in our research. This may be due in a large part to the nature of our sample. It did not include any specific religious groups nor was it drawn from geographical areas such as the Bible Belt or cities with a heavily concentrated Irish-Catholic population in which religious ideology has considerable social importance. If research along the lines of the present work should be carried through in such areas, the religious factor might easily come to the fore to a much greater extent than in the present study.

Apart from this limitation, there is another and more fundamental one. Religion does not play such a decisive role within the frame of mind of most people as it once did; only rarely does it seem to account for their social attitudes and opinions. This at least was indicated by the present results. The quantitative relationships obtained (Chapter VI)<sup>[1]</sup> are not particularly striking, and although part of the interview sche-

dule was devoted specifically to religion, it cannot be said that the material gathered in this part of the interviews is very rich. On an overt level at least, religious indifference seems to put this whole sphere of ideology somewhat into the background; there can be no question but that it is less affect-laden than most of the other ideological areas under consideration and that the traditional equation between religious »fanaticism« and fanatical prejudice no longer holds good.

Yet, there is reason enough to devote some close attention to our data on religion, scarce though they may be. The considerable part played by actual or former ministers in spreading fascist propaganda and the continuous use they make of the religious medium strongly suggest that the general trend toward religious indifference does not constitute altogether a break between religious persuasion and our main problem. Although religion may no longer stimulate open fanaticism against those who do not share one's own belief, we are led to suspect that on a deeper, more unconscious level the religious heritage, the carry-over of old belief and the identification with certain denominations, still make themselves felt.

Our approach was guided by certain theoretical considerations inherent in our general frame of reference. In order to give relief to the focus of our observations, it is appropriate to indicate the more funda-

mental of these theoretical reflections.

It was expected from the very beginning that the relations between religious ideology and ethnocentrism would be complex. On the one hand the Christian doctrine of universal love and the idea of »Christian Humanism« is opposed to prejudice. This doctrine is doubtless one of the major historical presuppositions for the recognition of minorities as sharing equal rights with majorities »in the sight of God.« The Christian relativization of the natural, the extreme emphasis on the »spirit,« forbids any tendency to regard natural characteristics such as »racial« traits as ultimate values or to judge man according to his descent.

On the other hand, Christianity as the religion of the »Son« contains an implicit antagonism against the religion of the »Father« and its surviving witnesses, the Jews. This antagonism, continuous since St. Paul, is enhanced by the fact that the Jews, by clinging to their own religious culture, rejected the religion of the Son and by the fact that the New Testament puts upon them the blame for Christ's death. It has been pointed out again and again by great theologians, from Tertullian and Augustine to Kierkegaard, that the acceptance of Christianity by the Christians themselves contains a problematic and ambiguous element, engendered by the paradoxical nature of the doctrine of God becoming man, the Infinite finite. Unless this

element is consciously put into the center of the religious conception, it tends to promote hostility against the outgroup. As Samuel<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, the »weak« Christians resent bitterly the openly negative attitude of the Jews toward the religion of the Son, since they feel within themselves traces of this negative attitude based upon the paradoxical, irrational nature of their creed – an attitude which they do not dare to admit and which they must therefore put under a heavy taboo in others.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that many of the usual rationalizations of anti-Semitism originate within Christianity or at least have been amalgamated with Christian motives. The fight against the Jews seems to be modeled after the fight between the Redeemer and the Christian Devil. Joshua Trachtenberg<sup>3</sup> has given detailed evidence that the imagery of the Jew is largely a secularization of the medieval imagery of the Devil. The fantasies about Jewish bankers and money-lenders have their biblical archetype in the story of Jesus driving the usurers from the Temple. The idea of the Jewish intellectual as a sophist is in keeping with the Christian denunciation of the Pharisee. The Jewish traitor who betrays not only his master but also the ingroup to which he has been admitted, is Judas. These motifs are enhanced by more unconscious trends such as are expressed in the

idea of the crucifix and the sacrifice of blood. Although these latter ideas have been more or less successfully replaced by »Christian Humanism,« their deeper psychological roots have still to be reckoned with.<sup>4</sup>

In attempting to evaluate the influence of such elements of religion upon the existence or absence of prejudice today, one has to take into consideration the position in which Christianity presently finds itself: it is faced with an »indifference« which often seems to make it altogether unimportant. The Christian religion has been deeply affected by the process of Enlightenment and the conquest of the scientific spirit. The »magical« elements of Christianity as well as the factual basis of Christian belief in biblical history have been profoundly shaken. This, however, does not mean that Christian religion has been abolished. Although largely emasculated in its profoundest claims, it has maintained at least part of the social functions acquired throughout the centuries. This means that it has largely become *neutralized*. The shell of Christian doctrine, above all its social authority and also a number of more or less isolated elements of its content, is preserved and »consumed« in a haphazard way as a »cultural good« like patriotism or traditional art.

This neutralization of religious beliefs is strikingly

exemplified by the following statement of *M 109*, a high-scoring Roman Catholic who attends church regularly. He writes on his questionnaire that he considers religion a

»thoroughly important part of existence, perhaps it should occupy 2 to 5 per cent of leisure time.«

The relegation of religion, which was once regarded as the most essential sphere of life, to »leisure,« as well as the time allotment made for it and, above all, the fact that it is subsumed under a calculated time schedule and referred to in terms of per cent is symbolic of the profound changes which have taken place with regard to the prevailing attitude towards religion.

It may be assumed that such neutralized residues of Christianity as that indicated in *M 109's* statement are largely severed from their basis in serious belief and substantial individual experience. Therefore, they rarely produce individual behavior that is different from what is to be expected from the prevailing patterns of civilization. However, some of the formal properties of religion, such as the rigid antithesis of good and evil, ascetic ideals, emphasis upon unlimited effort on the part of the individual, still exercise considerable power. Severed from their roots and often devoid of any specific content, these formal constituents are apt to be congealed into mere formulae. Thus, they as-



sume an aspect of rigidity and intolerance such as we expect to find in the prejudiced person.

The dissolution of positive religion and its preservation in a noncommittal ideological form are due to social processes. While religion has been deprived of the intrinsic claim of truth, it has been gradually transformed into »social cement.« The more this cement is needed for the maintenance of the *status quo* and the more dubious its inherent truth becomes, the more obstinately is its authority upheld and the more its hostile, destructive and negative features come to the fore. The transformation of religion into an agency of social conformity makes it fall in line with most other conformist tendencies. Adherence to Christianity under such conditions easily lends itself to abuse; to subservience, overadjustment, and ingroup loyalty as an ideology which covers up hatred against the disbeliever, the dissenter, the Jew. Belonging to a denomination assumes an air of aggressive fatality, similar to that of being born as a member of one particular nation. Membership in any particular religious group tends to be reduced to a fairly abstract ingroup-outgroup relationship within the general pattern brought out by the foregoing discussion of ethnocentrism.

These theoretical formulations are not intended as hypotheses for which crucial tests could be provided by our research; rather, they furnish some of the back-

ground against which the observations now to be reported may plausibly be interpreted.

## B. General Observations

There is much in the interview material to support the view, suggested by findings from the questionnaire, that the more religion becomes conventionalized, the more it falls in line with the general outlook of the ethnocentric individual. An illustration of this point is afforded by the following excerpt from the interview of *F 5054*, a woman who scored high on the ethnocentrism scale.

The subject seems to have accepted a set of rather dogmatic moral codes which makes her regard people, especially »youngsters who call themselves atheists« as falling outside the circle in which she wants to move. She made a point of admitting (confidentially) that one of the main reasons she was looking forward to moving away from Westwood was that she could thereby get her youngest daughter away from the influence of the neighbor's boy who is an atheist because his father tells him »religion is a lot of hooey.« She is also distressed, because her eldest daughter »just won't go to church.«

From the above it is evident that she is quite in agreement with organized religion and tends to be a conformist in religious matters. Christian ethics and its moral codes are regarded as absolutes; and deviations are to be frowned upon or punished.

The account suggests that there is a connection bet-

ween conventional religious rigidity and an almost complete absence of what might be called personally »experienced« belief. The same holds for the high-scoring man 5057, a person who sticks to the Church although he »does not believe in a personal God.«

The subject believes that most Protestant religions are very much the same. He selected Christian Science because »it is a quieter religion than most.« He started going to Unity sunday school while living with his grandparents and liked the Unity Church, which, in his estimation, presents a mild form of Christian Science. He joined the Christian Science Church when he married, inasmuch as his wife's family and his wife are all Christian Scientists. »Religion should not be allowed to interfere with the ordinary essentials. However, religion should restrain you from overindulgences of any kind, such as drinking, gambling, or anything to excess.«

A high-scoring young woman, *F 103*, says »My parents let us make our own choice; just so we go to church.« There we see the lack of any interest in the content of religion; one goes to church because »it's the thing to do« and because one wants to please one's parents. A final example is afforded by another prejudiced young woman, *F 104*, who remarks »I have never known any people who were not religious. I have known one fellow who was wavering, and he was a very morbid person.« The idea here seems to be

that one goes to church in order to express one's normality or at least to be classed with normal people.

These examples help us to understand why persons or groups who »take religion seriously« in a more internalized sense are likely to be opposed to ethnocentrism. What proved to be true in Germany, where »radical« Christian movements, such as the dialectical theology of Karl Barth, courageously opposed Nazism, seems to hold good beyond the theological »elite.« The fact that a person really worries about the meaning of religion as such, when he lives in a general atmosphere of »neutralized« religion, is indicative of a nonconformist attitude. It may easily lead toward opposition to the »regular fellow,« for whom it is as much »second nature« to attend church as it is not to admit Jews to his country club. Moreover, the stress on the specific content of religion, rather than on the division between those who belong and those who do not belong to the Christian faith, necessarily accentuates the motives of love and compassion buried under conventionalized religious patterns. The more »human« and concrete a person's relation to religion, the more human his approach to those who »do not belong« is likely to be: their sufferings remind the religious subjectivist of the idea of martyrdom inseparably bound up with his thinking about Christ.

To put it bluntly, the adherent of what Kierkegaard,

a hundred years ago, called »official Christianity« is likely to be ethnocentric although the religious organizations with which he is affiliated may be officially opposed to it, whereas the »radical« Christian is prone to think and to act differently.

However, it should not be forgotten that extreme religious subjectivism, with its one-sided emphasis on religious experience set against the objectified Church, may also under certain conditions fall in line with the potentially fascist mentality. Religious subjectivism that dispenses with any binding principles provides the spiritual climate for other authoritative claims. Moreover, the sectarian spirit of people who carry this outlook to an extreme sometimes results in a certain affinity for the aggressive ingroup mood of movements generally condemned as »crack-pot,« as well as for those underlying anarchical trends which characterize the potentially fascistic individual. This aspect of religious subjectivism plays an important role in the mentality of fascist agitators who operate in a religious setting.<sup>5</sup>

Among those who *reject* religion, a number of significant differences may be noted. As our quantitative results have shown, no mechanical identification of the non – or antireligious person with the »low scorer« can be made. There are, to be sure, »agnostic« or »atheistic« persons whose persuasions are part and

parcel of a universally progressive attitude which holds for minority questions. The actual meaning of this »progressiveness,« however, may vary widely. Whereas antireligious progressives are definitely opposed to prejudice under present conditions, when it comes to the question of susceptibility to fascist propaganda, it makes all the difference whether they are »ticket thinkers« who subscribe wholesale to tolerance, atheism, and what not, or whether their attitude toward religion can be called an autonomous one based on thinking of their own.

Moreover, it may turn out to be an important criterion of susceptibility whether a person is opposed to religion as an ally of repression and reaction, in which case we should expect him to be relatively unprejudiced, or whether he adopts an attitude of cynical utilitarianism and rejects everything that is not »realistic« and tangible, in which case we should expect him to be prejudiced. There also exists a fascist type of irreligious person who has become completely cynical after having been disillusioned with regard to religion, and who talks about the laws of nature, survival of the fittest and the rights of the strong. The true candidates of neo-paganism of the fascist extreme are recruited from the ranks of these people. A good example is the high-scoring man 5064, the Boy Scout leader, discussed in Chapter XVI.[6] Asked about re-

ligion, he confesses to »worshiping nature.« He exalts athletics and camp collectivity, probably on the basis of latent homosexuality. He is the clearest example we have of the syndrome involving pagan pantheism, belief in »power,« the idea of collective leadership, and a generally ethnocentric and pseudoconservative ideology.

It is against the background of these general observations on the structure of the relationship between religion and modern prejudice that the following, more specific observations may be understood.



## C. Specific Issues

### 1. The Function of Religion in High and Low Scorers

Evidence in support of our hypothesis concerning »neutralized« religion is offered by a trait which seems to occur rather frequently in our interview material. It is the disposition to view religion as a means instead of an end. Religion is accepted, not because of its objective truth, but on account of its value in realizing goals that might also be achieved by other means. This attitude falls in line with the general tendency toward subordination and renunciation of one's own judgment so characteristic of the mentality of those who follow fascist movements. Acceptance of an ideology is not based upon understanding of or belief in its content but rather upon what immediate use can be made of it, or upon arbitrary decisions. Here lies one of the roots of the stubborn, conscious, and manipulative irrationalism of the Nazis, as it was summed up by Hitler's saying: »*Man kann nur für eine Idee sterben, die man nicht versteht.*« (One can die only for an idea which one does not understand.) This is by its intrinsic logic tantamount to contempt for truth *per se*. One selects a »*Weltanschauung*«

after the pattern of choosing a particularly well advertised commodity, rather than for its real quality. This attitude, applied to religion, must necessarily produce ambivalence, for religion claims to express *absolute* truth. If it is accepted for some other reason alone, this claim is implicitly denied and thereby religion itself rejected, even while being accepted. Thus, rigid confirmation of religious values on account of their »usefulness« works against them by necessity.

Subordination of religion to extrinsic aims is common in both high and low scorers; by itself, it does not appear to differentiate between them. It seems, however, that prejudiced and unprejudiced subjects do differ with respect to the kinds of goals that are emphasized and the ways in which religion is utilized in their service.

High scorers, more often than low scorers, seem to make use of religious ideas in order to gain some immediate practical advantage or to aid in the manipulation of other people. An example of the way in which formalized religion is adhered to as a means for maintaining social status and social relationships is afforded by the highly prejudiced young woman, *F 201*, who is very frankly interested in »a stable society« in which class lines are clearly drawn.

»I was brought up in the Episcopalian Church through going to a school for girls. It's nice. My friends go. It's

more of a philosophy (than Christian Science); it raises your standards. The philosophy of the Episcopalian Church follows the pattern of all Protestant churches. It takes in the upper classes and gives them a religion or makes it a little nearer.«

Ethnocentric subjects frequently think of religion as a practical aid in the mental hygiene of the individual. The statement of *F 109* is characteristic.

»I don't understand religion. It's like a fairy tale to me. I don't know if I believe in God. There must be one but it is hard to believe it. Religion gives you something to hold on to, to base your life on.«

If religion only serves the need for something »to hold on to,« this need may also be served by anything which provides the individual with absolute authority, such as the fascist state. There is a strong probability that fascism played exactly the same role with German womanhood which was formally exercised by their belief in positive religion. Psychologically, fascist hierarchies may function largely as secularizations and substitutes of ecclesiastical ones. It is not accidental that Nazism arose in Southern Germany with its strong Roman-Catholic tradition.

*M 118*, a moderately high scorer, shows clearly the element of arbitrariness in his religious belief, mixed up with pseudoscientific statements which take the

stamina out of this belief.

»I am willing to believe in the existence of a God. Something I can't explain anyway. Was it Darwin who said the world started with whirling gas? Well, who created that? Where did the start of it come from? That of course has little to do with church ritual.« (He has stated just before that the church »is pretty important.«)

There is no logical interconnection between this reasoning and the subject's adherence to positive Christianity. Consequently the continuation of the passage reveals by its sophistry the aspect of insincerity in conventionalized religion which leads easily to malicious contempt for the values one officially subscribes to.

*M 118* goes on to say:

»I believe in the power of prayer even if it's just in the satisfaction of the individual performing it. I don't know if there is any direct communication but it helps the individual, so I'm for it. It's also a chance for introspection; to stop and look at yourself.«<sup>7</sup>

The approach to religion for extraneous reasons is probably not so much an expression of the subject's own wants and needs as an expression of his opinion that religion is good for others, helps to keep them content, in short, can be used for manipulative purpo-

ses. Recommending religion to others makes it easier for a person to be »in favor« of it without any actual identification with it. The cynicism of the central European administrators of the nineteenth century who taught that religion is a good medicine for the masses, seems to have been to a certain extent democratized. Numerous members of the masses themselves proclaim that religion is good for the masses, whereas they make for themselves, as individuals, a kind of mental reservation. There is a strong similarity between these appreciations of religion and a trait which played a large role in Nazi Germany. There, innumerable persons exempted themselves privately from the ruling ideology and talked about »they« when discussing the Party. The fascist-minded personality, it seems, can manage his life only by splitting his own ego into several agencies, some of which fall in line with the official doctrine, whilst others, heirs to the old superego, protect him from mental unbalance and allow him to maintain himself as an individual. Splits of this kind become manifest in the uncontrolled associations of uneducated and naive persons, such as the rather medium-scoring man *M 629*, who is serving a life sentence in San Quentin prison. He makes the extraordinary statement:

»I believe, personally, I have a religion that hasn't been defined so far as I know in any books yet. I believe that

religion has a value for people who believe in it. I think it's used as an escape mechanism by those who use it.«

The illogical way in which this man has made a sedative of religion can be accounted for without much psychological interpretation by the fact that he spent nineteen months in condemned row.

More sophisticated persons sometimes have to deal with the same conflict. An example is the moderately high woman, 5059, who rejects atheism because »an atheistic funeral was so cold.« She simply denies any contradictions between science and religion, calling the idea of a contradiction a »malevolent invention,« thus apparently projecting her own uneasiness about this conflict upon those who speak it out. This is similar to the mentality of the Nazi who puts the blame for social defects on the critique of our social order.

It must now be pointed out that low scorers also often accept religion, not because of any intrinsic truth that it may hold for them, but because it may serve as a means for furthering human aims. An example of such practical religion is the following excerpt from the interview with a woman student of journalism, *F 126*, who obtained extremely low scores on both the A-S and the E scales.

Family were moderate church-goers. She rarely goes now. However, she has much respect for religion and

seems to feel that it might be developed into something that would give people that faith and understanding for each other that is lacking. »I don't know what else could give people something to hold onto, some purpose in life. They seem to need something to believe in. Some of us seem to have a love for people without that, but not very many.«

In one sense this way of looking at religion has something in common with the externalized attitudes described above. However, it is our impression that when the practical approach to religion appears in the thinking of the low scorer its content, or its context, can usually be distinguished from what is found in the thinking of the high scorer. Thus, although the young woman just quoted believes that religion is good for people, gives them »something to hold onto,« she seems to mean that they need it at least for a humane and ideal purpose, that is, so that they may have more »understanding for each other,« not simply in order to get along better or to function more efficiently. Low as well as high scorers are likely to consider that religion contributes to the mental hygiene of the individual; but whereas the high scorers characteristically indicate that it is good for other people because they are chronically weak, and possibly good for themselves in times of acute external stress (»fox-hole religion«), the low scorers are more likely to think of religi-

on in internalized terms, as a means for reducing hatred, resolving inner conflicts, relieving anxiety, and the like. Practically never do we encounter a low scorer who conceives of religion primarily in terms of external practical utility – as an aid to success, to status and power, or to a sense of being in accord with conventional values.



## 2. Belief in God, Disbelief in Immortality

The neutralization of religion is accompanied by its dissection. Just as emphasis on the practical uses of religion tends to sever religious truth from religious authority, so the specific contents of religion are continually submitted to a process of selection and adaptation. The interview material suggests that the tendency to believe selectively in religion is a distinguishing feature of our prejudiced subjects. A fairly common phenomenon among them is belief in God accompanied by disbelief in immortality. Two examples follow. In the case of 5009, a devout Baptist, the interviewer reports:

... sincerely feels deeply religious, believes in God, but has, as an educated man, occasional doubts concerning the life after death.

And in the case of 5002:

... still is a »Christian,« believes in God, would like to believe in life after death, but has doubts and thinks that a sincere religious revival or a new religious myth would be a good thing for the world.

Particularly common are statements to the effect that

interviewees regard themselves as religious, as followers of the church, but disagree with »some of its teachings,« which sometimes refers to miracles, sometimes to immortality. This outlook seems corroborative of an underlying pattern of considerable significance the elements of which have been established in our psychological analyses. The abstract idea of God is accepted as an expansion of the father idea, whereas general destructiveness makes itself felt in a reaction against the hope for the individual expressed by the dogma of immortality. Subjects with this point of view want a God to exist as the absolute authority to which they can bow, but they wish the individual to perish completely.

The concept of God underlying this way of thinking is that of the absolute essence of punitiveness. It is therefore not astonishing that religious leanings of this particular brand are frequent in the high scorers among our group of prison inmates (cf. Chapter XXI).[8]

*M 627*, who is serving a life sentence for rape, is »having trouble with religion« and does not believe that »there should be a set way of worship.« But he believes, in spite of an undertone of religious rebelliousness,

»that every man should have his own way of worship as long as he believes in a power greater than himself.«

This power has the form of external authority, but remains completely abstract, nothing but the projective concept of power as such.

»Well, I have heard so many fellows talk about the powers they believed in ... and I tried to recognize the power in myself and just couldn't ... read all kinds of religious books ... but still kind of foggy.«

The same line of thought is expressed by *M 656A*, who is serving a term for forgery, »Robert« in Chapter XXI.

»Well, I'm not a man to discuss religion a great deal, because I don't know a lot about it. I believe in the Bible, I believe there is someone a lot bigger and stronger than anyone on this earth. ... I don't attend church often but ... try to live the right way.«

For this man all specific religious content is negligible compared with the idea of power and the closely related rigid, moralistic stereotypes of good and bad:

»The Catholic religion, for example, is just as good as the one I believe in. They all are patterned after the same type of living, right or wrong. I'm the type of person that doesn't believe in any particular denomination.«

This »abstract authoritarianism« in religious matters easily turns into cynicism and overt contempt for what one professes to believe. *M 664C*, asked about his religious views, answers:

»Oh, I don't pay much attention ... I believe in God and all that stuff but that is about all.«

The choice of the word »stuff« refutes the statement in which it occurs. One effect of neutralization in such cases is that little is left of God but the object of swearing.

The nihilistic aspect of the configuration here under consideration is clearly indicated in the case of the murderer *M 651*.

»The part I like about it is the fact that it makes other people happy, though it doesn't concern me, and you see so much hypocrisy. ...«

Asked what is most important in religion, he says:

»Belief, I think that belief is everything. That is the thing that holds you together.«

When this is pursued by the interviewer who wants to find out something about the subject's own religious feelings, he answers:

»... I believe when you die you are through. ... Life is short and eternity is forever. How could God send you to Hell for eternity, just on the basis of a short lifetime's record ... it doesn't seem to be either merciful or just.«

This material is indicative of relationships among abstract belief in power, rejection of the more concrete and personal aspects of religion, particularly the idea of an eternal life, and thinly veiled impulses toward violence. As this violence is taboo within the individual, particularly in situations such as a prison, it is projected upon a Deity. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that an entirely abstract idea of the almighty Deity, as it prevailed during the eighteenth century, could be reconciled much more easily with the »scientific spirit« than could the doctrine of an immortal soul, with its »magical« connotations. The process of demythification liquidates traces of animism earlier and more radically than it does the philosophical idea of the Absolute.

It may be noted, however, that just the opposite tendency can be observed among addicts of astrology and spiritualism. They often believe in the immortality of the soul, but strongly deny the existence of God, because of some kind of pantheism which ultimately results in exaltation of nature. Thus, case *M 651*, not quite consistently with his previous confes-

sion of religiousness for extraneous reasons, comes out with the statement that he:

believes in astrology because he doesn't believe in God.

There is reason to believe that the ultimate consequence of this attitude is sinister.

### 3. The Irreligious Low Scorer

The difference between irreligious and religious low scorers may correspond to a difference between rational and emotional determinants of freedom from prejudice. Subject *M 203* is characteristic of the former. He may be regarded as a genuine liberal with a somewhat abstract, rationalistic mentality. His antireligious attitude is based not so much on political persuasions as on a general positivistic outlook. He rejects religion for »logical reasons« but differentiates between »Christian ethics,« which he regards as falling in line with his progressive views, and »organized religion.« Originally, his antireligious attitude may have been derived from anticonventional rebellion: »I went to church because I was expected to.«

This rebellion is somewhat vaguely rationalized as being of a purely logical nature, perhaps on account of some unconscious guilt feelings. (He is unemotional and apathetic in a way suggesting neurotic traits, possibly a disturbance in his relation to objects.) His rational critique of religion is formulated as follows:

»But I was always pretty skeptical of it; I thought it kind of phony, narrow, bigoted and snobbish, hypocritical ... unsemantic, you might say. It violates the whole Christian ethics.«

Religion is here experienced both as a humanizing factor (Christian ethics) and as a repressing agency. There can be no doubt that this ambiguity has its basis in the double function of religion itself throughout history and it should, therefore, not be attributed solely to subjective factors.

The term hypocritical, used by *M 203*, occurs very frequently in the interviews of low scorers, and sometimes in those of high scorers, usually with reference to the organization of the church in contrast to »genuine« religious values. This expresses the historical emancipation of subjective religious experience from institutionalized religion. The hatred of the hypocrite, however, may work in two ways, either as a force toward enlightenment or as a rationalization of cynicism and contempt for man. It seems that the use of the term hypocrite, like that of the term »snob« obtains more and more the connotation of envy and resentment. It denounces those who »regard themselves as something better« in order to glorify the average and to establish something plain and supposedly natural as the norm.<sup>9</sup> The struggle against the lie is often a mere pretext for coming into the open with destructive motives rationalized by the supposed »hypocrisy« and »uppishness« of others.

This phenomenon can be understood against the



background of democratized culture. The critique of religion as »hypocritical,« a critique which in Europe was either confined to small intellectual layers or countered by metaphysical philosophy, is in this country as widespread as Christian religion itself. Part of the ambivalence toward religion can be accounted for by the simultaneous ubiquity of both the Christian heritage and the »spirit of science.« This double cultural ubiquity may favor an inconsistent attitude toward religion without necessarily involving the individual's psychological make-up.

The fact that America, for all its interest in science, is still close to a religious climate may help to explain a more general trait of irreligious low scorers: their actual or fictitious »negative« conversion. Thus, for example, 5028 and 5058, like *M 203*, report that they »broke away« from religion. In American culture one is rarely »born« as an irreligious person: one becomes irreligious through conflicts of childhood or adolescence, and these dynamics favor nonconformist sympathies which, in turn, go with opposition to prejudice.

That a subject is consciously irreligious under the prevailing cultural conditions suggests the existence of a certain strength of the ego. An example is *M 202*, our »conservative but not fascist« person (see pp. [324, 404]), who scores extremely low on the E scale.

As a child subject was very religious. He went to church with his family every Sunday and he would »fall on my knees in the street« to pray for something. At the age of 19 he changed. He became disgusted by the gossip in church. They would tell him things about someone that were »none of their damned business.« Also these people would come and testify in church and do bad things again. He could not understand this inconsistency in their actions.

In this case the antireligious attitude, as far as it goes, is overtly derived from resentment against outside interference with individual liberty and this, be it noted, is hardly less an element in American ideology than is Christianity itself. Here, as in many other respects, individual, psychological ambivalence toward religion on the part of the subject reflects objective antagonism in our culture.

*M 310*, a genuine liberal, offers another example of the rebellious feature in irreligiousness. The subject, who rejects Christian tradition altogether, is the child of religious parents. He admits no open conflict with them, although relations with them were apparently very cool. In all probability he displaced his rebellion against the family upon their religion, thus avoiding the trouble of undergoing difficulties of a more personal kind. Often enough, strong ideological attachments or oppositions can be understood as such dis-

placements of family conflicts, a device which allows the individual to express his hostilities on a level of rationalization and so dispense with the necessity of deep emotional entanglements – and which also allows the youngster to remain within the family shelter. It may also be in some respects more gratifying to attack the infinite father than to attack the finite one. It should be emphasized, however, that the term rationalization does not imply, here or elsewhere, the allegation *untrue*. Rationalization is a psychological aspect of thinking which by itself decides neither truth nor untruth. A decision on this matter depends entirely on the objective merits of the idea in which the process of rationalization terminates.

In contrast to those irreligious low scorers who underwent a »negative« conversion are *easy-going* low scorers such as *M 711*. His negative attitude toward religion is marked not so much by opposition as by an indifference that involves the element of a somewhat humorous self-reflection. This subject professes rather frankly a certain confusion in religious matters but in a way which suggests that his apparent weakness is allowed to manifest itself on the basis of some considerable underlying strength of character. With people like him it is as if they could afford to profess intellectual inconsistencies because they find more security in their own character structure and in the depth

of their experience than in clear-cut, well-organized, highly rationalized convictions. When asked about his attitude toward religion, he answers:

»I don't really have any (laughs). More or less an absence of views. On organized religion I suppose I am confused (laughs) if anything.«

He does not need to reject religion because he is not under its spell; there are no traces of ambivalence, and therefore no signs of hatred, but rather a kind of humane and detached understanding. The religious idea he accepts is tolerance, in a characteristically nonconventional way demonstrated by his choice of negative expressions rather than high sounding »ideals.« »I think I became aware of intolerance.« But he does not use this awareness for ego enhancement but is rather inclined to attribute his religious emancipation to external accidental factors:

»If I'd stayed in Denver, I'd probably attended a church. I don't know. I don't think of it; I don't feel the need of organized religion particularly.«

Interesting is this subject's discussion of prayer. He admits the psychological efficacy of prayer, but is aware that this »therapeutic« aspect of religion is incompatible with the idea of religion itself. He regards

prayer as a kind of autosuggestion, which could »accomplish results« but »I certainly don't see there is anyone on the receiving end.«

This subject makes the bizarre but strangely profound statement:

»My religious curiosity did not last very long. Probably took up photography (laughs) about that time.«

Only an interpretation making full use of psychoanalytic categories would do justice to this sentence. The link between his early interest in religion and the later one in photography is apparently curiosity, the desire to »see« things – a sublimation of voyeurism. It is as if photography in a somewhat infantile way would fulfill the wish for »imagery« which underlies certain trends in religion and is at the same time put under a heavy taboo by both Judaism and Protestantism. This may be corroborated by the fact that the subject during his religious phase was attracted by theosophy, by religious ways of thinking which promised to »lift the curtain.«

It should be noted that this subject's attitude toward atheism is no more »radical« than is his Opposition to religion.<sup>10</sup> He says:

»Well, I don't think any more about atheists than anything else. As a matter of fact I talked with several people who

profess to be atheists and they don't even seem to agree. Perhaps I am an atheist (laughs) ... you get into semantics, really. Professional atheists ... just impress me as doing it because it seems to be a stunt. Don Quixote battling windmills.«

This may be indicative of the easy-going person's suspicion of the »ticket,« his awareness of the tendency of any rigid formula to degenerate into a mere piece of propaganda.<sup>11</sup>

Incidentally, the subject senses clearly what was formulated one hundred years ago in Baudelaire's Diary: that atheism becomes obsolescent in a world the objective spirit of which is essentially areligious. The meaning of atheism undergoes historical changes. What was one of the decisive impulses of the eighteenth century Enlightenment may function today as a manifestation of provincial sectarianism or even as a paranoid system. Half-mad Nazis such as Mathilde Ludendorff fought, besides the Jews and the Free Masons, the Roman-Catholics as an *ultra-montan* conspiracy directed against Germany, transforming the tradition of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* into a pattern of persecution mania.

## 4. Religious Low Scorers

A clear-cut example of a religious low scorer is the somewhat sketchy interview of *F 132*, a young woman brought up in India where her parents are missionaries. Her combining positive Christianity with an outspoken concrete idea of tolerance (»equality for everyone«) is derived from »life experience with the Indians.« She is passionate in matters of racial understanding. However, her church affiliations make it impossible for her to draw the political consequences from her tolerance idea:

»I don't like Ghandi. I don't like radical people. He is a radical. He has done much to upset and disunite the country.«

Her association with the church involves an element of that religious conventionalism which is usually associated with ethnocentrism. In spite of her closeness to the church and to theological doctrine, her religious outlook has a practical coloring.

»It (religion) means a great deal. It makes a person happier – more satisfied. Gives them peace of mind. You know where you stand and have something to work for – an example to follow. Hope for an after-life. Yes, I believe in

immortality.«<sup>12</sup>

This girl is probably atypical in many ways because of her colonial upbringing as well as because of the mixture of »official« religiosity and more spontaneous religious humanism. Her particular attitude is probably due, on the surface level at least, to her insight into ingroup-outgroup problems. However, this example seems to offer some support for the hypothesis that only fully conscious, very articulate, unconventional Christians are likely to be free of ethnocentrism. At any rate, the rareness of religious low scorers in our sample is significant. As indicated above, the composition of the sample itself may be responsible for this. However, this rarity suggests something more fundamental. The tendency of our society to become split into »progressive« and »*status quo*« camps may be accompanied by a tendency of all persons who cling to religion, as a part of the *status quo*, also to assume other features of the *status quo* ideology which are associated with the ethnocentric outlook. Whether this is true or whether religion can produce effective trends in opposition to prejudice, could be elucidated only after much extensive research.



## Fußnoten

[1 R. Nevitt Sanford, »Ethnocentrism in Relation to Some Religious Attitudes and Practices,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 208–221.]

2 Maurice Samuel, *The Great Hatred* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940).

3 Joshua Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943).

4 A detailed theoretical analysis of the relationship between Christianity and anti-Semitism has been contributed by Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, »Elemente des Antisemitismus,« *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam: Querido Verlag N.V., 1947) [GS 3].

5 The interaction between revivalism, religious subjectivism, and fascist propaganda has been analysed in detail by T.W. Adorno, »The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Speeches« [GS 9.1, ⇨ pp. 7ff.].

[6 GS 9.1, ⇨ pp. 270ff.]

7 This attitude, that of a homespun psychologist as it were, can also be found in low scorers. The characte-

ristic configuration to be found in high scorers, however, seems to be the unresolved contradiction between a critical attitude toward religion as an objectivity and a positive attitude toward it for purely subjective reasons. It is characteristic of the prejudiced mentality as a whole that he stops thinking at certain contradictions and leaves them as they are, which implies both intellectual defeatism and authoritarian submissiveness. This mechanism of arbitrarily giving up processes by command of the ego, as it were, is often misinterpreted as »stupidity.«

[8 William R. Morrow, »Criminality and Antidemocratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 817–890.]

9 Cf. the section on F.D.R. in Chapter XVII [above, pp. 380ff.]

10 The »easy-going« low scorer is rarely radical in any respect. This, however, does not make him a middle-of-the-roader. He is persistently aware of the nonidentity between concept and reality. He is fundamentally nontotalitarian. This is behind his specific idea of tolerance.

11 More material on this subject is presented in Chapter XIX [see below, pp. 454ff.]

12 It would be a tempting task to analyze the change of meaning undergone by the word »belief.« It illustrates most clearly religious neutralization. Formerly the idea of belief was emphatically related to the religious dogma. Today it is applied to practically everything which a subject feels the right to have as his own, as his »opinion« (for everybody is entitled to have opinion) without subjecting it to any criteria of objective truth. The secularization of »believing« is accompanied by arbitrariness of that which one believes: it is moulded after the preferences for one or the other commodity and has little relation to the idea of truth. (»I don't believe in parking,« said a conventional high-scoring girl in her interview.) This use of belief is almost an equivalent of the hackneyed, »I like it,« which is about to lose any meaning. (Cf. the statement of Mack, given in Chapter II, »I like the history and sayings of Christ.« [*The Authoritarian Personality*, P. 35].)

## Chapter XIX

### Types and Syndromes

#### A. The Approach

Hardly any concept in contemporary American psychology has been so thoroughly criticized as that of typology. Since »any doctrine of types is a halfway approach to the problem of individuality, and nothing more,«<sup>1</sup> any such doctrine is subject to devastating attacks from both extremes: because it never catches the unique, and because its generalizations are not statistically valid and do not even afford productive heuristic tools. From the viewpoint of general dynamic theory of personality, it is objected that typologies tend towards pigeonholing and transform highly flexible traits into static, quasi-biological characteristics while neglecting, above all, the impact of historical and social factors. Statistically, the insufficiency of twofold typologies is particularly emphasized. As to the heuristic value of typologies, their overlapping, and the necessity of constructing »mixed types« which practically disavow the original constructs, is pointed out. At the hub of all these arguments is aversion against the application of rigid concepts to the supposedly

fluid reality of psychological life.

The development of modern psychological typologies, as contrasted, for example, with the old scheme of »temperaments,« has its origin in psychiatry, in the therapeutic need for a classification of mental diseases as a means of facilitating diagnosis and prognosis. Kraepelin and Lombroso are the fathers of psychiatric typology. Since the clear-cut division of mental diseases has in the meantime completely broken down, the basis of typological classifications of the »normal,« derived from the former, seems to vanish. It is stigmatized as a remnant of the »taxonomic« phase of behavior theory the formulation of which »tended to remain descriptive, static and sterile.«<sup>2</sup> If not even the mentally diseased, whose psychological dynamics are largely replaced by rigid patterns, can be sensibly divided according to types, how, then, is there any chance of success for procedures such as the famous one of Kretschmer, the *raison d'être* of which was the standard classification of manic-depression and dementia praecox?

The present state of the discussion on typology is summed up by Anne Anastasi as follows:

»Type theories have been most commonly criticized because of their attempt to classify individuals into sharply divided categories. ... [S]uch a procedure implies a *multi-modal* distribution of traits. The introverts, for ex-

ample, would be expected to cluster at one end of the scale, the extroverts at the other end, and the point of demarcation between them should be clearly apparent. Actual measurement, however, reveals a uni-modal distribution of all traits, which closely resembles the bell-shaped normal curve.

Similarly, it is often difficult to classify a given individual definitely into one type or the other. The typologists, when confronted with this difficulty, have frequently proposed intermediate or ›mixed‹ types to bridge the gap between the extremes. Thus Jung suggested an ambivert type which manifests neither introvert nor extrovert tendencies to a predominant degree. Observation seems to show, however, that the ambivert category is the largest, and the decided introverts and extroverts are relatively rare. The reader is referred, for example, to the distribution curve obtained by Heidebreder with an introversion questionnaire administered to 200 college students (Ch. II). It will be recalled that the majority of scores were intermediate and that as the extremes of either introversion or extroversion were approached, the number of cases became progressively smaller. The curve, too, showed no sharp breaks, but only a continuous gradation from the mean to the two extremes. As was indicated in Chapter II, the same may be said of all other measurable traits of the individual, whether social, emotional, intellectual, or physical.

It is apparent, then, that insofar as type theories imply the classification of individuals into clear-cut classes, they are untenable in the face of a mass of indisputable data. Such an assumption, however, is not necessarily inherent in all systems of human typology. It is more characteristic

of the popular versions and adaptations of type theories than of the original concepts. To be sure, type psychologists have often attempted to categorize individuals, but this was not an indispensable part of their theories; their concepts have occasionally been sufficiently modified to admit of a normal distribution of traits.«<sup>3</sup>

In spite of such concessions to more satisfactory categorizations, the »nominalistic« exclusion of typological classifications has triumphed to such a degree that it is almost tantamount to a taboo, no matter how urgent the scientific and pragmatic need for such classifications may be. It should be noted that this taboo is closely related to the notion, still taught by numerous academic psychiatrists, that mental diseases are essentially inexplicable. If one would assume, for the argument's sake, that psychoanalytic theory has really succeeded in establishing a number of dynamic schemata of psychoses, by which the latter become »meaningful« within the psychological life of the individual in spite of all their irrationality and the disintegration of the psychotic personality, the problem of typology would be completely redefined.

It cannot be doubted that the critique of psychological types expresses a truly humane impulse, directed against that kind of subsumption of individuals under pre-established classes which has been consummated in Nazi Germany, where the labeling of live human

beings, independently of their specific qualities, resulted in decisions about their life and death. It is this motive which has been stressed particularly by Allport;<sup>4</sup> and Boder has demonstrated in great detail in his study of »Nazi Science« the interconnections of psychological *pro et contra* schemes, the repressive function of categories such as Jaensch's »*Gegentypus*« and the arbitrary manipulation of empirical findings.<sup>5</sup> Thus, enquiries devoted to the study of prejudice have to be particularly cautious when the issue of typology comes up. To express it pointedly, the rigidity of constructing types is itself indicative of that »stereopathic« mentality which belongs to the basic constituents of the potentially fascist character. We need only to refer, in this connection, to our high scorer of Irish descent who attributes his personal traits unhesitatingly to his national extraction. Jaensch's »anti-type,« for example, is an almost classic case of the mechanism of projection, the effectiveness of which in the make-up of our high scorers has been established, and which in Jaensch's has wormed its way into the very same science whose task it would be to account for this mechanism. The essentially undynamic, »anti-sociological,« and *quasi*-biological nature of classifications of the Jaensch brand is directly opposed to the theory of our work as well as to its empirical results.<sup>6</sup>

Yet all these objections do not dispose altogether



of the problem of typology. Not all typologies are devices for dividing the world into sheep and buck, but some of them reflect certain experiences which, though hard to systematize, have, to put it as loosely as possible, hit upon something. Here one has to think primarily of Kretschmer, Jung, and Freud. It should be particularly emphasized that Freud, whose general emphasis on psychological dynamics puts him above the suspicion of any simple »biologism« and stereotypical thinking, published as late as 1931<sup>7</sup> a rather categorical typology without bothering much about the methodological difficulties of which he must have been aware very well, and even, with apparent naïveté, constructing »mixed« types out of the basic ones. Freud was too much led by concrete insights into the matters themselves, had too intimate a relationship to his scientific objects, to waste his energy on the kind of methodological reflections which may well turn out to be acts of sabotage of organized science against productive thinking. This is not to say that his typology has to be accepted as it stands. Not only can it be criticized by the usual antitypological arguments to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter; as Otto Fenichel has pointed out, it is also problematic from the viewpoint of orthodox psychoanalytic theory. What counts, however, is that Freud found such a classification worthwhile. One has

only to look at the relatively easy and convincing integration of different kinds of twofold typologies in Donald W. MacKinnon's »Structure of Personality«<sup>8</sup> to gain the impression that typologies are not altogether arbitrary, do not necessarily do violence to the manifoldness of the human, but have some basis in the structure of psychological reality.

The reason for the persistent plausibility of the typological approach, however, is not a static biological one, but just the opposite: dynamic and social. The fact that human society has been up to now divided into classes affects more than the external relations of men. The marks of social repression are left within the individual soul. The French sociologist Durkheim in particular has shown how and to what extent hierarchical social orders permeate the individual's thinking, attitudes, and behavior. People form psychological »classes,« inasmuch as they are stamped by variegated social processes. This in all probability holds good for our own standardized mass culture to an even higher degree than for previous periods. The relative rigidity of our high scorers, and of some of our low scorers, reflects psychologically the increasing rigidity according to which our society falls into two more or less crude opposing camps. Individualism, opposed to inhuman pigeonholing, may ultimately become a mere ideological veil in a society which ac-

tually *is* inhuman and whose intrinsic tendency towards the »subsumption« of everything shows itself by the classification of people themselves. In other words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer, or rather never were, »individuals« in the sense of traditional nineteenth-century philosophy. Ticket thinking is possible only because the actual existence of those who indulge in it is largely determined by »tickets«: standardized, opaque, and overpowering social processes which leave to the »individual« but little freedom for action and true individuation. Thus the problem of typology is put on a different basis. There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and »produces« different »types« of persons. Only by identifying stereotypical traits in modern humans, and not by denying their existence, can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classification and subsumption be challenged.

The construction of psychological types does not merely imply an arbitrary, compulsive attempt to bring some »order« into the confusing diversity of human personality. It represents a means of »conceptualizing« this diversity, according to its own structure, of achieving closer understanding. The radical renunciation of all generalizations beyond those per-

taining to the most obvious findings would not result in true empathy into human individuals but rather in an opaque, dull description of psychological »facts«: every step which goes beyond the factual and aims at psychological meaning – as it has been defined in Freud's basic statement that all our experiences are meaningful (*»dass alle unsere Erlebnisse einen Sinn haben«*) – inevitably involves generalizations transcending the supposedly unique »case,« and it happens that these generalizations more frequently than not imply the existence of certain regularly recurring *nuclei* or syndromes which come rather close to the idea of »types.« Ideas such as those of orality, or of the compulsive character, though apparently derived from highly individualized studies, make sense only if they are accompanied by the implicit assumption that the structures thus named, and discovered within the individual dynamics of an individual, pertain to such basic constellations that they may be expected to be representative, no matter how »unique« the observations upon which they are based may be. Since there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological theory, it would be spurious to exclude typology *per se*. Methodological »purity« in this respect would be tantamount to renouncing the conceptual medium or any theoretical penetration of the given material, and would result in an irrationality as

complete as the arbitrary subsumptiveness of the »pigeonholing« schools.

Within the context of our study, another reflection of an entirely different nature points in the same direction. It is a pragmatic one: the necessity that science provide weapons against the potential threat of the fascist mentality. It is an open question whether and to what extent the fascist danger really can be fought with psychological weapons. Psychological »treatment« of prejudiced persons is problematic because of their large number as well as because they are by no means »ill,« in the usual sense, and, as we have seen, at least on the surface level are often even better »adjusted« than the nonprejudiced ones. Since, however, modern fascism is inconceivable without a mass basis, the inner complexion of its prospective followers still maintains its crucial significance, and no defense which does not take into account the subjective phase of the problem would be truly »realistic.« It is obvious that psychological countermeasures, in view of the extent of the fascist potential among modern masses, are promising only if they are differentiated in such a way that they are adapted to specific groups. An over-all defense would move on a level of such vague generalities that it would in all probability fall flat. It may be regarded as one of the practical results of our study that such a differentiation has at

least to be *also* one which follows psychological lines, since certain basic variables of the fascist character persist relatively independently of marked social differentiations. There is no psychological defense against prejudice which is not oriented toward certain psychological »types.« We would make a fetish of the methodological critique of typology and jeopardize each attempt of coming psychologically to grips with prejudiced persons if a number of very drastic and extreme differences – such as the one between the psychological make-up of a conventional anti-Semite and a sado-masochistic »tough guy« – were excluded simply because none of these types is ever represented in classic purity by a single individual.

The possibility of constructing largely different sets of psychological types has been widely recognized. As the result of the previous discussions, we base our own attempt on the three following major criteria:

- a. We do not want to classify human beings by types which divide them neatly statistically, nor by ideal types in the usual sense which have to be supplemented by »mixtures.« Our types are justified only if we succeed in organizing, under the name of each type, a number of traits and dispositions, in bringing them into a context which shows some unity of meaning in those traits. We regard those types as being scientifically most productive which integrate traits,

otherwise dispersed, into meaningful continuities and bring to the fore the interconnection of elements which belong together according to their inherent »logic,« in terms of psychological understanding of underlying dynamics. No mere additive or mechanical subsumption of traits under the same type should be permitted. A major criterion for this postulate would be that, confronted with »genuine« types, even so-called deviations would no longer appear as accidental but would be recognizable as meaningful, in a structural sense. Speaking genetically, the consistency of meaning of each type would suggest that as many traits as possible can be deduced from certain basic forms of underlying psychological conflicts, and their resolutions.

b. Our typology has to be a *critical* typology in the sense that it comprehends the typification of men itself as a social function. The more rigid a type, the more deeply does he show the hallmarks of social rubber stamps. This is in accordance with the characterization of our high scorers by traits such as rigidity and stereotypical thinking. Here lies the ultimate principle of our whole typology. Its major dichotomy lies in the question of whether a person is standardized himself and thinks in a standardized way, or whether he is truly »individualized« and opposes standardization in the sphere of human experience. The indivi-

dual types will be specific configurations within this general division. The latter differentiates *prima facie* between high and low scorers. At closer view, however, it also affects the low scorers themselves: the more they are »typified« themselves, the more they express unwittingly the fascist potential within themselves.<sup>9</sup>

c. The types must be constructed in such a way that they may become productive pragmatically, that is to say, that they can be translated into relatively drastic defense patterns which are organized in such a way that differences of a more individual nature play but a minor role. This makes for a certain conscious »superficiality« of typification, comparable to the situation in a sanatorium where no therapy could ever be initiated if one did not divide the patients into manic-depressives, schizophrenics, paranoiacs, and so forth, though one is fully aware of the fact that these distinctions are likely to vanish the deeper one goes. In this connection, however, the hypothesis may be allowed that if one could only succeed in going deep *enough*, at the end of the differentiation just the more universal »crude« structure would reappear: some basic libidinous constellations. An analogy from the history of the arts may be permitted. The traditional, crude distinction between Romanesque and Gothic style was based on the characteristic of round and pointed ar-



ches. It became apparent that this division was insufficient; that both traits were overlapping and that there were much deeper-lying contrasts of construction between the two styles. This, however, led to such complicated definitions that it proved impossible to state in their terms whether a given building was Romanesque or Gothic in character though its structural totality rarely left any doubt to the observer to which epoch it belonged. Thus it ultimately became necessary to resume the primitive and naive classification. Something similar may be advisable in the case of our problem. An apparently superficial question such as »What kind of people do you find among the prejudiced?« may easily do more justice to typological requirements than the attempt to define types at first sight by, say, different fixations at pregenital or genital developmental phases and the like. This indispensable simplification can probably be achieved by the integration of *sociological* criteria into the psychological constructs. Such sociological criteria may refer to the group memberships and identifications of our subjects as well as to social aims, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. The task of relating psychological type criteria to sociological ones is facilitated because it has been established in the course of our study that a number of »clinical« categories (such as the adulation of a punitive father) are intimately related to so-

cial attitudes (such as belief in authority for authority's sake). Hence, we may well »translate« for the hypothetical purposes of a typology a number of our basic psychological concepts into sociological ones most closely akin to them.

These considerations have to be supplemented by a requirement prescribed by the nature of our study. Our typology, or rather, scheme of syndromes, has to be organized in such a way that it fits as »naturally« as possible our empirical data. It should be borne in mind that our material does not exist in an empty space, as it were, but that it is structurally predetermined by our tools, particularly the questionnaire and the interview schedule. Since our hypotheses were formulated according to psychoanalytic theory, the orientation of our syndromes toward psychoanalytic concepts is reinforced. Of course, the limitations of such an attempt are narrow since we did not »analyze« any of our subjects. Our characterization of syndromes has to concentrate on traits that have proved to be psychoanalytically significant rather than on the ultimate dynamic patterns of depth psychology.

In order to place the following typological draft into its proper perspective, it should be recalled that we have pointed out in the chapter on the F scale that all the clusters of which this scale is made up belong to one single, »over-all« syndrome. It is one of the

outstanding findings of the study that »highness« is essentially *one* syndrome, distinguishable from a variety of »low« syndromes. There exists something like »the« potentially fascist character, which is by itself a »structural unit.« In other words, traits such as conventionality, authoritarian submissiveness and aggressiveness, projectivity, manipulativeness, etc., regularly go together. Hence, the »subsyndromes« which we outline here are not intended to *isolate* any of these traits. They are all to be understood within the general frame of reference of the high scorer. What differentiates them is the emphasis on one or another of the features or dynamics selected for characterization, not their exclusiveness. However, it seems to us that the differential profiles arising within the overall structure can readily be distinguished. At the same time, their interconnection by the over-all potentially fascist structure is of such a nature that they are »dynamic« in the sense that transitions from one to the other could easily be worked out by analyzing the increase or decrease of some of the specific factors. Such a dynamic interpretation of them could achieve more adequately – that is to say, with a better understanding of the underlying processes – what is usually done in a haphazard way by the »mixed types« of static typologies. However, theory and empirical substantiation of these dynamic relations among the syndromes could

not be touched upon within the present research.

The principle according to which the syndromes are organized is their »type-being« in the sense of rigidity, lack of cathexis, stereopathy. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the order of our syndromes represents a more dynamic »scale of measurement.« It pertains to potentialities, and accessibility to counter-measures, but not to overt prejudice – basically to the problem of »over-all highness« vs. »lowness.« It will be seen, for example, that the case illustrating the psychologically relatively harmless syndrome at the bottom of our scheme is extremely high in terms of overt antiminority prejudice.

Pragmatic requirements as well as the idea that the high scorers are generally more »typed« than the low scorers seem to focus our interest on the prejudiced person. Yet we deem it necessary also to construct syndromes of low scorers. The general direction of our research leads us to stress, with a certain one-sidedness, psychological determinants. This, however, should never make us forget that prejudice is by no means an entirely psychological, »subjective« phenomenon. It has to be remembered what we pointed out in Chapter XVII[10]: that »high« ideology and mentality are largely fomented by the objective spirit of our society. Whereas different individuals react differently, according to their psychological make-up, to the

ubiquitous cultural stimuli of prejudice, the objective element of prejudice cannot be neglected if we want to understand the attitudes of individuals or psychological groups. It is therefore not sufficient to ask: »Why is this or that individual ethnocentric?« but rather: »Why does he react positively to the omnipresent stimuli, to which this other man reacts negatively?« The potentially fascist character has to be regarded as a product of interaction between the cultural climate of prejudice and the »psychological« responses to this climate. The former consists not only of crude outside factors, such as economic and social conditions, but of opinions, ideas, attitudes, and behavior which appear to be the individual's but which have originated neither in his autonomous thinking nor in his self-sufficient psychological development but are due to his belonging to our culture. These objective patterns are so pervasive in their influence that it is just as much of a problem to explain why an individual resists them as it is to explain why they are accepted. In other words, the low scorers present just as much of a psychological problem as do the high scorers, and only by understanding them can we obtain a picture of the objective momentum of prejudice. Thus the construction of »low« syndromes becomes imperative. Naturally, they have been chosen in such a way as to fit as well as possible with our general principles of organi-

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zation. Yet it should not come as a surprise that they are more loosely interconnected than the »high« ones.

The syndromes to be discussed have been developed gradually. They go back to a typology of anti-Semites worked out and published by the Institute of Social Research.<sup>11</sup> This scheme was modified and extended to the low scorers during the present research. In its new form, which emphasized the more psychological aspects, it was applied particularly to the Los Angeles sample; the interviewers here tried as far as possible to ascertain the relation between their case findings and the hypothetical types. The syndromes which are presented here are the result of the modifications which this draft underwent on the basis of our empirical findings, and of continuous theoretical critique. Still, they have to be regarded as tentative, as an intermediate step between theory and empirical data. For further research, they need redefinition in terms of quantifiable criteria. The justification of presenting them now lies in the fact that they may serve as guides for this future research. Each syndrome is illustrated by a profile of one characteristic case, mainly on the basis of the interview protocol of each person selected.

## B. Syndromes Found Among High Scorers

A rough characterization of the several types may precede their detailed presentation. *Surface Resentment* can easily be recognized in terms of justified or unjustified social anxieties; our construct does not say anything about the psychological fixations or defense mechanisms underlying the pattern of opinion. With the *Conventional* pattern, of course, acceptance of conventional values is outstanding. The superego was never firmly established and the individual is largely under the sway of its external representatives. The most obvious underlying motive is the fear of »being different.« The *Authoritarian* type is governed by the superego and has continuously to contend with strong and highly ambivalent id tendencies. He is driven by the fear of being weak. In the *Tough Guy* the repressed id tendencies gain the upper hand, but in a stunted and destructive form. Both the *Crank* and the *Manipulative* types seem to have resolved the Oedipus complex through a narcissistic withdrawal into their inner selves. Their relation to the outer world, however, varies. The cranks have largely replaced outward reality by an imaginary inner world; concomitantly, their main characteristic is projectivity and their main fear is that the inner world will be »conta-



minated« by contact with dreaded reality: they are beset by heavy taboos, in Freud's language by the *dé-lire de toucher*. The manipulative individual avoids the danger of psychosis by reducing outer reality to a mere object of action: thus he is incapable of any positive cathexis. He is even more compulsive than the authoritarian, and his compulsiveness seems to be completely ego-alien: he did not achieve the transformation of an externally coercive power into a superego. Complete rejection of any urge to love is his most outstanding defense.

In our sample, the conventional and the authoritarian types seem to be by far the most frequent.

## 1. Surface Resentment

The phenomenon to be discussed here is not on the same logical level as the various »types« of high and low scorers characterized afterwards. As a matter of fact, it is not in and of itself a psychological »type,« but rather a condensation of the more rational, either conscious or preconscious, manifestations of prejudice, in so far as they can be distinguished from more deep-lying, unconscious aspects. We may say that there are a number of people who »belong together« in terms of more or less rational motivations, whereas the remainder of our »high« syndromes are characterized by the relative absence or spuriousness of rational motivation which, in their case, has to be recognized as a mere »rationalization.« This does not mean, however, that those high scorers whose prejudiced statements show a certain rationality *per se* are exempt from the psychological mechanisms of the fascist character. Thus the example we offer is high not only on the F scale but on all scales: she has the *generality* of prejudiced outlook which we have taken as evidence that underlying personality trends were the ultimate determinants. Still, we feel that the phenomenon of »Surface Resentment,« though generally nourished by deeper instinctual sources, should not be entirely ne-

glected in our discussion since it represents a sociological aspect of our problem which might be underestimated in its importance for the fascist potential if we concentrate entirely on psychological description and etiology.

We refer here to people who accept stereotypes of prejudice from outside, as ready-made formulae, as it were, in order to rationalize and – psychologically or actually – overcome overt difficulties of their own existence. While their personalities are unquestionably those of high scorers, the stereotype of prejudice as such does not appear to be too much libidinized, and it generally maintains a certain rational or pseudorational level. There is no complete break between their experience and their prejudice: both are often explicitly contrasted one with the other. These subjects are able to present relatively sensible reasons for their prejudice, and are accessible to rational argumentation. Here belongs the discontented, grumbling family father who is happy if somebody else can be blamed for his own economic failures, and even happier if he can derive material advantages from antiminority discrimination, or the actually or potentially »vanquished competitors,« such as small retailers, economically endangered by chain stores, which they suppose to be owned by Jews. We may also think of anti-Semitic Negroes in Harlem who have to pay excessive rents to

Jewish collectors. But these people are spread over all those sectors of economic life where one has to feel the pinch of the process of concentration without seeing through its mechanism, while at the same time still maintaining one's economic function.

5043, a housewife with extremely high scores on the scales who »had often been heard discussing the Jews in the neighborhood,« but is »a very friendly, middle-aged« person who »enjoys harmless gossip,« expressed high respect for science and takes a serious though somewhat repressed interest in painting. She »has fears about economic competition from zootsuits« and »the interview revealed that similar attitudes are strongly held about Negroes.« She »has experienced quite a severe comedown in terms of status and economic security since her youth. Her father was an extremely wealthy ranch owner.«

Although her husband was making a good living as a stock broker when she married him in 1927, the stock-market crash and the ensuing depression made it necessary for her to grapple with economic problems, and finally it even became necessary for them to move in with her wealthy mother-in-law. This situation has caused some friction while at the same time relieving her of a great deal of responsibility. In general, the subject seems to identify herself with the upper middle-class, thus striking a balance between her upper-class background and her present precarious middle-class position. Although

she does not admit this into her ego, the loss of money and status must have been very painful to her; and her strong prejudice against Jews infiltrating the neighborhood may be directly related to her fear of sinking »lower« on the economic scale.

The consistently high scores of this subject are explained by the interviewer on the basis of a »generally uncritical attitude« (she always »agrees very much« on the questionnaire) rather than by an active, fascist bias, which does not come out in the interview. Characteristic is the relative absence of serious family conflicts.

She was never severely disciplined; on the contrary, both parents tended to give in to her wishes and she was ostensibly their favorite. ... There was never any serious friction and, continuing through the present, the relationship among the siblings and the family in general is still very close.

The reason why she was chosen as a representative of »Surface Resentment« is her attitude in race questions. She »shows a very strong prejudice towards all minority groups« and »regards the Jews as a problem,« her stereotypes following »pretty much the traditional pattern« which she has taken over mechanically from outside. But »she does not feel

that *all* Jews necessarily exhibit all the characteristics. Also she does not believe that they can be distinguished by looks or any special characteristics, except that they are loud and often aggressive.

The last quotation shows that she does not regard those features of the Jews which she incriminates as inborn and natural. Neither rigid projection nor destructive punitiveness is involved:

With regard to the Jews she feels that assimilation and education will eventually solve the problem.

Her aggressiveness is evidently directed against those who might, as she fears, »take something away from her,« either economically or in status, but the Jews are no »countertype.«

Hostility is openly expressed toward the Jews who have been moving into the neighborhood as well as toward those Jews who she believes »run the movies.« She seems to fear the extension of their influence and strongly resents the »infiltration« of Jews from Europe.

She also expresses the above-mentioned differentiation between »outside« stereotypy and concrete experiences, thus keeping the door open for a mitigation of her prejudice, though, according to the interviewer, if a fascist wave should arise, »it seems likely that she

would display more hostility and quite possibly accept fascist ideology«:

Experiences with Jews have been limited to more or less impersonal contacts with only one or two closer acquaintances, whom she describes as »fine people.«

It may be added that if there is any truth in the popular »scapegoat theory« of anti-Semitism, it applies to people of her kind. Their »blind spots« are at least partly to be attributed to the narrow, »petty bourgeois« limitations of experience and explanation on which they have to draw. They see the Jew as the executor of tendencies actually inherent in the total economic process, and they put the blame upon him. It is a postulate necessary for the equilibrium of their ego that they must find some »guilt« responsible for their precarious social situation: otherwise the just order of the world would be disturbed. In all probability, they primarily seek this guilt within themselves and regard themselves, preconsciously, as »failures.« The Jews relieve them superficially of this guilt feeling. Anti-Semitism offers them the gratification of being »good« and blameless and of putting the *onus* on some visible and highly personalized entity. This mechanism has been institutionalized. Persons such as our case 5043 probably never had negative experiences with Jews, but simply adopt the externally pro-

nounced judgment because of the benefit they draw from it.



## 2. The »Conventional« Syndrome

This syndrome represents stereotypy which comes from outside, but which has been integrated within the personality as part and parcel of a general conformity. In women there is special emphasis on neatness and femininity, in men upon being a »regular« he-man. Acceptance of prevailing standards is more important than is discontent. Thinking in terms of in-group and outgroup prevails. Prejudice apparently does not fulfill a decisive function within the psychological household of the individuals, but is only a means of facile identification with the group to which they belong or to which they wish to belong. They are prejudiced in the specific sense of the term: taking over current judgments of others without having looked into the matter themselves. Their prejudice is a »matter of course,« possibly »preconscious,« and not even known to the subjects themselves. It may become articulate only under certain conditions. There is a certain antagonism between prejudice and experience; their prejudice is not »rational« inasmuch as it is little related to their own worries but at the same time, at least on the surface, it is not particularly outspoken, on account of a characteristic absence of *violent* impulses, due to wholesale acceptance of the va-

lues of civilization and »decency.« Although this syndrome includes the »well-bred anti-Semite,« it is by no means confined to upper social strata.

An illustration of the latter contention, and of the syndrome as a whole, is 5057, a 30-year-old welder, »extremely charming in manner,« whose case is summarized by the interviewer as follows:

He presents a personality and attitudinal configuration encountered rather frequently among skilled workers, and is neither vicious nor exploitive, but instead merely reflects the prejudices of his own ingroup in the fashion of the »Conventional« anti-Semite.

His acceptance of his own situation as well as his underlying concern with status is evidenced by the description of his occupational attitude:

The subject likes his work very much. He expressed absolutely no reservations about his present job. It was clear from the outset that he sees himself as a skilled craftsman, and finds in welding a chance for creative and constructive activity. He did say that one limitation is that welding is certainly not a »white-collar« job; it is physically dirty and carries with it some hazards. His satisfaction with his present work is further corroborated by his questionnaire statement that if he were not restricted in any way his occupation would be in the same line of work, perhaps on the slightly higher level of welding engineer.

His professional outlook is optimistic in a realistic way, with no indications of insecurity. His conventionalism is set against »extremes« in every respect: thus he

selected Christian Science because »it is a quieter religion than most. ... Religion should restrain you from indulgences of any kind, such as drinking, gambling, or anything to excess.« ... He has not broken away from his grandparents' teachings and hasn't ever questioned his religious beliefs.

Most characteristic of the subject's over-all attitude are the following data from his questionnaire:

Replying to the projective question, »What moods or feelings are the most unpleasant or disturbing to you?« the subject mentioned »disorder in my home or surroundings« and »the destruction of property.« The impulse which he finds hard to control is »telling people what is wrong with them.« In answering the question, »What might drive a person nuts?« he said, »Worry – A person should be able to control their mind as well as their body.«

With regard to ethnocentrism he is, in spite of his general moderateness and seeming »broad-mindedness,« in the high quartile. The specific color of his animosity attitude is provided by his special emphasis upon the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy: he does not

have, or does not like to have, »contacts« with the outgroup, and at the same time he projects upon them his own ingroup pattern and emphasizes their »clannishness.« His hostility is mitigated by his general conformity and his expressed value for »our form of government.« However, a certain rigidity of his conventional pattern is discernible in his belief in the unchangeability of the traits of the outgroup. When he experiences individuals who deviate from the pattern, he feels uneasy and seems to enter a conflict situation which tends to reinforce his hostility rather than to mitigate it. His most intense prejudice is directed against the Negroes, apparently because here the demarcation line between in- and outgroup is most drastic.

Concerning other minorities his remarks are as follows:

The biggest minority problem right now, according to the subject, is that of the Japanese-Americans »because they are coming back.« Subject feels they should be »restricted in some way and their parents deported.« As for their traits: »I have had no personal contact with them except in school where they always seemed to be good students. I have no personal dislike for them.«

When questioned as to the »Jewish problem« subject commented, »They certainly stick together. They support each other a lot more than the Protestants do.« He thinks they should not be persecuted just because they are Je-

wish. »A Jew has just as much right to freedom in the United States as anyone else.« This was followed by the statement: »I hate to see an excessive amount of them coming in from other countries. I favor complete exclusion of Jewish immigrants.«

His rejection of the Jews is primarily based on their difference from the subject's conventional ingroup ideal, and the Jews themselves are differentiated according to degrees of assimilation:

Subject can recognize a Jew by the »kinkiness« of his hair, his heavy features, his thick nose, and sometimes by his thick lips. As for Jewish »traits,« the subject remarked that there are »different types of Jews just as there are different types of Gentiles.« He spoke of the »kikey type, like those at Ocean Park,« and the »higher type, like those in Beverly Hills.«

As to the relation between stereotypy and experience,

»What contacts I have had have all been on the good side. When I was running the gas station in Beverly Hills I had to deal quite a bit with them, but I cannot remember any unfortunate experiences with them. All the experiences were rather pleasant in fact.« At this point, the subject recounted an experience with a Jewish delicatessen owner in Ocean Park. At the time the subject was 8–10 years old. He was selling magazines in this area, and went into the store to try to sell a magazine to the owner. While waiting to get the owner's attention he spied a wonderful-

looking coffee cake and wished that he could have it. The man bought the magazine and noticed the longing look on the boy's face. Apparently thinking that the boy did not have enough money to buy it, he took it out of the case, put it in a bag, and gave it to the boy. From the respondent's account of this incident, it was apparent that this gesture was both humiliating and gratifying at the same time. He recalls how embarrassed he was that the man should think that he was »poor and hungry.«

Subject believes that there are some »good« Jews as well as »bad« Jews – just as there are »good« and »bad« Gentiles. However, »Jews as a whole will never change, because they stick together close and hold to their religious ideals. They could improve the opinion that people have of them, nevertheless, by not being so greedy.« ... Would permit those Jews already here to remain, though he adds, »Jews should be allowed to return to Palestine, of course.« Further, »I would not be sorry to see them go.« With respect to the educational quota system the subject expressed his approval, though he suggested the alternative of having »separate schools established for the Jews.«

### 3. The »Authoritarian« Syndrome

This syndrome comes closest to the over-all picture of the high scorer as it stands out throughout our study. It follows the »classic« psychoanalytic pattern involving a sado-masochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex, and it has been pointed out by Erich Fromm under the title of the »authoritarian-masochistic« character.<sup>12</sup> According to Max Horkheimer's theory in the collective work of which he [Fromm] wrote the sociopsychological part, external social repression is concomitant with the internal repression of impulses. In order to achieve »internalization« of social control which never gives as much to the individual as it takes, the latter's attitude towards authority and its psychological agency, the superego, assumes an irrational aspect. The subject achieves his own social adjustment only by taking pleasure in obedience and subordination. This brings into play the sado-masochistic impulse structure both as a condition and as a result of social adjustment. In our form of society, sadistic as well as masochistic tendencies actually find gratification. The pattern for the translation of such gratifications into character traits is a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex which defines the formation of the syndrome here in question. Love for the

mother, in its primary form, comes under a severe taboo. The resulting hatred against the father is transformed by reaction-formation into love. This transformation leads to a particular kind of superego. The transformation of hatred into love, the most difficult task an individual has to perform in his early development, never succeeds completely. In the psychodynamics of the »authoritarian character,« part of the preceding aggressiveness is absorbed and turned into masochism, while another part is left over as sadism, which seeks an outlet in those with whom the subject does not identify himself: ultimately the outgroup. The Jew frequently becomes a substitute for the hated father, often assuming, on a fantasy level, the very same qualities against which the subject revolted in the father, such as being practical, cold, domineering, and even a sexual rival. Ambivalence is all-pervasive, being evidenced mainly by the simultaneity of blind belief in authority and readiness to attack those who are deemed weak and who are socially acceptable as »victims.« Stereotypy, in this syndrome, is not only a means of social identification, but has a truly »economic« function in the subject's own psychology: it helps to canalize his libidinous energy according to the demands of his overstrict superego. Thus stereotypy itself tends to become heavily libidinized and plays a large role in the subject's inner household. He deve-



lops deep »compulsive« character traits, partly by retrogression to the anal-sadistic phase of development. Sociologically, this syndrome used to be, in Europe, highly characteristic of the lower middle-class. In this country, we may expect it among people whose actual status differs from that to which they aspire. This is in marked contrast to the social contentment and lack of conflict that is more characteristic of the »Conventional« syndrome, with which the »Authoritarian« one shares the conformist aspect.

Interview *M* 352 begins as follows:

(Satisfaction?) »Well, I'm the head operator – shift foreman – rotating schedules. ...« (Subject emphasizes »head« position) – small department – 5 in department – 5 in a shift – »I get personal satisfaction ... that I have 5 people working for me, who come to me for advice in handling the production that we make, and that the ultimate decision ... is mine, and in the fact that in the ultimate decision, I should be *right* – and am usually, and the knowledge that I am correct gives me personal satisfaction. The fact that I earn a living doesn't give me any personal satisfaction. It's these things that I have mentioned ... knowing that I am pleasing someone else also gives me satisfaction.«

The denial of material gratifications, indicative of a restrictive superego, is no less characteristic than the twofold pleasure in being obeyed and giving pleasure

to the boss.

His upward social mobility is expressed in terms of overt identification with those who are higher in the hierarchy of authority:

(What would more money make possible?) »Would raise our standard, automobile; move into better residential section; associations with business and fraternal, etc., would be raised ... to those in a bracket higher, except for a few staunch friends which you keep always; and naturally, associate with people on a higher level – with more education and more experience. After you get there, and associate with those people ... that fires you on to the next step higher. ...«

His religious belief has something compulsive and highly punitive:

»My belief is that, just according to the Bible, there is a God – the world has gone along and needed a Savior, and there was one born – lived, died, risen again, and will come back some time; and the person who has lived according to Christianity will live forever – those who have not will perish at that time.«

This overt rigidity of conscience, however, shows strong traces of ambivalence: what is forbidden may be acceptable if it does not lead to social conflict. The over-rigid superego is not really integrated, but remains external.

»Adultery, as long as never found out, is o.k. – if found out, then it's wrong – since some of the most respected people do it, it must be all right.«

The subject's concept of God is plainly identical with such an externalized superego or, to use Freud's original term, with the »ego-ideal,« with all the traits of a strong, but »helpful« father:

»Well, when it comes down to the fundamentals, everybody has an idea of some sort: may not call Him God, but an ideal that they live up to and strive to be like. ... Heathens or anybody else has some sort of religion, but it is something that they put their faith in that can do things for them – can help them.«

The genetic relation between the »Authoritarian« syndrome and the sado-masochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex is borne out by some statements of the subject about his own childhood:

»Well, my father was a very strict man. He wasn't religious, but strict in raising the youngsters. His word was law, and whenever he was disobeyed, there was punishment. When I was 12, my father beat me practically every day for getting into the tool chest in the back yard and not putting everything away ... finally he explained that those things cost money, and I must learn to put it back.« ... (Subject explains that his carelessness led to a beating

every day, as promised by the father, and finally after several weeks, he simply quit using the tools altogether, because »I just couldn't get 'em all back«) ... »But, you know, I never hold that against my father-I had it coming. He laid the law down, and if I broke it, there was punishment, but never in uncontrolled anger. My father was a good man – no doubt about that. Always interested on boys' activities.«

»My father was a great fraternal man; was out practically every night. Took an active part always on committees – a good mixer, everybody liked him ... a good provider. We always had everything we needed, but no unnecessary luxuries ... no whims provided for. ... Father felt they were luxuries that probably – felt they were unnecessary. ... Yes, rather austere. ...« (Which parent closest to?) »I think my father. Although he beat the life out of me, I could talk to him about anything.« ... (Subject emphasizes that his father always gave everyone, including himself, a square deal.)

The subject has been »broken« by the father: he has been overadjusted. It is exactly this aspect which bears the main emphasis in his anti-Semitism. He who admires brute force blames the Jews for their recklessness in practical matters.

»The Jews seem to be taking advantage of the present-day situation, I think. Now, they want to – they're bringing these Jews in from Europe, and they seem to click together, somehow, and they seem to be able to corner capital. They're a peculiar people – no conscience about

anything except money.« (Subject apparently meant, here, no conscience about money, although maybe about other things.) »If you stand in the way of their making money, they'll brush you aside.«

Rigidity of the image of the Jew, visible already in the »Conventional« syndrome, tends to become absolute and highly vindictive:

»To me a Jew is just like a foreigner in the same class as – say, oh, I was gonna say a Filipino. You would be pointed out ... they observe all these different religious days that's completely foreign to me – and they stick to it – they don't completely Americanize. ...« (What if there were less prejudice against them?) »I don't know – I can't help but feel that a Jew is meant to be just the way he is – no change possible – a sort of instinct that will never lose – stay Jewish right straight through.« (What ought to be done?) »They have the ability to get control – now, how we're gonna stop 'em ... probably have to pass some regulation prohibiting them.«

Again the idea of authority is the focal point: the Jews appear dangerous to him as usurpers of »control.«

One last feature of the »Authoritarian« syndrome should be mentioned. It is the psychological equivalent of the »no-pity-for-the-poor« ideology discussed in Chapter XVII.[13] The identification of the »authoritarian« character with strength is concomitant with rejection of everything that is »down.« Even

where social conditions have to be recognized as the reason for the depressed situation of a group, a twist is applied in order to transform this situation into some kind of well-deserved punishment. This is accompanied by moralistic invectives indicative of strict repression of several desires:

He went on to emphasize that you should segregate Negroes and whites, that by all means give equal opportunities and everything instead of »evading the problem« as he called it. He refers to high prevalence of venereal disease among Negroes, which he blames on their low morals and, under further questioning by the interviewer, he finally attributes it to »congested conditions of living« and tries very hard to explain what he means. This leads to a lack of modesty and respect for privacy – everybody's thrown together – »lose the distance that is supposed to be between people,« etc., etc.

The emphasis on »distance,« the fear of »close physical contacts« may be interpreted as corroborative of our thesis that, for this syndrome, the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy absorbs large quantities of psychological energy. Identification with the familial structure and ultimately with the whole ingroup becomes, to this kind of individual, one of the main mechanisms by which they can impose authoritarian discipline upon themselves and avoid »breaking away« – a temptation nourished continuously by their underlying

ambivalence.

## 4. The Rebel and the Psychopath

The resolution of the Oedipus complex characteristic of the »Authoritarian« syndrome is not the only one that makes for a »high« character structure. Instead of identification with parental authority, »insurrection« may take place. This, of course, may in certain cases liquidate the sadomasochistic tendencies. However, insurrection may also occur in such a way that the authoritarian character structure is not basically affected.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the hated paternal authority may be abolished only to be replaced by another one – a process facilitated by the »externalized« superego structure concomitant with the over-all picture of the high scorer. Or masochistic transference to authority may be kept down on the unconscious level while resistance takes place on the manifest level. This may lead to an irrational and blind hatred of *all* authority, with strong destructive connotations, accompanied by a secret readiness to »capitulate« and to join hands with the »hated« strong. It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish such an attitude from a truly nonauthoritarian one and it may be well-nigh impossible to achieve such a differentiation on a purely psychological level: here as much as anywhere else it is the sociopolitical behavior that counts, determining whether a



person is truly independent or merely replaces his dependency by negative transference.

The latter case, when it is combined with an urge to take pseudorevolutionary actions against those whom the individual ultimately deems to be weak, is that of the »Rebel.« This syndrome played a large role in Nazi Germany: the late Captain Roehm, who called himself a »*Hochverräter*« in his autobiography, is a perfect example. Here we expect to find the »Condottiere« which was included in the typology drafted by the Institute of Social Research in 1939, and described as follows:

This type has arisen with the increased insecurity of post-war existence. He is convinced that what matters is not life but chance. He is nihilistic, not out of a »drive for destruction« but because he is indifferent to individual existence. One of the reservoirs out of which this type arises is the modern unemployed. He differs from former unemployed in that his contact with the sphere of production is sporadic, if any. Individuals belonging to this category can no longer expect to be regularly absorbed by the labor process. From their youth they have been ready to act wherever they could grab something. They are inclined to hate the Jew partly because of his cautiousness and physical inefficacy, partly because, being themselves unemployed, they are economically uprooted, unusually susceptible to any propaganda, and ready to follow any leader. The other reservoir, at the opposite pole of society, is the group belonging to the dangerous professions, colo-

nial adventurers, racing motorists, airplane aces. They are the born leaders of the former group. Their ideal, actually an heroic one, is all the more sensitive to the »destructive,« critical intellect of the Jews because they themselves are not quite convinced of their ideal in the depths of their hearts, but have developed it as a rationalization of their dangerous way of living.<sup>15</sup>

Symptomatically, this syndrome is characterized, above all, by a penchant for »tolerated excesses« of all kinds, from heavy drinking and overt homosexuality under the cloak of enthusiasm for »youth« to proneness to acts of violence in the sense of »*Putsch*.« Subjects of this type do not have as much rigidity as do those who exhibit the orthodox »Authoritarian« syndrome.

The extreme representative of this syndrome is the »Tough Guy,« in psychiatric terminology the »Psychopath.« Here, the superego seems to have been completely crippled through the outcome of the Oedipus conflict, by means of a retrogression to the omnipotence fantasy of very early infancy. These individuals are the most »infantile« of all: they have thoroughly failed to »develop,« have not been moulded at all by civilization. They are »asocial.« Destructive urges come to the fore in an overt, nonrationalized way. Bodily strength and toughness – also in the sense of being able to »take it« – are decisive. The

borderline between them and the criminal is fluid. Their indulgence in persecution is crudely sadistic, directed against any helpless victim; it is unspecific and hardly colored by »prejudice.« Here go the hoodlums and rowdies, plug-uglies, torturers, and all those who do the »dirty work« of a fascist movement.

Robert M. Lindner's extensive case study, *Rebel Without a Cause*, offers a description and dynamic interpretation of the »Tough Guy« which establish the affinity of this type to the »Rebel« as well as to the »Authoritarian« character. According to Lindner:

The psychopath is not only a criminal; he is the embryonic Storm-Trooper; he is the disinherited, betrayed antagonist whose aggressions can be mobilized on the instant at which the properly-aimed and frustration-evoking formula is communicated by that Leader under whose tinsel aegis license becomes law, secret and primitive desires become virtuous ambitions readily attained, and compulsive behavior formerly deemed punishable becomes the order of the day.<sup>16</sup>

The psychopath is described as a »rebel, a religious disobeyer of prevailing codes and standards« whose main characteristic is that he cannot wait, »cannot delay the pleasures of gratification« – an inability suggesting that, together with the failure to build up a superego, the formation of the ego has been crippled, in spite of the bridled »egotism« of such persons. As

to the masochistic component, the following passage from Lindner may be quoted:

That the psychopath is burdened with guilt and literally seeks punishment has been observed by the author in countless cases. The clue to this strange situation lies, as one would suspect, in the Oedipus situation. Deprived of an avenue to satisfactory post-Oedipal adjustment and continuously beset by the consequent incest and parricidal fantasies, the emergent guilt can be assuaged only through expiation. »I have sinned against my father and I must be punished« is the un verbalized theme of psychopathic conduct: and for this reason they very often commit crimes free from acquisitional motives, marry prostitutes or, in the case of women, apportion their charms occupationally in an attempt at self-castigation. That such activities constitute a species of »neurotic gain« is also to be considered. The fact of punishment sought, received and accepted does not complete the tale: there is in addition a narcissistic »yield« which derives directly from the punitive act and mediates the original need. This is naturally on a subliminal level of apprehension, unreportable directly but always noticeable.<sup>17</sup>

Examples of the rebel-psychopath are to be found in our San Quentin sample. We think mainly of the psychopath, *Floyd*, our *M 658*, and the »Tough Guy,« *Eugene*, our *M 662A*, dealt with extensively in Chapter XXI.<sup>[18]</sup> If the traits under consideration here do not appear so vividly there, it should be borne in mind that the guiding interest of the San Quentin study was

defined by our over-all variables rather than by psychological subgroups among the high and low scorers. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the prison situation works as a heavy check on the expression of the decisive traits of the psychopath who, after all, is not a psychotic and behaves, in a certain sense, quite »realistically.« In addition, his completely living »for the moment,« his lack of ego identity enables him to adapt himself successfully to a given situation: when talking to an interviewer, he is likely not to display directly the attitudes indicative of his »toughness.« Rather, the latter have to be inferred indirectly, particularly from certain speaking habits, such as the frequency of references to bodily violence. It is with an eye to such indices that the statements of those two San Quentin interviewees should be read. Neither the widespread existence of the »Tough Guy« syndrome, particularly in marginal spheres of society, nor its importance for some of the most sinister aspects of the fascist potential can be doubted.

## 5. The Crank

In so far as the introjection of paternal discipline in the »Authoritarian« syndrome means continuous repression of the id, this syndrome can be characterized by frustration in the widest sense of the term. However, there seems to be a pattern in which frustration plays a much more specific role. This pattern is found in those people who did not succeed in adjusting themselves to the world, in accepting the »reality principle« – who failed, as it were, to strike a balance between renunciations and gratifications, and whose whole inner life is determined by the denials imposed upon them from outside, not only during childhood but also during their adult life. These people are driven into *isolation*. They have to build up a spurious inner world, often approaching delusion, emphatically set against outer reality. They can exist only by self-aggrandizement, coupled with violent rejection of the external world. Their »soul« becomes their dearest possession. At the same time, they are highly projective and suspicious. An affinity to psychosis cannot be overlooked: they are »paranoid.« To them, prejudice is all-important: it is a means to escape acute mental diseases by collectivization, and by building up a pseudoreality against which their aggressiveness can

be directed without any *overt* violation of the »reality principle.« Stereotypy is decisive: it works as a kind of social corroboration of their projective formulae, and is therefore institutionalized to a degree often approaching religious beliefs. The pattern is found in women and old men whose isolation is socially reinforced by their virtual exclusion from the economic process of production. Here belong organized war mothers, »ham-an'-egggers,« and regular followers of agitators even in periods when racist propaganda is at a low ebb. The often-abused term »lunatic fringe« has a certain validity with regard to them: their compulsiveness has reached the stage of fanaticism. In order to confirm to each other their pseudoreality, they are likely to form sects, often with some panacea of »nature,« which corresponds to their projective notion of the Jew as eternally bad and spoiling the purity of the natural. Ideas of conspiracy play a large role: they do not hesitate to attribute to the Jews a quest for world domination, and they are likely to swear by the Elders of Zion. A significant social trait is semi-erudition, a magical belief in science which makes them the ideal followers of racial theory. They can hardly be expected above a certain educational level, but also rarely among workers. *F 124*

is a woman over 50 years of age, tall, heavily built, with sharp features, prominent gray-blue eyes, a pointed nose,

thin lips, straight mouth line. She had a bearing which was meant to be impressive.

This »impressiveness« actually implies a pathological sense of inner superiority, as if she belonged to a secret order, at the same time being surrounded by people whose names she does not want to mention, since otherwise she might divulge too vulgar or dangerous implications:

She doesn't care for her fellow-workers. Some have all the degrees but no common sense. She wouldn't like to mention names, but she'd like to tell me what goes on. Some just spend their time gossiping together. She doesn't believe she could do more than just speak to her fellow-workers. Very scornful of them, feels superior and aloof. ... They don't know her at all – no indeed – implies she's a very special somebody and could reveal her gifts to them but doesn't.

Her interest in internal and as far as possible external status is strongly colored by an overemphasis on »connections,« which suggests »ideas of reference«:

She has been a »governess« in the home of President X's family ... and in President Y's son's family – first the older son, then the younger. Talked to Mrs. Y on the phone when she was in the White House at the time of the birth of the third child. And her sister worked for S. who later was governor of a southwestern state.



As to her spurious »inner world,« semi-erudition, and pseudo-intellectuality, the following account is highly characteristic:

She reads a great deal – »good« books – went through the schools in her Texas home town about equal to seventh grade now. She also draws and writes and was learning to play an instrument. One picture she drew here at school but never showed it to anyone. It was of two mountains and the sun in between shining on the valley in which the mist was rising. This just »came« to her, too, though she had never had any training. It was really beautiful. She writes stories, too. When she was left a widow, instead of chasing after men like some women, she wrote stories. One was a fantasy for Mary Pickford. It would have been just right for her to play in, but of course, she'd never shown it to anyone. It was called *Little May and O'June* and had come to her once when she had her children on a picnic. A love fantasy about Little May (the girl) and O'June (the boy). Her daughter was very gifted, too. An artist ... who drew Texas Blue Bonnets – »the state flower, you know.« – saw her daughter's work and said, »You've got a real genius there.« He wanted to give the daughter lessons, but she refused, saying, »No, Mother, he would just spoil my style; I know how to draw what I want to draw.«

With regard to race questions, her hatred shows the paranoid tendency towards stopping nowhere – in principle she would be willing to stigmatize every

group she can lay her hands on and only reluctantly confines herself to her favorite foes.

She thinks the »Japs, Jews, and Niggers should go back where they came from.« ... »Of course, then the Italians should go back where they belong in Italy, but – well, the three main ones who don't belong here are the Japs, Jews, and Niggers.«

Her anti-Semitism shows strong traces of projectivity, of the fake mysticism of the »blood,« and of sex envy. The following statement reveals her attitudinal pattern:

»The Jews feel superior to Gentiles. They wouldn't pollute their blood by mixing it with Gentiles. They would bleed us of our money and use our women for mistresses, but they wouldn't marry among us, and they want their wives spotless. The Y's entertained Jews quite often. I don't know if it was their money or what. That's why I didn't vote for Y the second time. I'd seen too many fat Jew women and hooked-nose men at their house. Of course, I've heard Pres. Roosevelt's mother had some Jewish blood, too.« Left the B's because they were Jews. They had a home like a palace and wanted her to stay. They said, »We knew it was too good to be true« ... when she was leaving.

Striking is the similarity between the subject's way of thinking and a certain kind of crackpot religious

movement, based on readiness to hear »inner voices« which give both moral uplifting and sinister advice:

The Catholics have been wonderful to her, and she admires them but wouldn't join their church. There was something inside her that said »No.« (She gestures her rejection.) She has an individualistic religion. Once she was out walking in the early morning – the birds were singing – she raised her hands and her face to the sky, and they were wet. ... (She considered it a supernatural phenomenon.)

## 6. The »Manipulative« Type

This syndrome, potentially the most dangerous one, is defined by stereotypy as an extreme: rigid notions become ends rather than means, and the whole world is divided into empty, schematic, administrative fields. There is an almost complete lack of object cathexis and of emotional ties. If the »Crank« syndrome had something paranoid about it, the »Manipulative« one has something schizophrenic. However, the break between internal and external world, in this case, does not result in anything like ordinary »introversion,« but rather the contrary: a kind of compulsive overrealism which treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, manipulated, seized by the subject's own theoretical and practical patterns. The technical aspects of life, and things *qua* »tools« are fraught with libido. The emphasis is on »doing things,« with far-reaching indifference towards the content of what is going to be done. The pattern is found in numerous business people and also, in increasing numbers, among members of the rising managerial and technological class who maintain, in the process of production, a function between the old type of ownership and the workers' aristocracy. Many fascist-political anti-Semites in Germany showed this syndrome: Himmler

may be symbolic of them. Their sober intelligence, together with their almost complete absence of any affections makes them perhaps the most merciless of all. Their organizational way of looking at things predisposes them to totalitarian solutions. Their goal is the construction of gas chambers rather than the pogrom. They do not even have to hate the Jews; they »cope« with them by administrative measures without any personal contacts with the victims. Anti-Semitism is reified, an export article: it must »function.« Their cynicism is almost complete: »The Jewish question will be solved strictly legally« is the way they talk about the cold pogrom. The Jews are provocative to them in so far as supposed Jewish individualism is a challenge to their stereotypy, and because they feel in the Jews a neurotic overemphasis on the very same kind of human relationships which they are lacking themselves. The ingroup-outgroup relationship becomes the principle according to which the whole world is abstractly organized. Naturally, this syndrome can be found in this country only in a rudimentary state.

As to the psychological etiology of this type, our material sets us certain limitations. However, it should be borne in mind that compulsiveness is the psychological equivalent of what we call, in terms of social theory, reification. The compulsive features of the boy chosen as an example for the »Manipulative«

type, together with his sadism, can hardly be overlooked – he comes close to the classical Freudian conception of the »anal« character and is in this regard reminiscent of the »Authoritarian« syndrome. But he is differentiated from the latter by the simultaneity of extreme narcissism and a certain emptiness and shallowness. This, however, involves a contradiction only if looked at superficially, since whatever we call a person's emotional and intellectual richness is due to the intensity of his object cathexes. Notable in our case is an interest in sex almost amounting to preoccupation, going with backwardness as far as actual experience is concerned. One pictures a very inhibited boy, worried about masturbation, collecting insects while the other boys played baseball. There must have been early and deep emotional traumata, probably on a pregenital level. *M 108*

is going to be an insect toxicologist and work for a large organization like Standard Oil or a university, presumably not in private business. He first started in chemistry in college but about the third term began to wonder if that was what he really wanted. He was interested in entomology in high school, and while hashing in a sorority he met a fellow worker in entomology, and in talking about the possibility of combining entomology and chemistry, this man said he thought it would be a very good field to investigate a little further. He found out insect toxicology had everything that combined his interests, wasn't over-

crowded, and that he could make a good living there, and that there wasn't likely to be a surplus as there would be in chemistry or engineering.

Taken in isolation, the professional choice of this subject may appear accidental, but when viewed in the context of the whole interview, it assumes a certain significance. It has been pointed out by L. Lowenthal<sup>19</sup> that fascist orators often compare their »enemies« to »vermin.« The interest of this boy in entomology may be due to his regarding the insects, which are both »repulsive« and weak, as ideal objects for his manipulation.<sup>20</sup>

The manipulative aspect of his professional choice is stressed by himself:

Asked what he expects to get from the job other than the economic side, he said that he hopes to have a hand in organizing the whole field, that is, in organizing the knowledge. There is no textbook, the information is scattered, and he hopes to make a contribution in organizing the material.

His emphasis on »doing things« goes so far that he even appreciates people whom he otherwise hates, though in a terminology with destructive overtones. Here belongs his statement about Roosevelt, which was quoted in part in Chapter XVII<sup>[21]</sup>:

Asked about the good points of Roosevelt, he said, »Well, the first term he was in office he whipped the U.S. into shape. Some people argue he only carried out Hoover's ideas, but actually he did a good job which was badly needed ... he usurped power that was necessary to do something – he took a lot more power than a lot.« ... Asked whether his policies were good or bad, subject replied, »Well, at any rate, he was doing something.«

His political concepts are defined by the friend-foe relationship, in exactly the same way as the Nazi theoretician Karl Schmitt defined the nature of politics. His lust for organization, concomitant with an obsession with the domination of nature, seems boundless:

»There will always be wars.« (Is there any way of preventing wars?) »No, it's not common goals but common enemies that make friends. Perhaps if they could discover other planets and some way of getting there, spread out that way, we could prevent wars for a time, but eventually there'd be wars again.«

The truly totalitarian and destructive implications of his dichotomous way of thinking become manifest in his statement about the Negroes:

(What can we do about the Negroes?) »Nothing can be done. There are two factions. I'm not in favor of interbreeding because this would produce an inferior race. The Negroes haven't reached the point of development of



Caucasians, artificially living and absorbing from the races.« He would approve of segregation, but that's not possible. Not unless you are willing to use Hitler's methods. There are only two ways of handling this problem – Hitler's methods or race mixture. Race mixture is the only answer and is already taking place, according to what he has read, but he's against it. It wouldn't do the race any good.

This logic allows only for one conclusion: that the Negroes should be killed. At the same time, his way of looking at the prospective objects of manipulation is completely unemotional and detached: although his anti-Semitism is marked he doesn't even claim that you can

»tell the Jews by their appearance, they're just like other people, all kinds.«

His administrative and pathologically detached outlook is again evidenced by his statement on intermarriage:

He said that if he were an American businessman in Germany or England he'd probably marry first an American woman if he could, then he might marry a German or an English woman.

However, »swarthy« people like Greeks or Jews have

no chance in this experimental setup. It is true, he has nothing against his Spanish brother-in-law, but expresses his approval by the phrase that »you couldn't tell him from a white person.«

He takes a positive attitude towards the church for manipulative purposes:

»Well, people want church; there is a purpose, it sets standards for some people, but for other people, it is not necessary. A general sense of social duty would do the same thing.«

His own metaphysical views are naturalistic, with a strong nihilistic coloring:

Asked about his own beliefs he said he's a mechanistic – there is no supernatural entity, not concerned with us as humans; it goes back to a law of physics. Humans and life are just an accident – but an inevitable accident. And then he tried to explain that – that there was some matter accrued when the earth was started and it was almost by accident that life started and it just kept on.

As to his emotional structure:

His mother is »just Mom«; he seems to have some respect for his father and father's opinions, but there was no real attachment any place. He said as a child he had a lot of friends, but on further questioning, he couldn't mention any closer friends. He did a lot of reading as a child.

Didn't have many fights – couldn't remember them – didn't have any more than any other boys. He has no real close friends now. His closest friends were when he was in the 10th or 11th grade, and he still keeps track of some of them, he said. (How important are friends?) »Well, they're especially important in younger years, and in your older years you don't enjoy life as much without them. I don't expect my friends to help me get along.« They're not needed so much at present age, but he supposed that at the interviewer's age it would be very important to have friends.

Finally it should be mentioned that the only moral quality that plays a considerable role in the thinking of this subject is loyalty, perhaps as a compensation for his own lack of affection. By loyalty he probably means complete and unconditional identification of a person with the group to which he happens to belong. He is expected to surrender completely to his »unit« and to give up all individual particularities for the sake of the »whole.« *M 108* objects to Jewish refugees not having been »loyal to Germany.«

## C. Syndromes Found Among Low Scorers

The following schematic observations may help towards orientation among the »low« syndromes. The *Rigid* low scorers are characterized by strong superego tendencies and compulsive features. Paternal authority and its social substitutes, however, are frequently replaced by the image of some collectivity, possibly moulded after the archaic image of what Freud calls the brother horde. Their main taboo is directed against violations of actual or supposed brotherly love. The *Protesting* low scorer has much in common with the »Authoritarian« high scorer, the main difference being that the further-going sublimation of the father idea, concomitant with an undercurrent of hostility against the father, leads to the conscientious rejection of heteronomous authority instead of its acceptance. The decisive feature is opposition to whatever appears to be tyranny. The syndrome of the *Impulsive* low scorer denotes people in whom strong id impulses were never integrated with ego and superego. They are threatened by overpowering libidinous energy and in a way as close to psychosis as the »Crank« and the »Manipulative« high scorer. As to the *Easy-Going* low scorer, the id seems to be little repressed, but rather to be sublimated into compas-

sion, and the superego well developed, whereas the extraverted functions of the otherwise quite articulate ego frequently do not keep pace. These subjects sometimes come close to neurotic indecision. One of their main features is the fear of »hurting« anyone or anything by action. The construct of the *Genuine Liberal* may be conceived in terms of that balance between superego, ego, and id which Freud deemed ideal.

In our sample the »Protesting« and the »Easy-Going« low scorers apparently occur most frequently. Emphasizing, however, once again that the low scorers are as a whole less »typed« than the high scorers, we shall refrain from any undue generalization.

## 1. The »Rigid« Low Scorer

We may start with the »low« syndrome that has most in common with the over-all »high« pattern, and proceed in the direction of sounder and more durable »lowness.« The syndrome which commands first attention is the one which shows the most markedly stereotypical features – that is to say, configurations in which the absence of prejudice, instead of being based on concrete experience and integrated within the personality, is derived from some general, external, ideological pattern. Here we find those subjects whose lack of prejudice, however consistent in terms of surface ideology, has to be regarded as accidental in terms of personality, but we also find people whose rigidity is hardly less related to personality than is the case with certain syndromes of high scorers. The latter kind of low scorers are definitely disposed towards totalitarianism in their thinking; what is accidental up to a certain degree is the particular brand of ideological world formula that they chance to come into contact with. We encountered a few subjects who had been identified ideologically with some progressive movement, such as the struggle for minority rights, for a long time, but with whom such ideas contained features of compulsiveness, even of paranoid obsessi-

on, and who, with respect to many of our variables, especially rigidity and »total« thinking, could hardly be distinguished from some of our high extremes. All the representatives of this syndrome can in one way or another be regarded as counterparts of the »Surface Resentment« type of high scorer. The accidentalness in their total outlook makes them liable to change fronts in critical situations, as was the case with certain kinds of radicals under the Nazi regime. They may often be recognized by a certain disinterestedness with respect to crucial minority questions *per se*, being, rather, against prejudice as a plank in the fascist platform; but sometimes they also see *only* minority problems. They are likely to use clichés and phraseology hardly less frequently than do their political opponents. Some of them tend to belittle the importance of racial discrimination by labeling it simply as a by-product of the big issues of class struggle – an attitude which may be indicative of repressed prejudice on their own part. Representatives of this syndrome can often be found, for example, among young, »progressive« people, particularly students, whose personal development has failed to keep pace with their ideological indoctrination. One of the best means for identifying the syndrome is to note the subject's readiness to deduce his stand towards minority problems from some general formula, rather than to make

spontaneous statements. He also may often come forward with value judgments which cannot possibly be based on any real knowledge of the matter in question.

*F 139* is a religious educator.

For the past ten years she has considered herself very progressive. Lately she has little time to read, but her husband reads and studies constantly and keeps her up to date by discussion. »My favorite world statesman is Litvinov. I think the most dramatic speech of modern times is the one he made at the Geneva conference when he pleaded for collective security. It has made us very happy to see the fog of ignorance and distrust surrounding the Soviet Union clear away during this war. Things are not settled yet though. There are many fascists in our own country who would fight Russia if they could.«

The hollowness of her enthusiasm about Litvinov has already been noted in our discussion of stereotyped thinking in politics (Chapter XVII).[22] The same seems to be true of her assertion that she is an internationalist, followed up by her rhetorical question, »Would I be a true Christian if I weren't?« This is typical of the »deductive« way of thinking which seems to characterize the rigid low scorer. The present subject seems to proceed in the same way as she approaches minority questions.



Subject believes that all people are one, and again she feels that is the only point of view possible for a true Christian.

The somewhat sweeping expression »that all people are one« should be noted: a person free of stereotypy would rather tend to acknowledge differences and to take a positive stand towards differentiation. What is meant is probably »equal in the sight of God« and she deduces her tolerance from this general assumption.

As mentioned in the chapter on politics, the superficiality of her progressivism is indicated by her highly aggressive attitude towards alcoholism, called by herself »one of her pet subjects,« which plays almost the same role as do certain paranoid ideas in the »Crank« among the high scorers. It may be recalled in this connection, that Alfred McClung Lee has demonstrated the close connection between prohibitionism and prejudiced ways of thinking. As a matter of fact, there is evidence enough that this »Rigid« low scorer has more than a sprinkling of the »high« mentality. There is the emphasis on »status,« with reference to her daughter:

»I feel badly about her school too – (names the school). The influx of people with lower educational and cultural standards than ours has had effect on the schools of course.«

There are destructive fantasies, thinly veiled by »sensible« moral reflections:

»The same with smoking. I am not really worried about it though. No one on either side of our family ever smoked or drank, with one exception. My husband's sister smoked. She is dead now.«

There is a rationalization of punitiveness:

»If I could bring about Prohibition tomorrow I would do it. I believe in preventing everything that doesn't make man better – that makes him worse. Some people say if you forbid something it makes people do it on the sly. Well, I say, how about murder, and robbery, and dope? We have prohibited them and some people still commit crimes, but we do not think of taking off the ban on them.«

And there is, finally, official optimism, a characteristic reaction-formation against underlying destructiveness:

»If one didn't always have hope and believe everything was moving upwards, one's Christianity wouldn't mean anything, would it?«

Under changing conditions she might be willing to

join a subversive movement as long as it pretended to be »Christian« and to »move upwards.«

## 2. The »Protesting« Low Scorer<sup>23</sup>

This syndrome is in many respects the counterpart of the »Authoritarian« high scorer. Its determinants are psychological rather than rational. It is based on a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex which has deeply affected the individuals in question. While they are set against paternal authority, they have at the same time internalized the father image to a high degree. One may say that in them the superego is so strong that it turns against its own »model,« the father, and all external authorities. They are thoroughly guided by *conscience* which seems to be, in many cases exhibiting this pattern, a secularization of religious authority. This conscience, however, is quite autonomous and independent of outside codes. They »protest« out of purely moral reasons against social repression or at least against some of its extreme manifestations, such as racial prejudice.<sup>24</sup> Most of the »neurotic« low scorers who play such a large role in our sample show the »Protest« syndrome. They are often shy, »retiring,« uncertain about themselves, and even given to tormenting themselves with all kinds of doubts and scruples. They sometimes show certain compulsive features, and their reaction against prejudice has also an aspect of having been forced upon

them by rigid superego demands. They are frequently guilt-ridden and regard the Jews *a priori* as »victims,« as being distinctly different from themselves. An element of stereotypy may be inherent in their sympathies and identifications. They are guided by the wish to »make good« the injustice that has been done to minorities. At the same time they may be easily attracted by the real or imaginary intellectual qualities of the Jews which they deem to be akin to their desire to be »aloof« from worldly affairs. While being non-authoritarian in their way of thinking, they are often psychologically constricted and thus not able to act as energetically as their conscience demands. It is as if the internalization of conscience has succeeded so well that they are severely inhibited or even psychologically »paralyzed.« Their eternal guilt feelings tend to make them regard *everyone* as »guilty.« Though they detest discrimination, they may find it sometimes difficult to stand up against it. Socially, they seem usually to belong to the middle class, but it is hard to define their group membership in more precise terms. However, our material seems to indicate that they are frequently to be found among people who underwent serious family troubles, such as a divorce of their parents. *F 127*

is extremely pretty in the conventional »campus girl« style. She is very slight, blond, fair-skinned, and blue-

eyed. She wears a becoming »sloppy Joe« sweater, daintily fixed blouse, and brief skirt, with bobby socks. She wears a sorority pin. She is very friendly and interested, seems to enjoy the discussion, but is quite vague in her answers about family life until the interview is quite well along. Then she suddenly decides to reveal the most important single fact in her life – her parents' divorce which she usually hides – and from that point on speaks with apparent freedom about her own feelings.

She shows the characteristic neurotic concern with herself, indicative of a feeling of impotence: she has a somewhat magical belief in psychology, apparently expecting that the psychologist knows more about her than she does herself:

What she would like above all is to be a psychiatrist. (Why?) »Because psychiatrists know more about people. Everyone tells me their troubles. I don't think there is anything more satisfying than to be able to help people with their problems. But I don't have the brains or the patience to be a psychiatrist. That is just an idea.«

Her attitude towards the father is hostile:

Father is a lawyer. At present he is enlisted in the army and is somewhere in the Pacific, in charge of a Negro battalion. (What does he think about that?) »I don't know what he thinks about anything.«

Her social attitude is a combination of conformist »correctness,« the emphatic and self-confessed desire for »pleasure« (almost as if her conscience would order her to enjoy herself), and a tendency towards re-tiring internalization. Her indifference to »status,« though perhaps not quite authentic, is noteworthy.

(Interests?) »Oh fun – and serious things too. I like to read and discuss things. I like bright people – can't stand clinging vines. Like to dance, dress up, go places. Am not much good at sports, but I play at them – tennis, swimming. I belong to a sorority and we do lots of war work as well as entertaining service men.« Subject names sorority. (That is supposed to be a good house isn't it?) »They say so. I didn't think there was anything very special about it.«

Her social progressiveness is characterized by both an element of fear and a conscientious sense of justice:

(What do you think about poverty?) »I hate to think of it. And I don't think it is necessary.« (Who is to blame?) »Oh, I don't mean the poor people are. I don't know, but you would think that by now we could work out a way so that everyone would have enough.«

Her anxiety makes her more aware of the fascist potential than most other low scorers are:

»It would be terrible to have Nazis here. Of course there

are some. And they would like to have the same thing happen. ... Lots of Jewish kids have a hard time – in the service, and in going to medical school. It isn't fair.« (Why the discrimination?) »I don't know unless it is the Nazi influence. No, it went back before that. I guess there always are some people who have ideas like the Nazis.«

Her indignation is primarily directed against »unfairness.« The notion that »there are always people with ideas like the Nazis« is remarkable: a highly developed sense of responsibility seems to give her an understanding in social matters that goes far beyond her purely intellectual insight. Psychologically, the complete absence of prejudice in her case seems best understood as a superego function, since the girl relates a rather unpleasant experience which otherwise might well have made her prejudiced: she was kidnapped, as a child of four, by a Negro but:

»He didn't hurt me. I don't think I was even scared.«

As to the genetic background of her attitude, the following clinical data are pertinent:

»I am more like my father I am afraid and that isn't good. He is a very impatient man, overbearing, and everything for himself. He and I didn't get along. He favored my sister because she played up to him. But both of us suffered with him. If I even called my sister a name as kids



will do when they fight, I got spanked, and hard. That used to worry my mother. For that reason she hardly ever punished us, because he did it all the time, and mostly for nothing. I was spanked constantly. I remember that better than anything.« (Do you think your mother and father loved each other?) »No, perhaps they did at first, but my mother couldn't stand the way he treated us. She divorced him.« (She flushes and her eyes fill with tears as she says this. When interviewer commented that she had not realized the parents were divorced she says – »I wasn't going to say anything. I hardly ever do.«)

As to neurotic traits: there are indications of a strong mother-fixation:

»I don't want mother to ever get married again.« (Why?)  
»I don't know. She doesn't need to. She can have friends. She is very attractive and has lots of friends but I couldn't stand to have her marry again.« (Do you think she might anyway?) »No. She won't if I don't want her to.«

And there are symptoms of sexual inhibition, based on her experience of the breakdown of her parents' marriage.

(Boys?) »Oh, I don't get serious and I don't want them to. I neck a little of course, but nothing to give them any idea I am cheap. I don't like cheap fellows either.«

Her statement that she does not want to commit her-

self because she is afraid of war marriages is probably a rationalization.

### 3. The »Impulsive« Low Scorer

The case of an »impulse-ridden« low scorer has been described by Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford.<sup>25</sup> They write:

The most markedly pathological case from among our lows [low scorers] showed in an extreme degree a pattern that was different from that which we have regarded as most typical of our low extremes. This girl was clearly impulse-ridden. Her ego was lined up with her id, so that sexual perversions, promiscuity and drinking orgies were made to seem permissible to her. ... In stating why she liked Jews she gave much the same reasons that the high extremes had given for hating them.

There is reason to assume that this case represents a syndrome of its own, being in some respects the counterpart of the psychopathic high scorer. This syndrome stands out in all-adjusted people who have an extremely strong id, but are relatively free of destructive impulses: people who, on account of their own libidinous situation, sympathize with everything they feel to be repressed. Moreover, they are those who respond so strongly to all kinds of stimuli that the in-group-outgroup relation has no meaning to them – rather, they are attracted by everything that is »different« and promises some new kind of gratification. If

they have destructive elements, these seem to be directed against themselves instead of against others. The range of this syndrome seems to reach from *libertines* and »addicts« of all kinds, over certain asocial characters such as prostitutes and nonviolent criminals, to certain psychotics. It may also be noted that in Germany very few Nazis were found among actors, circus folk, and vagrants – people whom the Nazis put into concentration camps. It is difficult to say what are the deeper psychological sources of this syndrome. It seems, however, that there is weakness both in the superego and in the ego, and that this makes these individuals somewhat unstable in political matters as well as in other areas. They certainly do not think in stereotypes, but it is doubtful to what extent they succeed in conceptualization at all.

Our illustration, *F 205*, is selected from the Psychiatric Clinic material:

She is a pleasantly mannered, attractive young college girl who is obviously seriously maladjusted and who suffers from great mood swings, tension, who cannot concentrate on her school work and has no goals in life. ... Sometimes she is extremely upset, comes crying and »mixed up,« complains that she is not being helped fast enough. Therapist feels that she cannot stand any deeper probing, that therapy will have to be mostly supportive, because of her weak ego, possibility of precipitating a psychosis. Schizoid tendencies.

She is set against prejudice with a strong accent on »interbreeding,« probably an expression of her own impulse for promiscuity: there should be no »boundaries«:

(Prejudices?) »If there were interbreeding between races it might help in the combining of cultures – it may internationalize culture. I think there should be one system of education everywhere. It may not be practical – but perhaps selective breeding would be possible – an accumulation of good traits might come out. And the imbeciles could be sterilized.« (Quotes some study on heredity subject has learned about.) »It seems improvements aren't made fast enough. The whole society is ill and unhappy.«

The last sentence indicates that her own discontent leads her, by the way of empathy, towards a rather radical and consistent critique of society. The keenness of her insight as well as her being attracted by what is »different« comes out even more clearly in her statement on minority problems:

»There is a terrific amount of minority oppression – prejudice. There is a fear of minorities, a lack of knowledge. I would like to assimilate all groups – internationally. Would want the education of the world unified. The minorities themselves also keep themselves apart. It's a vicious circle. Society makes them outcasts and they react this way.« (Differences?) Interviewer tried hard to have

subject describe differences between groups, but subject insisted: »All differences that exist are due to conditions people grow up in and also to the emotional responses (to discrimination).« (Jews?) »I don't see how they are different as a *group*. I have Jewish friends. ... Maybe they are more sensitive because of prejudice against them. But that's good.«

According to the clinical data the girl is a genuine Lesbian, who was severely reprimanded because of her homosexuality, and became afterwards »rather promiscuous to determine whether she did react sexually to men.« »All emotionally upset in one way or the other,« she said. Her later history indicates that the Lesbian component is stronger than anything else.

It may be added that the Los Angeles sample contains three call-house girls, all of them completely free of prejudice and also low on the F scale. Since their profession tends to make them resentful about sex altogether, and since they profess symptoms of frigidity, they do not seem to belong to the »Impulsive« syndrome. However, only much closer analysis could ascertain whether the ultimate basis of their character formation is of the »impulsive« kind and has only been hidden by later reaction-formations, or whether their low score is due to a purely social factor, namely the innumerable contacts they have with all kinds of people.

#### 4. The »Easy-Going« Low Scorer

This syndrome is the exact opposite of the »Manipulative« high scorer. Negatively, it is characterized by a marked tendency to »let things go,« a profound unwillingness to do violence to any object (an unwillingness which often may approach, on the surface level, conformity), and by an extreme reluctance to make decisions, often underscored by the subjects themselves. This reluctance even affects their language: they may be recognized by the frequency of unfinished sentences, as if they would not like to commit themselves, but rather leave it to the listener to decide on the merits of the case. Positively, they are inclined to »live and let live,« while at the same time their own desires seem to be free of the acquisitive touch. Grudging and discontent are absent. They show a certain psychological richness, the opposite of constrictedness: a capacity for enjoying things, imagination, a sense of humor which often assumes the form of self-irony. The latter, however, is as little destructive as their other attitudes: it is as if they were ready to confess all kinds of weaknesses not so much out of any neurotic compulsion as because of a strong underlying sense of inner security. They can give themselves up without being afraid of losing themselves. They are

rarely radical in their political outlook, but rather behave as if they were already living under nonrepressive conditions, in a truly human society, an attitude which may, sometimes, tend to weaken their power of resistance. There is no evidence of any truly schizoid tendencies. They are completely nonstereopathic – they do not even resist stereotypy, but simply fail to understand the urge for subsumption.

The etiology of the »Easy-Going« syndrome is still somewhat obscure. The subjects in whom it is pronounced seem not to be defined by the preponderance of any psychological agency, or by retrogression to any particular infantile phase though there is, superficially seen, something of the child about them. Rather, they should be understood *dynamically*. They are people whose character structure has not become »congealed«: no set pattern of control by any of the agencies of Freud's typology has crystallized, but they are completely »open« to experience. This, however, does not imply ego weakness, but rather the absence of traumatic experiences and defects which otherwise lead to the »reification« of the ego. In this sense, they are »normal,« but it is just this normality which gives them in our civilization the appearance of a certain immaturity. Not only did they not undergo severe childhood conflicts, but their whole childhood seems to be determined by motherly or other female ima-



ges.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps they may best be characterized as those who know no fear of women. This may account for the absence of aggressiveness. At the same time, it is possibly indicative of an archaic trait: to them, the world has still a matriarchal outlook. Thus, they may often represent, sociologically, the genuine »folk« element as against rational civilization. Representatives of this syndrome are not infrequent among the lower middle-classes. Though no »action« is to be expected of them, one may count on them as on persons who, under no circumstances, ever will adjust themselves to political or psychological fascism. The aforementioned *M 711*

is very amiable, mild, gentle, casual, slow, and somewhat lethargic in both voice and manner. He is quite verbal, but very circumstantial. His statements are typically surrounded with qualifications to which he commonly devotes more attention than to the main proposition. He seems to suffer from pervasive indecision and doubt, to be pretty unsure of his ideas, and to have great difficulty in committing himself to positive statements on very many matters. In general, he tends to avoid committing himself to things, either intellectually or emotionally, and in general avoids getting involved in things.

He describes his choice of profession as accidental, but it is interesting that he was originally a landscape architect – which may imply a desire for the restituti-

on of nature rather than its domination – and later became an interviewer in government employment, a job that gives him the gratification of helping other people without his stressing, however, this aspect narcissistically. He is not indifferent to wealth and admits his wish for »security,« but is, at the same time, totally unimpressed by the importance of money *per se*. His religious attitude has been described in Chapter XVIII,<sup>[27]</sup> and it fits psychologically, in every detail, into the make-up of the »Easy-Going« syndrome. It may be added that he »does not believe in the Immaculate Conception« but doesn't think »it makes any difference.«

When asked about discipline in childhood, he answers »practically none,« »very undisciplined.« His strong attachment to his mother is emphasized without any inhibition: the only period of his childhood when there were any »bones of contention« was when his mother »exhibited her possessiveness. She didn't like the gals I went with.« What he himself likes about women is described as follows:

»Awfully hard to say when you're pretty sold on a gal. ... Seems to have all the things I like – fun to be with, brains, pretty. She likes me, which is important. We share things together.« (What enjoy doing together?) »Music, reading, swimming, dancing. Most of the things which don't require too much energy, which makes it good.«

It is remarkable that there is no trace of hostility against the father – whom he lost very early – in spite of the mother-fixation. It is the imaginative gift of the father which lingers in his memory:

(Pleasant memories of father?) »Lots of pleasant memories, because he spoiled us when he was home, always cooking up wonderful ideas for things to do.« (Mother and father got along?) »I think very well.« (Which parent take after?) »I don't know, because I didn't know my father very well.« (Father's faults?) »Don't know.«

Most significant are his statements on race issues:

(What think of minority group problems?) »I wish I knew. I don't know. I think that is one problem we should all be working on.« (Biggest problem?) »Negroes, in terms of numbers. ... I don't think we've ever faced the problem squarely. ... Many Negroes have come to the West Coast. ...« (Have you ever had Negroes as friends?) »Yes ... Not intimately, though have known a number that I've liked and enjoyed.« (What about intermarriage?) »I think it's a false issue. ... They say, ›What if your sister married a Negro?‹ I wouldn't have any feelings about it, frankly. ...« (Negro traits?) »No.«

As to the Jews, he does not come to their »defense,« but actually denies that they are a »problem«:

(What about the Jewish problem?) »I don't think there is a Jewish problem. There again, I think that's been a herring for agitators.« (How do you mean?) »Hitler, Ku Klux Klan, etc.« (Jewish traits?) »No ... I've seen Jewish people exhibit so-called Jewish traits, but also many non-Jewish people.« ... (Subject emphasizes there is no distinction along racial lines.)

The danger implicit in the »Easy-Going« syndrome, i.e., too great reluctance to use violence even against violence, is suggested by the following passage:

(What about picketing Gerald K. Smith?) »I think Gerald K. Smith should have an opportunity to speak, if we are operating under a democracy.« (What about picketing as registering a protest?) »If a certain group wants to, they have a right to. ... I don't think it's always effective.«

That the subject's attitude of noncommitment to any »principle« is actually based on a sense of the concrete and not purely evasive is indicated by the following highly elucidating passage:

(Interviewer reads question ... about tireless leader and refers to subject as agreeing a little, asks for elaboration.) »I agree a *little*. However, the opposite of that, Huey Long, was a courageous, tireless leader and Hitler (laughs). It depends.« (How do you mean?) »Well, I admired Willkie; I admired Roosevelt; I admired Wallace. But, I don't think we should ever have leaders in whom

the people put their faith and then settle back. People seem to seek leaders to avoid thinking for themselves.«

This subject's interviewer concludes with the dialectical statement that »power is almost equivalent to the abuse of power.«

## 5. The Genuine Liberal

By contrast to the pattern just described, this syndrome is very outspoken in reaction and opinion. The subject in whom it is pronounced has a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence. He cannot stand any outside interference with his personal convictions and beliefs, and he does not want to interfere with those of others either. His ego is quite developed but not libidinized – he is rarely »narcissistic.« At the same time, he is willing to admit id tendencies, and to take the consequence – as is the case with Freud's »erotic type.«<sup>28</sup> One of his conspicuous features is moral courage, often far beyond his rational evaluation of a situation. He cannot »keep silent« if something wrong is being done, even if he seriously endangers himself. Just as he is strongly »individualized« himself, he sees the others, above all, as individuals, not as specimens of a general concept. He shares some features with other syndromes found among low scorers. Like the »Impulsive,« he is little repressed and even has certain difficulties in keeping himself under »control.« However, his emotionality is not blind, but directed towards the other person as a *subject*. His love is not only desire but also compassion – as a matter of fact, one might think of defining this

syndrome as the »compassionate« low scorer. He shares with the »Protesting« low scorer the vigor of identification with the underdog, but without compulsion, and without traces of overcompensation: he is no »Jew lover.« Like the »Easy-Going« low scorer he is antitotalitarian, but much more consciously so, without the element of hesitation and indecision. It is this configuration rather than any single trait which characterizes the »Genuine Liberal.« Aesthetic interests seem to occur frequently.

The illustration we give is a girl whose character of a »genuine liberal« stands out the more clearly, since, according to the interviewer,

she is politically naive like the majority of our college women, regardless whether they are high or low.

No »ticket« is involved. *F 515*

is a 21-year-old college student. She is a handsome brunette with dark, flashing eyes, who exudes temperament and vitality. She has none of the pretty-pretty femininity so frequently seen in high subjects, and would probably scorn the little feminine wiles and schemes practiced by such women. On the contrary, she is extremely frank and outspoken in manner, and in build she is athletic. One senses in her a very passionate nature and so strong a desire to give intensely of herself in all her relationships, that she must experience difficulty in restraining herself

within the bounds of conventionality.

Apart from a semiprofessional interest in music she also »enjoys painting and dramatics.« As to her vocation, however, she is still undecided. She

has taken nurses' aid training. She liked helping people in this way. »I enjoyed it. I feel that I could now take care of a sick person. It didn't bother me to carry bedpans and urinals. I learned that I could touch flesh without being squeamish. I learned to be tactful about certain things. And then it was patriotic! (slightly joking tone). People liked me.« (Why did they like you?) »Because I smiled, and because I was always making cracks – like I'm doing now.«

Her views with regard to minorities are guided by the idea of the individual:

»Minorities have to have just as many rights as majorities. They are all people and should have just as many rights as the majority. There should be no minorities; there should only be individuals and they should be judged according to the individual. Period! Is that sufficient?«

(Negroes) »Same thing! Still as individuals. Their skin is black, but they are still people. Individuals have loves and sorrows and joys. I don't think you should kill them all or liquidate them or stick them in a corner just because they are different people. I would not marry one, because I should not want to marry a person who has a trait I don't



like, like a large nose, etc. I would not want to have children with dark skins. I would not mind if they live next door to me.« (Earlier in the interview subject had brought out the fact that she had also to care for Negro patients during her nurses' aid work, and that she had not minded at all having to give baths to them, etc.)

(Jews?) »Same! Well I could marry a Jew very easily. I could even marry a Negro if he had a light enough skin. I prefer a light skin. I don't consider Jews different from white people at all, because they even have light skins. It's really silly.« (What do you think are the causes of prejudice?) »Jealousy.« (Explain?) »Because they are smarter and they don't want any competition. We don't want any competition. If they want it they should have it. I don't know if they are more intelligent, but if they are they should have it.«

The last statement shows complete absence of any aspect of guilt feelings in her relation to the Jews. It is followed up by the joke:

»Maybe if the Jews get in power they would liquidate the majority! That's not smart. Because we would fight back.«

Her views on religion, with a slightly humorous touch, are centered in the idea of Utopia. She mentions the word herself, when referring to her reading of Plato. The gist of her religion is contained in the statement: »Perhaps we will all be saved.« This

should be compared with the prevailing »anti-Utopian« attitude of our subjects.

The description of both her parents contains elements of her own ego ideal, in quite an unconventional way:

»Father has been employed for 25 years in the freight complaint department of the – R.R. Co. His work involves the hiring of many men. He has about 150 people working under him.« (Subject described her father as follows:) »He could have been vice-president by now – he has the brains – but he does not have the go-get-it nature; he is not enough of a politician. He is broad-minded – always listens to both sides of a question before making up his mind. He is a good ›argumenter‹ for this reason. He is understanding. He is not emotional like mother. Mother is emotional, father factual. Mother is good. She has a personality of her own. She gives to all of us. She is emotional. She keeps Daddy very satisfied.« (In what way?) »She makes a home for him to come home to – he has it very hard at the office. It's living. Their marriage is very happy – everybody notices it. Their children perform too – people notice them! Mother is very friendly. Understanding. She gives sympathy. People love to talk to her. Someone calls her up on the telephone and they become lifelong friends just from having talked on the telephone! She is sensitive; it is easy to hurt her.«

Her attitude towards sex is one of precarious restraint.  
Her boy friend

wants to have sexual intercourse everytime that they have a date – in fact he wanted it the first time he dated her – and she doesn't want it that way. She cries every time he tries something, so she supposes it cannot be right for her. She thinks that friendship should precede sexual relations, but he thinks that sex relations are a way of getting to know each other better. Finally she broke with him three days ago (said with mock tearfulness). He had said, »Let's just be friends,« but she didn't want that either! The sex problem bothers her. The first time she danced with him he told her that he thought she wanted intercourse; whereas she just wanted to be close to him. She is worried because she didn't mean it the other way, but perhaps unconsciously she did!

It is evident that her erotic character is connected with a lack of repression with regard to her feelings towards her father: »I would like to marry someone like my father.«

The result of the interview is summed up by the interviewer:

The most potent factors making for the low score in this case are the open-mindedness of the parents and the great love subject's mother bore all her children.

If this can be generalized, and consequences be drawn for high scorers, we might postulate that the increasing significance of the fascist character depends largely upon basic changes in the structure of the fa-

mily itself.<sup>29</sup>

## Fußnoten

1 Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1937), p. 13.

2 Jules H. Massermann, *Principles of Dynamic Psychiatry* (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1946), p. 85.

3 Anne Anastasi, *Differential Psychology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), pp. 230–232.

4 Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*.

5 David P. Boder, »Nazi Science,« *Twentieth Century Psychology*, ed. Philip L. Harriman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 10–21.

6 It should be remembered that Jaensch's anti-type is defined by synaesthesia, that is to say, the supposed or actual tendency of certain people »to have color experiences when listening to a tone, or to music in general, and to have tone experiences when looking at colors or pictures« (*Ibid.*, p. 15). This tendency is interpreted by Jaensch as a symptom of degeneracy. It may well be assumed that this interpretation is based on historical reminiscence rather than on any factual

psychological findings. For the cult of synaesthesia played a large role within the lyrical poetry of the same French authors who introduced the concept of *décadence*, particularly Baudelaire. It can be noted, however, that synaesthetic imagery fulfills a specific function in their works. By clouding the division between different realms of sense perception, they simultaneously try to efface the rigid classification of different kinds of objects, as it is brought about under the practical requirements of industrial civilization. They rebel against reification. It is highly characteristic that an entirely administrative ideology chooses as its archfoe an attitude which is, above all, rebellion against stereotypy. The Nazi cannot stand anything which does not fit into his scheme and even less anything which does not recognize his own reified, »stereopathic« way of looking at things.

7 Sigmund Freud, »Libidinal Types,« *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 1 (1932), pp. 3–6.

8 Donald W. MacKinnon, »Structure of Personality,« *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, ed. Joseph McVicker Hunt (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1944), vol. 1, pp. 3–48.

9 It should be stressed that two concepts of types have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there are those who are types in the proper sense, typified persons,

individuals who are largely reflecting set patterns and social mechanisms, and on the other hand, persons who can be called types only in a formal-logical sense and who often may be characterized just by the *absence* of standard qualities. It is essential to distinguish the real, »genuine« type structure of a person and his merely belonging to a logical class by which he is defined from outside, as it were.

[10 See above, pp. 332ff.]

11 Institute of Social Research, »Research Project on Anti-Semitism,« *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, IX, 1 (1941), pp. 133–137.

12 Erich Fromm, »Sozialpsychologischer Teil: Der autoritär-masochistische Charakter,« *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, ed. Max Horkheimer (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1936), pp. 110–135.

[13 See above, pp. 392ff.]

14 Institute of Social Research, *Studien über Autorität und Familie*. Cf. also in this connection, Erik H. Erikson, »Hitler's Imagery and German Youth,« *Psychiatry* 5 (1942), pp. 475–493.

15 Institute of Social Research, »Research Project on Anti-Semitism« [1941], p. 135.

16 Robert M. Lindner, *Rebel Without a Cause*, introd. Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, (New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1944), p. 14 (orig. ital.).

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.

[18 William R. Morrow, »Criminality and Antidemocratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates,« *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 817–890.]

19 Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, *Prophets of Deceit* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 55–58.

20 This, of course, covers only a superficial aspect. It is well known from psychoanalysis that insects and vermin serve frequently as symbols for siblings. The fantasies involved here may be traces of the little boy's wish to beat his little brother until he »keeps quiet.« Manipulativeness may be one form in which death wishes for the siblings are allowed to come to the fore. »Organizers« are frequently persons who want to exercise domineering control over those who are actually their *equals* – substitutes for the siblings over whom they wish to rule, like the father, as the next best thing, if they cannot kill them. Our insect toxicologist mentions frequent childhood quarrels with his sister.



[21 See above, p. 378.]

[22 See above, p. 351.]

23 This term was suggested by J.F. Brown.

24 It was pointed out in Chapter XVIII that religion, when it has been internalized, is an effective antidote against prejudice and the whole fascist potential, notwithstanding its own authoritarian aspects. [See above, p. 443.]

25 Else Frenkel-Brunswik and R. Nevitt Sanford, »Some Personality Factors in Anti-Semitism,« *The Journal of Psychology* 20 (1945) p. 287.

26 The subject chosen as an illustration of this type »was brought up in a household of women – mother and grandmother.«

[27 See above, p. 449.]

28 Sigmund Freud, »Libidinal Types,« p. 4.

29 Cf. Max Horkheimer, »Authoritarianism and the Family Today,« *The Family: Its Function and Destiny*, ed., Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 359–374.

## List of Abbreviations

The full names of organizations which appear in the text in abbreviated form are listed below as a reference aid.

A.M.A.	American Medical Association
A.F. of L.	American Federation of Labor
CCF	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
C.I.O.	Congress of Industrial Organizations
FEPC	Fair Employment Practice Commission
G.M.	General Motors
I.L.W.U.	International Longshoremen's and and Warehousemen's Union
NRA	National Recovery Act
OPA	Office of Price Administration
OWI	Office of War Information
PAC	Political Action Committee (of the C.I.O.)
P.T.A.	Parent Teachers Association
UNO	United Nations Organization
WPA	Works Progress Administration
WPB	War Production Board

The Stars Down to Earth:  
The *Los Angeles Times* Astrology Column

A Study in Secondary Superstition

## Vorbemerkung

Die Publikation der Abhandlung »The Stars Down to Earth« im »Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien«\* scheint dem Autor als die einer Amerikastudie im wörtlichsten Sinne gerechtfertigt: die Untersuchung wurde in Amerika, an amerikanischem Material durchgeführt. Sie bildet einen wesentlichen Teil der Arbeit der Hacker-Foundation in Beverly Hills aus der Zeit von 1952 bis 53, als der Autor die wissenschaftliche Leitung jener Foundation innehatte. Nicht bloß ermöglichte die Foundation finanziell die Untersuchung, sondern der Autor ist ihr auch für vielfache wissenschaftliche Hilfe zu Dank verpflichtet. Er gilt in erster Linie Dr. Frederick Hacker, der wesentliche Anregungen, zumal mit Hinsicht auf die Verwandtschaft der psychologischen Funktion der Astrologie mit der des Traums, gab; dann Frau Liesel Seham, die, weit über ihre sekretarialen Pflichten hinaus, bei der Gestaltung des englischen Textes mit unermüdlichem Fleiß und größtem Verständnis half.

Die Hacker-Foundation, die materiell von einer psychiatrischen Klinik getragen wird, setzt sich die wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung psychiatrischer und psychologischer Probleme zur Aufgabe. Ihre wesentlich psychoanalytische Orientierung traf mit sozial-

psychologischen Intentionen zusammen, wie sie das Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung seit der Publikation des Kollektivwerks über »Autorität und Familie« (1936) verfolgte. Diese Intentionen setzte der Autor fort, als er die von ihm betreuten Arbeiten der Foundation soziologisch akzentuierte. Die Astrologiestudie fällt in mehr als einer Hinsicht in den Zusammenhang des Werkes »The Authoritarian Personality« von T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson und R. Nevitt Sanford, das als erster Band der von Max Horkheimer und S. Flowerman herausgegebenen Serie »Studies in Prejudice« 1950 erschien. Mit Rücksicht auf die theoretischen Erwägungen, die hinter der Studie stehen, darf auf das Kapitel »Kulturindustrie« aus der »Dialektik der Aufklärung« von Max Horkheimer und Theodor W. Adorno (Amsterdam 1947 [jetzt GS 3, ⇒ S. 141ff.]), und auf die »Thesen gegen den Okkultismus« aus den »Minima Moralia« (Frankfurt 1951 [jetzt GS 4, ⇒ S. 273ff.]) verwiesen werden.

Ihr Spezifisches jedoch hat die Studie darin, daß sie ihre theoretischen Kategorien auf ein höchst konkretes, wenn man will handfestes, Material anwendet. Dabei geht es nicht so sehr um die Dechiffrierung des Okkultismus selber in der zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft, als um die Erhellung der sozialpsychologischen Implikationen einer sehr breiten Schichten zu-

bestimmten Zeitungsspalte. Dem Okkultismus ist sie, wie die Studie darlegt, nur begrenzt zuzurechnen; vielmehr repräsentiert sie sekundären, sozialpsychologisch kalkulierten Aberglauben. Dies Material wird einer »content analysis«, der inhaltlichen Deutung unterworfen, wie sie Massenkommunikationen gegenüber als eigenes Verfahren sich ausgebildet hat. Doch wurde die »content analysis« nicht nach amerikanischer Übung quantitativ vollzogen; nicht die Frequenz einzelner Motive und Formulierungen der astrologischen Spalte gezählt. Sondern es wurde durchaus *qualitativ* verfahren. Das Skelett der Interpretation stellte eben die Theorie bei. Auch insofern darf die Studie als Beispiel geistiger Wechselwirkung von Amerika und Deutschland gelten: amerikanisches Material wurde mit deutscher Methode behandelt. Allerdings könnten die qualitativ gewonnenen Resultate ihrerseits recht wohl mit orthodox-amerikanischen, quantitativen Techniken weiter verfolgt werden; andererseits ist gerade die astrologische Infektion durchaus internationaler Art, und die meisten der in Amerika herausgearbeiteten Kategorien wären auch auf analoge deutsche Publikationen anzuwenden. Dabei allenfalls hervortretende Differenzen könnten ihrerseits für die vergleichende Kulturosoziologie relevant werden. Vorarbeiten in dieser Richtung wurden im Institut für Sozialforschung an der Frankfurter Universität durch-

geführt.

Auf Differenzen verschiedener Typen astrologischer Publikationen ist im Text eingegangen; sie finden sich selbstverständlich auch in Deutschland. So wenig ihre soziologische und psychologische Bedeutung zu unterschätzen ist, so wenig dürften doch sogenannte Niveauunterschiede am Wahrheitsgehalt der Sache selbst etwas ändern; viel eher sind sie im kommerziellen Hinblick auf verschiedene Konsumentenschichten geplant. Zudem bieten sie der Kritik gegenüber die willkommene Ausweichmöglichkeit, daß man jeweils auf eine richtige oder tiefe gegenüber einer falschen oder flachen Astrologie sich zurückziehen kann. Die Vorsorge für Hilfhypothesen, mit denen nach Belieben das Fragwürdigste sich verteidigen läßt, gehört selbst zum Wesen von Systemen vom Schlag des astrologischen. Im übrigen zielt die Kritik gar nicht so sehr auf die Astrologie selber als auf ihre soziale Funktion, die »Botschaft«, das »message«, das sie den Konsumenten zukommen läßt und das sich als Sparte dem Betrieb der Kulturindustrie reibungslos integriert.

Sozialpsychologische Untersuchungen in Amerika können Begriffe der Psychoanalyse in ihrer strengen, Freudischen Gestalt ohne weiteres voraussetzen. Da jedoch in Deutschland die vom nationalsozialistischen Regime verfemte Freudische Theorie auch nach des-

sen Sturz noch nicht zur wahrhaft eindringlichen Erfahrung gelangte und in weitem Maß durch Verwässerungen verdrängt ist, die dogmatisch als Fortschritt über Freud betrachtet werden, so schien es dem Autor angemessen, bei einer Reihe Freudischer Begriffe – und zwar genau denen, die in Deutschland heute noch den gleichen Schock ausüben wie vor dreißig Jahren – auf die wichtigsten Belegstellen zu verweisen. Meist wurde die deutsche Originalausgabe der Gesammelten Werke und nicht die englische Übersetzung zugrunde gelegt.

Frankfurt a.M.  
Institut für Sozialforschung  
Juni 1956

T.W. Adorno



## Fußnoten

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